PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S. AROORAN SUGARS LTD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/1996
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH, M.M. PUNCHHI, N.P. SINGH, M.K. MUKHERJEE, S.SAGHIR AHMAD
ACT
HEADNOTE
JUDGMENT
(With C.A. Nos. 352-354 of 1980)
JUDGMENTN.P. SINGH, J.
The State of Tamil Nadu is the appellant in these appeals. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 has been filed against the judgment of the High Court of madras in Writ Petition 1464 of 1974, whereas Civil Appeal Nos. 352-352-354 of 1980 have been filed against the judgment of the same High Court in Writ Petition 2341-2343 of 1978. All the writ Petitions had been filed on behalf of the respondent which were allowed by the High Court.
The respondent, a public limited company which owned and possessed 3421.14 acres of land, was engaged in composite and integrated activity of raising sugarcane on the aforesaid land and crushing it in its sugar factory. The Tamil Nadu Reforms (Fixation of ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 58 Of 1961), (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) was published in the Tamil Nadu government Gazette on 2.5.1962. According to the said Act, a ceiling of 30 standard acres of agricultural land was fixed as the maximum holding. Under Section 18(1) of the principal Act, the surplus land has to be notified as required for public purposes and on such publication in view of Section 18(3) of the Act land specified in the notification shall deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such publication and all right, title and interest of all persons in such land shall be deemed to have been extinguished. The relevant part of Section 18 of the Act is as follows:-
18. Acquisition of surplus
land.-(1) After the publication of
the final statement under section
12 or 14, the Government shall,
subject to the provisions of
sections 16 and 17, publish a
notification to the effect that the
surplus land is required for a
public purpose.
(2)..............................
(3) On the publication of the
notification under sub-section (1),
the land specified in the
notification together with the
trees standing on such land and
buildings, machinery plant or
apparatus, constructed, erected or
fixed on such land and used for
agricultural purpose shall, subject
to the provisions of this Act, be
deemed to have been acquired for a
public purpose and vested in the
Government free from all
encumbrances with effect from the
date of such publication and right,
title and interest of all persons
in such land shall, with effect
from the said date, be deemed to
have been extinguished:
Provided that where there is
any crop standing on such land on
the date of such publication, the
authorized officer may, subject to
such conditions as may be
prescribed, permit the harvest of
such crop by the person who had
raised such crop.
Section 50(1) of the Act provides for payment of amount at the rates specified in Schedule III thereto, to person whose right, title or interest in any land is acquired by the Government.
Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land ) Act 17 of 1970, Under the Principal Act there was provision for grant of Exemption to the lands held by sugar factories in excess of the ceiling area. This provision was deleted by Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 41 of 1971, which came into force from 15.1.1972. Because of such amendment even the sugar factories in general could not hold land in excess of 15 standard acres. The respondent filed its return under Section 8 of the Principal Act on 6.4.1972. The Additional Authorised officer (Land Reforms), Tiruvarur, published the draft statement under section 10(1) of the principal Act on 19.4.1972. The minimum compensation payable for excess Lands vesting in the Government was 9 times of the net annual income. As such when the respondent filed its return on 6.4.1972, it was entitled to compensation at the rare of 9 times of the net annual income. However, the Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Fixation off Ceiling of land) Fourth Amendment Act, 1972(Act 39 of 1972) which came in force with effect from 21.12.1972 amended Schedule III of principal Act reducing the minimum multiples from 9 times to 2 times. The said Amending Act 39 of 1972 purported to reduce the multiple of compensation which was payable in respect of lands which vested in the Government after 21.12.1972. A notification under Section 18(1) of the principal Act was published on 4.4.1973 declaring as surplus an extent of 3414.87 acres of land held by the respondent. Possession over such excess land were taken over by the state Government between 6.4.1973 and 26.4.1973. The Draft Compensation Assessment Roll was published by the state Government on 5.12.1973 determining the amount payable to the respondent in respect of the surplus lands applying the rate of 2 times the net annual income.
On 15.2.1974, The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land ) Sixth Amendment Act 1972 (Act 7 of 1974) was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. Subsection(2) of Section 3 of Act 7 of 1974 amended subsection (3) of section 18 of the principal Act on and from 1.3.1972. The relevant part thereof is as follows:-
"3(2) in section 18 of the
principal Act,-
(a) in sub-section (3), for the
words "with effect from the date of
such publication," The words "with
effect from the date of the
commandment of this Act," had been
substituted:
(b)................................
..
(c)................................
....
The effect of substitution of sub-section (3) of section 18 of the principal Act shall be that whereas under the original sub-section (3) of section 18 of the principal Act only on publication of the notification under subsection(1) of section 18, the land specified in the notification together with the trees standing on such land and buildings, machinery plant etc., was deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances ‘with effect from the date of such publication’; because of the substitution of subsection (3) of section 18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 the lands in question shall deemed to have vested in Government’ with effect from the date of the commencement’ of Act 7 of 1974, i.e. with effect from 1.3.1972. It can be said that as sub-section (3) of section 18 stood prior to amendment by Act 7 of 1974 on publication of the notification under Section 18(1), the vesting of the respondent’s sugarcane land in the state Government had taken place with effect from 4.4.1973, but in view of substituted sub-section (3) of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974, it shall be deemed that the vesting of the excess lands took place with effect from 1.3.1972. In Section 3 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 a new sub-section (3-A) was also introduced which is as follows:
"(3-A) (a) Every person
who, after the date of the
commencement of this Act, was in
possession of, or deriving any
benefit from the property vested in
the Government under Sub-section
(3) shall be liable to pay to the
Government, for the period, after
such commencement, for which he was
in such possession or deriving such
benefit, an amount as compensation
for the use, occupation or
enjoyment of that property as the
authorised officer may fix in the
prescribed manner. Such officer
shall take into consideration such
facts as may be prescribed.
