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Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal v. Devaji Supadu Dorik and Ors.

Supreme Court of India · 17 January 1977 · [1977] 2 S.C.R. 621

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
17 January 1977
Reported as
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 621
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Ray, A.N. (Cj)
Length
5 pages
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PETITIONER:
RANCHHODDAS CHHAGANLAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DEVAJI SUPADU DORIK AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/01/1977
BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1517 1977 SCC (3) 584

ACT

Transfer of Property Act, 1882--Sec. 53A--Doctrine of

part performance-Whether transferee should be ready and

willing to perform--Indian Penal Code--Finding without

issue-- Not sustainable--Cross objection--If judgment can be

challenged by respondent without filing cross objection.

Article 133 of Constitution--Practice and

procedure--Objection about validity of grant of

certificate--To be raised at what stage.

HEADNOTE

The appellant agreed to sell certain land to the re-

spondents by an agreement for sale entered into between the

parties for Rs. 17,000/-. The respondent was put in posses-

sion pursuant to the said agreement after Rs. 12,000/were

paid. He failed to pay the balance of Rs. 5,000/- in spite

of demand by the appellant The appellant filed a suit for

possession of the land and, in the alternative, for a decree

for Rs. 5,000/- with interest.

The respondent contended that the agreed price was Rs.

12,000/- which was already paid and that, therefore, Rs.

5,000/- were not payable. The respondent contended that if

the court came to the conclusion that Rs. 17,000/- was the

agreed price .then the Court should take into account cer-

tain amount which was already paid by the respondent.

The Trial Court decreed the appellant’s suit for posses-

sion and came to the conclusion that the agreed price was

Rs. 17,000/-. The High Court in an appeal confirmed the

finding of the Trial Court that the agreed price was Rs.

17.000/-. The High Court, however, granted the decree of

Rs. 5,000/with interest but refused the prayer for posses-

sion.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD: (1) The respondent was never ready and willing to

perform the agreement as alleged by the appellant. One of

the ingredients of part performance under s. 53A of the

Transfer of. Property Act is that the transferee has taken

possession in part performance of the contract. In the

present case. there was no performance in part by the

respondent of the contract between the parties. The doc-

trine of part performance is a defence. It is generally not

a sword but a shield. The act of part performance must be

such as not only to be referable to a contract such as that

alleged but to be referable to no other title Section 53A

requires a positive act of readiness and. willingness on the

part of the transferee to perform the agreement. [624 A-E]

(2) The High Court wrongly found that there was an

extension of the performance of the contract by one year.

There was no issue raised on that point. It is well

settled that there should be specific issues on questions of

fact. The contention that the appellant could not put an end

to the contract if there was failure on the part of the

respondent to perform the agreement fallacious. [624

F-G]

(3) It was not open to the respondent to challenge the

finding of the High Court that the agreement was for Rs.

17000/-. The respondent can certainly support the judgment

on any ground which is open to him under ’the impugned

judgment. The respondent did not file any Cross-objection

on the finding in the judgment of High Court about the price

of the agreement. It is therefore, not open to him to

challenge the finding. [623 G-H]

622

(4) The contention of the respondent that certificate

was not competent because the value all along had not been

over Rs. 20,000/- cannot be allowed to be taken at the late

stage. If the respondent had taken this point at the time

when the matter was heard in the High Court the appellant

could have satisfied the High Court. Such a plea was not’

raised even in the statement o! case. [623 D-F]

State of Assam and lint. etc. v. Basanta Kumar Dass etc.

etc. [1973] SC.R. 158, followed.

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 945 of 1972.

(From the Judgment and Decree dated 15-10-1969 of the

Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 420/63).

V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and Miss Man]u Jetlay, for

the appellant.

Sharad Manohar and Suresh Sethi, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAY, C.J. This appeal is by certificate from the

judgment dated 15 October 1969 of the Bombay High Court in

First Appeal No. 420 of 1963.

The trial court by its judgment dated 24 June 1963

decreed the suit in favour of the appellant. The High Court

reversed the judgment of the trial court.

The pre-eminent question in this appeal is whether the

respondent has been ready and willing to perform the agree-

ment entered into with the appellant. The case of the

appellant is that there was an oral agreement for sale of

property consisting of agricultural land admeasuring 23

acres approximately for a sum of Rs. 17000/-. The respond-

ent from time to time paid Rs. 12000/- to the appellant.

The respondent was also in possession of the property. The

appellant called upon the respondent to pay the full amount

of purchase price. The respondent failed to. do so. The

plaintiff, on respondent’s refusal to perform the’ agree-

ment, flied the suit.

In the suit the reliefs claimed were possession of the

property and in the alternative a decree for Rs. 10,500/-

consisting of the principal sum of Rs. 5000/- as the balance

amount of purchase price and interest thereon amounting to

Rs. 5500/-.

The principal defence was that the agreement for sate

was only for Rs. 12000/-. and that the respondent paid the

amount in full. The respondent characterised the suit as

’mean effort to recover illegally the additional price of

the ostensible Rs. 5000/-’. The respondent also alleged

that if the Court decided that the price of the property was

agreed to be Rs. 17000/-, then the respondent would ask

the Court to take into account the sum of Rs. 12000/- paid

by him and also the sum of Rs. 1500/- paid by him from time

to time thereafter.

