PETITIONER:
TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GRAM PANCHAYAT PIMPRI WAGHERE
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1976
BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2463 1977 SCR (1) 306
1976 SCC (4) 177
ACT
Bombay Village Panchayat Act (Bom. 6 of 1933), s.
89--’House,’ if includes ’building’.
Interpretation of statutes--Rules as an aid--Use of State-
ment of objects and reasons.
HEADNOTE
The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted under
the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1933. The Act initially
empowered the Panchayat to levy tax on houses and Lands as
one of the taxes enumerated in s. 89(2). In 1939, the
section was amended .and s. 89(1) made it obligatory on
Panchayats to levy tax on houses and lands. The amending
Act of 1947 provided that every panchayat shall levy a tax
upon the owners or occupiers of ’houses including farm
buildings and conferred power on the Panchayat to tax shops
and hotels. The 1952-Amendment conferred power to tax prem-
ises where machinery is run by steam etc.
In exercise of the powers under s. 89 the respondent, by
a resolution of 1952, imposed tax own houses within its
jurisdiction. In 1954, s. 89 was amended and the word
’buildings’ was substituted for the words houses’ and
’houses including farm buildings’. By a resolution of 1964,
the respondent revised the tax on houses and also stated
that for factories the tax would be at a concessional rate.
The respondent demanded taxes on the appellant’s factory
buildings for the years 1967 to 1970. The appellant chal-
lenged the levy unsuccessfully in the High Court.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that: (1)
since it was only in 1954 that the word ’building’ was
substituted for the word ’house’, the respondent had no
power to impose taxes on the factory buildings by the 1952
resolution; and (2) even if the 1952 resolution authorised
the levy. since it was replaced by the 1964-resolution,
which was not valid as it was not passed in accordance with
the Act and the rules, no tax could be levied either under
the 1952-resolution or under the 1964-resolution.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) The word ’house’ would in its ordinary sense
include any ’building’ irrespective of its user. Having
regard 10 the nature of the word as used in taxing and
municipal legislation, and the nature and purpose of the
statute in the present case, it is manifest that the legis-
lature used the word ’house’ so that the Panchayat would be
in a position to levy taxes on all buildings situated in the
village. [319A]
(a) The word ’house’ is not defined in the Act. There-
fore, the word must be construed in that sense which ’peo-
ple, conversant with the subject-matter with which the
statute is dealing, would attribute to it. To ascertain
its meaning one must understand the subject-matter with
respect to which it is used in a statute. The weight of
judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the word
’house’ is not restricted to a mere dwelling house. but
also extends to a ’building which is used for business’,
[316 E-F, 317D]
Yorkshire Insurance v. Clayton 8 Q.B.D. 424. Grant v.
Langston 1900 A.C. 383, Daniel v. Coulsting 14 L.I.C. P 70,
Folkestone v. Woodword L.R. 15 Eq. 159, Wimbledon Urban
District Council v. Ha.stings 87 L.T.R. 118. Ravenseft
Properties v. London Borough of Hillingdon 1969 20 P & C.R.
483 and Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 pages 364 and 365
referred to.
(b) The rules. framed under the Act and placed before
the legislature for approval, are a legitimate aid in the
construction of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio. (i)
they made no distinction between dwelling houses’
307
and ’buildings’, (ii) the 1934-rules used the word ’lauds
and buildings’ instead of the words ’lands and houses’; and
(iii) the 1943-rules defined ’house’ as any building or set
of buildings within the same enclosure’. [317F]
(c) The Act, in 1933, empowered a Panchayat to levy tax
not only on houses but also on lands. It would be unsound
to hold that a land which is admittedly taxable would be
exempt when a factory is built upon it. [317 H]
(d) In the Amending Act of 1945 the expressions farm
buildings’ and ’houses’ are used without distinction. [317
G]
(e) The 1947-Amendment indicates that the tax was on
the business of shops and hotels and not on the houses
where such business is turn, and the 1952-Amendment intro-
duces. one more optional tax in s. 89(2) as different from
the obligatory tax on houses and lands in s. 89(1). [318
E-F]
(f) The words ’houses and lands’ in s. 89 mean all
buildings, including factory buildings. The substitution
of the word ’buildings’ in place of the word ’houses’ made
explicit what was implicit in the statute. From that amend-
ment it could not be suggested that the factories would be
included only within ’buildings’ and not within ’houses’.
[318 H]
(g) The Statement of objects and reasons is ordinarily
not used as an aid to the construction of a statute. It is
sometimes referred to for the limited purpose of finding the
object of the legislature in enacting the statute where all
other methods of interpretation fail. [318 G]
(2) Even if the 1964-resolution be invalid, the demands
made by the respondent are valid ,red legal, because, (a)
the 1952-resolution has not been superseded, and the levy
in the present case was not pursuant, at to the 1964 resolu-
tion, but was pursuant to the 1952-resolution; and (b) s.