(b) Any amount payable to the
Government under clause (a) shall
be recoverable as arrears of land
revenue."
According to the respondent, in view of the amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974, antedating the date of vesting from 4.4.1973 to 1.3.1972 the respondent was entitled to the payment applying the multiple of 9 times of the net annual income instead of multiple of 2 times which was introduced by aforesaid Act 39 of 1972 with effect from 21.12.1972. Writ petition No. 1464 of 1974 was filed on behalf of the respondent challenging the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll aforesaid, before the High Court which was admitted by the High Court.
It may be pointed out that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-state, could not explain as to what was the purpose of enacting Act 7 of 1974 aforesaid and what object it purported to achieve. He simply stated that later the legislature itself restored the original position by enacting Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of ceiling on Land) Amendment Act 78 (Act 25 of 1978). Section 4 of that Act is as follows:
"4. Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961, as
subsequently modified, to have
effect subject to modifications-The
Principal Act, shall, on and from
the 1st day of march 1972, have
effect as if, -
(1) in section 18 of the principal
Act,-
(a) in sub-section (3), for the
words "with effect from the date of
the commencement of this Act," the
words "with effect from the date of
such publication" had been
substituted:
(b)................................
.......
(c) sub-section (3-A) had been
omitted.
.................................."
In view of section 4 aforesaid, in sub-section (3) of section 18 of the principal Act the words "with effect from the date of such publication" was again substituted for the words " with effect from the date of commencement of this Act" which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. Subsection(3-A) which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 was also omitted. Sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which are relevant provided:
"5. Certain provisions of Tamil
Nadu Act 7 of 1974 not to have
effect-
(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Tamil Nadu land
Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on
Land) Sixth Amendment Act, 1972
(Tamil Nadu Act 7 of 1974)
(hereinafter in this section
referred to as the 1972 Act), or in
any judgment, decree or order of
any court or other authority, sub-
section(2) of section 3 of the 1972
Act shall be omitted and shall be
deemed always to have been omitted
and accordingly the modifications
made to section 18 of the principal
Act by the said sub-section (2),-
(a) shall be deemed never to
have been made and the provisions
of the said section 18 of the
principal Act as they stood prior
to the said modifications shall
continue in force and shall be
deemed always to have continued in
force; and
(b) shall be deemed never to
have had the effect of vesting in
the State Government the surplus
lands specified in any notification
published under sub-section (1) of
the said section 18 of the
principal Act on or after the 2nd
may 1962 and before the date of
publication of this Act in the
Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from
a date earlier to the date of the
publication of the notification
under the said sub-section (1) and
shall be deemed always to have had
the effect of vesting in the state
Government such surplus lands, only
with effect from the date of the
publication of such notification.
(2) Anything done or any action
taken under the principal Act in
pursuance of the provisions of sub-
section (2) of section 3 of the
1972 Act, shall be re-opened and
determined in accordance with
provisions of the principal Act, as
modified by this Act.
6. Vesting of certain surplus lands
and validation - Notwithstanding
anything contained in any judgment,
decree, or order of any court or
other authority,-
(a) where before the date of
publication of this Act in the
Tamil Nadu Government (1) of
section 18 of the principal Act has
been published, the surplus land
specified in such notification
shall be deemed to have vested in
the state Government, with effect
from the date of such publication
only, and accordingly the
provisions of the principal Act, as
modified by section 4 of this Act,
shall for all purposes apply and be
deemed always to have been applied
in respect of such surplus lands so
vested; and
(b) all acts done and
proceedings taken by any officer or
authority under the principal Act,
on the basis that compensation in
respect of surplus lands referred
to in clause (a) shall be payable
only according to the rates
specified in schedule III of the
principal Act, as in force on the
date of publication of the said
notification, shall, for all
purposes be deemed to be and to
have always been validly Section 4
of this Act had been in force at
all material times when such acts
or proceedings were done or taken."
As already mentioned the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 claiming compensation applying the multiple of 9 times instead of 2 times and for a direction to the authorised officer to prepare the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll in respect of the lands which had vested taking into account the provisions of aforesaid Act 7 of 1974. This stand was taken on behalf of the respondent because the effect of Act 7 of 1974 was that vesting was to take effect with effect from 1.3.1972 as provided in section 3 of Act 7 of 1974. On 1.3.1974, admittedly aforesaid Amendment Act 39 of 1972 by which the compensation amount payable for the surplus lands was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income had not come into force, it came into force with effect from 21.12.1972. As such if by virtue of Act 7 of 1974 if the vesting had taken place with effect from 1.3.1972 the date of commencement of Act 7 of 1974, it shall be deemed that vesting had taken place prior to 21.12.1972 when admittedly schedule III provided for payment by applying the multiple of 9 times. The High Court by; its order dated 8.10.1976 quashed the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll published, treating the vesting of the surplus lands with effect from 1.3.1972 because of Act 7 of 1974. Civil Appeal No. 134/80 is directed against aforesaid order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976. The respondent also filed Writ petition No. 624 of 1978 for issuance of mandamus to the authorised officer on basis of the aforesaid judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 to prepare the Draft Assessment Roll as per that a judgment. The High Court by its order dated 3.3.1978 directed the authorised officer to prepare the Assessment Roll accordingly.
