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State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma

Supreme Court of India · 6 February 1996 · [1996] 2 S.C.R. 236

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
6 February 1996
Reported as
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 236
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Ramaswamy, K.
Length
8 pages
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF U.P.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
O.P. SHARMA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/02/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (2) 488 1996 SCALE (2)356

ACT

HEADNOTE

JUDGMENT

ORDER

This appeal by special leave has been placed before us by a reference. The facts are not in dispute. The appellant- State has filed an F.I.R. with allegations as under:

"It is submitted that Modi

Paints and Varnish Works,

manufactures Varnish and Paints at

Modinagar. This firm had been

buying linseed oil and other edible

oils in large quantities for quite

some time, and had been storing the

same and utilizing it for the

manufacture of paints and varnish.

This industrial unit had been

buying and storing the linseed oil

and other edible oils, and in this

respect the said industrial unit

has not obtained any licence.

The said industrial unit had

given an application for obtaining

a licence in respect of their

business for the purpose of said

oils for utilizing the same in

paints and varnish but their

application was rejected.

Subsequent to that also, the said

industrial unit kept purchasing,

storing and utilizing the said oils

and kept manufacturing said selling

paints and varnish. Earlier also

this firm had not made available

its records concerning stock of

bills.

To-day on 4.12.1985 in the

evening at about 3.30 p.m. myself

Abdul Qadir, Senior Marketing

Inspector, Modinagar under the

direction of Sri P.K. Upadhayaya,

Addl. District Magistrate [Supply]

Ghaziabad along with Sri Mohan

Singh, District Supply Officer,

Ghaziabad, Sri Rameshwar Dayal,

Supply Inspector Modinagar, Sri

Rais Ahmad, Supply Inspector

Modinagar, Sri S.K. Mishra,

Marketing Inspector, Sri S.K.

Singh, Marketing Inspector, Sri

Anil Kumar Srivastava, Marketing

Inspector, Modinagar, Sri J.R.

Joshi, Sub-Inspector, Sri

SamaiSingh, Constable No.56, Sri

Sukhbir Singh, Head Constable

No.53, Police Station Modinagar

etc. inspected the oilstored in the

oil tankers of Modi Paints and

Varnish Works, Modinagar. To verify

four tanks oil stored in them the

oils stated by the party, three

samples each were taken from every

tank total 27 samples and sealed on

the spot in the presence of the

representatives of the firm Sri

Kailash Chandra, Store Clerk and

Sri O.P. Sharma, Factory Manager,

the stock register pertaining to

the year 1985-86 consisting of 389

pages serially numbered was taken

into custody after the used pages

signed by me and the said Kailash

Chandra. The stock of stored oil

was inspected on the basis of the

stock register and the following

quantities of oil was found stored

in the tanks:

1. Soyabean oil 843 Qtls. and 57

kgs.

2. Castor oil 8147 Qtls. and 45

kgs.

3. Refined Soyabean oil 32 Qtls.

& 31 kgs.

The sample fard was prepared

of one sample each from the

collected samples and after taking

the signature of every one it was

handed over to the store clerk Sri

Kailash Chandra. The stock register

pertaining to the year 1984-85 was

taken into custody and according to

it on 4.11.1985 they had in their

stock 2000 kiloliters of linseed

oil stored with them. According to

the oil register taken into

custody, the aforesaid unit had

purchased the refines soyabean oil,

soyabean oil and linseed oil, had

stored the same, utilised the same

for manufacturing of varnish and

paints and sold the said paints and

varnish. The said oil comes in the

category of edible oils because

soyabean oil and refined soyabean

oil are such oils in which the food

can be cooked. In this way the said

unit has utilised the edible oils

in the manufacture of paints and

varnish in illegal manner and

without obtaining any licence.

In this way the said unit and

the owner of the said unit [Modi

Industrial Unit] Sri Kailash

Chandra, Store Clerk, Om Prakash

Sharma, Factory Manager and Modi

Paints and Varnish Works, Modinagar

have violated the clause 4 of the

U.P. Oil Seeds and Oilseeds

Products Control Order 1966 [as

amended upto date] Government Order

1284/XXIX-E-C-L-112[US]/77 dated

8.3.1977 which is published in the

U.P. Gazette dated 8th March 1977

and G.O. No.4500/XXIX-Section 8-22

Oil/82 dated 29.10.1982 and Clauses

2, 3, and 6 of Pulses Edible Oil

Seed and Edible Oil [Storage

Control] Order 1977 [as amended

upto date] which is a punishable

offence under Section 3/7 of the

Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Therefore register a case

against all the aforesaid persons

and take necessary action. The

copies of recovery memos and

Supurdginama are enclosed herewith

accordingly the entire aforesaid

stored oil has been given in the

custody of Sri Nand Kishore,

General Manager, Modi Industries,

Modinagar and the sample seal and

the nine sealed samples along with

two stock registers are accordingly

being handed over by me in the

police station."

