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CaseMinister › Judgments › Supreme Court › 1976 › Nawn Estates (p) Ltd. v. C.I.T., West Bengal

Nawn Estates (p) Ltd. v. C.I.T., West Bengal

Supreme Court of India · 14 October 1976 · [1977] 1 S.C.R. 798

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
14 October 1976
Reported as
[1977] 1 S.C.R. 798
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Singh, Jaswant
Length
13 pages
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PETITIONER:
NAWN ESTATES (P) LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
C.I.T., WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1976
BENCH:
SINGH, JASWANT
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1977 AIR 153 1977 SCR (1) 798
1977 SCC (1) 7

ACT

Income Tax Act 1922--sec. 23A(1)--Expln. 2(1) to Sec.

23A(1)--Meaning of investment Companies, whether restricted

to shares stocks and other securities or used in contradis-

tinction with manufacturing processing & trading opera-

tions--Indian Companies Act 1913--Sec. 87(f)--ComPanies

Act 1956--Sec. 372(11).

Interpretation of statutes--Expressions not being

terms of art whether to be construed in technical sense or

ordinary popular sense as used by business men--Legislative

history as guide to construction---Genesis and development

of law as key to interpretation--Whether English decisions

useful guides or construction of analogous provisions,

fundamental concepts and general principles.

HEADNOTE

The appellant is a Private Limited Company incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, its shares being held

by the members of the Nawn family. The object of the appel-

lant Company inter alia was purchase of land and buildings

and letting out of lands and buildings in lieu of appropri-

ate consideration. The appellant at the relevant time was

investing monies in the house properties and its major

income every year has been derived from those properties.

The Income Tax Officer held that the appellant was a

Company whose business consisted mainly in holding of in-

vestments as envisaged by section 23A(1) and explanation

2(i) thereto of the Income Tax Act 1922 and that since it

had declared dividend. which was less than the prescribed

statutory 100 per cent of his total income as reduced by

taxes referred to in clauses a, b and c of section 23A(1),

it was liable to pay super tax on the undistributed balance

of the distributable profits at the prescribed rate of 50

per cent. An appeal by the assessee before the Appellate

Asstt. Commissioner succeeded. The Tribunal. however,

restored the order of the Income-tax Officer. In a reference

filed at the instance of the assessee, the High Court an-

swered the reference in favour of the Revenue and against

the assessee.

In an appeal by Special Leave, the appellant contended :

That the appellant was not a company whose

business consisted wholly or mainly in

holding of investments because the

meaning to be attributed to the said expres-

sion having not been defined by the

Income Tax Act, 1922, the technical meaning

assigned to "investment Companies"

under section 87(f) of the Indian Companies

Act, 1913, which was in force when the

Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 was enacted

should be given, or, in the alternative, the

meaning given to it in section 372(11) of

the Companies Act,1956 should be given to the

said expression. So construing only the

Companies whose principal business is the

acquisition and holding of shares, debentures,

stocks and other securities would be

covered by the Company whose busi-

ness consists wholly or mainly in holding an

in vestment and that if it is so

construed the appellant would not be covered

by section 23A(1).

The counsel for the respondent Revenue con-

tended: That the expression "A company whose

business consists wholly or mainly in the

holding of investments" means a Company whose

income is derived from investments in contra-

diction to the income received from manu

facturing or processing or trading

operations.The expression "investment" in the

context in which it occurs not being a term of

art

799

with a definite and technical meaning should

be understood in its ordinary popular sense as

understood in business parlance.

Dismissing the appeal.

HELD:

1. The expression investment is not defined in the

Income-Tax Act but the Act also does not lay down that the

terms and expression not defined therein shall have the same

meaning as given to them in the Companies Act. [802A]

2. The legislative history-of the Income Tax Act, 1922

right from its amendment in the year 1955 and thereafter as

well as the Legislative history of the Income Tax Act, 1961,

clearly shows that Legislature did not adopt the definition

of investment Companies as given in the Indian Companies

Act, 1913 or in the Companies Act, 1956. [801H, 802A---B]

3. While enacting section 23A and explanation 2(i)

thereto the Legislature intended to cover fields of activity

wider than those contemplated the provisions of the Compa-

nies Act, 1913 and 1956. [802--B]

4. The term ’investment’ in the text in which it occurs

not being a term of art there is no warrant for giving it

the restricted meaning. The said expression has to be

understood in the ordinary popular sense as used by busi-

nessmen and so construed it would embrace within its

compass the appellant Company whose primary or principal

income is admittedly derived from house property which it

leases out to tenants. [802C-D]

Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore v. Jaswant Singh

Charan Singh (19 STC 469) followed.

