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Union of India v. D.M. Revri & Co.

Supreme Court of India · 2 September 1976 · [1977] 1 S.C.R. 483

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
2 September 1976
Reported as
[1977] 1 S.C.R. 483
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Length
8 pages
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PETITIONER:
UNION OF INDIA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
D.M. REVRI & CO.
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/09/1976
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2257 1977 SCR (1) 483
1976 SCC (4) 147

ACT

Arbitration Act, 1940--Contract between lay parties not

to be thwarted by narrow pedantic and legalistic interpreta-

tion--Intendment of parties regarding validity of arbitra-

tor’s appointment. whether material.

HEADNOTE

The respondent partnership firm, entered into contract

with the appellant for the supply of East German sugar.

Provision for arbitration was made in clause (17) of the

contract, and the arbitrator was to be nominated by the

Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture. In the

present dispute, before an arbitrator was nominated, the

Ministry of Food & Agriculture was bifurcated into two

separate Ministries and the subject-matter of the contract

was allotted to the Ministry of Food. The respondents took

the stand that there was no longer any Secretary in the

non-existent Ministry of Food and Agriculture and clause

(17) of the contract was a dead-letter. The appellant’s

proposal to amend clause (17) to suit the changed circum-

stances, was rejected by the respondents. Thereafter, the

two Ministries were reintegrated into a Ministry of Food &

Agriculture and two Secretaries were put incharge of the two

departments. The Secretary, Food Department, on a request

from the appellant under clause (17), appointed an arbitra-

tor. The respondents served on the appellant a notice under

C.P.C. Sec. 80 but instead of proceeding to sue the appel-

lants, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator

without protest until award was made, The appellant’s appli-

cation to the Sub Judge, Delhi, for passing a decree in

terms of the award was resisted by the respondents who

sought to set aside the award, challenging the validity of

the Arbitrator’s appointment and contending that the arbi-

tration agreement under clause (17) was made by only one of

the partners, and was not binding on the others. The Sub-

Judge rejected their objections and made the award a rule of

the court. An appeal to the High Court was allowed on the

ground that on bifurcation of the Ministries clause (17) of

the contract became dead, and could not be revived on their

re-integration.

Allowing the appeal the Court,

HELD: There were, after integration, two Secretaries in

the Ministry of Food & Agriculture, but the argument that

this event rendered the arbitration agreement vague and

uncertain, is based on a highly technical and doctrinaire

approach and is opposed to. plain common sense. A contract

is a commercial document between the parties and must be

interpreted in such a manner as to give it efficacy rather

than to invalidate it. It would not be right while inter-

preting a contract entered into between two lay parties, to

apply strict rules of construction which are ordinarily

applicable to formal documents. The meaning of such a

contract must be gathered by adopting a common sense ap-

proach and it must not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow

pedantic and legalistic interpretation. The Secretary in

the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in charge of the De-

partment of Food, would be the Secretary in the Ministry of

Food and Agriculture concerned with the subject matter of

the contract and under clause (17), he would be the person

intended by the parties to exercise the power of nominating

the arbitrator. Furthermore, the respondents did not raise

any objection to the appointment of the arbitrator and

participated in the arbitration proceedings without protest,

indicating the clear intendment of the parties that the

Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture concerned

with the subject matter of the contract should be the person

entitled to nominate the arbitrator. [488 B-E, 489 A-E]

484

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1972.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 12-8-71 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. No. 47-D of

1964.

Gobind Das and Girish Chandra, for the Appellant.

Bakshi Shiv Charan Singh and Harbans Singh, for the

Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J., This appeal, by special leave, is direct-

ed against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi setting

aside an award made by an arbitrator on the ground that he

was not a validly appointed arbitrator and hence had no

jurisdiction to arbitrate and make an award. The facts

giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated

as follows.

The respondents--a partnership firm--entered into a

contract with the appellant for the supply of 30,000 tons of

East German sugar at the rate and as the terms and condi-

tions set out in a letter dated 3rd July, 1954 addressed by

the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture to the respondents. The Ministry of Food

and Agriculture was concerned with the subject-matter of

this contract and hence clause (9) provided that "superin-

tendence and inspection of quality, weight and packing of

sugar Shall be made by a reputable superintending agency to

be approved by the Government of India, in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture" and clause (10) stipulated for delivery

to be made to "authorities or parties nominated by the

Ministry of Food and Agriculture". There was provision for

arbitration made in clause (17) and that clause also re-

ferred to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. It was in

the following terms:

"ARBITRATION: All questions, disputes or

differences whatsoever which may at any time arise

between the parties to the agreement touching the

agreement or the subject-matter thereof, arising

out of or in relation thereto and whether as to

construction or otherwise shall be referred to a

single arbitrator for decision. Such a single

arbitrator shall be nominated by the Secretary to

the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and

Agriculture in his absolute discretion and the

decision of such arbitrator shall be final and

binding upon the parties. The reference to the

arbitrator shall be governed by the provisions of

the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 as amended from

time to time and the rules made thereunder."