The aforesaid Act 25 of 1978 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 18.5.1978 and took effect on and from 1.3.1972. It restored parts of sub-section (3) of section 18 as it stood prior to the amendment in that subsection by Act 7 of 1974. it reiterated that the date of vesting of the surplus lands shall be date of the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Act. so far the respondent is concerned, such notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 had been published on 4.4.1973, i.e. after 21.12.1972 from which date because Amendment Act 39 of 1972 the compensation amount payable for the surplus lands had been reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income. Section 5 of Act 25 of 1978 also contained non-obstante clause with deeming fiction saying that notwithstanding anything contained in the Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Sixth Amendment Act 1972 (Act 7 of 1974) or any judgment, decree or order of any court, sub-section (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid 1972 Act shall be omitted and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. Section 6 thereof said that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court where before the date of the publication of the said Act in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette a notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act had been published the surplus lands specified in such notification ’ shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government with effect from the date of such publication only.........’ and the provisions of the principal Act as modified by section 4 of Act 25 of 1978 shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested and compensation in respect of surplus land shall be paid only according to the rates specified in Schedule III of the principal Act as in force on the date of the publication such notification. In other words, sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 purported to efface and obliterate the amendment which had been introduced in sub-section (3) of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974 and purported to validate the notification which had been issued on 4.4.1973 under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principle Act declaring 3414.78 acres of the land belonging to the respondent as surplus. It need not be pointed out that this was done because the multiple of 9 times was reduced to 2 times by Act 39 of 1972 with effect from 21.12.1972. If the vesting had taken place by effect of amended sub-section (3) of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974 with effect from 1.3.1972, the date of the commencement of the said Act, then the respondent was entitled for compensation applying the multiple of 9 times.
Writ petition Nos. 2341-2343 of 1978 were filed on behalf of the respondent questioning the validity of the aforesaid provisions of Act 25 of 1978 and for a direction that such provisions which were introduced by the said Act had no effect on the right of the respondent to receive compensation applying the minimum multiple of 9 times of the net annual income. Those writ petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 20.7.1979. Civil Appeal Nos. 352-354/80 have been filed against the said Judgment.
Mr. Venugopal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-state, took a stand that civil Appeal No. 134/80 has been filed on behalf of the state challenging the validity of the judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in Writ petition No. 1464/74 directing payment of compensation to the respondent applying the provisions of Act 7 of 1974, after coming into force of the Act 25 of 1978 it shall be deemed that the basis of the judgment in writ petition No. 1464/74 has been taken away as such the respondent cannot claim compensation by applying the multiple of 9 times. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant-State that the provisions of Act 25 of 1978 being constitutional and valid, High court should have dismissed the writ petition Nos. 2341-2343 of 1978 filed on behalf of the respondent questioning the validity of Act 25 of 1978.
It may be mentioned at the outset that none of the two judgments of the High Court dated 88.10.1976 and 20.7.1979 in writ petition No. 1464/74 and writ petition Nos. 2341- 2343/78 have became final. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil appeal Nos. 352-354 of 1980 are directed against the aforesaid judgments dated 8.10.1976 and 20.7.1979. In this background, it has to be examined whether sections 4, 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 with non-obstante clause and deeming provisions have taken away the effect of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 directing the appellant-state to apply 9 times multiple in view of the amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974. The other aspect is as to whether in view of the provisions aforesaid of Act 25 of 1978, this Court while considering the appeal against aforesaid judgment dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 has now to proceed as if the amendments in the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 had never been introduced. There is no dispute in respect of legislative competence of legislature to enact Act 25 of 1978. The only dispute is whether provisions of that Act has achieved the achieved the desired result.
Sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 contain deeming fiction in its different clauses while purporting to omit and remove the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in the principal Act. The role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is by now well settled. When a statute creates legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between what persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to. Thereafter courts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. In the well-known case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 observed:
"If you are bidden to treat an
imaginary state of affairs as real,
you must surely, unless prohibited
from doing so, also imagine as real
the consequences and incidents
which, if the putative, state of
affairs had in fact existed, must
inevitably have flowed from or
accompanied it....The statute says
that you must imagine a certain
having done so, you must cause or
permit your imagination to boggle
when it comes to the inevitable
corollaries of that state of
affairs."
That statement of law aforesaid in respect of a statutory fiction is being consistently followed by this court. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of state of Bombay V. Pandurang Vinayak, 1953 SCR 773; Chief Inspector of Mines V. Karam Chand Thapar, 1962(1) SCR 9; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. V. Union of India,(1988) 1 SCR 700; M. Venugopal V. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1964) 2 SCC 323; and Harish Tandon V. Additional District Magistrate. Allahabad, (1995)1 SCC 537.
Section 5 of Act 25 of 1978 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Act 7 of 1974, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court , or other authority, sub-section (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid Act’ shall be omitted and shall be deemed always to have been omitted and the modifications made to section 18 of the principal Act by the said sub-section (2)-
(a) ’shall be deemed never to
have been made and the provisions
of the said section 18 of the
principal Act as they stood prior
to the said modifications shall
continue in force and shall be
deemed always to have continued in
force; and
(b) ’shall be deemed never to
have had the effect of vesting in
the state Government the surplus
lands specified in any notification
published under sub-section (1) of
the said section 18 of the
principal Act on or after the 2nd
May 1962 and before the date of
publication of this Act in the
Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from
a date earlier to the date of the
publication of the notification
under the said sub-section (1) and
shall be deemed always to have had
the effect of Vesting in the state
Government such surplus lands, only
with effect from the date of the
publication of such notification.’
