PETITIONER:
Mc DOWELL & COMPANY LIMITED
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/04/1985
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
DESAI, D.A.
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION:
1986 AIR 649 1985 SCR (3) 791
1985 SCC (3) 230 1985 SCALE (1)788
ACT
Concepts of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, difference in-Tax Planning Colorable device within the framework of law cannot be allowed to be a part of Tax Planning.
New plea-Constitution of India, 1950-Appeal by Special Leave under Article 136-Supreme Court cannot entertain a plea not taken in the High Court.
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1947-"Turn over", scope of-Test for determining whether an excise duty is a part of "turn over," under the Sales Tax Act- The incidence of, excise duty being directly relatable to manufacture, validity of the decision In McDowell’s case reported in [1977] 1 SCR 914 reconsidered:
HEADNOTE
"Excise duty" as defined in section 2(10) of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968 is leviable on the manufacture of liquor and the manufacturer cannot remove the same from the distillery unless the duty imposed under the Excise Act has been paid. Buyers of Indian liquor from the appellant’s distillery obtain distillery passes for release of liquor after making payment of excise duty and present the same at the distillery there upon the bill of sale or invoice is prepared by the distillery showing the price of liquor but excluding excise duty. The appellant’s books of account also did not contain any reference to excise duty paid by the purchaser. The appellant, there-ore, paid sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the basis of turnover which excluded excise duty. This position was not accepted by the Sale Tax Authorities and the matter was contested right upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Mc Dowell & Company Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer VIIth Circle, Hyderabad, etc. reported in [1977] 1 SCR 914 held that the Sales Tax Authorities were not competent to include in the "turnover" of the appellant, the excise duty which was not charged by it, but was paid directly to the Excise 792 Authorities the buyers of the liquor, inasmuch as the excise duty did not go into the common till of the appellant and did not become a part of the circulating capital.
After the judgment of the Supreme Court Rules 76 and 79(1) of the A.P. Distillery Rules were suitably amended with effect from August 4, 1981. Amended Rule 76(a) provides that "No spirit of liquor" manufactured or stored shall be removed unless the Excise duty specified in rule 6 has been paid by a holder of D-2 licence before such removal and the amended rule 79(1) provides that on payment of the excise duty by the holder of D-2 licence a distillery pass for the removal of spirit fit for human compensation may be granted in favour of any of the named persons therein.
The appellant, being a D-2 licence holder was served with a notice, on the basis of the amended provisions, by the respondent proposing to include a sum of Rs. 4,49,09,532.40 representing the excise duty paid directly by buyers of appellants’ liquor in the appellants, turnover for a part of the year 1982-83, Thereupon, the appellant again moved the High Court for quashing the said notice. The High Court considered the effect of the amended Rules and held that the primary liability to pay excise duty was indisputably of the holder of the D-2 licence. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the findings (a) that the turnover related to liquor; and (b) that the excise duty which was payable by the appellant but had by amicable arrangement been paid by the buyer was actually a part of the turnover of the appellant and was, therefore, liable to be so included for determining liability for sales tax. When leave was granted by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, the correctness of the decision in appellants’ case reported in [1977] 1 SCR 914, was doubted and the matter was referred to a larger Bench.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^
HELD: (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. (concurring)
1.1 Much legal sophistry and Judicial exposition both in England and India have gone into the attempt to differentiate the concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance and to discover the invisible line supposed to exist which distinguishes one from the other. Tax avoidance, it seems, is legal; tax evasion is illegal. Though initially the law was, and law still is, there is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothings to be implied", during the period between the two world wars the theory came to be propounded and developed that it was perfectly open for persons to evade (avoid) income tax if they could do so legally. In the wake of World War II huge profiteering and racketeering became the order of the day, something which persists till today but on a much larger scale. Therefore, the attitude of the entire English Courts towards avoidance of tax perceptibly changed and hardened, The march of the law against Tax avoidance schemes des- 793 cribed as magic performance by lawyer turned magician continued and then came a significant departure from the West-mininister and the Fisher Executors principle in 1982 and finally "the ghost of West-minister" has been exercised in England. Thus, in the very country of its birth, the principle of West-minister has been given a decent burial and in that very country where the phrase "tax avoidance" originated the judicial attitude towards tax avoidance has changed and the smile, cynical or even affectionate though it might have been at one time, has now frozen into a deep frown. The courts are concerning themselves not merely with the genuineness of a transaction, but with the intended effect of it for fiscal purposes. No man now can get away with a tax avoidance project with the mere statement that there is nothing illegal about it.
