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S. Ramaswamy v. Union of India & Ors.

Supreme Court of India · 17 August 1976 · [1977] 1 S.C.R. 221

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
17 August 1976
Reported as
[1977] 1 S.C.R. 221
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Chandrachud, Y.V.
Length
8 pages
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PETITIONER:
S. RAMASWAMY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/08/1976
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
GUPTA, A.C.
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2394 1977 SCR (1) 221
1976 SCC (4) 79

ACT

Directorate General of Technical Development (Class I

Posts) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1974, Rule 2, inter-

pretation of--Whether officer on special duty is in the same

grade as Development Officers.

HEADNOTE

Two vacancies arose for the selection posts of Industri-

al Advisers in the Directorate General of Technical Develop-

ment, for which some Development Officers including respond-

ents Nos. 6 to 11 applied. These respondents filed a writ

petition against the promotion of the appellant to these

posts. The Government opposed the same. During the penden-

cy of the petition which was later dismissed, the appellant

made a representation to the Departmental Promotion Commit-

tee for considering his preferential claim, but the same was

not placed before the Committee. The appellant made further

representation to the Government, but the Committee decided

to recommend respondents Nos. 6 and 7 for the appointment.

The appellant filed a writ petition against the implementa-

tion of the recommendation, but the same was dismissed.

Allowing the appeal and directing that the appellant’s

name be included in the list of eligible officers to be

considered for promotion, the Court,

HELD: Under Rule 2 of the Directorate General of Techni-

cal Development (Class I Posts) Recruitment (Amendment)

Rules, 1974, a person belonging to the first category,

failing which, persons belonging to the 2nd category; and

persons in the 3rd category are, all and together, eligible

for being considered for promotion, subject to the fixation

of the field of choice under the Home Ministry’s Memorandum

dated May 16, 1957. The amended rule does not mean that

Development Officers can be considered for promotion to the

post of Industrial Adviser only in the. event that qualified

persons from the. first two categories are not available.

[224 D-F]

(2) The Amendment Rules of 1974, contemplate on their

plain language and are framed on the basis that the officer

on special duty is in a separate grade from the grade of

Development Officers. In the particular context in which

the words "in the’ grade" occur, they mean "in that particu-

lar grade", indicating thereby that the two grades are

different although their scale of pay may be identical. The

practice by which an integrated list of officers is prenared

according to the date. on which they acquire eligibility,

not having the authority of law, is vitiated in the instant

case because of the 1974 recruitment rules. [225 E, 227 B-

C, G]

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 381 of 1976.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 31.10.1975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No.

1077 of 1975).

F.S. Nariman and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the appellant.

Shyamala Pappu and Girish Chandra, for respondents 1-3.

Sobha Dikshit, for respondents 6-7.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRACHUD, J.--On February 7, 1959 the appellant, S.

Ramaswamy, was appointed as an Assistant Development Officer

in the Directorate General of Technical Development in the

Ministry of

222

Industry and Civil Supplies, Government of India. In 1964

he was appointed as a Development Officer on an ad hoc basis

and that appointment was regularized in May, 1966. On

December 1, 1966 the post of Officer on Special Duty was

created in the Directorate in order to deal effectively with

the development of agro-based food processing industries.

The Director General (Technical Development) recommended the

appellant for appointment to the post and in course of time

the appointment was duly made.

In 1974 a question arose regarding promotion to the selec-

tion post of Industrial Adviser in the Directorate. Re-

spondents 6 to 11 and some others who were working as Devel-

opment Officers filed writ petition No. 612 of 1974 in the

Delhi High Court asking that the Government of India be

restrained from promoting the appellant to the post of

Industrial Adviser and that their claims to the post be

considered in preference to the appellant’s claim. That

petition was dismissed on September 17, 1975.

During the pendency of the writ petition filed by re-

spondents 6 to 11, the appellant had made a representation

to the Departmental Promotion Committee for considering

his preferential claim to the post of Industrial Adviser.

