PETITIONER:
UTKAL CONTRACTORS & JOINERY (P) LTD. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ORISSA
DATE OF JUDGMENT24/09/1987
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2310 1988 SCR (1) 314
1987 SCC Supl. 751 JT 1987 (4) 1
1987 SCALE (2)639
ACT
Constitution of India: Articles 19, 32, 245 and 246- Laws for creating State monopolies either partially or complete in respect of any trade/business/industry/service- Whether State empowered to make-Laws relating to trading activities-Whether can be presumed to be reasonable and in general public interest-Legislation rendering judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law-Whether Legislature competent to enact-Whether such law can be retrospective.
Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Amendment and Validation ordinance, I987: Sections 1 to 5-ordinance promulgated to render ineffective Supreme Court’s decision striking down 1981 Act-Validity of-Whether encroachment on judicial power-Notification validated by ordinance-Effect of.
Statutory Interpretation: Executive Policy/Statement of objects and Reasons of Act/ordinance-Whether can control actual words used in the legislation.
HEADNOTE
The Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 was enacted to prevent smuggling forest produce and also to provide State monopoly in such forest produce. The State was empowered under section 1(3) of the Act, from time to time to issue a notification specifying the area or areas, the forest produce in relation to which and the date from which the Act shall come into force. The State Government issued a notification dated December 9, 1982 directing that the Act shall come into force at once in the whole of the State of Orrisa in relation to sal seeds
The petitioners were holders of long term license from the Government for collection of sal seeds from certain specified forest 315 divisions on payment of royalty. Consequent upon the issue of the above notification, the Government refused to accept royalty from the petitioners in respect of certain forest divisions on the ground that the notification had the effect of rescinding the existing contracts between the Government and the petitioners.
The petitioners thereupon filed writ petitions before the High Court for a declaration that the above notification was void, and did not have the effect of rescinding their contracts in relation to sal seeds. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The Supreme Court, allowing the appeals of the petitioners, held that the Act and the notification issued thereunder did not apply to forest produce grown in Government forests and that it was not, therefore, open to the Government to treat the contract dated May 25,1979. as rescinded.
On May 29, 1987, the Governor of Orissa promulgated orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) (Amendment and Validation) ordinance 1987 deeming it to have come into force with effect from September 5,1981, when the principal Act was notified in the Gazette, rendering the aforesaid decision ineffective.
The petitioners challenged the validity of this ordinance in this Court.
Dismissing the writ petitions, this Court, ^
HELD: 1.1. The impugned ordinance is valid and cannot be challenged on any ground. [327B]
1.2 The object to the Act was to prevent smuggling and to provide for State monopoly in the specified forest produce and not to provide State monopoly only to prevent smuggling. The validity of the statutory notification cannot be judged merely on the basis of statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill. Nor could it be tested by the Government policy from time to time. [318B]
The executive policy of the Government or the statement of objects and reasons of the Act or ordinances cannot control the words used in the legislation. [323F]
Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, [1960] 1 SCR 200 and State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371 at p. 382, relied on. 316
1.3 It is open to the State to make laws for creating State monopolies either partially or complete in respect of any trade or business or industry or service. The State may enter into trade like any other person either for administrative reasons or with the object of mitigating the evils in the trade, or even for the purpose of making profits in order to enrich the State exchequer. The law relating to such trading activities must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of general public. [324D-E]
Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, [19631 2 Supp. SCR 691, relied on.
