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Munshi & Ors. v. Richpal & Ors.

Supreme Court of India · 17 February 1977 · [1977] 3 S.C.R. 1

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
17 February 1977
Reported as
[1977] 3 S.C.R. 1
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Singh, Jaswant
Length
6 pages
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PETITIONER:
MUNSHI & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RICHPAL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/02/1977
BENCH:
SINGH, JASWANT
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1206 1977 SCR (3) 1
1977 SCC (2) 665

ACT

Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955--Ss. 7 and

7A--Scope of.

HEADNOTE

Section 7 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands

Act, 1955, which deals with termination of tenancy, provides

that no tenancy shall be ’terminated except on any of the

grounds mentioned in the section. Section 7 gives additional

grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases.

Respondent no. 2 sold his land to the appellants.

Claiming that he was a non-occupancy tenant under respondent

no. 2, respondent no. 1 filed a suit for possession of the

land by pre-emption. The trial Court decreed the suit in

favour of the plaintiff-pre-emptor holding that he had been

a tenant-at-will on the date of the sale and that he was

forcibly dispossessed after the sale.

The District Judge as well as the High Court upheld the

trial Court’s decision.

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the

pre-emptor had to prove his subsisting right of pre-emption

on the date of sale, date of institution Of the suit and

date of passing of the decree and since the plaintiff had

failed to file a suit for recovery of possession under s. 50

of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 his right and title had been

extinguished.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD: The plaintiff cannot but be deemed to be the

tenant of the suit land on the date of sale as well as on

all other material dates and is thus fully qualified and

entitled to pre-empt the land. [5H]

The point now sought to be raised was not raised by the

appellant in the Courts below. In view of the provisions of

ss. 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands

Act, 1955, which have an over-riding effect and the decision

of this Court in Rikki Ram & Anr v. Ram Kumar & Ors [1975] 2

SCC 318 it cannot be disputed that an order or decree di-

recting eviction of a tenant is necessary to be obtained to

bring about a determination of the tenancy. A fortiori,

the person who has been in possession of the land with the

right to possess it continues to hold the land and be a

tenant in spite of having been wrongfully put out of posses-

sion specially if he has initiated proceedings for recovery

of possession. [3E & 5F]

Since in the instant case, it has been concurrently

found by the Courts below that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was

a tenant of the suit land on the date of sale and it has

not been alleged that his tenancy was thereafter determined

or terminated on any of the grounds set out in ss. 7 and 7A

of the Act and the plaintiff had applied to the Tehsildar

for restoration of possession, he could not but be deemed to

be a tenant of the suit land on the date of the sale as well

as on all other material dates and thus fully qualified and

entitled to pre-empt the land. [5G]

Rikki Ram & Anr. v. Ram Kumar & Ors. [1975] 2 S.C.C. 318

followed.

Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram [1971] 2 S.C.R. 640 and Dindyal

& Anr. v. Rajaram [1971] 1 S.C.R. 298 referred to.

2

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2054/69.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated the 5-8-1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Regular Second Appeal No. 983 of 1969).

V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Miss Kamlesh

Bansal, for the appellants.

Ram Sarup and R. A. Gupta, for respondent No. 1. The Judg-

ment of the Court was delivered by

JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by special leave which is

directed against the judgment and order dated September 24,

1969, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,

passed in R.S.A. No. 983 of 1969 arises in the following

circumstances :-

Bhawani Dass, respondent No. 2 herein, who owned agri-

cultural land measuring 50 kanals and 6 mafias comprised in

Khewat No. 223, Khatauni No. 467-468, situate in village

Kohlawas, Tehsil Dadri, District Mohindergarh, sold the

same to Munshi, Dina and Rani Dutt, appellants before us, in

lieu of Rs.10,000/- by means of registered sale deed (Ext.

