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Min. of Finance v. S.B. Ramesh

Supreme Court of India · 2 February 1998

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
2 February 1998
Case no.
C.A. No. 3091 of 1995
Bench
K. Venkataswami, A.P. Misra
Length
7 pages
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PETITIONER:
MINISTRY OF FINANCE & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S.B. RAMESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/02/1998
BENCH:
K. VENKATASWAMI, A.P. MISRA

ACT

HEADNOTE

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENTK.Venkataswami. J.

The appellants impugn the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, dated 9.8.94 in O.A. No. 27/94.

Before proceeding to consider the issues, we want to observe the following:

This Court while granting special leaven on 28.2.95 expedited the hearing of the appeal and directed the counsel to complete the paper books within ten weeks. In spite of passing of nearly three years after the leave was granted, no steps have been taken to complete the paper books and we have to go only by order of the Tribunal. In the SLP paper book, only a copy of the judgment of the Tribunal, apart from the special Leave Petition and the Counter Affidavit filed by the appellant before the Tribunal. Is available and no other documents were included. Hence, leave was granted by this Court to complete the paper book. Even then the appellants did not care to avail the opportunity.

Now on merits.

The respondent in this appeal was working as an Income Tax Officer, Group ‘B’, during the relevant period. He was proceeded departmentally by filing a charge-sheet dated 7.5.87 for alleged irregularities in the income-tax assessment. For reasons with which we are not concerned, that was not pursued after certain stage dater on, the respondent was served with another charge-sheet dated 25.3.88. The article of charge reads as follows:-

"Shri S.B. Ramesh. Income Tax

Officer. Group-B. Andhra Pradesh

(now under suspension) has

contracted a second marriage with

Smt. K.R. Aruna while his first

wife. Smt. Anusuya is alive and the

first marriage has not been

dissolved. By this act, Shri S.B.

Ramesh has violated Rule 21(3) of

CCS (Conduct) Rules. 1964. In any

case, Shri S.B. Ramesh has been

living with Smt. K.R.Aruna and has

children by her. Thereby Shri S.B.

Ramesh has exhibited a conduct

unbecoming of a Government servant

and has accordingly violated rule

3(1) (iii) of the CCS (Conduct)

Rules 1964."

As the respondent denied the charge, an Enquiry was conducted in which the respondent did not participate. The Report of the Enquiry Officer was to the effect the first part of the charge was not proved and that the second part of the charge, namely, that the respondent, by living with Smt. K.R. Aruna and having children by her, Exhibited a conduct unbecoming of a Government servant violating Rule 3(1) (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 was established. This report of the Enquiry Officer was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, who by his order dated 23.4.92 imposed on him the punishment of compulsory retirement from service. Aggrieved by that, the respondent preferred an appeal on 4.6.92 which was kept pending without disposal for an unduly long time which obliged the respondent to file an application before the Tribunal challenging the punishment of compulsory retirement.

Before the Tribunal, the respondent challenged the order of compulsory retirement by contending that the Enquiry has not been held unconformity with the principles of natural justice, that the findings of the Enquiry Authority, which were acceded by the Disciplinary Authority, were all absolutely perverse and based on no evidence and that sub-rule (18) of rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules was not complied with. It also appears that the respondent raised a preliminary point before the Tribunal contending that his conduct, which has no relation to the discharge of official duties, cannot form a basis for departmental proceedings to charge him under rule 3(1)(iii) of the Conduct Rules. This as without merit in the light of a judgment of this Court in Govinda Menon Vs, Union of India (AIR 1967 SC 1274).

The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants before the Tribunal were to the effect that all resonable opportunity was given to the delinquent officer and all rule shave been followed and complied with. According to the learned counsel for the Department, the findings rendered by the Enquiry Officer, accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, were all based on evidence and, therefore, well-founded.