That Committee met on August 7, 1975 for proposing a panel

of officers for being considered for appointment to the post

of Industrial Adviser, but the appellant’s representation

was not placed before the Committee. The appellant made a

further representation to the Government on August 18, 1975

complaining that though he was eligible for being appointed

to the post of Industrial Adviser, his name was not included

in the list of eligible officers which was forwarded to the

Departmental Promotion Committee for due consideration for

appointment to the post.

The Committee, in its meeting of August 7, 1975

decided to recommend respondents 6 and 7 for appointment

as Industrial Advisers. On October 31, 1975 the appellant

filed writ petition No. 1077 of 1975 in the Delhi High Court

to restrain the Government from implementing the recommen-

dation and to restrain respondents 6 and 7 from taking

charge of the posts of Industrial Advisers. That petition

was dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of the High

Court on October 31, 1975. This appeal by special leave is

directed against the speaking order which was passed by the

High Court while dismissing the writ petition summarily.

Recruitment to the post of Industrial Adviser (Chemi-

cals) was governed originally by the Directorate General of

Technical Development (Class I posts) Recruitment Rules,

1963. Item 6 of the Schedule annexed to those Rules related

to appointment to the post of Industrial Adviser

(Chemicals), a Class I selection post, then generally in the

scale of Rs. 1300-100-2000. One of the methods of recruit-

ment to the post, as specified in column 9 of the Schedule,

was by promotion. Column 10 which regulated appointment

by promotion read thus:

"Promotion :--Development Officer having a

minimum experience of 10 years in the grade

provided however, that

223

in the scale of Rs. 1300-60-1600-100-1800, the

minimum experience shall be five years in that

grade."

In exercise of the powers conferred by Article

309 of the Constitution, the President on January

30, 1974 made the Directorate General of Technical

Development (Class I posts) Recruitment (Amendment)

Rules, 1974. Rule 2 of these Rules amended column

10 of the Schedule to the Rules of 1963 by substi-

tuting the following entry for the one extracted

above :--

"Promotion:

(i) Officer on Special Duty (Food Processing

Industries) with 5 years’ regular service in the

grade; failing which with 10 years’ regular service

in the grade of Development Officer and Officer on

Special Duty (Food Processing Industries) combined

together of which 4 years should be as Officer on

Special Duty (Food Processing Industries).

(ii) Development Officers having at least 10

years’ regular service in the grade, provided that

in respect of Development Officers, who are in the

grade of Rs. 1300-1800 not less than five years’

regular service shall be required."

That the appellant is qualified and eligible for ap-

pointment as an Industrial Adviser is beyond dispute and has

at no stage been questioned. But it has to be stated that

for the purpose of computing the completion of 5 years’

service as an Officer on Special Duty, the period during

which the appellant was working in that post on an ad hoc

basis has to be excluded from consideration. The appellant

was appointed as an Officer on Special Duty on an ad hoc

basis in 1966 but the appointment was regularized on January

23, 1970 after the President made the Recruitment Rules

dated January 14, 1970 regulating the method of recruitment

to that post. The appellant, therefore, must be taken to

have completed 5 years’ service in the post of Officer on

Special Duty on January 23, 1975.

It is also necessary to clarify that the decision of the

Departmental Promotion Committee to carve out three times

the number of vacancies viz., six as the zone of considera-

tion for promotion to the grade of Industrial Adviser is

open to no exception and has in fact not been challenged by

the appellant. The Office Memorandum dated May 16, 1975

issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs incorporates a deci-

sion taken by the Government after considering the replies

received from the various Ministries and the Union Public

Service Commission and keeping in view the policy of Govern-

ment, settled at the highest level, that greater emphasis

should be placed on merit as a criterion for promotion. It

records, inter alia, that the Departmental Promotion Commit-

tee or other selecting authority should first decide the

field of choice, i.e. the number of eligible officers await-

ing promotion who should be considered for inclusion in the

select list and that the field of choice, wherever possible,

should extend to five or six times the

224

number of vacancies expected within a year. In the instant

case, two vacancies were to be filled in the post of Indus-

trial Adviser but instead of carving out 10 or 12 persons as

the field of choice for promotion, the Committee decided to

select panel of 6 officers as the zone of consideration.

