Rabindra Kr. Nayak v. Collector,mayurbhanj, Orissa .

Court

Supreme Court of India

Decided

19 February 1999

Case no.

C.A. No.-000943-000943 - 1999

Bench

K.T.Thomas,Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri

Facts

Rabindra Kumar Nayak, an advocate, was appointed as an Assistant Public Prosecutor on August 14, 1995, under a provisional arrangement. He was entitled to a daily fee of Rs. 100. After being elected as a member of the Moroda Panchayat Samiti, he contested and won the election for Chairman on February 10, 1997. The fourth respondent, who lost the election, challenged Nayak's eligibility, claiming he was disqualified due to holding an office of profit. The District Judge ruled against Nayak, a decision that was upheld by the High Court of Orissa, leading Nayak to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Arguments

Petitioner Arguments

Nayak's main arguments were

• His appointment as Assistant Public Prosecutor was provisional and a stop-gap arrangement, thus he was not holding an office of profit.
• The fourth respondent's challenge was not maintainable under Section 45-B of the Act, as the appropriate remedy post-election was an election petition under Section 44-A.

The court addressed these arguments by emphasizing the nature of Nayak's appointment, concluding that it constituted an office of profit, regardless of its provisional status.

Respondent Arguments

The fourth respondent argued that Nayak was indeed holding an office of profit under the government, which disqualified him from being a member or Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti as per the provisions of the Act. The respondent maintained that the petition under Section 45-B was valid and appropriate.

The court found merit in the respondent's arguments, affirming that Nayak's role as Assistant Public Prosecutor fell within the definition of an office of profit.

Precedents considered

The judgment did not explicitly cite prior case law but relied on the legal definitions and interpretations of "office of profit" as established in the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959. The court's interpretation aligned with established legal principles regarding disqualification criteria for public office holders.

Legal principles

The court considered the definition of "office of profit" as it pertains to eligibility for public office under the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act. The key factors included:

• The nature of the appointment (provisional vs. permanent).
• The financial remuneration associated with the role.

Decision and reasoning

Rationale

The court reasoned that the nature of Nayak's appointment as Assistant Public Prosecutor, despite being provisional, still constituted an office of profit. The court emphasized that the essence of the role involved responsibilities and remuneration that aligned with the definition of holding an office of profit. The court also dismissed Nayak's procedural argument regarding the inappropriateness of the Section 45-B petition, asserting that the respondent had the right to challenge his eligibility.

Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed Nayak's appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. Nayak was deemed disqualified from holding the position of Chairman of the Moroda Panchayat Samiti due to holding an office of profit. The court did not specify further instructions for the appeal process, as the decision was final.

Conclusion

This judgment reinforces the legal principle that any position that provides remuneration and responsibilities under the government can be classified as an office of profit, leading to disqualification from certain public offices. It highlights the importance of maintaining the integrity of public office by ensuring that individuals do not hold conflicting roles that may compromise their duties.

Read the full judgment on the Supreme Court website (PDF)