It appears that disputes arose between the appellant and.

the respondents in regard to the fulfilment of this con-

tract. The appellant made a claim for payment of Rs.

3,29,107-8-0 against the respondents by a letter dated 11th

August, 1956 and threatened to recover it from the security

furnished by the respondents through their bankers. The

respondents disputed the claim of the appellant and by

their letter dated 23rd August, 1956 pointed out that it

was not competent to the: appellant to recover the amount of

the demand from the bankers of the

485

respondents without first. establishing its claim by arbi-

tration or suit. The respondents intimated to the appellant

that they were prepared to go to arbitration and. suggested

that it would be better still, .if a special case for the

opinion of the court were stated under section 90 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. The respondents also claimed to

recover from the appellant under the contract diverse

amounts aggregating to Rs. 6,05,689. There was no response

to this letter from the appellant and no steps were taken by

the appellant to have the disputes referred to an arbitrator

nominated by the Secretary in the Ministry of Food and

Agriculture as provided in clause (17) of the Contract. In

the meantime, as a result of an order made by the President

under clause (3) of Article 77 of the Constitution, the

Ministry of Food and Agriculture was bifurcated into two

separate Ministries, one of Food and the other of Agricul-

ture, with effect from 19th October, 1956 and sugar, the

subject-matter of the contract, came to be allotted to the

Ministry of Food. The respondents, by their letter dated

9th November, 1956, pointed out to the Secretary, Ministry

of Food that by reason of this bifurcation, the Ministry of

Food and Agriculture has ceased to exist and there was no

Secretary in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the

arbitration agreement contained in clause (17) of the con-

tract had, therefore, become a dead letter and was no longer

enforceable and once again called upon the appellant to

agree in stating a special case for the opinion of the court

failing which the respondents would have to file a suit

against the appellant. This letter also did not evoke any

response from the appellant and the disputes remained unre-

solved.

On 13th/l4th February, 1956 the appellant addressed a

letter to the respondents stating that since the Ministry of

Food and Agriculture was bifurcated into Ministry of Food

and Ministry of Agriculture, it was necessary to amend

clause (17) of the Contract so as to provide for arbitration

by "the Secretary to the Ministry, Government of India

administratively dealing with the subject of contract at the

time of reference to arbitration, or if there is no Secre-

tary, the administrative head of such Ministry at the time

of such reference" and proposed an amendment to that effect

for the acceptance of the respondents. The respondents, by

their letter in reply dated 26th February, 1957, declined to

accept the proposal for amendment of clause (17) of the

contract and once again reiterated that the arbitration

agreement contained in that clause was "dead and unenforce-

able". However, within a short time thereafter, another

order was issued by the President under clause (3) of Arti-

cle 77 of the Constitution integrating the Ministry of Food

and the Ministry of Agriculture into one single Ministry of

Food and Agriculture with effect from 23rd April, 1957.

This Ministry of Food and Agriculture had two departments,

one of Food and the other of Agriculture, and there was a

Secretary incharge each department. It seems that the

appellant requested the Secretary, Department of Food in the

Ministry of Food and Agriculture to nominate an arbitration

for adjudicating upon the disputes which had arisen between

the appellant and the respondents in terms of clause (17)

the Contract and the Secretary, Department of Food in the

Ministry of Food and Agriculture, by a letter dated 27th

February, 1958, nominated Shri A.V. Vishwanath Shastri,

Advocate, to act as sole arbitrator to

486

adjudicate upon such disputes. On the same day, the re-

spondents served a notice on the appellant under section 80

of the Code of Civil Procedure demanding payment of the

amounts due to the respondents and stating that in case the

appellant failed to meet these demands, the respondents

would have to file a suit against the appellant. Though

respondents gave this notice under section 80 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, they did not proceed to file a suit, but