[797 G-H, 798 F, 801 C, 807 A-D]
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Fishers Executors, [1926] AC 395; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminister, [19361 AC 1; Lord Howard De Waldan v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1942] 1 KB 389; Latilla v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1943] AC 377: Griffiths v. J.P. Harrizan Ltd. [1963] AC 1; Morgan v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1963] Chancery 438; Public Trustee v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1965] Chancery 286; Campbell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1967] Chancery 651; Greenberg v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1971] 3 All E.R. 136; W.T. Ramsay v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 11982] AC 300: Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd, 1982 STC 30: Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530; Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman & Co., [1968]1 SCR 10; Commissioner of Income tax. Gujarat v. Kharwar, 72 ITR 603 referred to.
2. The evil consequence of tax avoidance are manifold: (i) there is substantial loss of much needed public revenue particularly in a welfare State like ours; (ii) there is the serious disturbance caused to the economy of the country by the piling up of mountains of blackmoney directly causing inflation; (iii) there is "the large hidden loss" to the community by some of the best brains in the country being involved in the perpetual war waged between the tax avoider and his expert team of advisers, lawyers and accountants on the side and the tax-gathered and his perhaps not so skillful, advisers on the other side; (iv) there is the "sense of injustice and inequality which tax avoidance arouses in the breasts of those who are unwilling or unable to profit by it"; and (v) last but not least is the ethics (to be precise, the lack of it) of transferring the burden of tax liability to the shoulders of the guideless, good citizens from those of the "artful doggers". [808 H, 809 A- C]
3. The proper way to construe a taxing statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally or liberally, nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax, and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its approval to it. [809 E-F]
Wood Polymer Ltd. v. Bengal Hotels Limited, 40 Company Cases 597 referred to. 794
4. It is neither fair nor desirable to expect the legislature to intervene and take care of every device and scheme to avoid taxation. It is upto the Court to take stock to determine the nature of the new and sophisticated legal devices to avoid tax and consider whether the situation created by the devices could be related to the existing legislation with the aid of ’emerging’ techniques of interpretation, to expose the devices for what they really are and to refuse to give Judicial benediction. [809 G-H 810 A]
W.T. Ramsay v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1982] AC 300; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd. 1982 STC 30; Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] I All E.R. 530 quoted with approval.
HELD: (Per Ranganath Misra, J.)
1. Tax planning may be legitimate provided lt is within the framework of law, Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges. [823 H, 824 A]
Commissioner of Income tax v. A. Raman & Co. (1968) 67 ITR II SC J Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat II v. B.M. Kharwar, (1969) 72 ITR 603 SC; Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1940) 8 ITR 522 (PC); Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commission of Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax, Bombay, (1958) 34 ITR 388 (SC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sakarlal Balabhai (1972) 86 ITR 2 (SC) referred to.
Latilla v. I.R. 25 T.C. 107 quoted with approval.
2.1 The incidence of excise duty is directly relatable to manufacture but its collection can be deferred to a later stage as a measure of convenience or expediency. [815 A-B]
The Province of Madras v. M/s. Boddu Paidanna & Sons [1942] ECR 90 R.C. Jall v. Union of India, [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 436; Re. Sea Custom Act, [1964) 3 SCR 787; M/s- Guruswamy & Co. etc. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 548; Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers’ Association v. Union of India & Anr. [1970] 2 SCR 68; A.B. Abdul Kadir & Anr. v. State of Kerala, [1976] 3 SCR 219 referred to.
2.2 On an examination of the provisions of the A.P. Excise Act, the Rules were framed thereunder and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is clear, that the conclusion of the Court in Mc Dowells & Company Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Vllth Circle, Hyderabad etc., [1977] 1 SCR 914 at page 921 of [1973] 1 SCR, that intending purchasers of the Indian liquors who seek to obtain distillery passes are also legally responsible for payment of the excise duty is too broadly stated. The "duty wag primarily a burden which the 795 manufacturer had to bear and even if the purchasers paid the same under the Distillery Rules, the provisions were merely enabling and did not give rise to any legal responsibility or obligation for meeting the burden. [815 B-D]
The change in Rule 76 of the AP Distillery Rules has clearly affirmed the position that liability for payment of excise duty is of the manufacturer and the provisions of rules 80 to 84 do not militate against it. These rules do not detract from the position that payment of excise duty is the primary and exclusive obligation of the manufacturer and if payment be made under a contract or arrangement by any other person it would amount to meeting of the obligation of the manufacturer and nothing more. [815 D-F]
