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Vasavadatta Cements v. The State of Karnataka

Supreme Court of India · 18 January 1996 · [1996] 1 S.C.R. 749

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
18 January 1996
Case no.
C.A. No. 2084 of 1996
Reported as
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 749
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Agrawal, S.C. (J)
Length
9 pages
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PETITIONER:
VASAVADATTA CEMENTS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/01/1996
BENCH:
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1035 1996 SCC (2) 88
JT 1996 (1) 508 1996 SCALE (1)483

ACT

HEADNOTE

JUDGMENT

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2085 OF 1996

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17062 of 1993] Rajashree Cement V. State of Karnataka & Anr.

JUDGMENTS.C. AGRAWAL, J. :

Special leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

Both these appeals are directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated December 7, 1990 in Writ Petitions (Writ Petitions Nos. 20736 and 21195 of 1986) filed by the appellants wherein they had assailed the constitutional validity of Section 5(3-D) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’). By the impugned orders the said Writ Petitions of the appellants have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the question raised is covered by the decision in Ranganatha Associates v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1990 Kar. 82.

The appellants are manufactures of cement the price of which is controlled by the Cement Control Order, 1967 issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18-G and Section 25 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The appellants supply the cement packed either in gunny bags or in plastic bags. They also sell the same loose to bulk consumers. Till April 1, 1986 the appellants were enjoying deduction in respect of packing charges from the taxable turn-over. After the introduction of sub-section (3-D) in Section 5 of the Act the packing material was brought within the purview of the Act and made exigible to tax. Section 5(3-D) of the Act provides as under :

"Section 5. Levy of Tax on Sale or

Purchase of Goods.

(3-D). Notwithstanding anything

contained in the Act where goods sold or

purchased are contained in containers or

are packed in any packing materials

liable to tax under this Act, the rate

of tax and the point of levy applicable

to turn-over or such containers or

packing materials, as the case may be,

shall whether the containers or the

packing materials have already been

subjected to tax under this Act or not

or whether the price of the containers

or of the packing materials is charged

separately or not, be the same as those

applicable to goods contained or packed

:

Provided that no tax under this

sub-section shall be leviable if the

sale or purchase of goods contained in

such containers or packed in such

packing materials is exempt from tax

under this Act." The said provision in Section 5(3-D) is comparable to similar provision contained in Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which provides as follows :

"Section 6-C. Notwithstanding anything

in sections 5 and 6-A, where goods

packed in any materials are sold or

purchased, the materials in which the

goods are so packed shall be deemed to

have been sold or purchased along with

the goods and the tax shall be leviable

on such sale or purchase of the

materials at the rate of tax, if any, as

applicable to the sale, or, as the case

may be, purchase of goods themselves." In Raj Sheel & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (1989) 74 STC 379, this Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the said provisions contained in Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, and, in that context, this Court has laid down :