The respondent filed Criminal Misc. Petition No.15985 of 1985 in the High Court of Allahabad. The learned single Judge of the High Court by order dated January 7, 1986 quashed the F.I.R. holding that as per the case set out in the counter-affidavit, the respondent was not engaged in the sale or purchase of the oil seeds; he has been engaged in the manufacture of paints and varnishes. Therefore, he is not a dealer in oil seeds or edible oil covered under the U.P. Oilseeds and Oil-seeds Products Control Order, 1966 (for short, the ’Order’]. Accordingly, the prosecution against the respondent is not in accordance with law. The application was accordingly allowed and the F.I.R. was quashed. Thus this appeal by special leave.

The term "dealer" has been defined in clause 2 [g] of the Order thus:

"[g] ‘Dealer’ means a person

engaged in the business of purchase

or sale or storage for sale of oil

seeds - and oilseeds products, but

does not include the [Food

Corporation of India] the U.P. Food

and Essential Commodities

Corporation or a dealer who stocks

less than 5 quintals of oils or

less than 10 quintals of oil seeds

or less than 25 quintals".

No dealer shall occupy or set up any premise for purchase or sale or storage for sale of oil-seeds and oilseeds products, except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence granted by the Regional Food Controller under the Order.

Another Order, viz., Pulses, Edible Oil-seeds and Edible Oils [Storage Control Order], 1977 was issued. "Dealer" under clause 2 [f] thereof was defined to mean "a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any pulses, edible oil seeds or edible oils, whether or not in conjunction with any other business and includes his representative or agent". Clause 3 thereof also provides the mandatory requirement of obtaining licence by dealers with the following language:

"3. Licensing of dealers:-

Notwithstanding anything contained

in any State Orders after the

expiration of a period of fifteen

days from the coming into force of

this clause, no person shall carry

on business as a dealer in pulses

or in edible oilseeds or in edible

oils except under and in accordance

with the terms and conditions of a

licence granted under a State Order

if the stocks of pulses or edible

oilseeds or edible oils in his

possession exceed the quantities

specified below :

(i) Pulses 10 quintals for

all pulses taken

together.

(ii) Edible oils 5 quintals for

including all edible

hydrogenated oils including

vegetable hydrogenated

oils vegetable oils

taken together

(iii)Edible oil- 30 quintals of

seeds including all edible

groundnut in oilseeds.

shell."

Clause 4 imposes restriction on possession of pulses, edible oil-seeds and edible oils. No dealer shall, after a period of fifteen days from the coming into force of this clauses either by himself or by any person on his behalf, store or have in his possession at any time pulses, edible oil seeds or edible oils in excess of the quantities specified thereunder. The quantities specified or stock limits - maximum and minimum - have been prescribed.

Admittedly, the respondent does not have any licence issued under either of the Orders. Both the Orders issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act regulate "possession of" ant "dealing in" of the essential commodities for equitable distribution at fair price or for supply to the consumers. The question, therefore is: whether the respondent is a dealer within the meaning of either of the Orders? The case of the respondent is that since he stored 843 quintals and 57 kgs. of soyabean oil, 8147 quintals and 45 kgs of castor oil and 32 quintals and 51 kgs. of refined soyabean oil for the purpose of manufacturer of paints and varnish, he is not a dealer. That contention was accepted by the High Court. We find that the High Court is wholly incorrect in that construction. It is seen that the dealer means a person engaged in the business of purchase or sale or storage for sale of oil-seeds or oilseeds products. The exemption from the Order is given to the Food Corporation of India and the U.P. Food and Essential Commodities Corporation as they are public undertakings for regulating distribution of essential commodities. They are not dealer under the Orders. Any other dealer who stocks quantity less than the minimal prescribed under the Orders need not obtain licence. Even a person who is engaged in the business of purchasing oils or oil seeds for the purpose of using them in another commercial products is a dealer under the definitions referred to hereinabove, when he stores the quantity in excess of the limits prescribed by the Orders.

This controversy is no longer res integra.In State of A.P. v. Abdul Bakhi & Bros. [(1964) 7 SCR 764], a three- Judge Bench of this Court considered a similar question having arisen under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950. The respondent was carrying on business of tanning hides and skins and selling the tanned skins. He kept in stores a total quantity of tanning barks. He contended that since he was not dealing in them but stored them for the purpose of manufacture, he could not be held to be a dealer and that, therefore, he is not liable to pay the sales tax on its turnover. This Court had rejected the contention and held that when a person is buying or selling a commodityspecified in the Rule for use as finished products in another commercial use, he is engaged in the business of buying, selling or supplying that commodity and, therefore, he is a dealer within the meaning of that Act.