2.3 The definition of "turnover", in section 2(s) of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, which is to the effect. namely ’the total amount set out in the bill of sale (or if there is no bill of sale, the total amount charged) as the consideration for the sale or purchase of goods (whether such consideration be cash, deferred payment or any other thing or value) Including any sums charged by the dealer for anything done in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the delivery of the goods and any other sums charged by the dealer, whatever be the description, name or object thereof" clearly indicates that the total amount charged as the consideration for the sale is to be taken into account for determining the turnover. Where a bin of sale is issued (and obviously the bill has to state the total amount charged as consideration), the total amount set out therein is to be taken into account. In every transaction of sale, there is bound to be a seller at one end and a buyer at the other and transfer of title in the goods takes place for a consideration. [815 H,816 A-C]
2.4 Excise duty though paid by the purchaser to meet the liability of the appellant, is a part of the consideration for the sale and is includible in the turnover of the appellant. The purchaser has paid the tax because the law asks him to pay it on behalf of the manufacturer. Here, admittedly, the bills issued by the appellant did not include the excise duty; Payment of excise duty is a legal liability of the manufacture, its payment is a condition precedent to the removal of the liquor from the distillery and payment by the purchaser is on account of the manufacturer. According to normal commercial practice, excise duty should have been reflected in the bill either as merged in price or being shown separately. As a fact, in the hands of the buyer the cost of liquor is what is charged by the appellant under its bill together with excise duty which the buyer has directly paid on seller’s account. The consideration for the sale is thus the total amount not what is reflected in the bill. [818 C-F]
2.5 True, the excise duty component of the price would not be an addition to the coffers of the dealer, as it would go to reimburse him in respect of the excise duty already paid by him on the manufacture of the goods. But even so, it would be part of the sale price because it forms a component of the consideration for the sale of the goods that the amount representing excise duty would be payable by the purchaser, There is no other manner of liability, statutory or 796 otherwise, under which the purchaser would be liable to pay the amount of excise duty to the dealer. And on this reasoning, it would make no difference whether the amount of excise duty is included in the price changed by the dealer or is shown as a separate item in the bill, The position is not different when under a prior agreement, the legal liability of the manufacturer dealer for payment of excise duty is satisfied by the purchaser by direct payment to the excise authorities or to the State exchequer. [816 G-H, 817 A-D]
2.6 The conclusion reached in the appellants’ case in [1977] 1 SCR 914 on the second aspect of the matter namely, when the excise duty does not go into the common till of the assessee and it does not become a part of the circulating capital, it does not constitute turnover, is not the decisive test for deter mining whether such duty would constitute "turnover". The relevant consideration is not whether the law permits the incidence of the duty to be passed on to the purchaser but whether there is a prohibition against passing of it. If there is no bar, the incidence would be passed on to the purchaser in accordance with normal commercial practice. [819 A-C 821 B-C]
The Province of Madras v. M/s. Boddu Paidanna & Sons, [1942] FCR 90; RC Jall v. Union of India, [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 436; Re. Sea Customs Act, [1964] 3 SCR 787; M/s, Guruswamy & Co. etc. v. State of Mysore & Ors, [1967] 1 SCR 548; jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers’ Association v. Union of India & Anr. [1970] 2 SCR 68; A.B. Abbul Kadir & Ors. v. State of Kerala, [1976] 3 SCR 219: referred to.
Hindustan Sugar Mills v. Rajasthan State, [1979] I SCR 276 applied.
Paprika Ltd. & Anr. v. Board of Trade, []944] All. E.R. 372; Love v,
Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd. [1944] I All E.R. 618 quoted with approval.
M/s George Oakes(P) Ltd. v. The State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 570,
Anand Swarup Mahesh Kumar v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1981] 1 SCR 707 discussed and distinguished.
3.A stand which has not been taken in the writ petition before the High Court cannot be allowed to be taken in the Supreme Court. Here the contention based on item 26 of the amended First Schedule to the Sales Tax Act that the appellant had already paid tax on the basis of 50 p. in the rupee on the fooling that the consideration for its liquor did not include duty of excise pay able under the Excise Act and the appellant cannot, therefore, be made liable for sales tax on a different footing cannot be sustained. Such a stand had not been taken in the writ petition before the High Court and there has been no 797 factual examination of the position as to whether the classification indicated is not intended to cover a totally different situation. Further for resolving the dispute as to whether excise duty is a part of the turnover, reference to the Schedule is indeed wholly irrelevant. [820 A-D]
George Oakes (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The State Madras, 13 STC 98, distinguished.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 570 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.12.1982 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 7985/82.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Harish N. Salve, Ravinder Narain and Mrs. A.K. Verma for the Appellant.
S.T. Desai, B. Parthasarthi and T.V.S.N. Chari for the Respondents.
The following Judgments were delivered
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. While I entirely agree with my brother Rangnath Misra, J. in the judgment proposed to be delivered by him, I wish to add a few paragraphs, particularly to supplement what he has said on the fashionable’ topic of tax avoidance. My excuse for inflicting this extra opinion is that the ingenious attempts to rationalise and legitimise tax avoidance have always fascinated and amused me and made me wonder how ready the minds are to adapt themselves and discover excuses to dip into the treasury.