1.4 The legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law. There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively, subject, of course, to the legislative competence and other constitutional limitation. [325E-F]
1.5 The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a wellknown pattern of all validating acts. Such validating legislation which removes the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be considered as encroachment on judicial power. The legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision. [325F-G]
In the instant case, having regard to the then existing provisions of the Act, this Court declared that the Act and notification issued thereunder in relation to sal seeds did not apply to sal seeds grown in Government forests. The Act has been suitably amended by the impugned ordinance by removing the cause of ineffectiveness pointed out by this Court. The definition of "forest produce" under section 2(c) has been enlarged to include, among others, sal seeds, grown or found on Government lands or in Government forests. Clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 5 has been substituted covering all contracts for the purchase, sale, gathering or collection of ’specified forest produce’ grown or found in the area specified in the notification issued under section 1(3) of the Act. Such contracts shall stand rescinded when a notification under s. 1(3) of the Act is issued. Both these provisions shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from September 5, 1981, the date on which the Act had come into force. [326A-B, E-F] 317
The notification dated December 9, 1982 has been validated under A section 5 of the ordinance notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court to the contrary. It shall be deemed to have been issued in respect of sal seeds also grown or found in Government forests. lt shall be valid and effectual as if it were issued under section 1(3) of the Act as amended by the ordinance. This validation is more than sufficient to make it operative to cover the contracts of the petitioners. It does not suffer from any infirmity. [326H; 327A-B]
1.6 It would be impermissible for the State to enter into such contracts in future. The parties or Agents employed by the State cannot work for their own benefits. They must work on behalf of the State. [324F-G ]
Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Orrisa & ors., AIR 1987 SC 1455-[1987] 3 SCC 279; Hari Singh & ors. v. The Military Estate officer & Anr., [19731 1 SCR 515;Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Hindustan Tools Ltd., 119751 Supp. SCR 394; V.N. Saxena v. State of M.P., [1976] 3 SCR 237 and Misri Lal Jain Etc. v. State of Orissa & Anr., [1977] 3 SCR 714, referred to. D
JUDGMENT
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos 7597-99 of 1983.
And
Writ Petition Nos. 7606-09 of 1983.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
A.K. Sen, F.S. Nariman, S.N. Kacker, A.K. Ganguli, R.F. Nariman, A. Patnaik and M.M. Kshatriya for the Petitioners. F
Shanti Bhushan, S.N. Chatterjee, G.L. Sanghi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, G. Rath, Advocate General, R.K. Patra, R.K. Mehta and H. K . Puri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. "Sal seed" which is a minor forest produce at Orissa has again become the major subject of litigation between commercial users and the State of orissa.
The petitioners herein are holders of long term license from the 318 Government of orissa for collection of sal seeds from certain A specified forest divisions on payment of royalty. The State of orissa enacted Orissa Forest. Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 (The "Act"). It received the assent of President on August 21, 1981. The object of the Act was to prevent smuggling forest and also to provide State monopoly in such forest produce. Under Section 1(3) }3 of the Act the State is empowered from time to time to issue a notification specifying the area or areas the forest produce in relation to which and the date from which the Act shall come into force. Purporting to act under this provision a notification dated December 9. 1982 was issued by the State Government directing that the Act shall come into force at once in the whole of the State of Orissa in relation to sal seeds. Thereafter, the Government refused to accept royalty from the petitioners in respect of certain forest divisions on the ground that the notification had the effect of rescinding the existing contracts between the Government and the petitioners. The petitioners thereupon moved the orissa High Court with Writ Petitions for declaration that the said notification was void and did not have the effect of rescinding their contracts in relation to sal seeds. The orissa High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions. The matter was brought before this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 6230-31 of 1983. This Court allowed the appeals by judgment dated May 5, 1987. which has been since reported in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. and ors. v. State of orissa and ors., AIR 1987 SC 1455 = 1987 (3) SCC 279.
The nub of the arguments in those appeals was that the Act was not concerned with the sal seeds grown in the Government lands or Government Forests, and in any event, the petitioners’ contract remained untouched by the notification dated December 9, 1982. It was also contended that since the Government was already the owner of forest produce in Government lands, all that was necessary to create a State monopoly in any forest produce, was to vest in the Government the exclusive right to such forest produce grown in private holding. After dealing with the object of the Act and relevant provisions, a bench of this Court consisting one of us (o. Chinnappa Reddy, J.) said:
"Thus none of these provisions deals with forest
produce grown in Government lands nor is there any
other provision in the Act which expressly deals
with forest produce grown in Government lands. The
scheme of the Act is, 319
therefore, fully in tune with the object set out
in the Statement of objects and Reasons and in the
Preamble, namely that of creating a monopoly in
forest produce by making the Government the
exclusive purchaser of forest produce grown in
private holdings. It as argued by the learned
Additional Solicitor General that S. 5(1)(1) was