The legislature by different deeming clauses and through statutory fiction requires the Court to treat that amendments so introduced by Act 7 of 1974 had never been introduced in the principal Act. The power of the legislature to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or to enact a statute prospectively or retrospectively cannot be questioned and challenged unless the court is of the view that such exercise is in in violation of Article 14 of the constitution. It need not be impressed that whenever any Act or amendment is brought in force retrospectively or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, in this process rights of some are bound to be effected one way or the other. In every case, it cannot be urged that the exercise by the legislature while introducing a new provision or deleting an existing provision with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14 of the constitution. If that stand is accepted, then the necessary corollary shall be that legislature has no power to legislate retrospectively, because in that event a vested right is effected; of course, in special situation this court has held that such exercise was violative of Article 14 of the constitution. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of state of Gujarat & Another V. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & others,(1983) 2 SCR 287; T. R. Kapur V. State of Haryana, 1986 (Supp) SCC 584; and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, 1994(5) SCC 450. In the case of state of Gujarat V. Raman Lal (Supra) a Constitution Bench on the facts and circumstances of that case observed:
"The legislation is pure and
simple, self-deceptive, if we may
use such an expression with
reference to a legislature-made
law. The legislature is undoubtedly
competent to legislate with
retrospective effect to take away
or impair any vested right acquired
under existing laws but since the
laws are made under a written
Constitution, and have to conform
to the do’s and don’ts of the
constitution neither prospective
nor retrospective laws can be made
so as to contravene Fundamental
Rights. The law must satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution
today taking into account the
accrued or acquired rights of the
parties today. The law cannot say,
twenty years ago the parties had no
rights, therefore, the requirements
of the Constitution will be
satisfied if the law is dated back
by twenty years. We are concerned
with today’s rights and not
yesterday’s. A legislature cannot
legislate today with reference to a
situation that obtained twenty
years ago and ignore the march of
events and the constitutional
rights accrued in the course of the
twenty years. That would be most
arbitrary, unreasonable and a
negation of history."
In same terms this Court expressed the opinion in the cases of T.R. Kapur V. State of Haryana (supra) and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra) in respect of alterations in rules framed under Article 309 of the constitution retrospectively regarding conditions of service.
So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the provisions of Act 25 of 1978 do not purport to effect any vested or acquired right. It only restores the position which existed when the principal Act was in force. By notification dated 4.4.1973 issued under section 18(1) of the Act as it stood prior to amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974, 3414.87 acres of land had been declared as surplus which vested in the state Government under section 18(3) of the principal Act as it stood on that date. It can be said that Act 25 of 1978 simply nullifies Act 7 of 1974 which had made amendments in the principal Act after notification gad been issued under section 18(1) and vesting had taken place under section 18(3) of the principal Act as it stood prior to enactment Act 7 of 1974. By Act 7 of 1974 futile attempt had been made by introducing different amendments. in this process not only it created anomaly in the principal Act, but nothing purposeful was achieved. It is true that because of the amendments introduced by that Act 7 of 1974, the respondent could urge before the High Court that as the vesting had taken place on 1.3.1972, in spite of amendment Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income with effect from 21.12.1972 the respondent was entitled to compensation to be worked out on basis of 9 times of the net annual income. But on this ground the provisions of Act 25 to 1978 cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the constitution and as such ultra vires. Once the provisions are held to be legal and valid, then as pointed out above the wish and desire of the legislature has to be given full effect and to its logical end. The courts have to proceed on the assumption the Act 7 of 1974 had never been enacted and no amendment whatsoever had been introduced in the principal Act directing the vesting to take place with effect from 1.3.1972. This court shall be fully justified in examining the judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 on Writ Petition No. 1464/74 filed by the respondent, treating that Act 7 of 1974 was never enacted or was in existence. As the aforesaid judgment dated 8.10.1976 is solely based on amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974, once such amendments have been effected retrospectively, there is no escape from the conclusion that the substratum and basis of the judgment of the High court dated 8. 10.1976 is solely based on amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974, one such amendments have been effaced retrospectively, there is no escape from the conclusion that the substratum and basis of the judgement of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 has been taken away. The High Court had proceeded on the assumption that because of amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974 the vesting shall be deemed to have taken place with effect from 1.3.1972 and on that assumption direction was given to calculate the compensation applying 9 times multiples which had been reduced to 2 timed with effect from 21.12.1972 by amendment Act 39 of 1972. But if the provision which directed Vesting with effect from 1.3.1972 does not exist in eyes of law, then there is no question of holding that vesting shall be deemed to have taken place with effect 1.3.1972 when compensation was to be worked out by applying the 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income with effect from 21.12.1972. Thereafter on 4.4.1973 notification under Section 18(1) of the principal Act was issued declaring 3414.87 acres of land of the respondent as surplus which vested in the State Government under Section 18(3) of the principal Act as it stood on that date. As such the compensation has to be worked out on basis of the amendment which had been introduced in schedule III of the Act by amendment Act 39 of 1972. This Court can modify the judgement of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 taking into account No.134 of 1980 is against aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976.
There is yet another aspect of the matter. Section 6 of the Act 25 of 1978 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree, or order of any court or other authority where before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, a notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act had been published, the surplus lands specified in such notification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government, with effect from the date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested.