instead filed their statement of claim before the arbitrator

and in the statement they claimed payment of an aggregate

sum of Rs. 7,89,858/- from the appellant and also prayed

for a declaration that the contract stood "final and

properly performed" by the respondents. The appellant

filed its reply disputing the claim of the respondents. The

appellant also field a statement making its own claim for

Rs. 3,29,107-8-0 against the respondents. It was stated in

paragraph 18 of the statement of claim of the appellant

"that under Clause 17 of the contract the Secretary Food and

Agriculture Ministry of the Government in his discretion has

the right to nominate a sole Arbitrator and refer the dis-

pute to the Arbitrator and that has been duly done on 27th

February,1958, and the parties have been duly notified under

Secretary to the Government letter No. SIMP-3(4C) dated the

27th February, 1958". The respondents filed their written

statement denying the claim of the appellant and in para-

graph 18 of this written statement they averted "That para

18 of the Statement of Claim of the Government of India is

not objected to". The proceedings in connection with the

claim of the respondents and the counter-claim of the appel-

lant were carried on before the arbitrator and the respond-

ents participated in the arbitration proceedings without

objection or protest against the jurisdiction of the arbi-

trator. The arbitrator ultimately made an award against the

respondents.

The appellant made an application before the Sub-Judge,

Delhi to pass a decree in terms of the award. The respond-

ents resisted the application of the appellant and sought

to set aside the award mainly on two grounds. One ground

was that Daljeet Singh, a partner of the respondents, had no

power to bind the other partners by an arbitration agreement

and hence clause (17) of the contract was not binding on the

respondents, and the other was that the arbitrator was not

validly appointed and he had, therefore, no jurisdiction to

enter upon the reference and adjudicate upon the disputes

between the parties. Both these grounds were rejected by

the learned Sub-Judge and the award was made a rule of the

court. The respondents thereupon preferred an appeal to

the High Court. The same two grounds were also urged in the

appeal. Out of them, the first ground relating to lack of

authority in Daljeet Singh to bind the respondents by clause

(17) of the contract Was negatived by the High Court and it

was held that clause being an integral part of the contract,

the authority of Daljeet Singh to enter into the contract on

behalf of the respondents extended also to clause (17) of

the contract and in any event, the conduct of all the

partners showed that Daljeet Singh had authority on behalf

of the other partners to enter into the arbitration

agreement contained in clause (17) of the contract. The

second ground, however, found favour with the High Court

which held that in view of the bifurcation of the Ministry

of Food and Agriculture into two separate Ministries,

487

one of Food and the other of Agriculture, by the Presiden-

tial Order, which came into effect from 19th October, 1956,

the arbitration agreement in clause(17) of the contract

became dead and unenforceable and nothing that happened

thereafter could revive it and in any event, even after

reintegration of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture into

one single Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the arbitra-

tion agreement could not be given effect to since there

were then two Secretaries in the Ministry of Food and

Agriculture and clause (17) of the contract did not indicate

as to which Secretary was to exercise the power of nomi-

nating the arbitrator, with the result that the arbitration

agreement suffered from the fault of vagueness and uncer-

tainty. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal and

set aside the award made by the Arbitrator. Hence the

present appeal by the appellant with special leave obtained

from this Court.

The only question debated before us in this appeal was

as to whether the appointment of the arbitrator by the

Secretary, Department of Food in the Ministry of Food &

Agriculture was a valid appointment. Obviously, if the

appointment was invalid, the arbitrator would have no juris-

diction to arbitrate upon the disputes between the parties

and the award would be invalid. But, an alternative

argument was also advanced on behalf of the appellant to

sustain the award and it was that the respondents not having

raised any objection to the appointment of the arbitrator

and participated in the arbitration proceedings without any

demur or protest, it was not open to them, after the award

was made, to challenge it on the ground of invalidity of

appointment of the arbitrator. The respondents, having

taken the chance of obtaining the award in their favour,

could not denounce the award when it went against them. We

will first examine whether the appointment of the arbitrator

was valid, for, if it was, the second question, which raises

the issue of waiver, would not arise.

Now, clause (17) of the contract provided that all

disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved by

arbitration. It embodied an arbitration agreement between

the parties. It also laid down the machinery for appoint-

ment of the arbitrator. It provided that the arbitrator

shall be nominated by the Secretary in the Ministry of Food

& Agriculture in his absolute discretion. There was un-

doubtedly a Ministry of Food & Agriculture at the time when

the contract was made and there was one and only one Secre-

tary in that Ministry, so that at the date of the contract

there could be no question as to who was the person autho-

rised to nominate the arbitrator, The same position contin-

ued to obtain also at the time when disputes arose between

the parties. But before an arbitrator could be nominated by

the Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture to

adjudicate upon these disputes, the Ministry of Food &

Agriculture was bifurcated into two separate Ministries and

it ceased to exist as Ministry of Food & Agriculture. Then

obviously there was no individual who fiIIed the description

of "Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture" and,

consequently the machinery for appointment of the arbitrator

became unworkable. If the matter had rested there, a ques-

tion could well have arisen whether, despite the break-down

of the machinery for nomination of an arbitrator, the arbi-

tration agreement in clause (17)