5. It is now well settled that on analogous provisions,

fundamental concepts and general. principles unaffected by

the specialities of the English Income Tax Statutes, the

English Authorities can be useful guides. [802-E]..

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vazir Sultan & Sons (36

ITR 175) followed.

Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gas Lighting Improve-

ment Co. Ltd. (1923) 12 T.C. 503; (1923) A.C. 723 (H.L.).

Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Desouttex Bros Ltd. (1945)

29 T.C. 155, 160, 161; (1946) 1 All E.R. 58, 59, 60

(C.A.), Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Car Co.

(Wimbledon) Ltd. (1946) 2 All E.R. 609, 610, 611; 29 T.C.

214, 220, 222 (C.A.). Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.

Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co. Ltd. (1949)29 T.C. 352, 373,

Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rolls Royce Ltd. [1944] 2

All E.R. 340 and Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat v.

Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. (83 ITR 377) approved.

6. The genesis and development of the law relating to

additional super tax on undistributed profits of certain

Companies also confirms the conclusion that the expression

"A company whose business consists wholly or mainly in the

dealing in or holding of investments" takes within its

compass ’Companies which wholly or mainly derived their

income from house property. [804-D]

7. Even if it is assumed that the expression has a legal

character, it would not make any difference in the result of

the present appeal as the dictionary meaning of the expres-

sion "Investment Companies" is Companies whose income

consists mainly of investment income i.e., income which in

the hands of individual would not be earned income. [810C]

800

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeal Nos. 1760--1963

1971.

(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 9-2-1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax

Reference No. 90/67).

N. Mukherjee and P.K. Mukherjee, for the Appellant.

B.B. Ahuja and R.N. Sachthey, for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

JASWANT SINGH, J.--These appeals by special leave are

directed against the judgment dated February 9, 1971 of the

Calcutta High Court whereby the following question referred

to it under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

(hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) was answered in the

affirmative i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the

appellant :--

"Whether on the facts and in the circum-

stances of the case, the assessee is a company

whose business consists wholly or mainly in

the dealing in or holding of investments ?"

The facts material for our present purpose are: The

assessee appellant is a private limited company incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, its shares being held

by the members of Nawn family. For the assessment years

1955-56, 1956-57, 1957-58 and 1959-60 corresponding to the

financial years ending on March 31, 1955, March 31, 1956,

March 31, 1957 and March 31, 1959 respectively, the Income

Tax Officer being of the view that since the rents accruing

to the appellant from lands and house properties held by it

formed a major part of its income, it was a company whose

business consisted mainly in holding of investments as

envisaged by subsection (1) of section 23A of the Act and

Explanation 2(i) thereto and since it had declared more than

60% but less than the prescribed statutory 100% of its total

income as reduced by taxes referred to in clauses (a), (b)

and (c) of the aforesaid sub-section as dividends, it was

liable to super tax on the undistributed balance of the

distributable profits at the prescribed rate of 50%. Ac-

cordingly with the previous approval of the Inspecting

Assistant Commissioner, the Income Tax Officer levied

additional super tax at 50% of the net distributable bal-

ance available with the appellant by applying the provi-

sions of section 23A(1) of the Act. Aggrieved by this

order, the appellant took the matter in appeal to the Appel-

late Assistant Commissioner, who acceding to the contention

of the appellant and following an order dated April 6, 1963,

of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Income-tax Appeal

No. 5490 of 1961-62 for the assessment year 1958-59, held

that ’the appellant was not a company whose business con-

sisted wholly or mainly in the dealing in or holding of

investments’, and remitted the levy. Dissatisfied with the

order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Revenue

took the matter to the Tribunal but could not persuade it to

hold that the appellant was a company whose business con-

sisted wholly or mainly in the dealing in or holding of

investments. The Revenue then had the aforesaid

801

question referred under section 66( 1 ) of the Act to the

High Court at Calcutta which by its aforesaid judgment dated

February 9, 1971, answered the question in favour of the

Revenue and against the appellant. It is against this

judgment that the present appeals are directed.