totally out of tune with the rest of the
provisions and, while the rest of the provisions
dealt with forest produce grown in private
holdings the very wide language of S. S(1)(a) made
it applicable to all forest produce whether grown
in private holdings or Government forests. We do
not think that it is permissible for us to
construe S. 5(1)(a) in the very wide terms in
which we are asked to construe it by the learned
Additional Solicitor General because of its wide
language, as that would merely introduce needless
confusion into the scheme of the Act. Having
scanned the object and the scheme of the Act,
having examined each of the provisions of the Act
textually and contextually, we do not think it is
proper for us to construe the words of S. S(1)(a)
in their literal sense; we think that the proper
way to construe. S. 5(1)(a) is to give a
restricted meaning to the wide and general words
there used so as to fit into the general scheme of
the Act and S. 5(1)(b) are concerned by the
conjunction ’and’, and having regard to the
circumstances leading to the enactment and the
policy and design of the Act, we think that
clauses (a) and (b) must be construed in such a
way as to reflect each other. We have no doubt
that the contracts relating to specified forest
produce which stand rescinded are contracts in
relation to forest produce grown in private
holdings only. If the very object of the Act is to
create a monopoly in forest produce in the
Government so as enable the Government, among
other things, to enter into contracts, there was
no point in rescinding contracts already validly
entered into by the Government. Again S. 5(1) does
not bar any future contracts by the Government in
respect of forest produce; if so, what is the
justification for construing S. 5(1) in such a way
as to put an end to contracts already entered into
by the Government. Viewing S. 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b)
together and in the light of the preamble and the
Statement of objects and Reasons and against the
decor of the remaining provisions of the Act, we
have no doubt that S. 5(1) like the rest of the
provisions applied to forest produce grown in
private hold- 320
ings and not to forest produce grown in Government
landS. "
Then the conclusion was expressed in the following terms:
"We declare that the Act and the notification
issued under the Act do not apply to forest
produce grown in Government forests and that it
was not, therefore, open to the Government to
treat the contract dated May 25, 1979, as
rescinded. "
On May 29, 1987, the Governor of (Orissa promulgated orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) (Amendment and Validation) ordinance, 1987, (The "ordinance"). The ordinance shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from September 5, 1981 when the principal Act was notified in the Orissa Gazette. The ordinance purports to render the aforesaid decision ineffective. The petitioners have again approached this Court challenging the validity of the ordinance.
Before we examine the contentions raised in these petitions, lt will be useful to set out the provisions of ordinance:
"(2) It shall be deemed to have come into
force on the date on which the Orissa Forest
Produce (Control of Trade) Act 1981 (hereinafter
referred to as the principal Act) had come into
force, i.e. 5.9.1981 when the principal Act was
notified in the orissa Gazette.
2. 3 In clause (c) section 2 of the principal
Act, the full stop at the end of the clause shall
be substituted by a comma and thereafter the
following shall be added at the end, namely:-
"Whether grown or found on land owned by
private persons or on land owned by the State
Government (j, or in Government forests."
3. In Section 5 of the principal Act, in sub-
section (1)-
(1)-
"(i) for clause (a) the following clause shall be substituted, namely: 321
"(a) all contracts for the purchase, sale,
gathering or collection of specified forest
produce grown or found in the said area shall
stand rescinded, whether such forest produce
is grown or found on land owned by private
persons or on land owned by the State
Government or in Government forests."
(ii) After Explanation III, the following
Explanation shall be added, namely:-
"Explanation IV-The Explanations I to
III shall be deemed to be explanations to
clause (b) of this sub-section only and shall
not be deemed as in any manner qualifying or
detracting from clause (a) of this sub-
section or saving any contracts referred to
in clause (a) from the operation of the
provision for recission of contracts
contained in the said clause (a)".
4. In section 9 of the principal Act for sub-
section (4) the following sub-section shall be
substituted namely:-
"(4) The State Government or its authorised
officer or agent shall be entitled to take
delivery of any specified forest produce
collected by any person from land owned by
the State Government or Government Forests on
payment of only such collection charges as
may be determined by the State Government
from time to time.
Provided that it shall be open to the State
Government or the authorised officer or agent to
refuse to take delivery of any such forest produce
which is not fit for consumption or use as raw-
material for manufacture or for trade:
Provided further that in the case of any
dispute, the Divisional Forest officer or such
other officer who may be specifically empowered in
this behalf, as specified in sub section (2),
shall hear and dispose of the same in the manner
provided in this Act and the Rules made
thereunder. "
5.Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of
any Court to the contrary, the Notification dated
the 9th 322
December, 1982, issued by the State Government under
sub-section (3) of section 1 of the principal Act in
respect of sal seeds shall be deemed to have been
issued in respect of sal seeds whether grown or found
on land owned by private persons or on land owned by
the State Government or in Government forests and shall
be as valid and effectual as if it were issued under
sub-section (3) of section 1 of the principal Act as
amended by this ordinance and all instructions and
orders issued or made and all actions taken or things
done pursuant to the said Notification in respect of
sale, purchase and collection of sal seeds shall be
deemed to have been validly made, taken or done under
the principal Act as amended by this ordinance."