"It is commonly accepted that a

transaction of sale may consist of a

sale of the product and a separate sale

of the container housing the product

with respective sale considerations for

the product and the container

separately; or it may consist of a sale

of the product and a sale of the

container but both sales being conceived

of as integrated components of a single

sale transaction; or, what may yet be a

third case, it may consist of a sale of

the product with the transfer of the

container without any sale consideration

therefor. The question in every case

will be a question of fact as to what

are the nature and ingredients of the

sale. It is not right in law to pick on

one ingredient only to the exclusion of

the others and deduce from it the

character of the transaction. For

example, the circumstance that the price

of the product and the price of the

container are shown separately may be

evidence that two separate transactions

are envisaged, but that circumstance

alone cannot be conclusive of the true

character of the transaction. It is not

unknown that traders may, for the

advantage of their trade, show what is

essentially a single sale transaction of

product and container, or a transaction

of a sale of the product only with no

consideration for transfer of the

container, as divisible into two

separate transactions, one of sale of

the product, and the other a sale of the

container, with a distinct price shown

against each. Similarly where pursuant

to a transaction where there is no sale

of the container and its return is

contemplated, and in the event of its

not being returned the security is

liable to forfeiture. Alternatively, it

may be a case where the container is

sold and the deposit represents the

consideration for the sale, and in the

event of the container being returned to

the dealer the deposit is returned by

way of consideration for the resale. In

every case, the assessing authority is

obliged to ascertain the true nature and

character of the transaction upon a

consideration of all the facts and

circumstances pertaining to the

transaction. That the problem almost

always requires factual investigation

into the nature and ingredients of the

transaction has been repeatedly

emphasised by this Court." [pp. 384-85] After referring to the decision of this Court in Jamana Flour & Oil mill (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar, 1987 (2) SCR 1046, this Court has observed :-

"It is, therefore, perfectly plain that

the issue as to whether the packing

material has been sold or merely

transferred without consideration

depends on the contract between the

parties. The fact that the packing is of

insignificant value in relation to the

value of the contents may imply that

there was no intention to sell the

packing, but where any packing material

is of significant value it may imply an

intention to sell the packing material.

In a case where the packing material is

an independent commodity and the packing

material as well as the contents are

sold independently, the packing material

is liable to tax on its own footing.

Whether a transaction for sale of

packing material is an independent

transaction will depend upon several

factors, some of them being :

1. The packing material is a commodity

having its own identity and is

separately classified in the Schedule;

2. There is no change, chemical or

physical, in the packing either at the

time of packing or at the time of using

the content;

3. The packing is capable of being

reused after the contents have been

consumed;

4. The packing is used for

convenience or transport and the

quantity of the goods as such is not

dependent on packing;

5. The mere fact that the

consideration for the packing is merged

with the consideration for the product

would not make the sale of packing an

integrated part of the sale of the

product." [p. 387]

"Turning to section 6-C of the Act,

it seems to envisage a case where it

is the goods which are sold and there is

actual sale of the packing material. The

section provides by legal fiction that

the packing material shall be deemed to

have been sold along with the goods. In

other words, although there is no sale

of the packing material, it will be

deemed that there is such a sale. In

that event, the section declares, the

tax will be leviable on such deemed sale

of the packing material at the rate of

tax applicable to the sale of the goods

themselves. It is difficult to

comprehend the need for such a

provision. It can at best be regarded a

provision by way of clarification of an

existing legal situation. If the

transaction is one of sale of the goods

only, clearly all that can be taxed in

fact is the sale of the goods, and the

rate to be applied must be the rate as

in the case of such goods. It may be

that the price of the goods is

determined upon a consideration of

several components, including the value

of the packing material, but none the

less the price is the price of the

goods. It is not open to anyone to say

that the value of the different

components which have entered into a

determination of the price of the goods

should be analysed and separated, in

order that different rates of tax should

be applied according to the character of

the component (for example, packing

material). What section 6-C intends to

lay down is that even upon such analysis

the rate of tax to be applied to the

component will be the rate applied to

the goods themselves. And that is for

the simple reason that it is the price

of the goods alone which constitutes the

transaction between the dealer and the

purchaser. No matter what may be the

component which enters into such price,

the parties understand between them that

the purchaser is paying the price of the

goods. Section 6-C merely clarifies and

explains that the components which have

entered into determining the price of

the goods cannot be treated separately

from the goods themselves, and that no

account was in fact taken of the packing

material when the transaction took

place, and that if such account must be

taken then the same rate must be applied

to the packing material as is applicable

to the goods themselves. We find it

difficult to accept the contention of

the appellants that a rate applicable to

the packing material in the Schedule

should be applied to the sale of such

packing material in a case under section

6-C, when in fact there was no such sale

of packing material and it is only by

legal fiction, and for a limited

purpose, that such sale can be

contemplated. In the circumstances, no

question arises of section 6-C being

constitutionally discriminatory, and

therefore invalid." [p. 388] In Ranganatha Associates v. State of Karnataka (supra) a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, after taking note of the decision of this Court in Raj Sheel & Ors.