It would be seen that the expression ’company whose

business consists wholly or mainly in the dealing in or

holding of investments’ consists of two parts viz. (1) a

company whose business consists wholly or mainly in the

dealing in investments and (2) a company whose business

consists wholly or mainly in holding of investments, and

what we are required in these appeals is to find out the

true meaning of the latter part of the expression i.e. of ’a

company whose business consists wholly or mainly in holding

of investments’ in the context of sub-section (1) of section

23A of the Act and Explanation 2(i) thereto and to determine

whether the appellant is a company whose business falls

within the ambit of the said second part of the expression.

Our task has been facilitated to some extent because of

the concession rightly and fairly made on behalf of the

appellant that the objects for which it was incorporated

included inter alia (1 ) purchase of lands and buildings and

(2) letting out of lands and buildings in lieu of appropri-

ate consideration and that during the years in question, the

appellant has been inter alia investing moneys in house

properties and its major income every year has been derived

from those properties. The controversy revolves only

round . the meaning of the expression ’holding of invest-

ments’ in the context of section 23A of the Act and Explana-

tion 2(i) thereto.

Mr. Mukherjee, counsel for the appellant, has strenuous-

ly urged that the expression not having been defined in the

Act must necessarily take its colour from and to be given

the same technical meaning as borne by the expression ’i-

nvestment companies’ as used in section 87(f) of the Indian

Companies Act, 1913 (which was in operation when the Indian

Income-tax Act, 1922 was enacted) or as used in section

372(11) of the Companies Act, 1956 which followed it and

thus has to be confined to such companies whose principal

business is the acquisition and holding of shares, deben-

tures, stocks or other securities. According to Mr. Mukher-

jee, the appellant cannot in this view of the matter be

deemed to be a company falling within the purview of the

aforesaid expression.

Mr. Ahuja, Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue

has, on the other hand, contended that the expression ’a

company whose business consists wholly or mainly in the

holding of investments’ appearing in section 23A of the Act

as amended by Finance Act, 1955 means a company whose income

is derived from investments in contra-distinction to the

income received from manufacturing or processing or trading

operations and the word ’investments’ in the context in

which it occurs ,not being a term of art with a defined and

technical meaning should be understood in its ordinary

popular sense as understood in business parlance.

We have given our careful consideration to the matter

and are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the submis-

sion made by

802

Mr. Mukherjee. It is true that the term ’investment’ is not

defined in the Income-tax Act but it cannot be ignored that

the Act does not lay down that the terms and expressions not

defined therein shall have the same meaning as given to them

in the Companies Act in a particular context. It may also

be noted in this connection that although the Legislature

amended section 23A of the Act in 1955 and thereafter, it

did not adopt the definition of ’investment companies’ as

given in section 87(f) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 or

section 372(11) of.the Companies Act, 1956. It appears that

while enacting section 23A of the Act and Explanation 2(i)

thereto, the Legislature intended to cover fields of activi-

ty wider than those contemplated by the aforesaid provisions

of the Companies Act, 1913 or 1956. The term ’investment’ in

the context in which it occurs not being a term of Art,

there is, in our judgment, no warrant for giving it the

restricted meaning as canvassed by Mr. Mukherjee. We think,

in a situation like the one with which we are confronted,

resort should be had not to the technical meaning of the

term but to its popular meaning with reference to the con-

text in which it occurs. (See decision of this Court in

Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore v. Jaswant Singh

Charan Singh(1).

In the instant case, the aforesaid expression has to be

understood in the ordinary popular sense as used by busi-

nessmen, and so construing it, it would, in our opinion,

embrace within its sweep the appellant company whose primary

or principal income is admittedly derived from house proper-

ties which it leases out to tenants. It will be profitable

in this connection to refer to some English cases where the

term ’investment’ occurring in analogous provisions came up

for interpretation for it is now well settled that on analo-

gous provisions, fundamental concepts, and general princi-

ples unaffected by the specialities of the English Income-

tax statutes, English authorities can be useful guides. (See

decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Vazir Sultan & Sons(2).

In Gas Lighting Improvement Commissioners Inland Revenue

v. Co. Ltd.(3) Viscount Cave L.C. while construing the word

investment in Rule 8 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule to the

Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, observed at page 534 as under :-

"That they (i.e. the shares and deben-

tures held by the respondent company in a

Belgian and two Rumanian oil producing compa-

nies) are investments in the ordinary sense of

the term probably no one would deny. They are

money put out in the shares and securities of

undertakings other than the undertaking of the

appellant-company itself, with the expectation

of receiving dividends or interest upon them;

and they satisfy any one of the definitions

quoted by the Master of the Rolls from well-

known dictionaries and any other definition

of an investment which I am able to conceive."

