PETITIONER:
NRISINGHA MURARI CHAKRABORTY & ORS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/04/1977
BENCH:
SHINGAL, P.N.
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1174 1977 SCR (3) 521
1977 SCC (3) 7
ACT
Indian Penal Code 1860--Sec. 415-420--whether Passport is a
Property-Meaning of property.
HEADNOTE
The appellants were charged under section 420 read with
section 120B of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that
there was a conspiracy between them as a result of which
hundreds of applications were filed for the issue of pass-
ports. The applications were made by suppressing the real
facts about the .nationality and addresses of the applicants
and by making false representations in several other re-
spects. The prosecution alleged that hundreds of passports
were issued and delivered to persons who were not entitled
to have them under the law. Special Leave was granted
limited to the question whether the passports were property
within the meaning of section 420 of the Indian Penal code.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: 1. A passport is a document which by its nature
and purpose is a political document for the benefit Of its
holder. It recognises him as a citizen of the country
granting it and is in the nature of a request to the other
country for his free passage there. [522-C]
Satwant Singh Sawhney v.D. Ramarathnam (1967) 3 SCR 525
refered to;
Ahayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1962) 2 SCR 241
followed;
Queen Empress v. Appasami (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151 and
Queen Empress v. Sashi Bhushan (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 210
approved;
Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra and
Other (1969) 1 SCR 13 followed.
In re Packianathan A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 131(1) and Local
Government v. Ganga Ram A.I.R. 1922 Nagpur 229 approved.
2. The word ’property’ is defined as the right to the use or
enjoyment or the beneficial right of disposal of anything
that can be the subject of ownership, specially ownership of
tangible things. Passport is a tangible thing and is capa-
ble of ownership. It is the property of the State so long
as it is with the passport issuing authority and has not
been issued to the person concerned, and after issue it
becomes the property of the person to whom it has been
granted. Passport can be the subject of ownership or exclu-
sive possession and is therefore property within the meaning
of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. [523 A-C, 524 G]
JUDGMENT
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 277
of 1971.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 23rd June, 1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Crl.
A. No. 45 of 1964.
P.K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das for the Appellants.
D.N. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHINGHAL, J.--This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated June
23, 1971, upholding the conviction of the appellants for
offences under sections 420 and 420/120B of the Penal Code
but reducing their sentences. The charge related to cheat-
ing the passport issuing authority of the Hooghly
522
district by dishonestly inducing him to issue passports on
the basis of false representations. This Court has limited
the special leave to the question whether the passports were
"property" within the meaning of section 420 of the Penal
Code ?
Speaking broadly, the allegation against the appellants
was that there was a conspiracy between them as a result of
which 1480 applications were filed for the issue of pass-
ports from July, 1956 to April, 1957, by Muslims and Chinese
nationals. These applications were alleged to have been
made by suppressing the real facts about the nationality
and addresses of the applicants, and by making false repre-
sentations in several other respects. The prosecution
alleged that hundreds of passports were thus issued and
delivered to persons who were not entitled to them under the
law. Some of the appellants were alleged to be directly
concerned with those applications, and it was further
alleged that the orders of the Passport Authority were
obtained by dishonest inducement and false representation.
A passport is a document which, by its nature and pur-
pose, is a political document for the benefit of its holder.
It recognises him as a citizen of the country granting it
and is in the nature of a request to the other country for
his free passage there. Its importance was examined by this
Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam(1) with
reference to the provisions of the Indian Passport (Entry
Into India) Act, 1920, (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
and the Rules made thereunder which were in force at the
time when the offences were said to have been committed in
this case. After referring to sections 3 and 4 of the Act,
and rules 4 and 5 of the Rules, this Court observed as
follows,--
" ...... possession of passport,
whatever may be its meaning or legal effect,
is a necessary requisite for leaving India
for travelling abroad. The argument that the
Act .does not impose the taking of a passport
as a condition of exit from India, therefore
it does not interfere with the right of a
person to leave India, if we may say so, is
rather hypertechnical and ignores the reali-
ties of the situation. Apart from the fact
that possession of passport is a necessary
condition of travel in the international
community, the prohibition against entry
indirectly prevents the person from leaving
India. The State in fact tells a person living
in India ’you can leave India at your pleasure
without a passport, but you would not be
allowed by foreign countries to enter them
without it and you cannot also come back to
India without it.’ No person in India can
possibly travel on those conditions. Indeed
it is impossible for him to do so. That
apart, even that theoretical possibility of
exit is expressly restricted by executive
instructions and by refusal of foreign-ex-
change."’
There can therefore be no doubt that a passport is a docu-
ment of importance for travel abroad and is of considerable
value to its holder.
(1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525.