Material (or of the container). This is

not an irrelevant principle at all, if

one considers the practical aspect of a

trading transaction. Here, under Section

5(3-D) the Legislature has thought it

fit and convenient to treat the sale of

goods contained in a container as an

integrated, single transaction of sale

of the goods; this levy makes it simpler

for the assessee to maintain his

accounts, and convenient for the revenue

to levy and collect the tax; it makes it

unnecessary to analyse the components of

a particular sale and enter upon

investigation to find out the real price

(i.e., genuine price) at which the

packing material (or the container) is

purported to have been sold, and

separate it from the computation of the

turnover regarding the particular goods

(which was packed in the packing

materials or housed in the container).

Simplicity of procedure and

convenience of the tax collection are

not irrelevant while considering the

validity of a particular levy. Section

5(3-D) on the fact of it elevates the

status of the container (or the packing

material) to that of the goods dressed

in it. Such a container/packing material

is distinct from, another

container/packing material which has not

housed any goods." [pp. 852-53] The Karnataka High Court has also referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., 1984 (1) SCR 347, and has said :

"A seller who sells the bottles only and

the purchaser who purchases them as

such, are not concerned with anything

else, except the marketability of the

bottles. But the person who sells liquor

contained in a bottle, and a person who

purchases such a liquor, is concerned

with the liquor and its marketability;

the payment of a price for the bottle in

such a situation is part of the bargain

for the sale and purchase of the liquor.

In other words, the sale and purchase of

the bottles, here, is incidental to and

integrated with the sale and purchase of

the liquor. This makes all the

difference and for the purpose of the

levy of sales tax, this distinction

between the two types of sales which

classify the dealers differently i.e., a

trader who sells or purchases only

bottles and another dealer who sells or

purchases the bottles, because it

contains the liquor, cannot be held as

an arbitrary classification, bearing no

nexus to the object of the Act. Such a

classification, also, makes the levy and

collection simpler reducing the area of

disputes to the minimum; it also,

prevents the dealers from resorting to

tax evading mechanisation, while dealing

in goods which are sold in containers or

in packed condition by showing

unrealistic prices for the container (or

the packing materials) and the goods, so

as to reduce the sales tax payable in a

given case, i.e., if the sale of the

goods attracts a higher rate of

taxation, then, the dealers are likely

to sell the goods for a lesser price and

offset the reduction by increasing the

sale price of the container. Section

5(3-D), thus, prevents the dealers from

being tempted to resort to such a scheme

of tax evasion. Taxation operates in the

sphere of realities and a law levying a

tax normally takes note of such

realities. A hypothetical equality, is

not the basis of Article 14 of the

Constitution. Whenever, a distinction

exists in reality, and such a

distinction has a reasonable nexus with

the object of the law, the distinction

made by the law cannot be nullified as

violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution; every distinction made, is

not an act of discrimination; a

reasonable distinction is the product of

a sound discretion." Shri Harish N. Salve, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has not assailed the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 5(3-D) of the Act. He has confined his submissions to the interpretation of the said provisions. The learned counsel has submitted that in Ranganatha Associates v. State of Karnataka (supra) the High Court was in error in departing from the law laid down by this Court in Raj Sheel & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra). Shri Salve has urged that in view of the decision in Raj Sheel & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra) in respect of provisions of Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which are similar to the provisions contained in Section 5(3-D) of the Act, the question as to the liability for sales tax would depend on the actual ingredients of the contract and intention of the parties which has to be determined in each case.

Shri T.L. Vishwanath Iyer, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State, has however, supported the decision of the Karnataka High Court and has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Raj Bharat Das & Bros., 1988 Vol. 71 STC 277, and Ramco Cement Distribution Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 1993 Vol. 88 STC 151.