The Official Memorandum reflects but a policy decision

which cannot have the force of a rule made under Article 309

of the Constitution and therefore, the fixation of ratio for

consideration for promotion may reasonably and rationally

differ from case to case. The decision to select a panel of

six officers for appointment to the two posts of Industrial

Advisers, cannot be characterized as arbitrary or unreasona-

ble. Besides, even if a panel of 12 officers were to be

selected for consideration, the appellant would still be out

of it by the application of the impugned test adopted by the

Committee,

That test forms the centre of controversy in this ap-

peal. The test adopted by the Departmental Promotion Com-

mittee for selecting a panel of officers for consideration

for promotion to the post of Industrial Adviser may, in

terms of the counter affidavit field on’ behalf of the

Govt. be described as a ’chronological test’. Under the

Amendment Rules 1974 the channel of promotion to the post of

Industrial Adviser is this: (i) Officer on Special Duty with

five years’ regular service in the grade; or (ii) failing

that, persons with 10 years’ regular serbined service in

the grade of Development Officer and in the grade of Officer

on Special Duty, of which 4 years of service has to be in

the latter grade; or (iii) persons in the grade of Develop-

ment Officers having at least 10 years’ regular service in

that grade, provided that in respect of Development Officers

working in the grade of Rs. 1300-1800, 5 years’ regular

service would be sufficient to qualify the officer for

promotion. The amended rule does not, of course, mean that

Development Officers can be considered for promotion to

the post of Industrial Adviser only in the event that quali-

fied persons from the first 2 categories are not available.

A person belonging to the 1st category; failing which,

persons belonging to the 2nd category; and persons in the

3rd category are, all and together, eligible for being

considered for promotion, subject to the fixation of the

field of choice under the Home Ministry’s Memorandum dated

May 16, 1957. That field of choice was fixed in the in-

stant case at three times the number of vacancies viz., 6.

The appellant belongs to the 1st category and there was

therefore no question of going to the 2nd category. The

choice of eligible promotees was accordingly restricted to

the 1st and 3rd categories. But in selecting the panel,

what has been done by the application of the chronological

test is to ascertain the respective dates on which the

Officer on Special Duty completed 5 years’ regular service

in that grade and the Development Officers completed 10

years’ regular service in their grade, to arrange them in

the order of seniority according to the dates on which they

completed the qualifying service in their respective grades

and to select the first 6 only from the list so made, for

being considered for promotion to the two vacancies in the

post of Industrial Adviser. In the integrated list of

Development

225

Officers and Officer on Special Duty, appellant occupied the

19th position, since 18 Development Officers had completed

10 years’ regular service in their grade before the appel-

lant had completed 5 years’ regular service in his grade.

As the Departmental Promotion Committtee had decided to

carve out a field of choice consisting of six persons only,

the appellant, being outside the first six, was left out of

the select panel. As we have indicated earlier, even if the

field of choice were to extend to 12 officers, being six

times the number of vacancies, the appellant being 19th in

the integrated list would still be out of that panel.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of