The scope of a non-obstante clause and of validating Act has been examined by this Court from time to time . Reference in this connection be made to the judgment in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283 where Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Constitution bench said:
"When a legislature sets out
to validate a tax declared by a
court to be illegally collected
under and ineffectiveness or
invalidity must be removed before
validation can be said to take
place effectively. The most
important condition, of course, is
that the legislature must possess
the power to impose the tax, for if
it does not, the action must ever
remain ineffective and illegal.
Granted legislative competence, it
is not sufficient to declare merely
that the decision of the court
shall not bind for that is
tantamount to reversing the
decision in exercise of judicial
power which the legislature does
not possess or exercise. A Court’s
decision must always bind unless
the conditions on which it is
based are so fundamentally altered
that the decision could not have
been given in the altered
circumstances. Ordinarily, a court
holds a tax to be invalidly imposed
because the power to tax is wanting
or the statute or the rules or both
area invalid or do not sufficiently
create the jurisdiction .
Validation of a tax so declared
illegal may be known only if the
grounds of illegality or invalidity
are capable of being removed and
are in fact removed and the tax
thus made legal. Sometimes this is
done by providing for jurisdiction
where jurisdiction had not been
properly invested before. Sometimes
this is done by re-enacting
retrospectively a valid and legal
taxing provision and then by
fiction making the tax already
collected to stand under the re-
enacted law. Sometimes the
legislature gives its own meaning
and interpretation of the law under
which the tax was collected and by
legislative fiat makes the new
meaning binding upon courts. The
legislature may follow any one
method or all of them and while it
does so it may neutralise the
effect of the earlier decision of
the court which becomes ineffective
after the change of the law."
The same view was reiterated in the cases of west Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. V. State of Madras, (1963) 2 SCR 747; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India,(1968) 3 SCR 41; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath V. State of U.P,(1973) 3 SCC 585; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyay v. Union of India, (1975) 2 SCC 302; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. V. State of Haryana, (1985), 4 SCC 124; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. V. State of Orissa, 1987 Supp SCC 751; D. Cawasji & Co. v. state of Mysore, 1984 Supp SCC 490 and Bhubaneshwar Singh V. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 77. It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court’s directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed put in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in writ petition No. 1464/74, dated 8.10.1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 . If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional .
On behalf of the respondent, it was pointed out that the High Court in its judgment dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 has not declared any provision to be invalid because of which a validating Act was required. The said judgment had also no pointed out any defect in any Act which had to be rectified by a validating Act. It had simply proceeded on the provisions of Act 7 of 1974 and had issued direction to the state Government to proceed in accordance with those provisions. This Court has examined the power of the legislature to amend the provisions of the Act in question after a court verdict. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. (1975) 2 SCC 274 where it was observed:
"We see no substance in the
respondent’s contention that by re-
defining the term ‘house’ with
retrospective effect and by
validating the levies imposed under
the unamended Act as if
notwithstanding anything contained
in any judgment, decree or order of
any court, that Act as amended was
in force on the date when the tax
was levied, the Legislature has
encroached upon a judicial
function. The power of the
legislature to pass a law
postulates the power to pass it
prospectively as well as
retrospectively the one no less
than the other. Within the scope of
its legislative competence and
subject to other constitutional
limitations, the power of the
legislature to enact laws is
plenary. In United provinces V.
Atiga Begum, Gwyer, C.J. while
repelling the argument that Indian
Legislatures had no power to alter
the existing laws retrospectively
observed that within the limits of
their powers the Indian
legislatures were as supreme and
sovereign as the British parliament
itself and that those powers were
not subject to the "strange and
unusual prohibition against
retrospective legislation". The
power to validate a law
retrospectively is, subject to the
limitations aforesaid, an ancillary
power to legislate on the
particular subject.
The state legislature, it is
significant, has not overruled or
set aside the judgment of the High
Court. It has amended the
definition of ‘house’ by the
substitution of a new section 2(15)
for the old section and it has
provided that the new definition
shall have retrospective effect,
notwithstanding anything contained
in any judgment, decree or order of
any court or other authority. In
other words, it has removed the
basis of the decision rendered by
the High Court so that the decision
could not have been given to the
altered circumstances. If the old
Section 2(15) were to define
‘house’ in the manner that the
amended section 2(15) does, there
is no doubt that the decision of
the High Court would have been
otherwise. In fact, it was not
disputed before us that the
buildings constructed by the
respondent meet fully the
requirements of Section 2(15) as
amended by the Act of 1974.
In Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v.
State of U.P, the Legislature
amended the law retrospectively and
thereby removed the basis of the
decision rendered by the High Court
of Allahabad. It was held by this
Court that this was within the
permissible limits and validation
of the old Act by constitute an
encroachment on the functions of
the judiciary."
Again in the case of Sunder Dass V.
Ram Prakash, (1977) 3 SCR 60 it was
said:
"The appellant, however, urged
that the introduction of the
proviso in section 3 should not be
given greater retrospective
operation than necessary and it
should not be so construed as to
affect decrees for eviction which
had already become final between
the parties. Now, it is true, and
that is a settled principle of
construction, that the court ought
not to give a larger retrospective
operation to a statutory provision
than what can plainly be seen to
have been meant by the legislature.
This rule of interpretation is
hallowed by time and sanctified by
decisions, though we are not at all
sure whether it should have
validity in the context of changed
social norms and values. But even
so, we do not see how the
retrospective introduction of the
proviso in section 3 can be
construed so as to leave unimpaired
a decree for eviction already
passed, then the question arises in
execution whether it is a nullity.