Section 2(c) of the Act has now been enlarged to include forest produce whether grown or found on land owned by private persons or on land owned by the State Government or in Government forests
Section 5 of the Act has been amended to nullify all existing private contracts in relation to specified forest produce. It reads:
"5. Restriction on the purchase and transport and
rescission of subsisting contracts.
(1) on the issue of a notification under sub-S.
(3) of S. 1 in respect of any area-
(a) All contracts for purchase, sale gathering or
collection of specified forest produce grown or
found in the said area shall stand rescinded,
whether such forest produce is grown or found on
land owned by the State Government or in
Government forests,
(b) No person, other than
(i) the State Government,
(ii) an officer of the State Government
authorised in writing in that behalf; or
(iii) an agent in respect of the unit in
which the specified forest produce is grown
or found
shall purchase or transport any specified
forest produce in the said area. 323
Section 5 would come into effect only upon the notification issued by the Government under Section 1(3) of the Act. The Government has not issued a fresh notification under Section (3) so far as sal seeds are concerned. But the ordinance itself by Section 5 purports to validate the notification issued by the Government on December 9, 1982 the legality of which we will presently consider.
Mr. Nariman, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that the object and drift of the Act was to provide state monopoly in specified forest produce only to prevent smuggling and the notification dated December 9, 1982 was extraneous to the purpose of the Act. In support of the contention, the Counsel relied upon the Statement of objects and Roasons of the Act, the ordinance and Industrial Policy of the State Government. We do not think that the purpose of the Act or the ordinance was to provide State monopoloy only to prevent smuggling. Even in the previous decision of this Court, it was observed that the object of the Act was to prevent smuggling and to provide for State monopoly in the specified forest produce. The Preamble of the Act which is a key to the enactment is also clear on the object. It reads:
"An Act to provide for control and regulation of
trade in certain forest produce by creation of
State monopoly in such trade "
Secondly, the validity of the statutory notification cannot be judged merely on the basis of statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill. Nor it could be tested by the Government policy taken from time to time. The executive policy of the Government, or the Statement of objects and reasons of the Act or ordinance cannot control the actual words used in the legislation. In the Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, [ 1960] 1 SCR 200. S. K., Das. J. said:
"The statement of objects and reasons is not
admissible, however, for construing the section;
far less can it control the actual words used."
In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [ 1964] 1 SCR 371 at p. 382. Sinha, C.J. Observed:
"It is however well settled that the Statement of
objects and reasons accompanying a bill, when
introduced in Parliament cannot be used to
determine the true meaning and effect of
substantive provisions of the statute. They 324
cannot be used except for the limited purpose of
understanding the background and the antecedent
state of affairs leading up to the legislation.
But we cannot use this statement as an aid to the
construction of the enactment or to how that the
legislature did not intend to acquire the
proprietary rights vested in the State or in any
way to affect the State Governments’ rights as
owner of minerals. A statute, as passed by
Parliament, is the expression of the collective
intention of the legislature as a whole, and any
statement made by an individual, albeita a
Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act
cannot be used to cut down the generality of the
words used in the Statute."
The petitioners cannot also contend that the annulment of their contracts and the restrictions brought about on their rights to trade are unreasonable or arbitrary. Such restrictions must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of general public. It is open to the State to make laws for creating State monopolies either partially or complete in respect of any trade or business or industry or service. The State may enter into trade like any other person either for administrative reasons or with the object of mitigating the evils in the trade, or even for the purpose of making profits in order to enrich the State exchequer. The law relating to such trading activities must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of general public. That was the view taken by this Court in Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, [1963] 2 Supp. SCR 691 where it was observed that the law relating to such state monopoly should be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of general public within the scope of Article 19(6)(ii) of the Constitution.
As to the contention of Mr. Nariman, that the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder do not bar future contracts the like of which the petitioners are having, we may say that it would be impermissible for the State to enter into such contracts hereafterwards. The parties or Agents employed by the State cannot work for their own benefits. They must work on behalf of the State. That is what has been stated in Akadasi Padhan v. State of orissa, (Supra).