The Tribunal, on a consideration of the pleadings and documents placed before it, found that the findings were rendered on surmises and presumptions and the documents marked as exhibits were not properly proved and the nonexamination of Smt. Aruna was also fatal to the case of the prosecution. The Tribunal was aware of the well settled position that the degree of proof required in the departmental disciplinary proceedings need not be of the same standard as the degree of proof required for establishing the guilt of an accused in a criminal case. However, the Tribunal found that there was a total dearth of evidence to bring home the charge that the delinquent Officer has been living in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant or that he has exhibited adulterous conduct by living with Smt. K.R. Aruna and begetting children. On that basis the Tribunal set aside the order impugned before it, namely, the order of compulsory retirement of the delinquent officer. The Tribunal could have rested its decision on the basis of the conclusion as set out above. Instead the Tribunal, purporting to give additional reason, inter alia, observed as follows:-

"Though it would be ideal if sexual

relationship is confined to legal

wedlock, there is no law in our

country which makes sexual

relationship is confined to legal

wedlock, there is no law in our

country which makes sexual

relationship of two adult

individuals of different sex.

unlawful unless the relationship is

adulterous or promiscuous. If a man

and woman are residing under the

same roof and if there is no law

prohibiting such a residence, what

transpires between them is not a

concern of their employer. Such a

life, if accepted by the society

at large, without any displeasure

or grudge, then it cannot be said

that there is any moral turpitude

involved in their living in this

case, there is no case that on

amount of the applicant living with

Smt. K.R. Aruna, his reputation

among the general public has been

lowered or that, the public has

been looking down on his conduct as

immoral one, Therefore, even if

factually, the allegation that the

applicant who is already married to

another woman is living with Smt.

KR Aruna is proved to be true, we

are of the considered view, that,

that alone will not justify a

finding that the applicant is

guilty of misconduct deserving

departmental action and

punishment."

Immediately we prefer to record our total disapproval with the above observations of the Tribunal. We propose to deal with and rest our decision on the merits with reference to the findings of the Tribunal rendered on the basis of the facts relating to the case.

Against the order of the Tribunal which set aside the punishment of compulsory retirement, this appeal has been filed.

The learned counsel appearing for the appellants placed strong reliance on the latter part of the judgment of the Tribunal, extracted above, which related to additional/alternative reason given by the Tribunal to its decision. We have already expressed our disapproval to the later part of the judgment of the Tribunal.

We must observe that no serious attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellants to attack the findings of the Tribunal rendered in the first part of the judgment. The respondent. who appeared in person. presented his case by pointing out the portions of in the first part of the judgment of the Tribunal and also placed his written arguments.

It is necessary to set out the portions from the order of the Tribunal which gave the reasons to come to the conclusion that the order of the Disciplinary Authority was based on no evidence and the findings were perverse. The Tribunal, after extracting full the evidence of SW-1. the only witness examined on the side of the prosecution. and after extracting also the proceedings of the Enquiry Officer dated 18.6.91. observed as follows:-

"After these proceedings on

18.6.91 on the Enquiry Officer has

only received the brief from the PO

and then finalised the report. This

shows that the Enquiry Officer has

not attempted to question the

applicant on the evidence appearing

against him in the proceedings

dated 18.6.91. Under Sub-Rule 18 of

Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. It

is incumbent on the Enquiry

authority to question the officer

facing the charge, broadly on the

evidence appearing against him in a

case where the officer does not

offer himself for examination as

witness. This mandatory provision

of the CCS (CCA) Rules has been

lost sight of by the Enquiry

authority. The learned counsel for

the respondents argued as the

applicant did not appear in

response to notice. It was not

possible for the Enquiry authority

to question the applicant. This

argument has no force because. on

18.6.91 when the inquiry was held

for recording the evidence in

support of the charge, even if the

Enquiry officer has set the

applicant ex-parte and recorded the

evidence, he should have adjourned

the hearing to another date to

enable the applicant to participate

in the enquiry hereafter/or even if

the inquiry authority did not

choose to give the applicant an

opportunity to cross-examine the

witness examined in support of the

charge, he should have given an

opportunity to the applicant to

appear and then proceeded to

question him under sub-rule 18 of

Rule 14 of CCs (CCA) Rules. The

omission to do this is a serious

error committed by the enquiry

authority. Secondly, we notice that

the enquiry authority has marked as

many as 7 documents in support of

the charge. while SW-1 has proved

only one document: namely, the

statement of Smt. K.R. Aruna

alleged to have been recorded in

his presence. How the other

documents were received in evidence

are not explained either in the

report of the Enquiry authority or

in the proceedings. Even if the

documents which were produced along

with the charge sheet were all

taken on record. unless and until

the applicant had requested the

Enquiry officer to mark certain

documents in evidence on his side.