The shortest definition of tax avoidance that I have come across is "the art of dodging tax without breaking the law." Much legal sophistry and judicial exposition have gone into the attempt to differentiate the concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance and to discover the invisible line supposed to exist which distinguishes one from the other. Tax avoidance, it seems, is legal: tax evasion is illegal.
Though initially the law was, and I suppose the law still is, "there is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied", during 798 the period between the two world wars, the theory came to be propounded and developed that it was perfectly open for persons to evade (avoid) income tax if they could do so legally. For some time it looked as if tax avoidance was even viewed with affection. Lord Sumner in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Fishers Executors(l) said: ‘
"My Lords the highest authorities have always
recognised that the subject is entitled so to arrange
his affairs as not to attract taxes imposed by the
Crown so far as he can do so within the law, and that
he may legitimately claim the advantage of any
expressed term or of any emotions that he can find in
his favour in taxing Acts. In so doing he neither comes
under liability nor incurs blame."
Lord Tomlin echoing what Lord Sumner had said observed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of West Minister(2) follows type filing the prevalent attitude towards tax avoidance at that time:
"Every man is entitled if he can to order his
affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate
Acts is less than if otherwise would be. If he succeeds
in ordering them so as to secure this result, then,
however, unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue or his fellow tax payers may be of his
ingenuity. he cannot be compelled to pay on increased
tax."
Then came World War II and in its wake huge profiteering and racketeering, something which persists till today, but on a much larger scale. The attitude of the Courts towards avoidance of tax perceptibly changed and hardened and in Lord Howard De Waldan v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(a) Greene, M.R., dealing with the construction of an anti-avoidance section said:
"For years a battle of manoeuvre has been waged
between the legislature and those who are minded to
throw the (1) [1926] A.C. 395. (2) [1936] A.C, 1, (3) [1942] I,KB 389. 799
burden of taxation off their own shoulders on to those
Of their fellow subjects. In that battle the
legislature has been worsted by the skill,
determination and resourcefulness of its opponents of
whom the present appellant has not been the least
successful. It would not shock us in the least to find
that the legislature has determined to put an and to
the struggle by imposing the severest penalities. It
scarcely lies in the mouth of the tax payer who plays
with fire to complain of burnt fingers."
Expressing the same sentiment and dissertating on the moral aspects of tax avoidance Lord Simon in Latilla v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(1) said,
"My Lords, of recent years much ingenuity has been
expended in certain quarters in attempting to devise
met hods of disposition of income by which those who
were prepared to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of
residents in this country while receiving the
equivalent of such income without sharing in the
appropriate burden of British taxation. Judicial dicta
may be cited which point out that, however, elaborate
and artificial such methods may be, those who adopt
them are ’entitled’ to do 60. There is, of course, no
doubt that they are within their legal rights but that
is no reason why their efforts, or those of the
professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter,
should be regarded as a commendable exercise of
ingenuity or as a discharge of the duties of good
citizenship. On the contrary, one result of such
methods, if they succeed, is of course to increase pro
tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of the great
body of good citizens who do not desire or do not know
how, to adopt these manoeuvres."
In several cases, Griffith v. JP Harrizan Ltd.(2), Morgan v. Inland Revenue Commissioners’(3) Public Trustee v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(4), Lord Denning repeatedly referred to tax avoidance schemes
(1) [1943] A.C. 377.
(2) [1963] A.C. 1.
(3) [1963] Chancery 438.
(4) [1965] Chancery 286. 800 and described them as magic performance by lawyer-turnedmagicians. Lord Harman, almost in the same words as Lord Denning described a tax avoidance scheme as one ’which smells a little of the lamp" and said ’ it is a splendid scheme-it is almost too good to be true. In law quite too good to be true. It won’t do." (Campbell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(1), Stamp J. In re Western’s Settlements observed-
"...There must be some limit to the devices which
this Court ought to countenance in order to defeat the
fiscal intentions of the legislature. In my judgment
these proposals overstep that limit...I am not
pursuaded with this application represents more than a
cheap exercise in tax avoidance which r ought not to
sanction as distinct from a legitimate avoidance of
liability to taxation.
In Greenberg v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(2), Lord Reid dealing with a scheme for tax avoidance by forward dividend stripping observed,
" .... We seem to have travelled a long way from
the general and salutary rule that the subject is not
be taxed except by plain words. But I must recognise
that plain words are seldom adequate to anticipate and
forestall the multiplicity of ingenious schemes which
are constantly being devised to evade taxation.