India has strongly defended the method adopted by the De-

partmental Promotion Committee for preparing the panel of

selection. She contends that the Officer on Special Duty

and Development Officer work in the same grade namely, the

grade of Development Officer, save with the difference that

a Development Officer working as a Officer on Special Duty

draws a special pay of Rs. 200 in addition to the pay drawn

by him in the grade of Development Officer. Therefore,

according to the counsel, the Committee was justified in

preparing an integrated list comprising the appellant as

well as the Development Officers and in arranging them, for

the purpose of being considered for promotion, according to

the dates on which they completed the period of qualifying

service. On the record as it stands we find it difficult to

hold that the Officer on Special Duty, for the purposes of

the Amendment Rules of 1974, can be said to be in the same

grade as the Development Officer. Those rules contemplate

on their plain language and are framed on the basis that

the Officer on Special Duty is in a separate grade from the

grade of Development Officers. The rules refer to Officer

on Special Duty ’with 5 years’ regular service "in the

grade" and Development Officers having 10 years’ regular

service "in the grade". In the particular context in which

the words "in the grade" occur, they mean "in that particu-

lar grade", indicating thereby in clear terms that the two

grades are different. Even if it be true that the Officer

on Special Duty draws, except for the special monthly pay of

Rs. 200, the same pay as a Development Officer and that,

generally, the two are in a similar scale of pay that would

not justify the conclusion, for the purposes of the 1974

Rules, that they are in the same grade. Their scale of pay

may be identical, we will so assume, and yet they will be

working in different grades, one in the grade of Officer on

Special Duty and the others in the grade of Development

Officer. This position may not be true universally and we

propose lay down no proposition of universal application.

We are called upon to interpret the 1974 Rules which, in

our opinion, leave no doubt that within the contemplation of

those Rules is the supposition that the Officer on Special

Duty is in a grade different from that of the Development

Officer.

It is significant in this regard that the counter-affi-

davit filed on behalf of the Union of India by Shri K.

Srinivasan, Under Secretary, Ministry of Industrial and

Civil Supplies, Department of Industrial

226

Development, says in terms that the grade of-Officer on

Special Duty is different from the grade of Development

Officer and that these two being separate cadres, there was

no question of drawing up a combined seniority list of

officers in the two cadres. The affidavit further concedes

that the post of Officer on Special Duty carries higher

responsibilities. We might also mention that in the coun-

ter-affidavit which was filed on behalf of the Government in

the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition 612 of 1974, it was

stated that the Director General (Technical Development) had

recommended the appellant as "the only suitable officer" for

appointment to the post of Officer on Special Duty. That

Writ Petition was filed by respondents 6 to 11 and others to

restrain the Government from appointing the appellant as an

Industrial Adviser and for certain other reliefs. The stay

petition filed by respondents 6 to 11 was strongly resisted

by the Government which took the stand that the appellant

was eligible for being considered for promotion and that a

stay order ought not to be granted as no irreparable harm

would result if the appellant was appointed to the post of

Industrial Adviser after being found suitable for the promo-

tion. That affidavit, also sworn by Shri K. Srinivasan,

stated even in clearer terms that on confirmation as an

Officer on Special Duty, the appellant "ceased to belong to

the grade of Development Officers". The stand now taken by

the Government is directly contrary, its contention being

that the Officer on Special Duty is in the same grade as the

Development Officers. Considering the wording of the 1974

Rules and the context in which the words "in the grade"

occur, we are inclined to the view that the stand taken by

the Government in the Writ Petition filed by respondents 6

to 11 was more in consonance with the recruitment rules.

The crux of the Government’s answer to that writ petition

was that the appellant "was eligible for consideration for

promotion as Industrial Adviser (Chemicals) in terms of the

Statutory Rules" and their stand, broadly, was that the

claims of all persons eligible for the post of Industrial

Adviser and "within the field of consideration" would be

duly considered. The appellant then was obviously considered

to be both eligible and within the field of consideration.

The recruitment rules of 1974 have undergone no change since

then and whereas only one vacancy was to be filled then,

there are. two to be filled now. It is therefore difficult

to appreciate the change in the attitude of the Government

and the diametrically opposite stand it is taking now that

the appellant’s name is beyond the field of choice. It has

to be remembered that the writ petition filed by respondents

6 to 11 and other Development Officers asking, inter alia,

that the appellant’s name ought not to be considered for the

post of Industrial Adviser was dismissed on the opposition

of the Government. The Government now wants to do exactly

what the Development Officers asked it to do by writ peti-

tion and which writ petition the Government succeeded in

having dismissed on the strength of its contention, amongst

others, that the appellant was eligible for the higher post

and on the strength of the right it asserted to consider the

appellant for promotion. In fact, the Government even

opposed the stay application in the earlier writ petition

indicating the impending possibility of the appellant’s

appointment as Industrial Adviser.

