PETITIONER:
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HIS HOLINESS SRILLA SRI AMBALAVANAPANDARA SANNADHI ADHEENAKA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/11/1996
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK
ACT
HEADNOTE
JUDGMENT
ORDER
Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Special Tribunal of Madras in S.T. Appeal No.8 of 1982, dated November 15, 1988, by two learned Judges of the Madras High Court under the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversation into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 26 of 1963) (for short, the ‘Act’). The admitted facts are that respondents 3 to 438 are the cultivating tenants of the lands in Kodarangulam village, which is an estate under the Act. It was admittedly notified and taken over under the Act; as a result, the respondents as well as the first respondent came to file application under Section 9 of the Act for issuance of ryotwari Patta. The Tribunal granted Patta to the first respondent and on special appeal, the High Court had confirmed the same. It would appear that some of the tenants had filed special leave petitions on earlier occasions also, but the same came to be summarily dismissed. The State has come up by special leave with permission against the judgment of the Special Tribunal. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Shri R. Sunderavardan, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the State did not file any appeal against the order of the Tribunal and that, therefore, it cannot file appeal against the Special Tribunal’s judgment. Though technically he is right, but this Court has power under Article 136 of the Constitution, even to entertain an appeal against the original order of the Tribunal, which stood confirmed in the judgment of the Special Tribunal in the impugned judgment. Permission was granted to file the special leave. Under these circumstances, we do not see any force in the contention on the maintainability of the appeal.
It is contended for the appellant-State that by operation of the definition of "private land" under Section 3(13) of the Act read with Section 3(1)(b) of the Estate Land Act, 1908 and in view of the presumptions drawn under Section 185 of the Estates Land Act and Section 65 of the Act, the land is presumed to be ryoti land and the tenant in occupation is a ryot unless the first respondent proves that it is a private land. The cultivation test is one of the important criteria, apart from other consideration, since the tenants have been in continuous possession for a long period. It must be presumed that the land is a ryoti land. As a consequence, the tenants are ryots. Accordingly, they are entitled to ryotwari patta under Section 9 of the Act. On the other hand, it is the contention of Shri Sunderavardan, learned senior counsel, that both Melwaram and Kudivaram rights have been retained by the first respondent. It has been asserting its own right as a full owner. It is a freehold land as confirmed in the Inams Fair Register maintained by the Inams Commissioner as early as in 1864. Consequently, it is a private land. It is not necessary that the first respondent, being a religious institution, should personally cultivate the land. By operation of the Amendment Act 27 of 1966, the cultivation test, as regards religious institutions, has been dispensed with. Consequently, the ryotwari patta granted under Section 9 of the first respondent is valid in law. In view of the diverse contentions, the question that arises for consideration is; whether the respondent-tenants are entitled to ryotwari patta or the ryotwari patta granted to the first respondent is in accordance with law? With a view to appreciate the contentions, it is necessary to look into certain definitions under the Act. Section 3(7) defines "inam estate" to mean "an existing inam estate or a new inam estate".
"Section 3(13) defines "private
land" thus:
"(i) in relation to an existing
inam estate shall have the same
meaning as in sub-clause (b) of
clause (10) of Section 3 of the
Estates Land Act and
(ii) in relation to a new inam
estate shall mean the domain or
home-farm land of the landholder,
by whatever designation known, such
as kambattam, khas, sir or Pannai;
or..."
Section 2(16) defines ryot" thus:
"(i) in relation to an existing
inam estate shall have the same
meaning as in clause (15) of
Section 3 of the Estate land Act;
and
(ii) in relation to a new inam
estate shall mean a person who
holds for the purpose of
agriculture ryoti land in such
estate on condition of paying to
the landholder the rent which is
legally due upon it.
Explanation is not necessary for the purpose of this case.
Section 9 deals with grant of ryotwari patta. Subsection (1) of Section 9 envisages thus:
"9.(1) In the case of an existing
inam estate, the landholder shall,
with effect on and from the
notified date, be entitled to a
ryotwari patta in respect of
(a) all lands which immediately
before the notified date
(i) belonged to him as private land
within the meaning of sub-clause
(b) of clause (10) of Section 3 of
the Estates Land Act, or
(ii) stood recorded as private land
in a record prepared under the
provisions of Chapter XI or Chapter
XII of the said Act:
Provided that the private land
referred to in sub-clause (i) and
(ii)
(1) has not been subsequently
converted into ryoti land or has
not been finally held to be ryoti
land under Section 3-A of the
Madras Estate Land (Reduction of
Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXX of
1947); and
(2) is proved to have been
cultivated by the landholder
himself, by his own servants or by
hired labour with his own or hired
stock, in the ordinary course of
husbandry, for a continuous period
of three years within a period of
twelve years immediately before the
1st day of April, 1960; and
(b)(1) all lands which were
properly included or which ought to
have been properly included in the
holding of a ryot and which have
been acquired by the landholder by
inheritance or succession under a
will, provided that the landholder
has cultivated such lands himself,
by his own servants or by hired
labour with his own or hired stock,
in the ordinary course of
husbandry, from the date of such
acquisition or the 1st day of July
1950, whichever is later and has
been in direct and continuous
possession of such lands from such
later date;
(ii) all lands which were properly
included, or which ought to have
been properly included, in the
holding of a ryot and which have
been acquired by the landholder by
purchase, exchange or gift,
including purchase a sale for
arrears of rent, provided that the
landholder has cultivated such
lands himself, by his own servants
or by hired labour, with his own or
hired stock, in the ordinary course
of husbandry, from the 1st day of
July, 1950, and has been in direct
and continuous possession of such
lands from that date;
(iii) all lands [not being (i)
lands of the description specified
in sub-clause (a), (b) and (c) of
clause (16) of Section 3 of the
Estates Land Act, or (ii) forest
lands] which have been voluntarily
abandoned or relinquished by a
ryot, or which have never been in
the occupation of a ryot, provided
that the landholder has cultivated
such lands himself, by his own
servants or by hired labour, with
his own or hired stock, in the
ordinary course of husbandry, from
the 1st day of July, 1950 and has
been in direct and continuous
possession of such lands from that
date.