186(8) of the 1959-Act. which repealed the 1933-Act indi-
cates that any taxes imposed, in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the 1959-Act, shall be deemed to have been
levied under the 1959-Act and continue in force until super-
seded or modified and the tax in the present case is not
inconsistent with the 1959Act. [319 C-V]
ARGUMENTS
For the Appellant:
The first question which falls for determination of this
Hon’ble Court. for the purposes of this appeal, is whether
the expression ’house’ as used in s. 89 of the Bombay Vil-
lage Panchayat Act, 1933 includes a factory building; and
as such the Resolution dated the 24th February 1952 levies
tax on factory building. The list of dates is given at the
end of the Synopsis for ready reference.
Brief facts are as follows:
The Respondent is a Village Panchayat constituted under
the provisions of Bombay Village Panchayats Act (Act No. 6)
of 1933. In exercise of the powers conferred on it for
imposition of house taxes under s. 89 as amended, by a
Resolution dated 24-2-1952. the Respondent imposed a house-
tax on houses within its jurisdiction.
By another Resolution dated the 10th August 1964, the
Respondents increased the levy on the factory buildings.
The petitioners have their factory buildings which were
completed and occupied by about January 1968. After get-
ting the necessary information about the value, costs of
buildings etc. the respondent sent a notice dated 10th
January 1969 making a demand for payment of taxes on the
factory building for the years 1967-68. and 1968-69. This
was on the basis of the Resolution dated 10th August 1964 at
concessional rate of 25 nP per Rupees 100/-. Similar de-
mands were also made subsequently for year 1969-70. The
aggregate tax involved in this petition amounts to Rs.
1,34,763/- for the three years i.e. 1967-68, 1968-69 and
1969-70. It is this demand for tax which is challenged in
this petition.
308
In order to understand the contention of the petition-
ers, it is necessary to go into the brief legislative histo-
ry of the Acts.
There has been as many as 9 amendments to the Act.
Originally, the Bombay Village Panchayats Act 1933 made
imposition of house-tax optional. By amending Act No. 18 of
Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1939 the house-tax was made
compulsory.
By Bombay Village Panehayats (2nd Amendment Act) 1945,
the word "farm buildings" were included in regard to the
three districts of Ratnagiri, Kanara and Colaba. By Bombay
Village Panchayat Act 9 of 1947 for the expression ’Houses
including farm buildings’ was made applicable without any
distinction between the abovenamed three districts and the
other districts in the State. By the same amending Act, an
additional tax was included by adding s. 2(vi-a) viz. "tax
on shops and hotels."
By Bombay Village Panchayat Amendment Act 9 of 1953 s.
2(vi-b) was added providing for a tax on premises where
machinery is run by steam, oil or electric power or manual
labour for any trade or business and not for an agricultur-
al, or domestic purpose.
Then comes the most important amendment namely the
Bombay Village Panchayats Amendment 1954 (Bombay Act 7 of
1954). This amendment substituted for the word ’house’ the
word ’building’. It also substituted for el. 2(vi-a) and
2(vi-b) a new cl. 2(vi-a) providing for tax on the profes-
sions, trades and calling specified therein, namely, shop
keeping and hotel keeping or any other trade or calling
(other than agriculture which is carried on with the help of
machinery run by steam, oil electric power or manual power).
The statements of objects and reasons for’ making the impor-
tant change of the word "building" for the word "house" is
quoted herein below:
"Under s. 89(1) of the Act, as it stands at present,
village Panchayats cannot levy property tax on buildings
other than dwelling houses. It is, therefore, proposed to
empower them to levy such tax on all buildings in their
areas, irrespective of their use."
Two things emerge from the above legislative history namely
in 1952 when the Resolution dated 24th February 1952 was
passed, the expression used in s. 89(1) was ’house’. When
the Resolution dated 10th August 1964 was passed, the ex-
pression ’house’ was no longer in the statute but a wider
and comprehensive expression ’building’ was already insert-
ed.
On the above facts and position of law, the appellant
urges the following propositions:
I. Resolution dated 24th February 1952 cannot be the
basis for recovery of any taxes by the respondent on the
factory buildings of the appellant inter-alia for the fol-
lowing reasons :--
(a) The plain reading of the resolution dated 24th
February 1952 clearly indicates that the levy was intended
to be on dwelling house and not on factory buildings.
(b) In a taxing statute, words used have to be construed
as understood in common parlance in the context of the Act.
1962(1) Suppl. S.C.R. 498, 502 & 503 Motipur Zamind-
ari Co. (P) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar.