227

No rule or notification is cited before us to support

the "practice" adopted by the Departmental Promotion Commit-

tee whereby though the Officer on Special Duty and the

Development Officers belong to different grades, a common

list of officers was prepared according to the dates on

which the appellant, who is the sole incumbent of the post

of Officer on Special Duty, and Development officers com-

pleted 5 and 10 years of service respectively. By this

process, the appellant who belongs to a separate and dis-

tinct grade or cadre was placed 19th in the integrated list,

much below the field of choice which though, was rightly

limited to 6 officers.

We do not suggest that the method or practice, by which an

in tegrated list of officers is prepared according to the

dates an which they acquire eligibility in order to find out

which of those who are eligible fall within the field of

choice, is necessarily or in all circumstances bad. That

practice, not having the authority of law, is vitiated in

the instant case because of the 1974 recruitment rules which

envisage that an officer on Special Duty is in a separate

grade, cadre or class. It is for that reason wrong to put

him in an integrated list. The practice adopted by the

Departmental Promotion Committee overlooks that the rule-

making authority, being conscious while framing the Rules of

1974 that there was only one Officer on Special Duty for the

time being to be considered for appointment as Industrial

Adviser, considered him to be in a separate grade and gave

him a separate treatment by dealing with him in a separate

clause, namely clause (i) which uses the singular. In fact

the history of the recruitment rules itself shows that it

was thought necessary to bring an Officer on Special Duty of

certain experience within the area of eligibility. The

rules of 1963 restricted eligibility to Development Officers

and it was for the first time in 1974 that an Officer on

Special Duty was brought within that area. The circumstance

that the Officer on Special Duty is placed in clause (i) and

the Development Officers in clause (ii) is not the point of

matter and can confer no special privilege on the former.

Such a sequence may well be fortuitous. But what is impor-

tant is that if the Rules intended that the two grades of

officers should be clubbed together and that an Officer on

Special Duty should be considered to be in the same grade as

Development Officers, the easiest thing to do would have

been to say, for example, that Development Officers of ten

years’ experience would be eligible for promotion as Indus-

trial Adviser, provided that in the case of a Development

Officer who is working as an Officer on Special Duty, five

years’ experience in the latter post would be enough. The

integrated list, in the light of these facts and because of

the peculiar wording of the 1974 Rules, must therefore go.

This might apparently create an impasse but the solution

is simple. The field of choice fixed at six may be retained

but amongst those six shall be the appellant, the other five

being Development Officers according to the dates on which

they acquired eligibility. Alternatively, the field of

choice may, for instance, be expanded to eight, being four

times the number of vacancies, in which case the appellant

and

228

seven Development Officers can be considered for promotion.

This latter course may obviate possible hardship which would

result if one Development Officer is required to be dropped

from the list by restricting the field of choice to six. In

either event, suitability for promotion is entirely for the

concerned authority to decide and the fact that the appel-

lant must be included in the list of eligible officers who

fail within the field of choice does not mean that he must

be promoted to one of the posts of Industrial Advisers.

Mere inclusion in such a list confers no right on any one to

be promoted to the higher post. It only gives an opportunity

to be considered for promotion.

For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the

decision of the High Court, and direct that the appellant’s

name be included in the list of eligible officers for con-

sidering whether he is suitable for promotion to the post

of Industrial Adviser (Chemicals). The recommendation al-

ready made by the Departmental Promotion Committee for

appointment to the two posts of Industrial Adviser is

quashed. Appellant shall get his costs, here and in the High

Court, from Respondent I.

M.R. Appeal al-

lowed.

229

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