Parliament is very properly determined to prevent this
kind of tax evasion and, if the courts find it
impossible to give very wide meanings to general
phrases, the only alternative may be for Parliament to
do as some other countries have done and introduce
legislation of a more sweeping character which will put
the ordinary well-intentioned person at much greater
risk than is created by a wide interpretation of such
provisions as those which we are now considering."
(1) [1967] Chancery, 651.
(2) 1971(3) All ER. 135. 801
"I am inclined to think that the real explanation
of these verbal difficulties may be that, in
legislation of such extreme complexity as we have here,
it is not humanly possible for a draftsman to preserve
that consistency in the use of language which we
generally look for. Indeed, l sometimes suspect that
our normal meticulous methods of statutory construction
tend to lead us astray by concentrating too much 1 on
verbal niceties and paying too little attention to the
provisions read as a whole."
The march of the law against tax avoidance schemes continued and came a significant departure from the Westminister and the Fisher Executor. principle. In W.I.. Ramsay v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(1), the House of Lords had to consider a scheme of tax avoidance which consisted of a series or a combination of transactions each of which was individually genuine but the result of all of which was an avoidance of tax. Lord Wilberforce, with great force, observed,
"Given that a document or transaction is genuine,
the court cannot go behind it to some supposed
underlying substance. This is the well-known principle
of Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of
Westminister. This is a cardinal principle but it must
not be overstated or overextended. While obliging the
court to accept documents or transactions, found to be
genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look
at a document or a transaction in blinkers, isolated
from any context to which it properly belongs. If it
can be seen that a document or transaction was intended
to have effect as part of a nexus or series of
transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider
transaction intended as a whole, there is nothing in
the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded: to do so
is not to prefer form to sub stance, or substance to
form. It is the task of the court to ascertain the
legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought
to attach a tax or a tax consequence and if that
emerges from a series or combination of transactions,
in tended to operate as such, it is that series or
combination which may be regarded. For this there is
authority in the
(1) 11982] AB 300. 802
law relating to income tax and capital gains tax: See
Chinn v. Hochstrasser [1981] A.C. 533 and Inland
Revenue Com missioners v. Plummer [1980] A.C. 896."
"For the commissioners considering a particular
case it is wrong and an unnecessary self limitation, to
regard themselves as precluded by their own finding
that documents or transactions are not "shams", from
considering what, as evidenced by the documents
themselves or by the manifested intentions of the
parties, the relevant transaction is. They are not,
under the Westminister doctrine or any other authority,
bound to consider individually each separate step in a
composite transaction intended to be carried through as
a whole."
Later again he observed,
".....For the taxpayers it was said that to accept
the revenue’s wide contention involved a rejection of
accepted and established canons and that, if so general
an attack upon schemes for tax avoidance as the revenue
suggest is to be validated, that is a matter for
Parliament. The function of the courts is to apply
strictly and correctly the legislation which Parliament
has enacted: if the taxpayer escapes the charge, it is
for Parliament, if it disapproves of the result, to
close the gap. General principles against tax avoidance
are, it was claimed, for Parliament to lay down. We
were referred, at our request, in this connection to
the various enactments by which Parliament has from
time to time tried to counter tax avoidance by some
general prescription. The most extensive of these is
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, sections 460 et
seq. We were referred also to well known sections in
Australia and New Zealand (Australia, Income Tax
Assesment Act 1936 -51, section 260, New Zealand,
Income Tax Act 1976, section 99, replacing earlier
legislation). Further it was pointed out that the
capital gains tax legislation (starting with the
Finance Act 1965) does not contain any provision
corresponding to section 460. The intention should be 803
deduced therefore, it was said, to leave capital gains
tax to be dealt with by "hole and plug" methods: that
such schemes as the present could be so dealt with has
been con firmed by later legislation as to "value
shifting": Capital Gains Tax Act 1979, section 25 et
seq. These arguments merit serious consideration. In
substance they appealed to Barwick C.J. in the recent
case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Westraders
Pty. Ltd. [1980] 30 A.L.R. 353, 354-355, "
"I have a full respect for the principles which have
been stated but I do not consider that they should
exclude the approach for which the Crown contends. That
does not introduce a new principle: it would be to
apply to new and sophisticated legal devices the
undoubted power and duty of the courts to determine
their nature in law and to relate them to existing
legislation. While the techniques of tax avoidance
progress and are technically improved, the courts are
not obliged to stand still. Such immobility must result
either in loss of tax, to the prejudice of other
taxpayers or to Parliamentary congestion or (most
likely) to both. To force the courts to adopt, in
relation to closely integrated situations, a step by
step, dissecting, approach which the parties
themselves may have negated, would be a denial rather
than an affirmation of the true judicial process. In
each case the facts must be established, and a legal
analysis made: legislation cannot be required or even
be desirable to enable the courts to arrive at a
conclusion which corresponds with the parties’ own
intentions."