In Inland Revenue Commissioners v.

Desoutter Bros Ltd.(4) Lord Green while

construing the word ’investment’ occurring in

the (1) 19 S.T.C. 469. (2)’36 I.T.R. 175. (3)

(1923) 12 T.C. 503 @.534=[1923] A.C.723@ 729,

730 (H. L.) (4) (1945) 29 T.C. 155, 160-

61;[1946] 1 All. E.R. 58,59CP.

803

expression income received from investment in

section 12(1)(4) of the English Finance (No.

2) Act, 1939 and Schedule 7, Part I, Para-

graphs 6(1) and (2) thereof held that it is

not a word of art and it has to be interpreted

in the popular sense.

Again in Inland Revenue Commissioners v.

Broadway Car Co. (Vimbledon) Ltd.(1) which is

a direct authority on the question in hand),

the Court of Appeal while construing the

expression ’income received from investments’

occurring in the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1939,

held that the word ’investment’ must be con-

strued in the ordinary popular sense of the

word as used by businessmen and not as a term

of art having a defined or technical meaning

and that it was impossible to say that the

Commissioners had erred in law in coming to

the conclusion that rents from leases or under

leases can properly be comprised within the

phrase ’income from investments.’ At page

611, Cohen L. J. observed:

"The expression is, therefore, not

limited to investments which you would buy on

the advice of a stock-broker--stock exchange

investments. If you once go beyond that

field,it seems to me reasonably clear that

rents from leases or under-leases can proper-

ly, in suitable circumstances be comprised

within the phrase ’income from investments."

Again in Commissioners of Inland Revenue

v. Tootal Broadurst Lee Co. Ltd.(2) Lord

Normand while dealing with the question wheth-

er income described as royalties received by

the appellant company under three separate

agreements relating to patent rights and

admittedly part of the appellant’s business

profits was income from an investment within

the meaning of Paragraph 6 of Part I of the

Seventh Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act,

1939 observed at page 373, as follows :-

"The meaning of ’investment’ is not its

meaning in the vernacular of the man in the

street but in the vernacular of the business-

man. It is a form of income-yielding property

which the businessman looking at the total

assets of the company would single out as an

investment ...... The businessman would nor

limit income from investments to income from

the kinds of securities which are quoted on

the stock exchange, and he would, I think,

regard as income from investment a profitable

rent from a sub-lease of office premises, or

the like ........ "

In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rolls-

Royce Ltd(3) Macnaghten, J. observed at pages

341,342 as follows :--

"The word ’investment’ though it pri-

marily means the act of investing, is in

common use as meaning that which is thereby

acquired; and the primary meaning of the

transitive verb ’to invest’ is to lay. out

money in the acquisition of some species of

property; consequently, letters patent, which

(1) I1946] All. E.R. 609,610,611, 29 T.C.

214,220,222, (C. A.) (2) (1949) 29 T.C.

352,373. (3) [1944] 2 All. E.R. 340.

804

are undoubtedly a species of property, may

properly be described as an investment .....

Some light on the true interpretation of the

word ’investment’ in the Finance (No. 2) Act,

1939, Schedule VII, paragraph 6(1), may, I

think, be obtained from consideration of the

provisions of subparagraph(2). The income

which is to be included in the profits under

subpara. (1 ) is, it will be observed, income

received from investments in the case of a

building society, of a banking business,

assurance business, and a business concerned,

wholly or mainly, in dealing in or holding of

investments. In all those cases the invest-

ments would be investments acquired by the

laying out of money .... Business consist-

ing wholly or mainly in dealing in or holding

investments would, as a general rule, be

business where money, and nothing but money,

is laid out in acquiring the investments.

Thus the position that emerges from the above

mentioned decisions is that the aforesaid

expression cannot be limited to companies

whose principal business is the acquisition

and holding of shares, debentures, stocks or

other securities aS contended on behalf of the

appellant but covers companies whose primary

or principal source of income is house

property or capital gains as well. The

decision in Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat

v. Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. (1) on which

reliance has been placed by Mr. Mukherjee is

not helpful to the appellant as it turned on

the particular facts of that case.

The genesis and development of the law relating to

additional super-tax on undistributed profits of certain

companies also confirms the conclusion reached by us that

the expression ’a company whose business consists wholly or

mainly in the dealing in or holding of investments’ takes

within its compass companies which wholly or mainly derive

their income from house property.

