PETITIONER:
PANKAJESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
TULSI GRAMIN BANK & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/05/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIRAHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK
ACT
HEADNOTE
JUDGMENT
ORDER
Delay condoned.
Wehave heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
The petitioner was charge-sheeted for dereliction of the duty under Section 3 of theRegional Rural Banks Act (21 of 1976). Afterinquiry, the disciplinary authority directed with-holding of three increments with cumulative effect. On appeal,the appellate authority stated thus:"[Therefore, in accordance with the decision taken by the Board of Directors, oneincrement is released and he is warnedthat in future no such actor irregularity will be repeated, otherwise serious disciplinaryactionwill be taken". Wen writ petition was filedby the petitioner, the High Court in the impugned order dated December 16, 1996 made inWrit Petition 12133/93 stated as under:
"We do not feel inclinedto quash
the orderpassed by the appellate
disciplinary authority who has
disciplinary authority who has
disposed of the appeal of the
petitioner by setting aside the
order with-holdingone of the three
increments and has warned the
petition r that in future no such
act/irregularity will berepeated
byhim and if itis done in that
event disciplinary actionwill be
taken against him."
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that theHigh Court has misunderstood the operative Dartof theorder of the appellate authority. We find no force in the contention. TheWord "one increment release" would mean that the appellate authority is inclined to confirm thepenalty of imposing two incrementswith cummulative effect andthereby, one incrementwas released from the penalty. The High Court, therefore, isnot right in construing that two increments have been released and one was retained. Instead,the reverse isthe intention. Under the circumstances, while clarifying thefactualposition, we do not find that it is a case warranting interference.
The only legal question sought tobe raised in the SLP is whether under Rule 30(3) of the Staff Service Regulation, the enquiry officer has to be higher inrank than the delinquent officer. Regulation 30 (3)of the Staff ServiceRegulation postulates thus:
"The enquiry under this regulation
and the procedure with the
exception of the final order, may
bedelegated in case the person
against whom proceedings are taken
isan officer, toany officer who
isin a grade higher than such
officer and in the case of an
employee,to any officer. For
purpose ofthe enquiry, the officer
oremployee may not engage a legal
practitioner."
Thus an enquiry, under Regulation may be delegatedto a person higher in rankthan the delinquent officer, in the case of an officer. But in this case we donot find any substantial miscarriage of justice preejudicial to the petitioner for the reason that though it is always desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be directed toconductan enquiry, the enquiry is conducted as a delegate of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, theultimate decision is to be taken by the disciplinary authority. By mere delegatingthe enquiry whetherthe enquiry officer is of the same cadre or of higher grade than that of thepetitioner, it did not cause any material irregularity notresulted in anyinjustice to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, we do notfind any illegality warranting interference.
The special leave petitionis accordingly dismissed.