PETITIONER:
SREE GAJANANA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 418 1977 SCR (1) 665
1977 SCC (1) 37
ACT
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, s. 43(1)---State Government
can direct imposition of fixed rates on stage-carriage
operators for carrying mails as condition permit Ss.
48(3) and 59(3)(c), such directions do not interfere with
quasi judicial functions of Regional Transport
Authority--Special provisions of s. 48 (3)(XV) do not over-
ride general provisions of s. 43(1)(d)(1).
HEADNOTE
The State Government issued a notification u/s 43(1)
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, directing the State Transport
Authority to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of
freight upon the operators of stage-carriages other than
State Transport undertakings, carrying mails or postal
goods. The S.T.A. then directed the Regional Transport
Authority, u/s 44(1) of the Act, to impose the duty of
carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by the Government
as a condition annexed u/s 48(3)(XV) to permits.
The appellant contended that the power of the Government
u/s 43(1) to issue directions relating to "freights", does
not include imposition of charges for carrying postal goods
as conditions of permits granted by the Regional Transport
Authority. in exercise of its quasi judicial powers. Dis-
missing the appeal the Court,
HELD: The State Government has the data and the legal
power under Section 43(1) of the Act to fix freights for
carriage of postal goods in various types of carriages
mentioned there, including stage carriages. Such charges are
merely a species of freight on postal goods about which the
State Government can issue appropriate directions. [668 E]
(2) Section 48(3) deals with what lies past the quasi-
judicial stage of decision to grant the permit. At that
stage, the decision to grant the permit is already there and
only conditions have to be attached to the permit. The
Regional Transport Authority has, at this stage to act
mainly mechanically after considering matters on which it
has, acting quasi-judicially, formed an opinion and taken a
decision. There is no interference with the quasi-judicial
functions as the annexation of a condition like. this is a
part of the purely executive duties of the Regional.Trans-
port Authority. [668 D-E, 669 A]
S. Srikantiah & Ors. v. The Regional Transport Author-
ity, Anantapur & Ors [1971] Suppl. SCR 816 followed.
(3) There is no question of any special provision over-
riding the general. The provisions are complementary.
Section 48(3)(XV) is really meant to carry out the direc-
tions which can legally be given under section 43( 1 )(d)(i)
of the Act. [669 B--C]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 366 of 1976
(From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1974 of the
Karnataka High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No. 171/73).
K.N. Bhatta and M. Rangaswamy for the Appellant
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 3
B.R.G.K. Achar for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
666
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG J.--This appeal by special leave raises the question
whether the State Government could, by a general direction
given under Section 43(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) fix the charges to be
imposed upon operators of stage carriages for carrying mails
as conditions of their permits.
Section 48 of the Act lays down the power of the Region-
al Transport Authority to grant stage carriage permits with
conditions annexed thereto. The first stage of exercise of
this power is preceded by’ the quasi-judicial enquiry, under
Section 47 of the Act, into the matters affecting the
interests of public in general. Section 48, sub.. s. (1),
subjecting the power to grant stage carriage permits to
provisions of section 47 of the. Act, includes what may be’
correctly characterised as the "quasi-judicial" power either
to grant or refuse to grant a permit after consideration of
matters stated in Section 47 of the Act. After that, we
come to the power to attach conditions laid down in Sec-
tion 48(3), and we find:
"49(3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides
to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a
service of stage carriages of a specified description or for
one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject to
any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the
permit any one or more of the following conditions,
namely: ......... "
Out of a number of kinds of conditions which may be imposed,
the xvth, given below, is relevant:
"(xv) that mails shall be carried on any of the vehi-
cles authorised by the permit subject to such conditions
(including conditions as to the time in which mails are to
be carried and the charges which may be levied) as may be
specified".
Now, it is contended on behalf of the appellants, that
the power to attach conditions under. Section 48(3) is also
quasi-judicial with which the State Government neither has
nor ought to have any concern. The conditions of permits
are prescribed by statute. It is for the authority, exer-
cising the power quasi-judicially to grant or not to grant
permits, to decide what conditions to attach or not to
attach to each permit. It is. not, it is submitted, for the
State Government to dictate any conditions to be attached.
Hence, the challenge to the Government notification dated
30th May, 1968, which directed the State Transport Authori-
ty, to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of freight
upon operators carrying mails or postal goods in stage
carriages owned by operators other than State Transport
Undertakings throughout the State. The State Transport
Authority had, in its turn, issued a direction to the Re-
gional Transport Authorities all over the State under
Section 44 (1 ) of the Act to impose,
667
duty of carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by
the Government as a condition annexed under Section 48(3)
(xv) to permits.
The relevant part of Section 43 (1) of the Act
enacts: "43 (1) A State Government having regard
to-
(a) the advantage’s offered to the public, trade
and industry by the above development of motor
transport, and
(b) the desirability of co-ordinating road and
rail transport, and
(c) the desirability of preventing the deterio-
ration of the road system, and
(d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic
competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to
time, by notification in the Official Gazette,
issue directions to the State Transport Authority--
(i) regarding the fixing of fares and
freights for stage carriages, contract carriages
and public carriers;"
Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the
power of the Government to issue directions relating to
"freights" does not include imposition of charges for carry-
ing postal goods as conditions permits which the Regional
Transport Authority grants in exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers. The attack on the validity of the Government direc-
tion is thus two fold: firstly, that it falls outside the
scope of Section 43(1) of the Act as charges for carrying
mail are not "freight" on goods carried; and, secondly,
that no directions could be given to a quasi-judicial au-
thority as to how it should perform its functions.