"The capital gains tax was created to operate in the
real world, not that of make-belief.
The significance of Ramsay as a turning point in the interpretation of tax laws in England and the departure from the strings of Westminister were explained in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd.,(1) where Lord Diplock said,
"It would be disingenuous to suggest, and dangerous (1) [1982] S.T.C. 30 804
on the part of those who advise on elaborate tax-
avoidance schemes to assume, that Ramsay’s case did not
mark a significant change in the approach adopted by
this House in its judicial role to a pre-ordained
series of transactions (whether or not they include the
achievement of a legitimate commercial end) into which
there are inserted steps that have no commercial
purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax
which in the absence of those particular steps would
have been payable. The difference is in approach. It
does not necessitate the overruling of any earlier
decisions of this House; hut it does involve
recognising that Lord Hamlin’s oft-quoted dictum in IRC
v. Duke of Westminister(1) "Every man is entitled if he
can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching
under the appropriate Acts is less then it otherwise
would be", tell us little or nothing as to what methods
of ordering one’s affairs will be recognised by the
courts as effective to lesson the tax what would attach
to them if business transactions were conducted in a
straight-forward way."
Lord Scarman said,
"First, it is of the utmost importance that the
business community (and others, including their
advisers) should appreciate, as my noble and learned
friend Lord Diplock has emphasised, that Ramsay’s case
marks "a significant change in the approach adopted by
this House in its judicial role" towards tax avoidance
schemes. Secondly, it is now crucial when considering
any such scheme to take the analysis far enough to
determine where the profit, gain or loss is really to
be found,"
The winds of change continued to blow and in
Furniss v. Dawson(2) Ramsay was reiterated. Lord
Brightman observed,
"The fact that the court accepted that each step
in a transaction was a genuine step producing its
intended legal
(1) [1936] AC. 1(@)19=[1935] All ER. Rep. 259 (at) 267.
(2) [1984] 1 Ali E.R. 530, 805
results did not confine the court to considering each
step in h. isolation for the purpose of assessing the
fiscal results."
He further said,
"My Lords, in my opinion the rationale of the new
approach is this. In a preplanned tax saving scheme, no
distinction is to be drawn for fiscal purposes, because
none exists in reality, between (i) a series of steps
which are followed through by virtue of an arrangement
which falls short of a binding contract, and (ii) a
like series of steps which and followed through because
the participants are contractually bound to take each
step seriatim. In a contractual case the fiscal
consequences will naturally fall to be assessed in the
light of the contractually agreed results."
In the same case Lord Fraser explained the principle of Ramsay as follows:-
". . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __
The true principle of decision in Ramsay was that
the fiscal consequences of a preordained series of
transactions, intended to operate as such, are
generally to be asertained by considering the result of
the series as a whin, and not by dissecting the scheme
and considering each individual transaction separately.
"
Lord Scarman in his characteristic style observed,
"The law will develop from case to case. Lord
Wilberforcc in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. IRC [1981] 1 All ER
865 at 872, [1982] AC 300 at 324 referred to ’the
emerging principle’ of the law. What has been
established with certainty by the House in Ramsay’s
case is that the determination of what does, and what
does not, constitute unacceptable tax evasion is a
subject suited to development by judicial process. The
best chart that we have for the way forward appears to
me, with great respect to all engaged on the map-making
process, to be the words of Lord Diplock in IRC v.
Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. [1982] STC 30 at 32 which my noble
and learned friend Lord Brightman quotes in his speech.
These words 806
have space in the law for the principle enunciated by
Lord Tomlin in IRC v. Duke of Westminister [1936] AC I
at 19, [1935] All ER Rep. 259 at 267 that every man is
entitled if he can to order his affairs so as to
diminish the burden of tax. The limits within which
this principle is to operate remain to be probed and
determined judicially. Difficult though the task may be
for judges, it is one which is beyond the power of the
blunt instrument of legislation. Whatever a statute may
provide, it has to be interpreted and applied by the
courts; and ultimately it will prove to be this area of
judge-made law that our elusive journey’s end will be a
found. "
Lord Roskill put it even more forcefully:
"The error, if I may venture to use that word,
into which the courts below have fallen is that they
have looked back to 1936 and not forward from 1982.
They do not appear to have appreciated the true
significance of the passages in the speeches in
Ramsay’s case [1981] 1 All ER 865 at 872-873, 881,
[1982] AC 300 at 325, 337 of Lord Wilberforce and Lord
Fraser, and, even more important, of the warnings in
the Burmah Oil Case [1982] STC 30 at 32, 39 given by
Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman in the passages to which
my noble and learned friend Lord Brightman refers and
which I will not repeat. It is perhaps worth recalling
the warning given, albeit in another content by Lord
Atkin, who himself dissented in the Duke af
Westminister’s case, in United Australia Ltd. v.