"It seems to us that when the State carries on any
trade, business or industry it must inevitably
carry it on either departmentally or through its
officers appointed in that be half. In the very
nature of things, the States as such, cannot
function without the help of its servants or
employees and 325
that inevitably introduce the concept. Of agency in a
narrow and limited sense. If the State cannot act
without the aid and assistance of its employees or
servants, it would be difficult to exclude the concept
of agency altogether. Just as the State can appoint a
public officer to carry on the trade or its business so
can it appoint an agent to carry on the trade on its
behalf. Normally and ordinarily, the trade should be
carried on departmentally or with the assistance of
public servants appointed in that behalf. But there may
be some trade or business in which it would be
inexpendient to undertake the work of trade or business
department or with the assistance of State servants. In
such cases, it would be open to the State to employ the
services of agents, provided the agents work on behalf
of the State and not for themselves."
The next question to be considered is whether the State while purporting to amend the Act has encroached upon the judicial power and set aside the binding judgment of this Court. We do not think that Mr. Nariman was justified in contending so. The principles have been well established in a string of decisions of this Court, and we may briefly summarise as follows:
The legsilature may, at any time, in exercise of
the plenary power conferred on it by Articles 245
and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial
decision ineffective by enacting a valid law.
There is no prohibition against retrospective
legislation. The power of the legislature to pass
a law postulates the power to pass it
prospectively as well as retrospectively. That of
course, is subject to the legislative competence
and subject to other constitutional limitation.
The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders
of competent Courts by changing their basis by
legislative enactment is a well known pattern of
all validating acts. Such validating legislation
which removes the causes of ineffectiveness or
invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be
considered as encroachment on judicial power. The
legislature, however, cannot by a bare
declaration, without more, directly overrule,
reverse or set aside any judicial decision. [Hari Singh & ors. v. The Military Estate officer & Anr., [ 19731 1 SCR 515; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Hindustan Tools Ltd., 11975] Supp. SCR 394; V.N. Saxena v. State of M.P., [1976] 3 SCR 237 326 and Misri Lal Jain Etc. v. State of Orissa & Anr., [ 1977] 3 SCR 71. ]
In the instant case having regard to the then existing provisions of the Act, this Court declare. that the Act and notification issued thereunder in relation to sal seeds did not apply to sal seeds grown in Government forests. The Act has been suitably amended by the impugned ordinance by removing the cause of ineffectiveness pointed out by this Court. The new provisions would now cover specified forest produce whether grown or found on land owned by private persons or on land owned by the State Government or in Government forests and the contracts relating thereto. Such contracts shall stand rescinded when a notification under Section 1(3) of the Act is issued.
What remains to be considered is, whether it is necessary for the Government to issue a fresh notification under Section 1(3) of the Act. Mr. Nariman contended that the notification issued on December 9, 1982 was held to be applicable only to sal seeds grown in the private holdings, and in the absence of amendment to section 1(3), the validation of such a notification would not be effective to nullify the con tracts which the petitioners are having. It was also urged that the notification was "still born" and could not have been validated. We are unable to accept this contention also. The definition of "forest produce" under Section 2(c) has been enlarged to include among others, sal seeds, grown or found on Government lands or in Government forests. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been substituted covering all contracts for the purchase, sale, gathering or collection or ’specified forest produce’ grown or found. in the area specified in the notification issued under Section 1(3) of the Act. Both these provisions shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from September S, 1981 the date on which the Act had come into F; force. The notification dated December 9, 1982 issued under Section 1(3) of the Act reads:
"SRO No. 852/82-In exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section(3) of Section 1 of the
Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981
(orissa Act 22 of 1981), the State Government do
hereby direct that the Act shall come into force
at once in the whole of the State of Orissa in
relation to sal seeds. "
This notification has been validated under Section 5 of the ordinance not withstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court to the contrary. It shall be deemed to have been issued in respect of sal 327 seeds also grown or found in Government forests. It shall be valid and effectual as if it were issued under Section 1(3) of the Act as amended by the ordinance. This validation, in our opinion is more than sufficient to make it operative to cover the contracts of the petitioners. It does not suffer from any infirmity.
The impugned ordinance is, therefore, valid and cannot be challenged on any ground.
In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed, but we make to order as to costs. N.P.V. Petitions dismissed. 328