It appears that it was for the first time in 1930 that

deriving an inspiration from the corresponding law in the

U.K. contained in the Finance Act of 1922 and the Acts that

succeeded it a provision for inclusion of undistributed

income of a company controlled by five or less members, in

the total income of the members of the company was intro-

duced in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, by insertion of

section 23A(2) by section 4 of the Income-tax (Amendment)

Act, 1930 (Act 21 of 1930). This section required the

Income-Tax Officer to pass an order including the undistrib-

uted income in the total income of the shareholders, whenev-

er he was satisfied-- (i) that the company’s profits and

gains were allowed to accumulate beyond its reasonable

needs, existing or contingent, .having regard to the mainte-

nance and development of its business, and (ii) that such

accumulation or failure to distribute was for the purpose

of preventing the imposition of tax upon any of the members

in respect of their shares in the profits and gains so

accumulated or not distributed. Because of the inclusion

of the element of motive, which is difficult of ascertain-

ment as held in David Garlaw & Sons Ltd. v.C.I.R.(1) section

23A(2))

(1) 83 I.T.R. 377.

805

virtually remained a dead letter as only one order was

passed under section 23A(2) between 1930 when the section

was ’introduced and 31st March, 1936, when the Income-tax

Inquiry Committee submitted its report.

By the Amendment Act VII of 1939, the law was recast and

the element of motive as also of current needs and possible

future requirements of the company for expansion was

dropped. Instead a simple test was adopted by means of

section 23A, namely, whether a certain minimum percentage of

the distributable income, 60 per cent generally and 100 per

cent in certain cases, referred to as the statutory percent-

age, had or had not .been distributed as dividends. In

case of nondistribution, the section invested the Income Tax

Officer with power to make an order levying additional super

tax on the entire undistributed balance of the net income of

the company and not merely on so much of it as was necessary

to bring up the distribution to the statutory percentage but

to regard the whole of it to have been distributed Officer

was empowered to treat not only that part of the net undis-

tributed income of the company which would be equivalent to

the statutory percentage but to regard the whole of it to

have been distributed amongst the members in accordance with

their shares in the company and included in their total

income. The Income Tax Officer was, however, permitted to

refrain from making such order, if he thought it fit to do

so, taking into consideration the past losses of the company

and its meagre income for the current year. Although the

Amendment Act, 1939 simplified the procedure, there still

remained certain defects to be remedied. It left the

definition of ’a company in which the public are substan-

tially interested’ untouched. Consequently, it remained

possible for a company, though substantially controlled by a

group of persons united together in interest, to escape the

operation of section 23A by so managing its affairs that on

the last date of the accounting year its shares carrying 25%

of the voting power were allotted to the members of the

public which included relations. The cumbrous procedure of

ascertaining the quantum of the additional super-tax payable

by relating it to the rate applicable to the total income of

the shareholder after including the sum apportioned in his

total income, was also allowed to continue. These and some

other defects were noticed by the Mathai Commission its

Report in paras 33 to 36 in the following words :--

"33. Application of 100 per cent clause to

investment companies.--Section 23A of the

Indian Income-Tax Act does not make any dis-

tinction between investment companies and

trading or manufacturing companies; the re-

quirement of 60 percent distribution applies

equally to all. The formation of ’private’

investment companies,or what may be termed as

’personal holding companies’, enables rich

persons to escape tax liability, by transfer-

ring their assets (including house property,

stocks and shares) to such a company in ex-

change for the shares of the company,

(1) 1I T.C. 96,120

806

inasmuch as personal super-tax on 40 per cent

of the distributable income of the company is

saved. Such companies admittedly do not re-

quire funds for internal financing or capital

formation as the industrial or trading compa-

nies do. It has, therefore, been suggested

that the entire (100 per cent) amount of the

distributable "profits of such companies ought

to be required to be distributed.

34. The foreign practice on this point also

shows that the Indian law is unduly lenient

towards such investment companies. In the U.

K,, investment companies (companies the income

’whereof consists mainly of ’investment in-

come’) are treated on special lines in respect

of their investment income (i.e., income

which, if the company were an individual,

would not be earned income); such income is

automatically deemed to be the income of the

members of the company according to their

interests, while the estate or trading income

of such a company is treated in the same

manner as the income of non-investment compa-

nies. (Section 262 of the U.K. Income Tax

Act, 1952).