the enquiry authority had no

jurisdiction in marking all those

documents which he had called for

the purpose of defending himself on

the side of the applicant while he

has not requested for making of

these documents on his side. It is

seen that some of these documents

which is marked on the side of the

defence not at the instance of the

applicant. has been made use of by

the enquiry authority to reach a

finding against the applicant. This

has been accepted by the

disciplinary authority also. We are

of the considered view that this is

absolutely irregular and has

prejudiced the case of the

applicant. These documents, which

were not proved in accordance with

law should nor have been received

in evidence and that, any inference

drawn from these documents is

misplaced and opposed to law, we

further find that the enquiry

authority as well as, the

disciplinary authority have freely

made use of the statement alleged

to have been made by the statement

alleged to have been made by Smt Kr

Aruna in the presence of SW1 and it

was on that basis that they reached

the conclusion the applicant was

living with Smt. K.R. Aruna and

that, he was the father of the two

children on Smt. K.R. Aruna. The

S.W.1 in his deposition which is

extracted above, has not spoken to

the details contained in the

statement of Smt. K.R. Aruna which

was marked as Ex.1. Further it is

settled law that any statement

recorded behind the back of a

person can be made use of against

him in a proceeding unless the

person who is said to have made

that statement is made available

for cross-examination, to prove his

or her veracity. The disciplinary

authority has not even chosen to

include Smt. K.R. Aruna in the list

of witnesses for offering her for

being cross-examined for testing

the veracity of the documents

exhibited at Ex.1 veracity of the

documents exhibited at Ex.1 which

is said to be her statement.

Therefore, we have no hesitation in

coming to the conclusion that the

enquiry authority as well as, the

disciplinary authority have gone

wrong in placing reliance on Ex.1

which is the alleged statement of

Smt. K.R. Aruna without offering

Smt. K.R. Aruna as a witness for

cross-examination. The applicant’s

case is that the statement was

recorded under coercion and duress

and the finding based on this

statement is absolutely

unsustainable as the same is not

based on legal evidence. The other

documents relied on by the Enquiry

authority, as well as by the

disciplinary authority for reaching

the conclusion that the applicant

and Smt. K.R. Aruna were living

together and that they have

begotten two children have also

been not proved in the manner in

which they are required to be

proved."

Then. again after extracting the relevant portions from the disciplinary authority’s order, the Tribunal observed as follows:-

"We have extracted the fore-going

portions from the order of the

disciplinary authority for the

purpose of demonstrating that the

disciplinary authority has placed

reliance on a statement of Smt.

K.R. Aruna. without examining Smt.

K.R. Aruna. without examining Smt.

Aruna as a witness in the inquiry

and also on serval documents

collected from somewhere without

establishing the authenticity

thereof to come to a finding that

the applicant has conducted himself

in a manner unbecoming of a

Government servant. The nomination

form alleged to have been filed by

Sri Ramesh for the purpose of

Central Government Employees’

Insurance Scheme, was not a

document which was attached to the

memorandum of charges as one on

which the Disciplinary Authority

wanted to rely on for establishing

the charge. This probably was one

of the documents which the

applicant called for, for the

purpose of cross-examining the

witness or for making proper

defence. However, unless the

Government servant wanted this

document to be exhibited in

evidence, it was not proper for the

Enquiry Authority to exhibit it and

to rely on it for reaching the

conclusion against the applicant.

Further, an inference is drawn that

S.B.R.Babu mentioned in the school

records (admission registers and

Sh.Ramesh mentioned in the

Municipal records was the

applicant, on the basis of a

comparison of the hand-writing or

signature or telephone numbers are

only guess work. which do not

amount to proof even in a

disciplinary proceedings. It is

true that the degree of proof

required in a departmental

disciplinary proceedings, need not

be of the same standard as the

degree of proof required for

establishing the guilt of an

accused in a criminal case.

However, the law is settled now

that suspicion, however strong,

cannot be substituted for proof

even in a departmental disciplinary

proceeding. Viewed in this

perspective we find there is a

total dearth of evidence to bring

home the charge that the applicant

has been living in a manner

unbecoming of a Government servant

or that, he has exhibited

adulterous conduct by living with

Smt. K.R.Aruna and begetting

children."

On a careful perusal of the above findings of the Tribunal in the light of the materials placed before it. we do not think that there is any case for interference, particularly in the absence of full materials made available before us in spite of opportunity given to the appellants. On the facts of this case, we are of the view that the departmental Enquiry conducted in this case is totally unsatisfactory and without observing the minimum required procedure for proving the charge. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in rendering the findings as above and setting aside the order impugned before it.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs.

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