(e) Though several different meanings of the ’word
’house’ are given, the word ’house’ must be construed in the
context of the Act in which it appears. In the context of
the present Act, the house must mean as understood in common
parlance as ’dwelling place’. This meaning also appears as
the first meaning given in all dictionaries.
309
In 1933 in a village nobody could have said that a factory.
building means a house. Therefore, the expression "house"
must be given its ordinary meaning as meaning a "dwelling
house".
(d) The Legislative History of Section 89, which is set
out hereinabove, clearly shows that all kinds of buildings
including factory buildings were not included in the expres-
sion ’house’. The Amendment of 1954 substituting the word
’building’ for ’house’ takes the matter beyond any pale of
doubt. It must be remembered that these are amendments to
the same Act and these Amending Acts clearly indicate the
legislative expositions of the expression ’house’ used in
the 1933-Act. It is well established that later Acts should
be regarded as the legislative interpretation. of the former
one.
(i) 1957 SCR page 121 at 138 & 139 Hari Prasad Shivashan-
kar v. A. D. Divikar.
(ii) 1891 (137) US 682 at 692 George H. Cope v. Janet Cope.
(iii) 1928 A-C. 143 Ormand Investment Co. v. Betts.
(iv) 1941 (315) U.S.A. 262 (Head Note 8) Great Northern
Rly. v. U.S..A.
(v) 1900 (1) Q.B. 156 at 164, & 165 Attorney General
v. Clerksons.
(vi) [1955] 2 SCR 603, 632 "Bengal Immunity Case".
(vii) [1969] 1 SCR 370, 372 Ghewar Chand v. Workers’ Union.
(e) The High Court has observed in its Judgment as follows.
The object of the legislature in enacting s. 89 was to
enable the Village Panchayat to levy tax from such sources
as may be necessary for the proper discharge by the Panchay-
at of its duties under the Act. Having regard to the nature
of the word house as used in taxing legislation in England
and this country, the legislature used the word house so
that the village panchayat would be in a position to levy
taxes on all buildings situated in the village.
These observations are erroneous because the word house
as used in the taxing legislation has been interpreted in
England as meaning a dwelling house and not as including
every building. The High Court has relied on three deci-
sions for this purpose :--
(i) 1906 Appeal Cases 299 Lewin v. End.
(ii) 87 Law Times Reports 118 Wimbledon Urban District
Council v. Hastings.
(iii) 1900 A.C. 383 Grant v. Langston.
The authority of Wimbledon Urban District Council 87
L.T.R. 118 has no bearing because it was’ not a case of
taxing statute. It was under the Public Health Act and the
definition of building in terms included a school building
and therefore, it was held that the nuisance in an over-
crowded school came within the mischief of the Act and that
the Act applied to. school buildings also. It is impor-
tant to remember that the decision in the case Wimbledon
Urban District Council was based on the decision in Reg. v.
Mead (59 J.P. 150; 11 T.L.R. 242). This was again a case
under the Public Health Act dealing with the overcrowding in
a shelter house.
(f) Both the authorities namely, 1900 AC 383 Grant v.
Langston as well as 1906 A.C. 299 Lewin v. End relied by the
High Court accepted the position that the house must be a
dwelling house. If it is not so used, then the structure and
the character of the building as a whole should be regard-
ed in order to see whether it is fit for such use by any
class or condition of persons in the ordinary way of
living. Obviously, a factory building does not satisfy this
test.
310
II. The second question which arises is that even if the
Resolution dated 24th February 1952 is held to be validly
levying a tax on factory buildings, it is admitted that
another Resolution dated 10th August 1964 was also pass by
the Respondent though the Respondent relies only on the
Resolution of 24th February 1952 and has conceded that the
Resolution of 10th August 1964 is void and illegal for not
having been passed in accordance with the Act and the Rule.
The Resolution of 1964 clearly replaced and modified in
Resolution of 1952. If the Resolution of 1964 is illegal
and void, the resolution of 1952 is not automatically re-
vived. On the contrary, a fresh levy then would have to be
imposed. That not having been done, there is no valid levy
of tax on the factory building of the petitioners.
See [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 435, 446 Firm A.T.B. Melttab
Majid & Co. v. State of Madras.
(Once the old Rule has been substituted by the new Rule, it
ceases to exist and does not automatically got revived when
the new rule is held to be invalid).
The above ratio equally applies to the earlier Resolution of
24th February 1952 which was replaced by resolution dated
10th August 1964.