In view of the specific definitions contained in clauses 2 [g] and 2 [f] of the respective Orders there is no doubt to conclude that he is a dealer under the respective Orders. Since he had not obtained a licence, he is liable to be proceeded with in accordance with law. ’

Dr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that though the respondent had sought for licence, the licence had not been given to him and, therefore, he cannot be proceeded with. He also further contended that the F.I.R. does not contain all the ingredients of the offence and, therefore, the High Court was right in quashing the F.I.R. It is seen that the complaint is self-explanatory and has specifically mentioned about the storage of oil and oil seeds without licence under the respective Orders. It is not in dispute that the F.I.R. did mention that he purchased and kept in store the above quantity. Thus the ingredients have been specified. Whether he has applied for licence or not, we are not concerned with that controversy in this case.

The question then is: whether the High Court is right in its exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.? This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pirthi i & Anr. [Crl. A. 1752 of 1995] decided on November 30, 1995 held as under:

"It is thus settled law that the

exercise of inherent power of the

High Court is an exceptional one.

Great care should be taken by the

High Court before embarking to

scrutinize the FlR/charge-

sheet/complaint. In deciding

whether the case is rarest of rare

cases to scuttle the prosecution in

its inception, it first has to get

into the grip of the matter whether

the allegations constitute the

offence. It must be remembered that

FIR is only an initiation to move

the machinery and to investigate

into cognizable offence. After the

investigation is conducted and the

charge-sheet is laid the

prosecution produces the statements

of the witnesses recorded under

Section 161 of the Code in support

of the charge-sheet. At that stage

it is not the function of the Court

to weigh the pros and cons of the

prosecution case or to consider

necessity of strict compliance of

the provisions which are considered

mandatory and its effect of non-

compliance. It would be done after

the trial is concluded. The Court

has to prima facie consider from

the averments in the charge-sheet

and the statements of witnesses on

the record in support thereof

whether court could take cognizance

of the offence, on that evidence

and proceed further with the trial.

If it reaches a conclusion that no

cognigisable offence is made out no

further act could be done except to

quash the charge sheet. But only in

exceptional cases, i.e. in rarest

of rare cases of mala fide

initiation of the proceedings to

wreak private vengeance process of

criminal is availed of in laying a

complaint or FIR itself does not

disclose at all any cognisable

offence - the court may embark upon

the consideration thereof and

exercise the power.

When the remedy under Section

482 is available, the High Court

would be loath and circumspect to

exercise its extraordinary power

under Article 226 since efficacious

remedy under Section 482 of the

Code is available. When the Court

exercises its inherent power under

Section 482 the prime consideration

should only be whether the exercise

of the power would advance the

cause of justice or it would be an

abuse of the process of the court.

When investigating officer spends

considerable time to collect the

evidence and places the charge-

sheet before the Court, further

action should not be short-

circuited by resorting to exercise

inherent power to quash the charge-

sheet. The social stability and

order requires to be regulated by

proceeding against the offender as

it is an offence against the

society as a whole. This cardinal

principle should always be kept in

mind before embarking upon

exercising inherent power. The

accused involved in an economic

offence destablises the economy and

causes grave incursion on the

economic planning of the Stats.

When the legislature entrusts the

power to the police officer to

prevent organized commission of the

offence or offences involving moral

turpitude or crimes of grave nature

and are entrusted with power to

investigate into the crime in

intractable terrains and secretive

manner in concert, greater

circumspection and care and caution

should be born in mind by the High

Court when it exercises its

inherent power. Otherwise, the

social order and security would be

put in jeopardy and to grave risk.

The accused will have field day in

establishing the economy of the

State regulated under the relevant

provisions.

In State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [Crl. A. No.66 of 1996] decided on January 18, 1996, this Court observed as under:

"It has been held by this Court in

several cases that the inherent

power of the court under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure should be very sparingly

and cautiously used only when the

court comes to the conclusion that

there would be manifest injustice

or there would be abuse of the

process of the court, if such power

is not exercised. So far as the

order of cognizance by a Magistrate

is concerned, the inherent power

can be exercised when the

allegations in the First

Information Report or the complaint

together with the other materials

collected during investigation

taken at their face values do not

constitute the offence alleged. At

that stage it is not open for the

court either to shift the evidence

or appreciate the evidence and come

to the conclusion that no prima

facie case is made out."

In Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi & Ors. [JT 199 (1) 656] this Court held as under:

"... According to the complaint,

the respondents had thereby

committed breach of trust of

Government money. In support of the

above allegations made in the

complaint copies of the salary

statements of the relevant periods

were produced. In spite of the fact

that the complaint and the

documents annexed thereto clearly

made out a, prima facie, case for

cheating, breach of trust and

forgery, the High Court proceeded

to consider the version of the

respondents given out in their

petition filed under Section 482,

Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis that of the

appellant and entered into the

debatable area of deciding which of

the version was true, - a course

wholly impermissible...".

We accordingly hold that the High Court has committed grave error of law in quashing the F.I.R. The High Court should be loathe to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, as the case may be, and allow the law to take its own course.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. Investigating Officer is directed to complete the investigation within four weeks from the date of the receipt of this order and the appropriate Court would dispose of the case within six months therefrom.

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