PETITIONER:
RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LTD. & ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1977
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1516 1977 SCR (2) 825
1977 SCC (2) 578
ACT
Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 1948, clause
20(1)--Whether the provisions make it obligatory upon the
Textile Commissioner to specifythe period of operation
of his direction’s Meaning of the word "may".
HEADNOTE
Clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948
empowers the Textile Commissioner, having regard to the
capacity of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of dif-
ferent description or specification and to the needs of the
general public, to issue from time to time such directions
in writing to any manufacturer or manufacturers generally
regarding the class or specifications of cloth or yarn and
the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof which they
shall or shall not produce during such periods as may be
specified m the directions.
The respondents’ challenge to the vires of the notifi-
cation issued by the appellant which prohibited the
printing of any border or heading on sarees etc. for an
indefinite period was accepted by the Gujarat High Court.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court,
HELD: (1 ) The impugned notification in so far as it
prohibits the printing of any border and heading on sarees
etc., for an indefinite period is ultra vires clause 20 of
the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 1948 since the aforesaid
clause casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile Com-
missioner to specify the period during which the prohibition
shall remain in force. [827 B-C]
(2) It is well settled that the word "may" is capable of
meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context and
that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority
coupled with an obligation the word "may" which denotes
discretion should be construed to mean a command. Consid-
ering the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact
on those who are likely to be affected by the exercise of
the power, it is clear that the power conferred on the
Textile Commissioner in the Cotton Textile (Control) Order
1948 to issue directions is coupled with a duty to specify
the particular period for which the directions shall be
operative. [826 F-G]
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964] 2 SCR
197 (a) 202, principles reiterated.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1545-
1546 of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 4-8-1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos.
972 and 1527 of 1970 respectively.
826
V.P. Raman, Addl. Sol. Gen., S.N. Prasad .and Girish
Chandra, for the Appellant in CA 1182/72 and CAS.1545-46/72.
V.M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule, (Miss) M Tarkunde and P.C.
Kapoor for Respondents in C.A. 1182/72.
V.N. Ganpule, A.K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for RR.
No. 1 in C.As. 1545-46/72.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J. Under the power conferred by Section 3
of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the
Central Government issued an Order called "The Cotton Tex-
tiles (Control) Order, 1948". Clause 20 of that Order, as
amended, reads thus :--
"20(1) The Textile Commissioner may from
time to time issue directions in writing to
any manufacturer or class of manufacturers
or the manufacturers generally regarding the
classes or specifications of cloth or yarn,
and the maximum or the minimum quantities
thereof, which they shall or shall not pro-
duce during such periods as may be specified
in the directions, and they shall comply with
such directions.
20(2) In the exercise of the powers
conferred upon him by sub-clause (1) the
Textile Commissioner shah have regard to the
capacity of the producer to produce cloth and
yarn of different descriptions or specifica-
tions and to the needs of the general pub-
lic."
The question for our determination in these appeals is
whether, if the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appro-
priate directions to any manufacturer or class of manufac-
turers, it is obligatory upon him to specify therein the
period for which the directions will remain in operation.
As hold by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Jogendra Singh,(1) it is well settled that the word "may"
is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the
context and that where a discretion is conferred upon a
public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may"
which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a
command. Considering the purpose of the relevant empower-
ment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected
by the exercise of the power, we are clear that the power
conferred on the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is
coupled with the duty to specify the particular period for
which the directions shall be operative. Directions of the
kind envisaged by clause 20 are influenced and justified by
exigencies which render it imperative that the directions be
reviewed from time to time. That becomes feasible only if
the directions as limited expressly to a determinate period
of"
(1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197 at 202.
827
(Chandrachud, J.)
time at the end of which a fresh review of facts and circum-
stances becomes obligatory. There is a fear that a direc-
tion not limited in point of time may continue to operate
even after it has outlived its utility for the reason merely
that the need to review it is not clearly perceived. Be-
sides, the manufacturers must know, in order that they
may organize their business in their own interest as well as
in the interest of the community at large, as to how long
any particular embargo is going to be operative.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court
though on the ground only that the impugned Notification in
so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading
on sarees etc. for an indefinite period is ultra vires
clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948,
since the aforesaid clause casts an obligation or a duty
upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period
during which the prohibition shall remain in force. We
express no opinion on the other points, including Point No.
6 urged before the High Court for its consideration.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The appellants
will pay one set of costs of these appeals to the respond-
ents.
S.R. Appeals dis-
missed.
5--206SCI/77
828