S. 186(8) of 1958 Act (Bombay Act III of 1959) provides as
follows:
any appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee,
order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law, or form
made, issued, imposed or granted in respect of the said
villages and in force on the date of the commencement of
this Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent be
deemed to have been made, issued, imposed or granted under
this Act in respect of the village and shall continue in
force until it is superseded or modified by any appoint-
ment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order, scheme,
licence, permission, rule, by-law or form made,
issued, imposed or granted under this Act;
This also shows that on passing of the resolution dated
10th August 1964, the resolution dated 24th February 1952
ceased 10 be effective.
The Respondents rely on rules framed in 1938 but Rules
cannot be a;.d to the interpretation of the main Section.
The Respondents also relied on the Resolution dated
10th August 1964 and from the language thereof contend that
factory buildings were treated as ’house’. Now in the first
place in 1964 the word "House"---has already been. substi-
tued by the word "building" so when the respondents passed
the resolution on 10th August 1964, it fixed two rates; one
for all houses as is clearly indicated in the resolution at
the rate of 40 paise for Rs. 100/- and other for factory
buildings which was at the concessional rate. This 0n the
contrary, supports the submissions of the appellant that all
houses were treated as one class of buildings and all facto-
ries were treated as other class of buildings.
The Respondents also rely on the meaning of the word
’house’ given in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary at item (17)
as also on Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 pp. 363. 364.
However, every word has more than one meaning and it has to
be construed in the context of the Act in which it appears.
So construed in the context of the present Act, the word
’house’ cannot take in a factory building.
For the Respondent: The impugned levy of tax was
imposed by the Resolution of the respondent Gram Panchayat
dated 24-2-1952. This Resolution was passed in exercise of
the powers conferred on the respondent by S. 89(1) of the
Bombay Village Panchayat Act 1933 (Bombay Act 6 of 1933) as
it stood in 1952.
Though the Act of 1933 was repealed by the Act of 1959
(Born. Act 3 of 1959), the levy remained in force by virtue
of S. 186(8) of the 1959 Act.
311
Appellants’ only contention regarding this levy is that the
word "houses" occuring in the phrase "Houses and land" in S.
89(1) of the 1933 Act does not take in buildings housing
factories, but has the narrow meaning "dwelling houses", and
hence the levy on its factory buildings is illegal.
The short question which, therefore, arises for considera-
tion is what was the legislative intent in respect of the
word "Houses" as used in S. 89 (1) of the 1933 Act. Was it
used in the narrow sense of a dwelling house or in th wider
sense of any building irrespective of the use to which it
is put.
The word "House" is not defined in the Act. The dictionaries
relied on by the Appellant give various meanings of that
word; but dictionary meanings are not relevant in such
cases. The correct approach is to construe the word in
"that sense which people conversant with the subject matter
with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it."
[1962] 1 SCR 279, 282 Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Offi-
cer, Akola [1962] 1 SCR Supp. 498
Motipur Zamindari Co.
v.
The State of Bihar.
Though the word "house" has several meaning in non-legal
parlance in connection with taxing statutes, it has a
definite meaning in legal parlance, "any building in the
ordinary sense irrespective of its user."
Grant v. Langston
(1900 A.C, 383, 390
The ground floor of a building not communicating with
the upper floor and used for business purposes was held to
be a "house".
(1906) A.C. 299, 303 last para---observations of Lord Rob-
ertson).
Stroud Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2, page
1263 Item--(17)
(A brief report of the case of Ravenseft Properties vs.
London Borough of Hillingdon, decided by the Tribunal under
the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, appears in "Land Law,
cases and Materials" by R.H. Mandsley and E. Ii. Burn,
Third Edition p. 832. The relevant observation is "The
weight of judicial opinion appears to me to be conclusively
in favour of the view that the word ’House’ extends to a
building which is used for business and should not be re-
stricted to mere dwelling house."
The position in U.S.A. is also the same :-
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 41, p. 364 (Co1. 1) & p. 365.
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (West Publishing
House)--p. 686.
There is important intrinsic evidence in the present case to
show that at the relevant time the concerned Legislature was
aware that the word "House" and "Building" were synonymous
and interchangeable. The 1933-Act emers the Government to
make rules for various purposes. These rules had powers
placed before the Legislature for approval (or modification,
if thought fit) before they could come into force. Under
Cl, (n) of S-108 Govt. could make rules for fixing the
maximum rate of tax to be imposed under S. 89(1).
The rule is framed by Government in this respect on 18-12-
1934 i.e. immediately after passing the 1933-Act. The words
used in rule are lands, and ’Buildings’ instead of ’land
and houses’. ’these rules are a legitimate aid to construc-
tion of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio.
(Craies on Statute Law Vlth Edition p. 157; Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition p. 264).
41104SCI/76
312
The rules framed on 18-1-43 define "House" as "any
building or set of buildings within the same enclosure".
