PETITIONER:
THE SREE NARAYANA DHARMA-SANGAM TRUST
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SWAMI PRAKASANANDA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA
ACT
HEADNOTE
JUDGMENT
ORDER
Leave granted. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the Kerala High Court, made on January 16, 1996 in R.P. No.204/95 in C . R . P . No . 2724/94.
The dispute has arisen with regard to the election to the Committee of Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust. The Trust is governed by the scheme framed by the High Court in A.S. No.14/56, dated March 26, 1959. since the term of the elected body was to expire on 10.8.94, the Trust Board on 4.7.94 decided to conduct election on 26.7.94. Disputes had arisen as to the validity of the elections held on 26.7.94 and the suit came to be filed. Ad-interim injunction was granted by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Attingal in O.S. No.247/94 on 22.11 94. Against the interlocutory order passed by the appellate authority in C.M.A. No.167/94, dated December 2, 1994 C.R.P. No.2727/94 came to be filed. The High Court by judgment dated June 19, 1995 allowed the revision, set aside the order of the appellate authority and gave certain directions. Calling that matter in question S.L.P. (C) No.13667/95 came to be filed in this Court, This Court on June 29, 1995 passed the following order:
"We do not find any ground
warranting interference since it is
an individual case and that too by
an interim order. The S.L.P. is
dismissed. However, the trial
Court is directed to dispose of the
suit as expeditiously as possible
preferably within a period of six
months from the date of receipt of
this order."
Thereafter, an application came to be filed to review the order passed by the High Court in the revision, which had been dismissed by the High Court holding that the order passed by the High Court stood merged with the order of this Court. As a consequence, the High Court cannot review the order. Thus this appeal, by special leave.
Shri P.S. Poti, learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that this Court did not decide the matter on merits. When the patent error is apparent on the face of the record, it is always reviewable by the High Court and, therefore, the order dismissing the S.L.P. does not operate as a final order. Therefore, the High Court has the power to review its order. We find no merit in the contention. In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhimaji Ingle [(1996) 3 SCC 463] this Court has considered the similar controversy. The facts therein were that the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal passed an order in O.A. No 1169/93 against which S.L.P. was filed in this Court. It was dismissed by this Court on August 28, 1993. Pending the S.L.P., a review petition was filed in the Tribunal. The Tribunal reviewed its order. When that order came to be challenged, this Court held thus:
"4. But in this case, when the
self-same main order was confirmed
by this Court the question arises
whether the Tribunal has had power
under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any
other appropriate provision under
the Tribunals Act to review the
orders passed by it and confirmed
by this Court by refusing to grant
leave. We find that the exercise of
the review power is deleterious to
the judicial discipline. Once this
Court has confirmed the order
passed by the Tribunal, that
becomes final. Therefore, the
Tribunal cannot have any power to
review the previous order which
stands merged with the order
passed by this Court.
5. It is next contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent
that though the Tribunal was
communicated with the order of this
Court dated 25.8.1995, it has
thereafter passed the order. it
would mean that thought it had the
knowledge of dismissal of the order
passed by this Court, the Tribunal
has exercised the power of review
and that, therefore, it cannot be
said to be illegal. We are wholly
unable to appreciate the contention
of the learned counsel. We could
appreciate that if the Tribunal
had no knowledge of dismissal of
the SLP it might, in certain
circumstances, review its earlier
order, e.g., if it was found that
the order was vitiated by any
manifest error of law apparent on
the face of the record. But having
received the communication that
this Court has already upheld its
order, the Tribunal’s exercise of
power can be said to be audacious
and without any judicial
discipline. Under those
circumstances, we do not think that
the Tribunal is justified in
reviewing its own order when this
Court had confirmed the order
passed earlier."
Therefore, once this Court has passed an order, the order passed by the High Court stands merged with the order passed by this Court. Thereafter, the High Court/Tribunal is devoid of the jurisdiction to a review the order. This question also was reiterated in Yogendra Narayan choudhary V. Union of India [(1996) 7 SSC 1] thus:
"It is settled law that even the
dismissal of special leave petition
in. limine without assigning
reasons does not operate as res
judicata. Under these
circumstances, we are of the view
that the view or the latter Bench
of the CAT, Calcutta and of the
Cuttack Bench are clearly
consistent with the above
reasoning. Therefore we do not find
that there are fit cases warranting
interferences.
Thus it is settled law that even the dismissal of special leave petition in limine operates as a final order between the parties and any order passed by the High Court Tribunal subsequently operates as a res judicata as far as the parties thereto. are concerned. It is true that in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1386) 3 SCR at 558] this Court had pointed out that when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court in limine, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not precluded. The dismissal of the writ Petition under Article 32 does not operate as res judicata. That principle is entirely different from the review of an order under Order 47 Rule 1. Under these circumstances. we are of the view that the High Court is well justified in refusing to review the order passed in the revision. However, since the records have been called by the High Court and the matter is pending, the trial Court could not dispose of the matter within the time limit, specified earlier, by this Court.’ Therefore, we cannot find fault with the trial Court for non-disposal of the matter. However, the civil court is directed to dispose of the suit as indicated earlier within six months from now.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.