Sub-section (2) of Section 9 reads as under:
"(2) In the case of a new inam
estate the landholder shall, with
effect on and from the notified
date, be entitled to a ryotwari
patta in respect of
(a) all lands which immediately
before the notified date belonged
to him as private land:
Provided that in the case of
private land specified in clause
(13)(ii)(a) of Section 2, such land
is proved to have been cultivated
by the landholder himself, by his
own servants or by hired labour,
with his or hired stock, in the
ordinary course of husbandry, for a
continuous period of three years
within a period of three years
within a period of twelve years
immediately before the 1st day of
April 1960; and
(b)(i) all lands in the holding of
a ryot and which have been acquired
by the landholder by inheritance or
succession under a will, provided
that the landholder has cultivated
such lands himself, by his own
servants or by hired labour with
his own or hired stock, in the
ordinary course of husbandry, from
the date of such acquisition or the
1st day of April, 1960, whichever
is later and has been in direct and
continuous possession of such lands
from such later date;
(ii) all lands in the holding or
ryot and which have been acquired
by the landholder by purchase,
exchange or gift, including
purchase at a sale for arrears of
rent, provided that the landholder
has cultivated such lands himself,
by his own servants or by hired
labour, with his own or hired
stock, in the ordinary course of
husbandry, from the 27th day of
September, 1955, or from the date
of such acquisition whichever is
later and has been in direct and
continuous possession of such lands
from such later date:
Provided that nothing in this sub-
clause shall apply to any
acquisition by purchase, exchange
or gift including purchase at a
sale for arrears of rent by the
landholder on or after the 1st day
of April, 1960.
(iii) all lands [not being (i) land
of the description specified in
items (a), (b) and (c) of the sub-
clause (ii) of clause (17) of
Section 2, or (ii) forest lands]
which have been voluntarily
abandoned or relinquished by a
ryot, or which have never been in
the occupation of a ryot, provided
that the landholder has cultivated
such lands himself, by his own
servants or by hired labour, with
his own or hired stock, in the
ordinary course of husbandry, from
the 27th day of September, 1955,
and has been in direct and
continuous possession of such lands
from that date."
It would, thus, be seen that a ryot in an estate is defined under clause (15) of Section 3 of the Estates Land Act and if he is a new ryot, it is defined under sub-clause (b) of clause (16) of sub-section (2) of the Act. Though there is a dispute as to whether it is a new estate or an existing estate, in view of the clinching evidence or record, we have no hesitation to conclude that it is an existing estate. In the judgment under appeal, the learned Judges have referred to the confirmation of title deed by Inams Commissioner on September 10, 1864 wherein it was recorded that the title deed relates to the "whole village of Kodarangulam and its hamlets as whole village" and its annual quit rent was Rs.2,810/- inclusive of the jodi already charged on the land. Thus, it is clear that it was as existing estate, but not a new estate as presumed by the learned Judges in the High Court. The question then is: whether the tenants are ryots within the meaning of Section 3(15) of the Estate Land Act? The said section reads as under:
"3(15). "Ryot" means a person who
holds for the purpose of
agriculture ryoti land in an estate
on condition of paying to the
landholder the rent which is
legally due upon it."
Section 3 (16) defines ryot land
means cultivable land in an estate
other than private land, but does
not include
"(a) beds and bunds of tanks and of
supply, drainage, surplus or
irrigation channels;]
(b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands,
village sites, and other lands
situated in any estate which are
set apart for the common use of the
villagers;
(c) lands granted on service tenure
either free of rent or on
favourable rates of rent if granted
before the passing of this Act or
free of rent if granted after that
date, so long as the service tenure
subsists."
Ryoti land means entirable lands in an estate by a ryot who holds it for agriculture on condition of paying rent to the land-holder which is legally due other than private land.
Section 185 draws a presumption that the land in an Inam village is not a private land. Similarly, Section 65 of the Act draws a presumption that it is a ryoti land unless it is proved that it is a private land.