In the amending Act of 1945 and its statement of objects and
reasons the expressions "farm--buildings" and "farm-houses"
are used without distinction.
Although the 1933-Act was amended it was not found
necessary to change the expression ’houses and lands" occur-
ing in S. 89. That expression continued unchanged till
after 1952.
It is also worthy of note that the tax is not on houses
alone but on lands as well. It is unthinkable that a land
which is admittedly taxable would be intended to be exempt
when a building housing a factory is built upon it.
Under the 1933-Act as initially enacted, S. 89’(1)
conferred power (but imposed no obligation) upon Village
Panchayats to levy any one of the taxed enumerated in Sub-S.
(2). The first of these was the tax on "houses and lands".
It was thus optional. No tax was mentioned in S. 89(1).
By the 1939 amendment this scheme was changed. New S. 89(1)
made it obligatorY on Village Panchayats to levy tax on
houses and lands which were not subject to payment of agri-
cultural assessment. The six other taxes which were option-
al were retained in S. 89(2). This clearly shows that those
taxes were other than the tax on houses and lands (when a
tax on shops and hotels came to be added to this list as
(vi-a) it was a tax on shop-business and hotel-business and
not on the houses where such business was run. This can
also be seen from s. 124 of the 1949-Act which repealed the
1933-Act. The next amendment of 1945 split up S. 89(1), to
make separate provision for taking farm buildings in the
three districts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Kanara where farm
buildings used to be built on agricultural land and were
thus escaping assessment.
Additions were similarly made to the list of taxes in S.
89(2) from to time and were all taxes of a different kind
from the obligatory tax houses and lands provided for in S.
89 (1).
The L.A. Bill No. 51 of 1952 was passed in 1953 i.e. after
the levy question in this case had been already imposed and
further, add only to the list in S. 89(2) one more kind of
tax different from the obligatory tax "houses & lands".
The last amendment is of 1954. This substitues the word
"Buildings" for the word "houses’ in S. 89(1). The amend-
ment is not relevant as it was made much after 24-2-52 when
the impugned levy was imposed. What is relied on by the
appellant is the mention in the statement of objects and
reasons viz. that under S. 89(1) of the Act as it then
stood, Village Panchayats could not levy tax on buildings.
Now, it is well settled that statement of objects and rea-
sons for a given statute cannot be used as aid to the con-
struction of that statute. The statement can be referred to
for the limited purpose of finding the object of the Legis-
lature in enacting that statute when all methods of inter-
pretation fail. Even for this limited purpose, the state-
ment of objects and reasons for an amending Act enacted more
than twenty years later cannot be looked into when the
question is of construction of the original Act enacted more
than 20 years earlier. Apart from this, the Contemporents
Expositio provided by the Rules referred to earlier which
are a legitimate aid to construction of the original Act,
must prevail over and outweigh the statement of objects and
reasons of the Amend- Act of 1954.
The Resolution of 10th August 1964 did not supersede or
modify the Resolution dated 24-2-52. According to the
appellants own case as urged before the High Court and
accepted by it, the resolution is void. It can, therefore,
be of no effect. No levy was actually imposed in pursuance
of that resolution, Further, even according to that resolu-
tion, the tax on factory buildings was
313
not to be raised. The bills served on the appellant and the
demand made from it, is according to the levy under the
resolution of 24-2-1952.
The appellant’s contention in this respect is, therefore,
untenable.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
2238 of 1969.
(From the Judgment and order dated 8-9-1969 of the Bombay
High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1270/69).
M.C. Bhandare, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur, K.J. John
and Shri Narain for the Appellant.
B.D. Bal, M.S. Narasimhan and R.B. Ds, tar for the Respond-
ent.
RAY, C.J.--This appeal by certificate turns on the
meaning of the expression "house" as used in section 89 of
the Bombay Village. Panchayat Act, 1933 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act).
The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted under
the provisions of the Act. In exercise of powers conferred
on it for imposition of taxes on houses under section 89 of
the .Act, the respondent by a resolution dated 24 February,
1952 imposed tax on houses within its jurisdiction. The
resolution of 24 February, 1952 decided to levy a tax on
house at the rate of Annas -/4/- for every Rs. 100. The
resolution further decided that the basis for valuation for
a room of old house would be Rs. 100/-, for a room of new
house Rs. 125/and for Verandah (Padvi) Rs. 25/-.
By another resolution dated 10 August, 1964 the
respondent revised the tax on house at the rate of 40 nP.
for Rs. 100/- The resolution further said that for facto-
ries as a concession the tax would be 25 nP for Rs. 100/- on
capital value.