35. Very stringent regulations have been

laid down in the income-tax law of the U.S.A.

in respect of the distribution of earnings of

’personal holding companies."A special surtax

is payable by them upon their undistributed

profits, subject to certain adjustments, in

addition to the regular corporate normal tax

and surtax. This surtax is at the rate of 75

per cent of the undistributed profits upto $

2,000 and 85. per cent of the amount of undis-

tributed profits in excess of $ 2,000. A

corporation is a personal holding company

if (i) at least 80 per cent (or 70 per cent in

certain cases where a corporation was a

personal holding company in a prior year) of

its gross income for the taxable year is

’personal holding company income’ and (ii) at

any time during the last half of the taxable

year more than 50 per cent in value of its

outstanding stock is owned, directly or indi-

rectly, by or for not more than five individu-

als. It has been specifically provided in

section 503 of the Internal Revenue Code that

an individual is considered as owning the

stock owned not only by or for himself but

also the stock owned, directly or indirect-

ly, by or for his family (brothers, sisters,

spouse, ancestors and lineal descendants) or

by or for his partner. ’Personal holding

company income’ is practically synonymous with

income from investments or income from deal-

ings in investment. It

807

includes dividends and annuities, interests,

royalities, gains from stock, security and

commodity transactions, rents and certain

income from estates and trusts, subject to

certain qualifications.

"36. It will thus be seen that the sugges-

tion requiring investment companies in which

the public are not substantially interested to

distribute 100 per cent of their distributable

profits is reasonable, and we accordingly

recommend its incorporation in section 23A."

Accordingly following the recommendations of the Mathai

Committee the provisions of section 23A were tightened and

recast by section 15 of Finance Act 15 of 1955 and certain

incomes which were not being taxed were brought into the

net. The definition of ’a company in which public was

substantially interested’ was widened so as to include a

company owned by the Government or a company in which the

Government held 40% or more of the share capital. In the

case of non-Government companies, the definition made it

essential that--

(i) at least 50 per cent of the voting power was in the

hands of the public (in the case of an industrial company

i.e. a company engaged in the manufacturing or processing of

goods or in mining or m the generation or distribution of

electricity or any other form of power at least 40 per cent)

(ii) the shares of the company were at some time during

the previous year dealt with in any stock exchange in India,

or were freely transferable by the holder to other members

of the public,

(iii) the affairs of the company, or the shares carrying

more than 50 per cent of the total voting power (in the case

of an industrial company more than 60 per cent) were con-

trolled or held by at least six persons (an individual with

his relatives, and a nominator and his nominee being treat-

ed as one single person), and

(iv) such dispersal of control and voting power was

present throughout the previous year.

In addition, instead of treating the undistributed

income as having been distributed as dividends and making

the shareholders liable’ for the additional tax in the first

instance, the Amendment Act made the company itself liable

to pay the additional super-tax straightway, at a fiat rate

of four annas on each rupee of the undistributed income

(after permitted deductions).

Power was also given to the company to apply to the

Commissioner for fixing the statutory percentage of distri-

bution at a reduced level on the ground of current and

future needs of the company and a right of appeal was pro-

vided to the Board of Referees from the order of the Commis-

sioner. The 1955 Amendment also provided for

808

set-off of the amounts distributed in excess of the statuto-

ry percentage in earlier years against the short-fall of

distribution in the accounting year.

In 1957, the law was again amended by section 7 of

Finance (No. 2) Act, 1957 (26 of 1957) with effect from

first April, 1957. The provisions authorising ad hoc fixa-

tion of the statutory percentage for each company and the

right of appeal to the Board of Referees were eleminated.

The statutory percentage was fixed at 100 per cent for

investment companies, 45 per cent for industrial companies

and 60 per cent for all other companies. In the case of

non-industrial companies with large accumulated profits, the

statutory percentage was raised from 60 per cent to 90 per

cent. The rate of penal tax was raised from four annas in

the rupee i.e. 25 per cent, on the undistributed balance to

50 per cent in respect of an investment company and 37 per

cent in respect of other companies.

In 1958 a new provision was introduced by section 9 of

Finance Act, 1958 (Act No. 11 of 1958) with effect from

April 1,1958, empowering the Income Tax Officer to refrain

from passing an order under old section 23A, if the payment

of a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared would

not have resulted in a benefit to the Revenue..