15--1104SCI/76

488

could still be enforced by the Court by appointing an arbi-

trator in a proceeding under section 20 of the Arbitration

Act. But the position again changed and the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture came into being as a result of integra-

tion of the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agricul-

ture, with this change, namely, that the new Ministry of

Food & Agriculture had two departments, one of Food and the

other of Agriculture and there was a Secretary incharge of

each department. There were thus, after integration, two

Secretaries in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture and the

argument of the respondents was--and that argument found

favour with the High Court--that this event rendered the

arbitration agreement vague and uncertain, inasmuch as it

did not specify which of the two Secretaries was to nominate

the arbitrator "in his absolute discretion". Though this

argument appears attractive at first sight, a little scruti-

ny will reveal that it is unsound. It is based on a highly

technical and doctrinaire approach and is opposed to plain

commonsense.

it must be remembered that a contract is a commercial

document between the parties and it must be interpreted in

such a manner as to give efficacy to the contract rather

than to invalidate it. It would not be right while inter-

preting a contract, entered into between two lay parties, to

apply strict rules of construction which are ordinarily

applicable to a conveyance and other formal documents. The

meaning of such a contract must be gathered by adopting a

commensense approach and it must not be allowed to be

thwarted by a narrow pedantic and legalistic interpretation.

Here, at the time when the arbitrator came to be nominated

and the reference was made, there was a Ministry of Food &

Agriculture and there was a Secretary in that Ministry, but

the only difficulty, according to the High Court, was that

there were. instead of one, two Secretaries and it could not

be predicated as to which Secretary was intended to exercise

the power of nominating an arbitrator. We do not think this

difficulty is at all real. Let us consider, for a moment,

why in clause (17), the power to nominate an arbitrator was

conferred on the Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agri-

culture and not on a Secretary in any other Ministry. The

reason obviously was that at the date of the contract the

Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture was the

Officer dealing with the subject-matter of the contract. If

this object and reason of the provision of clause (17) is

kept in mind, it will become immediately clear that the

"Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture"authorised

to nominate an arbitrator was the Secretary incharge of the

Department of Food who was concerned with the subject-matter

of the contract. The Secretary incharge of the Department

of Food filled the description "Secretary in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture" ’yen in clause (17). The respondents

relied strongly on the use of the definite article ’the’

before the words "Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agri-

culture" and urged that what the parties to the contract had

in mind was not a Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agri-

culture, but the Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agri-

culture and that clearly postulated one definite Secretary

in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture and not one of two

Secretaries in that Ministry. This is, in our opinion, a

hyper technical argument which seeks to make a

489

fortress out of the dictionary and ignores the plain intend-

ment of the contract. We fail to see why the Secretary in

the Ministry of Food & Agriculture incharge of the Depart-

ment of Food could not be described as the Secretary. He

would be the Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture

concerned with the subject-matter of the contract and

dearly and indubitably he would be the person intended by

the parties to exercise the power of nominating the arbitra-

tor. The parties to the contract obviously could not be

expected to use the words "a Secretary in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture", because their intendment was not that

any Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture should

be entitled to exercise the power of nominating an arbitra-

tor, but it should only be the Secretary in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture concerned with the subject-matter of the

contract. That is why the use of the definite article

’the’. It is also significant to note that when the Secre-

tary in charge of the Department of Food in the Ministry of

Food & Agriculture nominated the arbitrator, the respondents

did not raise any objection to the appointment of the arbi-

trator and participated in the arbitration proceedings

without any protest. The respondents knew at that time that

there were two Secretaries in the Ministry of Food and

Agriculture and the appointment of the arbitrator was. made

by the Secretary in charge of the Department of Food and yet

they acquiesced in the appointment of the arbitrator and

took part in the proceedings. This circumstance is also

clearly indicative of the intendment of the parties that the

Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture concerned

with the subject-matter of the contract should be the person

entitled to nominate the arbitrator. Or else the respondents

would have objected to the appointment of the arbitrator and

declined to participate in the arbitration proceedings or at

any rate, participated under protest. We are, therefore, of

the view that the arbitrator was validly nominated by the

Secretary in charge of the Department of Food in the Minis-

try of Food & Agriculture.

This view renders it unnecessary for us to consider

whether by participating in the proceedings before the

arbitrator without objection or protest and taking the

chance of obtaining an award in their favour, the respond-

ents could be said to have waived the defect in the

appointment of the arbitrator.

We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of

the High Court and while dismissing the application for

setting aside the award, pass a decree in terms of the

award. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circum-

stances of the case, we make no order as to costs through-

out.

M.R. Appeal allowed

490

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