The appellant has factory buildings. The respondent by
a notice dated 10 January, 1969 made a demand of taxes on
the factory building of the appellant for the years 1967-68
and 1968-69. The respondent charged at the rate of 25 nP for
Rs. 100/-. The respondent did not charge the appellant at
the rate of 40 nP for Rs. 100/- which was the increased rate
pursuant to the resolution dated 10 August, 1964. The re-
spondent thereafter made a demand in the year 1969-70. The
aggregate tax involved in this appeal comes to Rs.
1,34,763/- for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70.
The appellant contended that in 1952 when the resolu-
tion was passed by the respondent levying taxes on houses
the respondent was not empowered to tax factory buildings.
The principal reason advanced by the appellant is that only
in 1954 the word "building" was substituted for the word
"house", and, therefore, the respondent would have no power
to impose taxes on the factory buildings by me resolution in
1952.
The other contention on behalf of the appellant is that
if the resolution dated 24 February, 1952 be held to be
valid levying a tax on factory praises the resolution was
replaced by the resolution of 10 August, 1964. Here the
contention of the appellant is that the resolution of 1964
is not valid because it was not passed in accordance with
314
the Act and the Rules. The appellant, therefore, contends
that the resolution in 1964 is void the resolution in 1952
would not be operative to support the tax.
The provisions contained in section 89 of the Act are as
follows:--
"Levy of taxes and fees by Panchayat: (1) Every Panchayat
shall levy in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-
scribed such of the taxes or fees specified in sub-section
(2) as may be necessary for the proper discharge by the
Panchayat of its duties under this Act.
(2) Taxes or fees which are leviable by a Panchayat under
sub-section (1) are:--
(i) a tax upon the owners or occupiers of houses and
lands within the limits of the village;
(ii) a pilgrim tax;
(iii) a tax on fairs and festivals,
(iv) a tax on sales of goods;
(v) octroi;
(vi) a tax on marriages, adoptions and feasts;
(vii) any other tax which may have been approved by the
district local board and sanctioned by Government."
Section 89 of the Act was amended by Amendment Act No.
of 1939 as follows :--
("a) For sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted,
namely:--
(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or
occupiers of houses and lands which are not subject to
payment of agricultural assessment within the limits of the
village in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-
scribed. The rules made for the levy of such tax may provide
that the payment of such tax may be made either in cash or
by the rendering of work and labour."
Sub-section (2) was amended as follows :.
"It shall be competent t0 a panchayat to, levy all or any of
the taxes or fees at such rates and in such manner as may be
prescribed, namely, clause (i) shall be deleted."
In 1945 section 89 was amended as follows:
Sub-section (1) of section 89 was substituted by the follow-
ing
’(1) Every panchayat, other than a panchayat, in the dis-
tricts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Canara, shall levy a tax
upon the owners or occupiers of houses .and lands which are
not subject to payment of agricultural assessment within
the limits of the village m such manner and at such rates as
may be prescribed.
315
(1A) Every panchayat in the districts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri
and Kanara shall levy a tax upon the owners or occupiers of
houses including farm buildings whether or not subject t0
payment of agricultural assessment and of lands which are
not subject to payment of agricultural assessment, within
the limits of the village in such manner and at such rates
as may be prescribed.
(1B) The rules made for .the levy of the, tax specified in
subsection (1 )and (1 A) may provide that the payment of
such tax may be made either in cash or by the rendering of
work and labour."
In 1947 section 89 was amended as follows :--
"(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or
occupiers of houses including farm buildings Whether or not
subject to payment of agricultural assessment and of land
which are not subject to payment of agriculural assessment,
within the limits of the village, in such manner, at such
rates and subject to such exemptions as may be prescribed.
(1A) Where an owner of a house or land has left the village
or cannot otherwise be found, any person to whom such house
or land has been transferred shall be liable for the tax
leviable under sub-section (1 ) from such owner.
(lB) The rules made for the levy of the tax specified in
sub-section (1) may provide that the payment of such tax may
be made either in cash or by rendering of work and labour."
Again, in 1947 in sub-section (2) after clause (vi) the
following new clause was inserted:
"(vi) (a) a tax on shops and hotels".
In 1952 section 89(2)(vi)(b) was amended as follows :--
"a tax on premises where machinery is run by steam, oil,
electric power or manual labour for any trade or busineess
and not for an agricultural or domestic purpose."
In 1954 section 89 was amended and the word "buildings"
was substituted for the words "houses including farm build-
ings" in subsection (1) thereof. Again in sub-section (IA)
of section 89 for the word "house" wherever it occurred the
word "building" was substituted. In subsection (2) of
section 89 for clauses (vi) (a) and (b) the following
clause was substituted :--
"(vi) (a) subject to the provisions of Article 276 of the
Constitution, a tax on the following professions, trades and
calling, namely :-
(a) shop keeping and hotel keeping;
(b) any trade or calling (other than agriculture
which is carried on with the help of machinery run by steam,
oil, electric power or manual labour."