D-1) dated October 17, 1966. Alleging that he held as a

non-occupancy tenant under Bhawani Dass the aforementioned

land on the date of its sale to the appellants and had

continued to do so and as such had a preferential right of

its purchase under clause Fourthly of section 15(1)(a) of

the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913)

which still applies to the State of Haryana, Richpal, re-

spondent No. 1 herein, brought a suit on October 17, 1967

for possession of the said’ land by pre-emption, in the

Court of the Sub-Judge, Charkhi Dadri. The suit was resist-

ed by the appellants contending inter alia that the plain-

tiff-respondent was neither a nonoccupancy tenant of the

land in question under Bhawani Dass, vendor, nor was he in

possession of the land either on the day of the aforesaid

sale or on the day of the institution off the suit. After

settling the necessary issues and recording the evidence

adduced by the parties, the trial court by its judgment

dated February 1, 1969, decreed the suit in favour of the

plaintiff-pre-emptor on payment of Rs. 10,000/- (the consid-

eration of the aforesaid sale) plus Rs. 727/- (the costs

incurred by the vendees-appellants on the stamps, registra-

tion fee etc.) holding that he had been a tenant-at-will

under the vendor from Kharif, 1957 to Rabi, 1968; that he

was forcibly dispossessed after the sale; that wrongful

eviction of a tenant could be of no consequence in the eye

of law; that the plaintiff-pre-emptor continued to hold his

rights as a tenant, including the right to immediate posses-

sion and cultivation of the land notwithstanding his wrong-

ful ouster therefrom by the vendees who could not be allowed

to take advantage of their own wrongs and the former must be

deemed to continue in legal possession of the land which was

comprised in his tenancy under the vendor on the date of the

sale right upto the date of the suit and the date of the

decree of the trial court in his favour. The trial court

further held that ’a tenant’s eviction can only be had

under sections 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricul-

tural Lands Act, 1955, and there is nothing on the record of

the case to even insinuate that the plaintiff’s tenancy

3

which subsisted at the time of the impugned sale was ever

determined or terminated under section 7 or 7A of the Act

and the plaintiff who was in physical possession of the land

in suit as a tenant at the time of the sale has to be

taken to be in legal possession up till the present moment’.

In conclusion, the trial could held that the mere act of

forcible dispossession of the plaintiff-pre-emptor at the

hands of the vendees after the sale could not have the

effect of divesting him of his right to hold the land which

he had acquired as a tenant of the vendor and in the eye of

law he must be presumed to have continued to be a tenant all

along and as such had a preferential right of pre-emption.

The judgment and decree passed by the trial court was

affirmed in appeal not only by the Additional District

Judge, Gurgaon, but also by a learned Single Judge and

Letters Patent Bench of the High Court. Aggrieved by these

decisions the vendees-appellants have, as already stated,

come up in further appeal to this Court.

The sole point that has been urged before us on behalf

of the appellants is that as according to the decision of

this Court in Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram(1) the plaintiff-pre-

emptor has to prove his subsisting right of pre-emption on

all the three material dates viz.(1) the date of sale, (2)

the date of institution of the suit and (3) the date of

passing of the decree and in the instant case, he failed to

file a suit in the revenue court for recovery of possession

of the suit land within one year of the date of his dispos-

session as contemplated by section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy

Act 1887 not only his remedy was destroyed but his

right and title was also extinguished at the expiry of that

period on the general principles underlying section 27 of

the Limitation Act, 1963, which may not in terms be applica-

ble to the present case. Though the learned counsel for the

appellants cited a few cases in support of his contention

but did not unfortunately bring to our notice the decision

of this Court in Dindyal & Anr. v. Raja Ram (2) which may in

an appropriate case require reconsideration by a larger

bench of this Court, we think, he cannot be allowed canvass

the aforesaid point. A reference to the record of the case

shows that the point now sought to be agitated before us was

not raised by the appellants either in their written state-

ment or in the grounds of the three appeals preferred by

them before the courts below. All that appeals from the

record to have. been urged by them in the grounds of the

aforesaid appeals was that the evidence had not been proper-

ly appraised and that in the absence of any lease deed in

his favour or any receipt evidencing payment of rent by him

to the vendor, mere entries in the khasra girdawaries were

not enough to establish that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was a

tenant of the suit land under the vendor at the time of the

sale. The suit land being situate in the district of

Mohindergarh which formed part of the territories of the

erstwhile of Pepsu, the case, as rightly observed by the

court of first instance, was governed by sections 7 and 7A

of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, which

in view of section 4 of that Act have an overriding effect

and provide as under :--

"4. Act to over ride other laws--Save, as

otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the

provisions

of this Act

(1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 640.

(2) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 298.

4

shall have effect notwithstanding anything

inconsistent therewith contained in any other

law for the time being in force or any instru-

ment having effect by virtue of any such law

or any usage, agreement, settlement, grant,

sanad or any decree or order of any court or

other authority.