The question therefore, is: whether it is a private land? "Private land" has been defined under Section 3 (1) of the Estate Land Act, which reads as under:
"(a) in the case of an estate
within the meaning of [sub-clause
(a), (b), (c) or (e) of clause (2)]
means the domain or home-farm land
of the landholder by whatever
designation known, such as,
kambattam, khas, sir or Pannai, and
includes all land which is proved
to have been cultivated as private
land by the landholder himself, by
his own servants or by hired stock,
for a continuous period of twelve
years immediately before the
commencement of this Act; and
(b) in the case of an estate within
the meaning of sub-clause (d) of
clause (2), means Pannai; or
(ii) land which is proved to have
been cultivated as private land by
the landholder himself, by his own
servants or by hired labour, with
his own or hired stock, for a
continuous period of twelve years,
immediately before the first day of
July 1908, provided that the
landholder has retained the
kudivaram ever since and has not
converted the land into ryoti land;
and
(iii) land which is proved to have
been cultivated by the landholder
himself, by his own servants or by
hired labour, with his own or hired
stock, for a continuous period of
twelve years immediately before the
first day of November, 1933,
provided that the landholder has
retained the kudivaram ever since
and as not converted the land into
ryoti land; or
A reading of it would clearly indicate that in the case of an estate within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 "private land" means the domain or home-farm land of the landholder of whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir or Pannai or the land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years, immediately before the first day of July, 1908, provided that the landholder has retained the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land. The question, therefore, is: whether the first respondent, though it was declared as a freehold land, had converted it into a ryoti land? It is seen that there is overwhelming evidence on record to establish that the tenants have been in possession of the land for a long period and ever since they have been cultivating the land.
In T.S. Pl. P. Chidambaram Chettiar vs. T.K.B. Santhanaramaswami Odayar & Ors. [(1968) 2 SCR 754 at 765], this Court had held thus:
"It seems to use that the
definition reads as a whole
indicates clearly that the ordinary
test for ‘private land’ is the test
of retention by the landholder for
his personal use and cultivation by
him or under his personal
supervision. No doubt, such lands
may be let on short leases for the
convenience of the landholder
without losing their distinctive
character; but it is not the
intention or the scheme of the Act
to treat as private those lands
with reference to which the only
peculiarity is the fact that the
landlord owns both the farms in the
lands and has been letting them out
on short term leases. There must,
in our opinion, be something in the
evidence either by way of proof of
direct cultivation or by some clear
indication of an intent to regard
these land as retained for the
personal use of the landholder an
his establishment in order to place
those lands in the special category
of private lands in which a tenant
under the Act cannot acquire
occupancy rights. In the present
case, there is no proof that the
lands were ever directly cultivated
by the landholder. Admittedly, soon
after the grant of 1862, the estate
came under the administration of
Receivers, who always let out the
lands to the tenants to be
cultivated."
In Pollisetti Pullamma & Ors vs. Kalluri Rameswaramma & Ors. [1990 Supp. (2) SCR 393], this Court had held that the ratio of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Periannan & Ors. vs. Airabadeeswarar Soundaranayagi Amman Kovil of O’Siruvayal by its truestees M.A.R. Periannan Chettiar & Ors. [AIR 1952 Madras 323] was held no longer good law in the light of the ratio in Chidambaram Chettiar’s case (supra). The same was also reiterated in later decisions.
It is seen from the evidence on record that there is overwhelming evidence that the tenants have been cultivating that land and ever since they are in possession, though the first respondent had filed a suit against them for evicting and other reliefs. In those suits, it was admitted that they were cultivating the land as tenants and committed default in paying rent. On that admission, the necessary conclusion is that the first respondent has converted the lands by its conduct as a ryoti land and the tenants have kudivaram rights and given the land on leasehold to the tenants and was collecting the rent from them. The tenants are the tillers of the soil and have fundamental right to economic empowerment under Article 39(b) which enjoins distribution of material resources to accord socio-economic justice and means for development for social status and dignity of person. Land is a source of livelihood. There is a strong linkage between the land and social status. The strip of the land on which the till and live assures them social justice and dignity of person providing near decent means of livelihood. So, economic empowerment is their fundamental right. They became the ryots and, ever since, remained in possession as ryots. Therefore, they are entitled to ryotwari Patta.
It is seen that the first respondent had purchased the land for the maintenance of the Math as well as the temple. Under these circumstances, it is necessary that the Institution and the temple are required to be maintained. Though the tenant/respondents are entitled to the ryotwari Patta, they should be burdened with the liability to maintain the Institution and the temple. As a consequence, we direct that every tenant shall deliver, regularly, to the Adheenam, the first respondent, every year, three quintals of paddy per acre within fifteen days after the harvest. In the event of their committing default in delivery of the three quintals of paddy per acre, they are liable to and shall pay interest at the rate of 21% from the date of default till date of payment. In the event of their committing further default in making the payment with interest, if the Institution is driven to lay the suit for recovery of the same, they should also be liable to pay, apart from the costs to be incurred for the recovery of the said amount, exemplary costs for the institution of the suit for recovery of the amount. With these conditions, the respondent-tenants are entitled to grant of ryotwari Patta under Section 9 of the Act.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.