The logical and inevitable
consequence of the introduction of
the proviso in section 3 with
retrospective effect would be to
read the proviso as if it were part
or the section at the date when the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was
enacted and the legal fiction
created by the retrospective
operation must be carried to its
logical extent and all the
consequences and incidents must be
worked out as if the proviso formed
part of the section right from the
beginning. This would clearly
render the decree for eviction a
nullity and since in execution
proceeding, an objection as to
nullity of a decree is a nullity,
the principle of finality of the
decree cannot be invoked by the
appellant to avoid the consequences
and incidents flowing from the
retrospective introduction of the
proviso in section 3. Moreover ,
the words "notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of any
court or other authority" in the
proviso make it clear and leave no
doubt that the legislature intended
that the finality of "judgment,
decree or order of any court or
other authority" should not stand
in the way of giving full effect to
the retrospective introduction of
the proviso in section 3 and
applying the provisions of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in
cases falling within the proviso."
Same was the situation in the case of Bhubaneshwar Singh V. Union of India (supra) where taking note of the subsequent amendments in the concerned Act the Court came to the conclusion:-
"In the present case as
already pointed out above, if sub-
section (2) as introduced by the
Coal Mines Nationalisation Laws
(Amendment) Act 1986 in section 10
had existed since the very
inception, there was no occasion
for the High Court or this Court to
issue a direction for taking into
account the price which was payable
for the stock of code lying on the
date before the appointed day. The
authority to introduce sub-section
(2) in section 10 of the aforesaid
Act with retrospective effect
cannot be questioned. Once the
amendment has been introduced
retrospectively, courts have to act
on the basis that such provision
was there since the beginning. The
role of the deeming provision need
not be emphasised in view of
series of judgments of this court
...................................
...................................
...................................
.............
In the present case, the
lacuna or defect has been removed
by the introduction of sub-section
(2) in section 10 of the Act with
retrospective effect. Sub-section
(2) of section 10 as well as
section 19, both have specified
that the amount which is to be paid
as compensation mentioned in the
schedule shall be deemed to include
and deemed always to have included,
the amount required to be paid to
such owner in respect of all coal
in stock on the date immediately
before the appointed day. As such
the earlier judgment of this court
is of no help to the petitioner."
On behalf of the respondent reference was made to the well-known judgment of this court in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak V. Union - of India, (1978) 2 SC 50 and it was pointed out from the judgment of Chief justice Bag who observed:
"I may, however, observe that
even though the real object of the
Act may be to set aside the result
of the Mandamus issued by the
Calcutta High Court, Yet, the
section does not mention this
object at all. Probably this was so
because the jurisdiction of a High
Court and the effectiveness of its
orders derived their force from
Article 226 of the Constitution
Itself. These could not be touched
by an ordinary act of parliament.
Even if section 3 of the Act Seeks
to take away the basis of the
judgment of the Calcutta High
Court, without mentioning it, by
enacting what may appear to be a
law, yet, i think that, where the
rights of the citizen against the
State are concerned, we should
adopt an interpretation which
upholds those rights. Therefore,
according to the interpretation I
prefer to adopt the rights which
had passed into those embodied in a
judgment and became the basis of a
mandamus from the High Court could
not be taken away in this indirect
fashion."
The facts of that case were entirely different. In the Act which was being challenged, there was no non-obstante clause purporting to take away the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. Letters patent Appeal filed against the judgment whose effect was being taken away by the provisions in question had been withdrawn. Bhagwati, J (as he then was) made a special mention of the aforesaid facts for purpose of holding that the effect of the Calcutta High Court had not be nullified by the provisions in question:-
"It is significant to note
that there was no reference to the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court
in the Statement of objects and
Reasons , nor any non-obstante
clause referring to a judgment of a
court in section 3 of the impugned
Act. The attention of parliament
does not appear to have been drawn
to the fact that the Calcutta High
Court has already issued a writ of
Mandamus commanding the Life
Insurance Corporation to pay the
amount of Bonus for the year April
1, 1975 to March 31,1976. It
appears that unfortunately the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court
remained almost unnoticed and the
impugned Act was passed in
ignorance of that judgment. Section
3 of the impugned Act or issued
that the provisions of the
settlement in so far as they relate
to payment of annual cash bonus to
class III and class IV employees
shall not have any force or effect
and shall not to deemed to have had
any force or effect from April
1,1975 to March 31,1976 was
concerned, it became crystalised in
the judgment and thereafter they
became entitled to enforce the writ
of mandamus granted by the judgment
and not any right to annual cash
bonus under settlement. This right
under the judgment was not sought
to be taken away by the impugned
Act. The judgment continued to
subsist and the Life Insurance
Corporation was bound to pay annual
cash bonus to Class III and Class
IV employees for the year April 1,
1975 to Mandamus. The error
committed by the Life Insurance
Corporation was that it withdrew
the Letters patent Appeal and
allowed the judgment of the learned
single judge to become final. By
the time the Letters Patent Appeal
came up for hearing, the impugned
Act had already come into force and
the Life Insurance Corporation
could, therefore , have
successfully contended in that
letters Patent Appeal that, since
the settlement, in so far as it
provided for payment of annual cash
bonus, was annihilated by the
impugned Act with effect from April
1,1975 to March 31,1976 and hence
no writ of mandamus could issue
directing the life Insurance
Corporation to make payment of such
bonus . If such contention had been
raised, there is little doubt,
subject of course to any
constitutional challenge to the
validity of the impugned Act , that
the judgment of the learned single
judge would have been upturned and
the writ petition dismissed. But on
account of some inexplicable
reason, which is difficult to
appreciate, the Life Insurance
Corporation did not press the
letters patent Appeal and the
result was that the judgment of the
learned single judge granting writ
of mandamus became final and
binding on the parties. It is
difficult to see how in these
circumstances the Life Insurance
Corporation could claim to be
absolved from the obligation
imposed by the judgment to carry
out the writ of mandamus by relying
on the impugned Act."