7. Termination of tenancy.--(1) No

tenancy shall be terminated except in accord-

ance with the provisions of this Act or except

of any of the following grounds, namely :--

(b) that the tenant has failed to pay rent

within a period of six months after it falls

due;

Provided that no tenant shall be ejected

under this clause unless he has been afforded

an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent

within a further period of six months from the

date of the decree or order directing his

ejectment and he had failed to pay such ar-

rears during that period;

(c) that the tenant, not being a widow, a

minor, an unmarried woman, a member of the

Armed Forces of the Union or a person incapa-

ble of cultivating land by reason of physical

or mental infirmity has after commencement

of the President’s Act sublet without the

consent in writing of the landowner, the land

comprising his tenancy or any part thereof;

(d) that the tenant has, without sufficient

cause, failed to cultivate personally such

land in the manner and to the extent customary

in the locality in Which such land is situat-

ed;

(e) that the tenant has used such land or

any part thereof in a manner which is likely

to render the land unfit for the purpose for

which it was leased to him;

(f) that the tenant, on demand in writing

by the landowner, has refused to execute a

kabuliyat agreeing to pay rent in respect of

his tenancy in accordance with the provisions

of sections 9 and 10.

(2)..............................

7A. Additional grounds for termination

of tenancy in certain cases.--(1) Subject to

the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), a

tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the

Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second

Amendment) Act, 1956 may be terminated on

the following grounds in addition to the

grounds specified in section 7, namely :-

(a) that the land comprising the tenancy

has been reserved by the land-owner for his

personal cultivation in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter II:

(b) that the landowner owns thirty standard

acres or less of land and the land falls

within the permissible limit;

5

Provided that no tenant shall be ejected

under this subsection--

(i) from any area of land if the area under

the personal cultivation of the tenant does

not exceed five standard acres,

(ii) from an area of five standard acres,

if the area under the personal cultivation of

the tenant exceeds five standards acres.

until he is allowed by the State Government

alternative land of equivalent value in stand-

ard acres.

(2) No tenant, who immediately preceding

the commencement of the President’s Act has

held any land continuously for a period of

twelve years or more under the same land-owner

or his predecessor in title, shah be ejected

on the grounds specified in sub-section (1)-

(a) from any area of land, if the area

under the personal cultivation of the tenant

does not exceed fifteen standards acres, or

(b) from an area of fifteen standards

acres, if the area under the personal cultiva-

tion of the tenant exceeds fifteen standard

acres;

provided that nothing in this sub-section

shall apply to the tenant of a landowner who

both, at the commencement of the tenacy and

the commencement of the President’s Act, was

a widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member

of the Armed Forces of the Union or a person

incapable of cultivating land by reason of

physical or mental infirmity.

Explanation.--In computing the period of

twelve years, the period during which any land

has been held under the same land-owner or his

predecessor in title by the father, brother or

son of the tenant shall be included.

(3) For the purpose of computing under

sub-sections (1) and (2) the area of land

under the personal cultivation of a tenant,

any area of land owned by the tenant and under

his personal cultivation shall be included."

It cannot, in view of the above noted provisions of law

and the decision of this Court in Rikh Ram & Anr. v. Ram

Kumar & Ors.(1) be disputed that an order or decree direct-

ing eviction of a tenant is necessary to be obtained to

bring about a determination of the tenancy. A fortiori, a

person who has been in possession of land with the right to

possess it continues to hold the ’land and to be a tenant in

spite of having been wrongfully put out of possession espe-

cially if he has initiated proceedings for recovery of

possession. As in the instant case, it has been concur-

rently found by all the courts below that the

plaintiff-pre-emptor was a tenant of ’the suit land on the

date of sale

(1) [1975] 2 S.c.c. 318.

6

and it has not been alleged much less proved that his

tenancy was, thereafter determined or terminated on any of

the grounds set out in sections 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenan-

cy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 and he had admittedly

applied to the Tehsildar for restoration of his posses-

sion, he cannot but be deemed to be a tenant of the suit

land on the date of the sale as well as on all other materi-

al dates and thus fully qualified and entitled to pre-empt

the land. We must fairly state that our judgment is based

on the provisions of law brought to our notice by counsel

and our conclusion is confined to the interpretation of the

Acts referred to above.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in

this appeal which is dismissed. In the circumstances of the

case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this

appeal.

P.B.R. Appeal

dismissed.

7

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