623

At the trial one of the issues was whether the appellant

proved that the respondent entered into a ’Sauda’ on 24

January 1952 with the appellant’s father to purchase for

Rs.7000/- the properties mentioned in Schedule ’A’ to the

plaint. The other issues were the defendant-respondent

proved that the properties were agreed to be purchased for

Rs.2000/-. A corollary to the issue raised in the written

statement was whether defendant proved the circumstances in

which it was made to appear that the ’Sauda’ was for Rs.

17000/-. In short the defendant alleged fraud against

the appellant. The charge is that the appellant changed

the figure to Rs. 17000/-. The trial court held in favour

of the appellant and rejected the defence of the respondent.

Counsel for the respondent contended that the suit of the

appellant was not maintainable. It was said that the appel-

lant was not competent to maintain the suit by reason of

provisions contained in sections 39 and 55 of the Indian

Contract Act. The gist of the contention is that the appel-

lant could not put an end to the contract if there was

failure on part of the respondent to perform the agreement.

The submission is fallacious. The case of the appellant has

always been that the respondent refused to perform the

agreement. The appellant all along asserted that the agree-

ment was that the property was agreed to be sold only for a

sum of Rs. 17000/-. The respondent refused to Perform the

agreement. The suit therefore was competent and valid.

Another contention was raised by the respondent that the

certificate was not competent because the value all along

has not been over Rs. 20000/-. This Court has held in the

decision in State of Assam and Anr. Etc. v. Basanta Kumar

Dass Etc. Etc. reported in 1973 ’ (3) S.C.R. 158 at page

168 that the objection to valuation cannot be allowed to be

taken at this late stage. But the graver objection to the

respondent not being allowed to challenge the certificate is

that if the respondent had taken this point at the time when

the matter was heard in the High Court the appellant could

have satisfied the High Court or the appellant would have

failed. This Court in any event, if a certificate had been

granted on a challenge being made, would have been in pos-

session of facts and the judgment of the High Court on that

question. That is the main reason why the respondent should

not be allowed to challenge the certificate at this stage.

The respondent has also not raised such a plea in the state-

ment of case.

The remaining question is one of substance and is the

real issue. It is whether the agreement has been performed.

Counsel for the respondent submitted that it was open to

the respondent to contend that the finding of the High Court

that the agreement was for Rs. 17000/- should not be

accepted. Counsel for the appellant rightly challenged

the competency of such an objection. The respondent can

certainly support the judgment 0 many ground which is open

to him under impugned judgment. The judgment is that the

agreement was between the parties, and that the sale price

was Rs.17000/-. The respondent did not file any cross

objection on the finding in judgment on that point. It is

therefore not open to the respondent to challenge that

finding.

624

The principal hurdle in the way of the respondent is

that the respondent has never been ready and willing to

perform the agreement, as alleged by the appellant. The

respondent alleged that the consideration for purchase was

Rs. 12000/-. The respondent has never been ready and will-

ing to perform the agreement alleged by the appellant. The

respondent relied on the doctrine of part-performance. One

of the limbs of part performance is that the transferee has

in the part performance of the contract taken possession of

the property. The most important consideration here is the

contract. The true principle of the operation of the acts of

part performance seems to require that the acts in question

must be referred to some contract and must be referred to

the alleged one; that they prove the existence of some

contract, and are consistent with the contract alleged. The

doctrine of part performance is a defence. It is a sword

and not a shield. It is a right to protect his possession

against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to

the terms of the contract. The appellant is right in the

contention that there was never any performance in part by

the respondent of the contract between the parties.

In Fry on Specific Performance, Sixth Edition, at page

276 it is stated ’that "the acts of part performance must be

such as not only to be referable to a contract such as that

alleged, but to be referable to no other title; and that the

acts relied upon as part performance must be unequivocally

and in their own nature referable to some such agreement as

that alleged".

The High Court found that the respondent performed in

part the agreement alleged by the appellant. It has been

said by the appellant that the High Court should have appre-

ciated that Section 53-A requires a positive act of

readiness and willingness on part of the transferee to

perform the agreement. In the present case the respondent

who was the transferee under the agreement did not perform

his part of the contract from 1952 till 1963 that is after

the judgment was pronounced by the trial court. The High

Court wrongly found that there was an extension of the

performance of contract by one year. There was no issue

raised on that point. It is well settled that there should

be specific issues on-questions of fact. Parties did’ not

go to trial on that question and there the High Court was in

error in holding that there was an extension of time for

performance of’ the contract. It is therefore erroneous to

say as the High Court did that the respondent can take

advantage of the period between 1953-54.

Some attempt was made by counsel for the respondent that

there was an admission by the appellant’s father that the

purchase price was Rs. 12000/-. This contention cannot be

accepted in view of the finding of the. High Court that the

purchase price was Rs. 17000/-.

One of the questions in the High Court was there should

be no award of interest on the sum of Rs. 5000/- which had

been paid. The High Court rightly allowed interest at the

rate of 6 per cent per annum. We are told the amount of Rs.

5000/- has been deposited in the High Court.

625

For the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that the

decree passed by the trial court was correct and the High

Court was in error in reversing the decree. The High Court

should not have reversed the decree particularly when it was

found that the respondent failed first in regard to the

agreement alleged by the defendant and second in allow-

ing the decree in favour of the respondent on the plea of

part performance of a contract Which was never pleaded by

the defendant/ respondent and was not a contract upon which

there could be any performance in part.

The appeal is therefore accepted. The Judgment of the

High Court is set aside. The judgment of the trial court is

restored. Parties will pay and bear their own costs in this

Court and the High Court.

The respondent will be at liberty to withdraw Rs.

5000/- deposited in the High Court.

P.H.P.

Appeal allowed.

626

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