(emphasis supplied)
Because of the aforesaid factual position of that case the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in the Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality (Supra) was held to be of no help to the life insurance Corporation.
Reference was also made on behalf of the respondent to the judgment of this court in the case of A.V. Nachane & Another V. Union of India & Another,(1982) 2 SCR 246 where it was observed in respect of the Amendment Act, which was the subject matter of controversy in that case, that it could not nullify the effect of the writ issued by this Court in D.J. Bahadur’s case, relying on aforesaid judgment in the Madan Mohan Pathak (Supra). From a bare reference to page 267 of the report, it appears that the learned judges placed reliance on the defect pointed out in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak by Bhagwati, J quoted above. In other words, on peculiar facts and circumstances of the case it was held that the effect of the judgment in the case of D.J. Bahadur had not been taken away by the Amending Act. On behalf of the respondent, reliance was also placed on the cases of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another, (1970) 1 SCC 509; The municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. v. The New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc. etc.,(1970) 2 SCC 280. In the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh V. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd.,(1975) 2 SCC 274 the aforesaid judgments in the cases of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another (supra) and The Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. (supra) were distinguished by pointing out:
"The decisions on which the
respondent relies are clearly
distinguishable. In the Municipal
Corporation of the city of
Ahmedabad V. New Shrock Spg. & Wvg.
Co. Ltd., the impugned provision
commended the corporation to refuse
to refund the amount illegally
collected by it despite the orders
of the Supreme Court and the High
Court. As the basis of these
decisions remained unchanged even
after the amendment, it was held by
this Court the Legislature had made
a direct inroad into the judicial
powers. In Janapada Sabha,
Chhindwara V. Central provinces
Syndicate Ltd., the Madhya Pradesh
Legislature passed Validation Act
in order to rectify the defect
pointed out by this court in the
imposition of a cess. But the Act
did not set out the nature of the
amendment nor did it provide that
the notifications issued without
the sanction of the state
Government would be deemed to have
been issued validly. It was held by
this court that this was tantamount
to saying that the judgment of a
court rendered in the exercise of
its legitimate jurisdiction was to
be deemed to be ineffective. The
position in State of Tamil Nadu V.
M. Ravappa Gounder , was similar.
In that case the reassessments made
under an Act which did not provide
for reassessments were attempted to
be validated without changing the
law retrospectively. This was
considered to be an encroachment on
the judicial functions.
In the instant case, the
Amending Act of 1974 cures the old
definition contained in section
2(15) of the vice from which it
suffered. The amendment has been
given retrospective effect and as
stated earlier the Legislature has
the power to make the laws passed
by it retroactive. As the Amending
Act does not ask the
instrumentalities of the State to
disobey or disregard the decision
given by the High Court but removes
the basis of its decision, the
challenge made by the respondent to
the Amending Act must fail. The
levy of the house-tax must
therefore be upheld."
In view of sections 4,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which cannot be held to be unconstitutional, there is no escape from conclusion that the provisions which had been introduced in the principal Act 7 of 1974 have been effaced and courts have to proceed as if they had never been introduced in the principal Act. If this is the effect of sections 4,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 then as a corollary it has to be held that under the amendment Act 39 of 1972 the compensation amount payable for the surplus land under schedule III to the Act was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income w. e. f 21.12.1972. Notification under section 18(1) of the Act declaring 3414.78 acres of land of the respondent-Company as surplus was issued on 4.4.1973 after coming into force of amended Act 39 of 1972 aforesaid and because of the notification dated 4.4.1973 the surplus lands vested in the State Government in view of section 18(3) of the Act as it stood on that date. Thereafter, the Draft Assessment Roll had to be published applying the rate of 2 times of the net annual income.
On behalf of the respondent, a stand was taken that sections 4, 5 and 6 Act 25 of 1978 shall not revive the notification dated 4.4.1973 which stood exhausted and a fresh notification had to be issued, even if the different provisions of Act 7 of 1974 shall be deemed to have been obliterated. In this connection, it may be pointed out that section 5 (b) of Act 25 of 1978 provided in clear and unambiguous terms that modification made to section 18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 "Shall be deemed never to have had the effect of vesting in the state Government the surplus lands specified in any notification published under sub-section (1) of the said section 18 of the principal Act on the after the 2nd May 1962 and before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from a date earlier to the date of the publication of the notification under the said sub-section (1) and shall be deemed always to have had the effect of vesting in the State Government such surplus lands, only with effect from the date of the publication of such notification." Again section 6(a) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court "where before the date of publication of this Act in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, a notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act has been published, the surplus land specified in such notification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government, with effect from the date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested" . In view of the aforesaid deeming provisions, the notification which was issued on 4.4.1973 under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act shall be deemed to be valid and shall have the effect of vesting the lands in question in the state Government under sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Principal Act w.e.f. 4.4.1973.
An objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that on 3.3. 1978 the High Court had allowed the Writ petition No. 624 of 1978 filed on behalf of the said respondent and issued a writ of mandamus directing the State to comply with the judgment dated 8.10.1976 of the High Court in writ petition No.1464 of 1978 and as no appeal has been filed on behalf of the state before this Court against the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978, the said order has attained finality and if the appeals filed on behalf of State are allowed, it small lead to an anomalous position. It appears that the respondent had filed the aforesaid writ Petition No. 624 of 1978 for a direction by the High Court to comply with the aforesaid order dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974. In that writ petition a grievance had been made that respondents of that writ petition were delaying preparation of the Draft Compensation Roll on the plea that special Leave Petition to Appeal to the supreme Court along with an application for stay had been filed on behalf of the state. In that writ petition, a learned judge of the High Court directed to consider the determination of the compensation and the preparation of the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll, under section 50(3) (a) of the Act 58 of 1961 in respect of the excess lands of the respondent. A copy of the writ of mandamus issued by the High Court in the said Writ Petition is on the record and the operative part thereof is as follows:-
"the Respondents herein, are
hereby directed to consider the
determination of the compensation
and the preparation of the Draft
Compensation Assessment Roll under
section 50{3}{a} of the Act 58 of
1961, in respect of the excess
lands of the petitioner, acquired
by you , in due compliance, fully
and properly of the judgment of
this court dated 8.10.76 and passed
in W.P.Nos. 346 and 1464 of 1974 on
or before 30.6.1976 and you, the
second respondent herein, are
hereby directed to call upon the
petitioner to furnish whatever
information is required on or
before 30.3.1978 (which information
will be supplied to you by the
petitioner within 15 days from the
date of receipt of the said notice)
and thereupon to proceed forthwith
to comply with the aforesaid
directions of this Court dated
8.10.76 and passed in w.p.Nos. 346
and 1464 of 1974."
It cannot be disputed that by the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978 the High Court had not determined any right or liability inter se between the parties. It simply directed the state Government to comply with the direction given by order dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 against which civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 has been filed. If an order dated 8.10.1976 is set aside by this court, any direction given on 3.31978 in writ petition No. 624 of 1978 shall be of no consequence. It can be said that the direction which was given on 3.3. 1978 was in the nature of execution order.
It was then pointed out on behalf of the respondent that on 15.6.1978 writ Misc. Petition No. 3153 in Writ Petition No. 624 of 1978 was filed on behalf of the state for recall of the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978 which was dismissed on 23.6.1978. It was stated that in the said petition on behalf of the state, attention of the learned judge was drawn to the fact that in the meantime Act 25 of 1978 had come in force and as such there was no question of payment of compensation to the respondent in terms of the order dated 8.10.1976 as directed in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974. It was urged that as no appeal has been filed against the order dated 23.6.1978 on behalf of the state, the said order shall be deemed to have become final in respect of the scope and effect of Sections 4 ,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978. The relevant part of order dated 23.6.1978 is as follows:-
"Even otherwise, the
respondent herein has challenged
the validity of Tamil Nadu Act 25
of 1978 and till the validity is
upheld, it is not open to the state
of Tamil Nadu to maintain an
application of this
character........
Whatever may be said about the
validity of the Act, which question
need not concern me at this stage,
I find great force in what Mr. M.R.
Narayanaswamy submits. In my
judgment rendered in W.P. 624 of
1978, I merely directed that state
of Tamil Nadu to give effect to the
judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in W.P Nos. 346 and 1464
of 1974. I directed full compliance
of that judgment on or before 30th
of June , 1978."
From a bare reference to the aforesaid order it appears that the learned judge having clearly said that he was not considering the effect of provisions of Act 25 of 1978, he dismissed the said writ Misc. Petition in view of the order passed on 3.3.1978. When the learned judge refused to consider the effect of the provisions of Act 25 of 1978, there is no question of the order dated 23.6.1978 having any effect, on the special Leave Petitions which had been filed on behalf of the state giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil Appeal Nos. 352-354 of 1980 .
It may be mentioned that a plea was taken on behalf of the appellant state that as Act 25 of 1978 provides for the vesting of the land on a particular date, it shall be deemed to be law relating to agrarian reform and as such protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. As such no challenge based on Article 14 is available to the respondent. It was stated that at the said Act had been reserved for the consideration of the president and has received his assent and as such it shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by; Article 31-c which says that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the fact that in section 2 of Act 25 of 1978 it has been specifically declared that the said Act was being enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles laid down in particular clauses {b} and {c} of Article 39 which is in chapter IV of the constitution i.e. ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. A stand was also taken on behalf of the appellant-state that Act 25 of 1978 has been included in the Ninth schedule of the Constitution and as such it has the protection of Article 31-B of the constitution and its validity cannot be questioned on basis of Article 14 of the constitution. In View of the findings recorded above that sections 4, 5 and 6 of 25 of 1978 are constitutionally valid and it has effaced the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in the principal Act because of which it shall be deemed that notification issued under section 18{1} of the principal Act on 4.4.1973 was legal and valid and because of the said notification the lands declared as surplus vested in the state under section 18{3} of the principal Act, there is no necessity to decide as to whether Act 25 of 1978 has the protection of Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the constitution.
Once it is held that vesting of the surplus land had taken place on 4.4.1973, then the respondent shall be entitled to the compensation amount which is to be worked out at 2 times of the net annual income because of Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple of the compensation from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income w.e.f. 21.12.1972. Accordingly, civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 are allowed . The Judgement dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 and judgment dated 20.7.1979 in writ petition No. 2341-2343 of 1978 of the High Court area set aside and the writ petitions filed on behalf of the respondent are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.