Barclays Bank Ltd.(1) ’ When these ghosts of the past
stand in the path of justice, clanking their mediaeval
chains, the proper course for the judge is to pass
through them undeterred.’ 1936, a bare half century
ago, cannot be described as part of the Middle Ages but
the ghost of the Duke of Westminister and of his
transaction, be it noted a single and not a composite
transaction, with his gardener and with other members
of his staff has haunted the ad ministration of this
branch of the law for too long. I confess that I had
hoped that ghost might have found quietude with the
decisions in Ramsay and in Burmah. Unhappily it (1) [1940] 4 All E.R. 20 @ 37=[1941] A.C. I @ 29. 807
has not. Perhaps the decision of this House in these
appeals , will now suffice as exorcism."
Thus the ghost of Westminister (in the words of Lord Roskill) has been exercised in England. Should it be allowed to rear its head in India?
I have referred to the English cases at some length, only to show that in the very country of its birth, the principle of Westminister has been given a decent burial and in that very country where the phrase ’tax avoidance’ originated the judicial attitude towards tax avoidance has changed and the smile, cynical or even affectionate though it might have been at one time, has now frozen into a deep C frown. The courts are now concerning themselves not merely with the genuineness of a transaction, but with the intended effect of it for fiscal purposes. No one can now get away with a tax avoidance project with the mere statement that there is nothing illegal about it.
Some years ago, a diverting attempt was made by a Correspondent to the London ’Times’ to defend tax avoidance. He said,
"The taxpayer is morally bound to obey the law,
but is not bound beyond the law, for apart from the law
taxation would be blackmail or racketeering. There is
not behind taxing laws, as there is behind laws against
crime, an in dependent moral obligation. When therefore
the tax-payer has obeyed the law, he had done all that
morality requires" He had further said,
"It is said that by avoiding a tax he throws a
load on to some other taxpayer. But this is not quite
accurate, for - the deficiency might be met by reducing
expenditure.. is it not a good thing that there should
be this last lawful remedy against oppressive taxation
by a majority, that human ingenuity can always find a
way by which the minority can escape from tyrannical
imposts."
The correspondent was answered by another’s correspondent who described the former’s defence of tax avoidance as ’an amusing 808 attempt to raise the art of tax avoidance to the moral level of political martyrdom and to make Hampdens of our modern tax dodgers’. Nor, may we say, are our tax dodgers Gandhiji is on the Dandi March to protest against the Salt Tax.
In Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman & Co.,(1) JC Shah, JJ. speaking for himself and Sikri and Ramaswami, JJ repeating almost verbatim the observations in Westminister and Fishers Executors observed:
"Avoidance of tax liability by 80 arranging
commercial affairs that charge of tax is distributed is
not prohibited.A taxpayer may resort to a device to
divert the income before it accrues or arises to him.
Effectiveness of the device depends not upon
considerations of morality, but on the Legislative
injunction in taking statutes may not, except on period
of penalty, be violated, but it may lawfully be
cumvented."
The same Judge, speaking for himself, Ramaswami and Grover JJ in Commissioner of income tax, Gujarat v. Kharwar(2) expressely followed Westminister and observed:
"The taxing authority is entitled and is indeed
bound to determine the true legal relation resulting
from a transaction. If the parties have chosen to
conceal by a device the legal relation, it Is open to
the taking authorities to unravel the device and to
determine the true character of relationship. But the
legal effect of a transaction cannot be displaced by
probing into the "substance of the transaction".