In 1959 the Act was repealed. The Bombay Village
Panchayats Act, 1958 being Act No. III of 1959 came into
existence. The
316
relevant section of the 1959 Act necessary for the purpose
of the present appeal is section 186(8) which is as follows
:--
"186. Notwithstanding the repeal of the said laws
and the foregoing provisions of this Act:
(8) any appointment, notification, notice, tax,
fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-
law, or form made, issued, imposed, or granted in
respect of the said villages and in force on the
date of the commencement of this Act shall in so
far as they are not inconsistent be deemed to have
been made, issued, imposed or granted under this
Act in respect of the village and shall continue in
force until it is superseded or modified by any
appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order,
scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law or form
made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act".
There is no dispute that the resolution of 1952 was
validly passed in exercise of powers conferred on the re-
spondent by section 89(1) of the Act. The principal conten-
tion of the appellant is that the word "house" means dwell-
ing house. The appellant relied on the decision in Wimble-
don Urban District Council v. Hastings(1) and Lewin v.
End(2) in support of the proposition that the expression
"house" means a dwelling house. The appellant sought to
support the contention by reference to the fact that the
word "house" which occurred in section 89 of the Act was
substituted by the word "building" in 195, indicating that
factory buildings would not be within the meaning of the
word "house".
The word "house" is not defined in the Act. This Court
in Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola(a) said
that the correct approach is to construe the word in that
sense which people conversant with the subject matter with
which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. Counsel
for the respondent rightly contended that the word "house"
would in its ordinary sense include any building irrespec-
tive of its user. To ascertain the meaning of the word
"house" one must understand the subject matter with respect
to which it is used in order to arrive at the sense in which
it is employed in a statute. Formerly, houses were built
that each house occupied a separate site. In modern times a
practice has grown up of putting separate houses one above
the other. They are built in separate flats or storeys. For
legal and ordinary purposes they are separate houses. Each
is separately let and separately occupied. One has no con-
nection with those above or below, except in so far as it
may derive support from those below instead of from the
ground as in the case of ordinary houses (See Yorkshire
Insurance v Clayton(4) and Grant v. Langston(5).
It may be stated generally that the word "house" is a
structure of a permanent character. It is structurally
severed from other tenements. It is not necessary that a
house if adapted for residential purposes should be actually
dwelt in [See Daniel v. Coulsting(6)]. A building in
(1) 87 Law Times Reports 118. (2) [1906] A.C. 299.
(3) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279. (4) 8 Q.B.D. 424.
(5) [1900] A.C. 383. (6) 14 L.J.C.P. 70.
317
Convent Garden had formerly been a dwelling house but was
converted into a fruit store warehouse and offices in which
no one slept and was held to be a "house" as regards assess-
ment to the rector’s rate within the provisions of the
relevant statute.
The idea of the varieties of meanings can be had from
the subject matter of the statute. A consecrated church was
treated as a house as regard the Building Line which a local
authority has a right to prescribe. [See Folkestone v.
Woodward(2)]. Under the Public Health Act, 1875 "house" was
not limited to an ordinary dwelling house and included a day
school having no boarders and where none of the staff resid-
ed. See Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under the compulsory
Purchase Act, 1965 "house" has been extended to a building
which is used for business purposes and is not restricted to
mere dwelling houses (See Ravenseft Properties v. London
Borough of Hillingdon(2).
The weight of judicial opinion is conclusively in favour
of the view that the word "house" extends to a building
which is used for business and should not be restricted to a
mere dwelling house (See Land Law, Cases and Materials by
R.H. Mandsley and E.H. Burn Third Edition, p. 832).
In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 page 364 it is said that in
a legal sense, the word "house" is more comprehensive, but
it is not limited to a structure designed for human habita-
tion, and may mean a building or shed intended or used as a
habitation or shelter for animals of any kind, a building in
the ordinary sense or any building, edifice, or structure
inclosed with walls and covered, regardless of the fact of
human habitation. Again in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41
page 365 it is said that under particular circumstances,
the term has been held equivalent to and interchangeable or
synonymous with "building", "dwelling" and "dwelling house"
and sometimes "premises".
The 1952 resolution of the Gram Panchayat in the present
case is to be understood in the background of the provisions
contained in section 89 of the Act and the rules framed
under section 108 of the Act. The rules were placed before
the legislature for approval. The rules framed in 2934 used
the words "lands and buildings" instead of the words "lands
and houses". The rules are a legitimate aid to construction
of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio (See Craies on
Statute Law 6th Edition p. 157).