Having carefully considered the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Ranganatha Associates v. State of Karnataka (supra), we are of the view that the High Court was in error in construing the provisions of Section 5(3-D) to hold that the legislature has thought it fit and convenient to treat the sale of goods contained in a container as an integrated, single transaction of sale of the goods and that it makes it unnecessary to analyse the components of a particular sale and enter upon investigation to find out the real price at which the packing material is purported to have been sold, and separate it from the computation of the turnover regarding the particular goods which was packed in the packing materials or housed in the container. The reasoning of the Karnataka High Court is similar to that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Raj Sheel v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, (1987) 64 STC 398. In that case the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with cases of manufacturers of or dealers in beer as well as manufacturers of or dealers in cement who had challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While considering the constitutional validity of Section 6-C, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had examined the nature and characteristics of the transaction involving the sale of cement packed in the materials which are generally used for packing purposes for the sale of these goods in the market and had observed that in the sale of those goods the container are necessary concomitants and the transfer of property in the containers in favour of the purchaser of the contents is incidental or unavoidable and that such a sale transaction would be a composite and integrated sale of the containers and the contents and one is not divisible from the other and the transaction is understood by the seller and the purchaser as the sale of the contents in those containers. Having regard to the nature of the such transactions and the goods sold, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that Section 6-C did not bring about any change in the legal position and that it was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act to obviate the possibility of different assessing authorities taking different views on the rate of tax exigible on the turn over and relating to packing material. The Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected the contention that by virtue of section 6-C the rate of tax applicable to the containers will vary according to the rate applicable to the contents and this would lead to arbitrariness and discrimination inasmuch as the same kind of containers would be subject to different rates of tax. The High Court held that when the content was sold with the container, both the dealer as well as the purchaser treated the transaction as the one involving the sale of the merchandise (the contents) only and the sale of the container, if any, would get merged in the sale of the content itself and thus it is always treated as a single transaction of sale of both the container and the content and the container whose identity pales into insignificance is identified with the content itself and the value of the container forms part of the consideration paid by the purchaser and it is one of the components of the sale price like the other components such as freight charges, excise duty, sales tax, etc.

This Court in Raj Sheel & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra), however, did not approve the said view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and, while allowing the appeals, observed :

"In the appeals before us, we find that

the High Court has proceeded on the

assumption that the transactions are

covered by trade practice and having

regard to the nature of the goods it has

inferred that what is charged is the

price of the bottled beer or of cement

packed in gunny bags, and reference has

also been made to the excise law and the

Cement Control Order requiring that the

liquor or the cement, as the case may

be, must be sold in bottles or in gunny

bags respectively. We are constrained to

observe that no attempt has been made by

the tax authorities to ascertain the

facts of each case and to determine what

were the actual ingredients of the

contract and the intention of the

parties. Assumptions have been made when

what was required was a detailed

investigation into the facts. We have

indicated earlier the several

possibilities which are open in cases of

this kind, and how the ultimate

conclusion can be vitally affected by

the tests to be applied. Because of the

lack of adequate and clear factual

material, the High Court also was

compelled to proceed on the basis of

generalised statements and broad

assumptions. We are unable, in the

circumstances, to hold that the cases

can be regarded as disposed of finally.

It is regrettable but the cases must go

back for proper findings on facts to be

ascertained on fuller investigation."

[pp. 388-89] The said observations are equally applicable to the present case involving construction of Section 5(3-D) of the Act. The liability for sale tax on the gunny bags used for packing the cement sold by the appellants has to be considered having regard to the facts of each case after determining what are the ingredients of the contract and the intention of the parties in accordance with the decision of this Court in Raj Sheel case (supra).

In Commissioner of Sales tax, U.P. v. Raj Bharat Das & Bros. (supra) and Ramco Cement Distribution Co.Pvt.Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (supra) there were findings of fact recorded by the authorities under the sale tax enactments and the decision was given in the light of the facts found. The said decisions have, therefore, no bearing on the matter in issue.

The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants are disposed of with the direction that the liability of the appellants for sales tax under Section 5(3-D) on the gunny bags/plastic bags in which the cement manufactured by the appellants is packed for sale would have to be determined after investigation into the facts and determining what were the ingredients of the contract and the intention of the parties. The impugned order of the High Court dated December 7, 1990 would stand modified accordingly. But, in the circumstance, there is no order as to costs.

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