So far as the first argument is concerned, we do not
find much substance in it. The term "charge" is a broad one.
As used here, it is not a technical term and has not been
defined by the Act. It has, therefore, its ordinary dic-
tionary meaning. It means any amount which may be demanded
as a price for the rendering of some service or as price of
some goods. The argument of the learned Counsel for the
appellant that the Act uses the term "freight" to. indicate
the charge made on carriage of goods, whereas the term
"fare" is used for the charge made for carrying passengers,
itself rests on the assumption that the term charge is a
wide one. It includes both freights and fares. It is true
that the term "fare" is used in relation to charges made for
carriage of passengers and the term freight is used for
charges made for the carriage of goods. Nevertheless, both
are charges. It may be that stage carriages are meant for
the carriage of passengers. But, as is a matter of common
knowledge, they also carry the luggage of passengers. In
other words, they also carry some goods incidentally. The
mail bags in which the postal goods are sent are only a type
of goods which are not so bulky as to require trucks
11--l234SCI/76
668
Or special vans. It is possible to carry them in stage
carriages together with the luggage of the passengers. In
any case, this is a condition which is probably imposed
only in those areas where mail vans of the State are not
found to be necessary or economical to run. In the villages
in the interior of some rural areas, there may not be so
much mail to carry as to justify sending a mail van.
Therefore, power is given to the Regional Transport Authori-
ty to attach the condition that postal goods should be
carried in stage carriages at rates fixed by the Govern-
ment. The real grievance of the operators is not that they
have to carry postal goods as a condition of their permits
but that the rates fixed are too low. The proper remedy for
such a grievance is, as the High Court rightly pointed out,
to apply to the Government for revision of rates fixed.
Coming to the second submission, we may observe that,
although, there is ample authority for the proposition that
the grant of stage carriage permits is a quasi-judicial
function, with which the State Government cannot interfere
by giving directions which may impede the due performance of
such functions, yet, when Section 48(3) speaks of the
power to attach conditions after the decision to grant the
permit, it really deals with what lies past the quasi judi-
cial stage of decision to grant the permit. At that stage,
the decision to grant the permit is already there and only
conditions have to be attached to the permit, such as the
necessity to carry postal goods on certain routes at rates
fixed by the Government. On the face of it, these rates
cannot be properly determined by the Regional Transport
Authority. They have to be uniform throughout the State. A
decision on what they should be must rest on considerations
of policy and on facts which are not quite relevant to the
grant of stage carriage permits.- In any case, it is the
State Government which has the data and the legal power,
under Section 43(1).of the Act, to fix freights for carriage
of postal goods in various types of carriages, mentioned
there, including stage carriages. We ’think that such
charges are merely a species of freight on postal goods
about which the State Government can issue appropriate
directions to the State Transport Authority. The Regional
Transport Authority has only to. annex the condition auto-
matically in areas where such a condition may be required to
be annexed to the permits granted.
A reference to Section 59, sub. s. (3)(c) would show
that acceptance of the fixed rates of fares and freights,
after their notification under Section 43, becomes a condi-
tion which has to be automatically attached to a permit.
The Regional Transport Authority has no option on this
matter. This is what this Court held in S. Srikantiah &
Ors. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur &
Ors.(1) In other words, the Regional Transport Authority has
to act mainly mechanically after considering matters on
which it has to form an opinion and take a decision quasi-
judicially. We think that there is no scope for argument
that there is any interference here with the quasi-judicial
functions of the Regional Transport Authority. The
(1) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 816.
669
annexation of a condition like this is a part of the purely
executive Activities of the Regional Transport Authority.
By Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 4023 of 1976,
learned Counsel for the appellant sought to add two further
grounds of appeal. These were: that, the special provisions
of Section 49(3)(xv) over-ride the general provisions of
Section 43(I)(d) (i) on the principle of interpretation
’generalia specialibus non derogant’ : and, that, in view of
the special provision of Section 48(3)(xv), the impugned
notification of the State Government was ultra vires. The
second ground is what follows if the first is good. But as
we have already explained above, the first ground itself is
not sound. There is no question of any special provision
over-riding the general. The provisions are complementary.
Section 48(3)(xv) is really meant to carry out the direction
which can legally be given under section 43(1)(d)(i) of the
Act. Therefore, although we allow the miscellaneous applica-
tion and have permitted the grounds to be argued, we reject
them as untenable.
For the reasons given above, we agree with the views
contained in the judgment of the Karnataka High Court
against which this appeal has been filed. We hold that the
impugned direction and notification by the Government was
not invalid and that the Regional Transport Authority had
not acted illegally in attaching the required condition to
the permit. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with
M.R. Appeal
dismissed.
670