The rules flamed in 1943 defined "house" as any building
or set of buildings within the same enclosure. In the Amend-
ing Act of 1945 the expressions "farm buildings" and
"houses" are used without distinction. The Act in 1933
conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy tax upon owners
or occupiers of houses and lands. This expression "houses
and lands" continued unchanged till the year 1952. It is
significant that the tax is not on houses alone but on lands
as well. It is unsound to hold that a land which is admit-
tedly taxable would be intended to be exempt when a building
housing a. factory is built upon it. The Act as initially
(1) L.R. 15 Eq. 159. (2) [19691 20 P & C.R. 483.
318
enacted conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy any one
of the taxes enumerated in sub-section (2). The first of
these was tax on houses and lands. Section 89 (1) of the
Act as it stood did not mention any particular tax. The
1939 Amendment changed the scheme. Section 89(1) of the Act
made it obligatory on Panchayats to levy tax on houses and
lands. In 1933 section 89(1) of the Act conferred optional
power on Panchayats to levy taxes. In 1939 section 89(1) of
the Act made it compulsory for Panchayats to levy tax on
owners or occupiers of houses and lands which are not sub-
ject to payment of agricultural assessment. The six other
taxes mentioned in section 89 (2) of the Act starting from
clauses (ii) to (vii) namely, a pilgrim tax, a tax on fairs
and festivals; a tax on sales of goods, octroi; a tax on
marriages, adoptions and feasts; and any other tax which may
have been approved by the district local board and sanc-
tioned by Government were made optional. A tax upon owners
or occupiers on houses and lands which figures in clause (i)
of section 89(2) of the Act was deleted, by the Amendment
Act of 1939 inasmuch as taxes on houses and lands became a
compulsory power of taxation under section 89( 1 ) of the
Act.
Reference may be made to the addition of clause (vi)(a)
in section 89(2) of the Act which was introduced in 1947 as
conferring power on Panchayats to levy tax on shops and
hotels. This indicates that the tax was on the business of
shops and the business of hotel. The tax was not on the
houses where such business was run. Section 124 of the 1959
Act which came in place of section 89 of the Act shows that
"shop keeping" and "hotel keeping" are considered to be
trades and callings.
The amendment of the year 1945 shows that a separate
provision was made for taxing farm buildings in three dis-
tricts of Colaba, Ratnagin and Kanara, where farm buildings
were constructed on agricultural land. The idea was to bring
such farm buildings within the province of assessment.
The amendment in 1952 added a tax on premises where
machinery is run by steam, oil, electric power or manual
labour in trade or business and not for agricultural or
domestic purposes. This addition of clause (vi) (b) to
section 89(2) of the Act illustrates one more kind of
optional tax as different from obligatory tax on houses and
lands within section 89 ( 1 ) of the Act.
The amendment of 1954 where the word "building" was
substituted for the word "house" does not help the appellant
to suggest that factories will be included only within
buildings and not within houses. The appellant referred to
statement of objects and reasons which said that the village
panchayat could not levy a tax on buildings, and, therefore,
the word "buildings" was substituted for the word "houses".
The statement of objects and reasons is ordinarily not used
as aid to construction of a statute. A statement is some-
times referred to for the limited purposes of finding the
object of the legislature in enacting the statute where all
other methods of interpretation fail.
The words "houses and lands" as used in section 89 of
the Act mean all buildings, and factory buildings would be
included within that meaning. The use of the expression
"buildings" in place of the words "houses including farm
buildings" made explicit what was, implicit in the statute.
319
Having regard to the nature of the word "houses" as used in
taxing legislations and municipal legislation and the nature
and purposes of the statute in the present case it is mani-
fest that the legislature used the word "house" so that the
village panchayat would be in a position to levy taxes on
all buildings situated in the village. The rule makers made
no distinction between the dwelling houses and buildings.
The second contention of the appellant is unacceptable.
The resolution of 10 August, 1964 did not supersede or
modify the resolution of 24 February, 1952. No levy was
actually imposed pursuant to the resolution of 10 August,
1964. Further the bills served on the appellant were pursu-
ant to the levies imposed under the resolution of 24 Febru-
ary 1952. In 1964 a tax on factory buildings was not raised.
The tax on houses was raised. Even if the resolution of 10
August, 1964 be invalid the demands made by the respondent
under the 1952 resolution are valid and legal for two rea-
sons. First, the resolution of 1952 has never been super-
seded; and second, section 186(8) of the 1959 Act indicates
that any tax imposed shall in so far as they are not incon-
sistent be deemed to have been made under the 1959 Act shall
continue in force until they are superseded or modified.
There is nothing to show that the tax is inconsistent with
the 1959 Act, nor was it argued to be so.
For these reasons the contentions of the appellant fail.
The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dis-
missed.
320