523
The word "property" has been defined in the Century,
Dictionary, which is an encyclopedic lexicon of the
English language, as follows,--
"the right to the use or enjoyment or
the beneficial fight of disposal of anything
that can be the subject of ownership; owner-
ship; estate; especially, ownership of tangi-
ble things .....: anything that may be
exclusively possessed and enjoyed; .....
possessions."
As has been stated, a passport provides the several bene-
fits mentioned above. It is a tangible thing and is capable
of ownership. There can therefore be no doubt that it is
"property". It is property of the State so long as it is
with the passport issuing authority and has not been issued
to the person concerned and, after issue, it becomes the
property of the person to whom it has.been granted.
Our attention has not been invited to any case where the
question now before us arose for consideration on an earlier
occasion. But a somewhat similar question was considered by
this Court in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1).
The appellant there applied to the Patna University for
permission to appear at .the M.A. examination as a private
candidate, representing that he was a graduate having ob-
tained the B.A. degree in 1951 and had been teaching in a
school. On that basis, an admission card was despatched for
him to the Headmaster of the school. It was however found
that he was neither a graduate nor a teacher. He was prose-
cuted for the offence ’under section 420 read with section
511 of the Penal Code. He contended that his conviction was
unsustainable because the admission card had no pecuniary
value and was not property. This Court repelled the conten-
tion and held that although the admission card as such had
no pecuniary value, it had immense value to the candidate
appearing in the examination for he could not have appeared
at the examination without it, and that it was therefore
property within the meaning of section 415 of the Penal
Code. While reaching that conclusion, this Court relied on
Queen Empress v. Appasami (2) and Queen Empress v. Sashi
Bhushan.(3) In Appasami’s case it was held that the ticket
entitling the accused to enter the examination room was
"property", and in Sashi Bhushan’s case it was held that
the term "property" included a written certificate to the
effect that the accused had attended a course of lectures
and had paid up his fees. On a parity of reasoning, we have
no doubt that looking to the importance and characteristics
of a passport, the High Court rightly held that it was
property within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 of the
Penal Code.
We may make a reference to Ishwarlal Girdharlal Parekh
v. State of Maharashtra and others (4) also. There the
question for consideration was whether an order of assess-
ment was "property" within the
(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241. (2) [1889] I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151.
(3) [1893] I.L.R. 15 All. 210. (4) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 193.
524
meaning of section 420 I.P.C. The charge in that case
was that the appellant dishonestly or fradulently induced
the income-tax authorities and obtainer an assessment order
for less income-tax than due. It was held that .the order
of assessment received by an assessee was "property",
since it was of great importance to the assessee, as con-
taining a computation, of his total assessable income and,
as containtion or his tax liability. This Court
also expressed the view that the word "property" did not
necessarily expressed that the thing, of which delivery
was dishonestly desired by the person who cheats, "must
have a money value or a market value, in the hand of the
person cheated". It was held that "even if the thing has no
money value, in the hand of the person cheated, but becomes
a thing of value, in the hand of the person, who may get
possession of it as a result of the cheating practised by
him, it would still fall within the connotation of the
term ’property’ in section 420 I.P.C." This decision also
lends support to the view we have taken for, as has been
stated, a passport is a valuable document.
Our attention has also been invited to In re Packiana-
than(1) and Local Government v. Gangaram.(2) The accused
in Packianathan’s case was prosecuted for an offence under
section 419 read with section 511 of the Penal Code. He was
going to Ceylon, and he used the permit which stood in the
name of one Kumarswami, while his own name was J. Packiana-
than. On seeing the permit the Health Officer issued a
health certificate. It was held that the health certificate
was "property" within the meaning of section 415 of the
Penal Code and that if a person dishonestly and fraudulently
induced the Health Officer to deliver it to him, he was
guilty of an offence under section 419 I.P.C. Local Govern-
ment v. Gangaram was a case where the accused obtained a
certificate from the Deputy Inspector of Schools by
stating untruly that he had passed the examination. It was
held that the certificate was ’property’ within the meaning
of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. and that the accused was
guilty of an offence punishable under section 420 I.P.C.
In taking that view the Nagpur High Court relied on Queen
Empress v. Appasami (supra) and Queen Empress v. Sashi
Bhushan (supra) on which reliance was placed by this Court
in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (Supra)
referred to above.
So as passport was a tangible thing, and was a
useful.document, and could be the subject of ownership or
exclusive possession, it was "property" within the meaning
of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. There is therefore nothing
wrong with the view which has been taken by the High Court
and the appeal is hereby dismissed. The appellants who are
on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence.
P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.
(1) A.I.R. 3920 Mad. 131 (1)
(2) A.I.R. 1922 Nagpur 229.