In 1959 the statutory percentage was raised to 50 per

cent for industrial companies and to 65 per cent for non-

industrial companies. by means of section 11 of Finance Act,

1959 (No. 12 of 1959) with effect from April 1, 1960. The

statutory percentage was reduced from 100 per cent to 90 per

cent in respect of investment companies by means of section

11(ii) of Finance Act, 1960 (No. 13 of 1960) with effect

from April 1, 1960.

In 1961, a radical change in the law relating to income

tax was introduced by the Finance Act of that year. It

exempted from additional super-tax (i) a company in which

the public were substantially interested, (ii) a subsidiary

company of any company in which the public were substantial-

ly interested.if the whole of the share capital of the

subsidiary company had been held by the parent company or by

its nominees throughout the previous year and (iii) a compa-

ny whose share capital to the extent of at least 75 per cent

was throughout the previous year beneficially held by a

charitable institution or fund established in India and

whose income from dividends was exempt from tax under

section 11 of the Act. Excepting these three classes of

companies, all other companies were brought within the

scheme of additional super taxation. The expression

’profits and gains distributed by any company’ appearing in

section 104 was not confined to companies deriving income

from business. The expression ’distributable income’ was

defined in section 109(i) as meaning the ’total income’ of a

company as reduced by certain items. The ’total income’ of

any assessee under the Act comprised not merely business or

profession income, but income under the various heads of

income enumerated in section 14. Consequently, the scheme

for levy of additional super-tax was also made applicable to

a company

809

whose income arose wholly or in part from property (8. 22),

or securities (s. 18), or capital gains (s. 45), or other

sources (s. 56). An ’investment company’ was defined in

section 109(i) of the Act as meaning a company whose busi-

ness consisted wholly or mainly in the dealing in or hold-

ing of investments. The statutory percentage in the case of

an investment company (whether Indian company or not) was

fixed at 90 per cent by section 109(iii)(1) of the Act. It

is significant that even in this Act, the restricted defini-

tion of the expression ’investment company’ as appearing in

section 372(II) of the Companies Act, 1956 was not adopted

by the Legislature.

By Finance Act, 1966, which came into force with effect

from April 1, 1966, the meaning of the term ’investment

company’ was clarified by amending clause (ii) of section

109 and providing therein that investment company meant a

company whose gross total income consisted mainly of income

which, if it had been the income of an individual, would

have been regarded as unearned income. An Explanation was

also added by this Act to the aforesaid clause (ii) reading

as under :--

"Explanation: In this clause the expression

unearned income’ has the meaning assigned to

it in the Finance Act of the relevant year."

In section 2(7)(e) of the Finance Act,

1966, ’unearned income’ was defined as meaning

income which is not earned income.

In section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act,

1966, ’earned income’ was defined thus:

"earned income" means any income of an

assessee who is an individual,

(i) which is chargeable under the head ’Sal-

aries’, or

(ii) which is chargeable under the head

’profits and gains of business or profession’,

where the business or profession is carried

on by the assessee or, in the case of a firm,

where the assessee is a partner actively

engaged "in the conduct of the business or

profession, or

(iii) which is chargeable under the head

’income from other sources’ if it is immedi-

ately derived from personal exertion or repre-

sents a pension or superannuation of other

allowance given to the assessee in respect of

the past services of any deceased person, or

which is chargeable under that head under

clause (ii) of subsection (2) of section 56 of

the Income Tax Act, and

XX XX

XX

810

Clause (ii)of section 109 was again amend-

ed by Finance Act, 1968 (Act 19 of 1968) with

effect from April 1, 1969. As a result of

this amendment, the clause read as under :--

"Investment company" means a company

whose gross total income consists mainly of

income which is chargeable under the heads

’interest, or securities, income from-house

property, capital gains and income from other

sources."

In view of the foregoing discussion, we

are clearly of opinion that the High Court was

fight in holding that the appellant is a

company whose business consisted wholly or

mainly in holding of investments.

Assuming without holding that the afore-

said expression as used in section 23A of the

Act has a legal character, it would not make

any difference in the result as the expression

’investment companies’ has been defined in

’Dictionary of English Law’ by Earl Jowitt

(Volume II) (1959 Edition) as "companies whose

income consists mainly of investment income

i.e. income which in the hands of an individu-

al would not be earned income."

In the result, the appeals fail and are

hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of

the case without any order as to costs.

P.H.P. Appeal dis-

missed.

811

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