We think that time has come for us to depart from the Westminister principle as emphatically as the British Courts have done and to dissociate ourselves from the observations of Shah, J. and similar observations made elsewhere. The evil consequences of tax avoidance are manifold. First there is substantial loss of much needed public revenue, particularly in a welfare state like ours. Next there (1) [1968]1 S.C.R 10. (2) 72 ITR 603. 809 is the serious disturbance caused to the economy of the country by the piling up of mountains of blackmoney, directly causing inflation. Then there is "the large hidden loss" to the community (as pointed out by Master Sheatcraft in 18 Modern Law Review 209) by some of the best brains in the country being involved in the perpetual war waged between the tax-avoider and his expert team of advisers, lawyers and accountants on one side and the tax-gatherer and his perhaps not so skilful, advisers on the other side. Then again there is the ’sense of injustice and inequality which tax avoidance arouses in the breasts of those who are unwilling or unable to profit by it’. Last but not the least is the ethics (to be precise, the lack of it) of transferring the burden of tax liability to the shoulders of the guideless good citizens from those of the ’artful dodgers’. It may, indeed, be difficult for lesser mortals to attain the state of mind of Mr. Justice Holmes, who said, "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society. I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization." But, surely, it is high time for tho judiciary in India too to part its ways from the principle of Westminister and the alluring logic of tax avoidance. We now live In a welfare state whose financial needs, if backed by the law, have to be respected and met. We must recognise that there is behind taxation laws as much moral sanction as behind any other welfare legislation and it is a pretence to say that avoidance of taxation is not unethical and that It stands on no less moral plane than honest payment of taxation. In our view, the proper way to construe a taking statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally, or liberally, nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax, and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its approval to it.A hint of this approach is to be found in the judgment of Desai, J. in Wood Polymer Ltd. v. Bengal Hotels Limited(1) where the learned judge refused to accord sanction to the amalgamation of companies as it would lead to avoidance of tax.
It is neither fair nor desirable to expect the legislature to intervene and take care of every device and scheme to avoid taxation. It is upto the Court to take stock to determine the nature of the new and sophisticated legal devices to avoid tax and consider whether the situation created by the devices could be related to the existing legislation with the aid of ’emerging’ techniques of interpretation as was done in Ramsay, Burma Oil and Dawson, to expose the devices
(1) 40 Company Cases, 597. 810 for what they really are and to refuse to give judicial benediction.
We agree with Ranganath Misra, J. that the appeal should be dismissed.
RANGANATH MISRA, J. The appellant company, a licensed manufacturer of Indian liquor at Hyderabad, is in appeal by special leave questioning the dismissal of its writ petition by the High Court.
Manufacture, sale-wholesale and retail-as also storage and transport of liquor are regulated by the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (’Excise Act’ for short) and the Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules the Andhra Pradesh Indian Liquor (Storage in Bond) Rules and the Andhra Pradesh Foreign Liquor Rules, and Indian liquor Rules all made under the Excise Act. ’Excise duty’ as defined in section 2(10) of the Excise Act is leviable on the manufacture of liquor and the manufacturer cannot remove the same from the distillery unless the duty imposed under the Excise Act has been paid. Buyers of Indian liquor from the appellant’s distillery as alleged by it, obtain distillery passes for release of liquor after making payment of excise duty and present the same at the distillery whereupon the bill of sale or invoice is prepared by the distillery showing the price of liquor but excluding the excise duty. The appellant’s books of account also did not contain any reference to excise duty paid by the purchaser. The appellant paid Sales Tax payable by it under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, (’Sales Tax Act’ for short), on the basis of its turnover which excluded excise duty. The Company was assessed to sales tax on the basis of its returns but later the Commercial Tax Officer was of the view that the Company had failed to include the excise duty paid on the liquor sold by it to wholesalers. The taking authority accordingly called upon the Company to show cause why assessments made may not be reopened. The appellant moved the High Court for quashing of such notice and having failed, carried the matter in appeal to this Court.A Division Bench of this Court in Mc Dowell & Company Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Vll Circle, Hyderabad, etc., (1) (1) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 914. 811 examined the provision of the Excise Act and the Rules made there under as also the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. This Court took the view:
"We hold that intending purchasers of the Indian
liquor who seek to obtain distillery passes are also
legally responsible for payment of the excise duty
which is collected from them by the authorities of the
excise department.
This Court then proceeded to determine whether excise duty paid directly to the Excise authorities or deposited directly in the State Exchequer in respect of Indian liquor by the buyers before - removing the same from the distillery could be said to form part of the taxable turnover of the appellant distillery. Precedents w ere referred to and the Court came to the conclusion that excise duty did not go into the common till of the appellant and did not become a part of the circulating capital. Therefore, the Sales Tax authorities were not competent to include in the turnover of the appellant the excise duty which was not charged by it but was paid directly to the excise authorities by the buyers of the liquor. The appellant, therefore, succeeded before this Court and the notices issued by the Sales Tax authorities were quashed.
The judgment of this Court was delivered on October 25, 1976. Rules 76 and 79 of the Distillery Rules were amended with effect from August 4, 1981. Rule 76(a) now provides: "No spirit or liquor manufactured or stored shall be removed unless the excise duty specified in rule 6 has been paid by a holder of D-2 licence before such removal." It is not disputed that appellant is the holder of a D-2 licence under the law. Amended rule 79 (1) provides:
"76 (1). On payment of the excise duty by the
holder of D-2 licence a distillery pass for the removal
of spirit fit for human consumption may be granted in
favour of any of the following persons only, namely:-
(a) a person holding a licence in the Andhra Pradesh
or in other States for sale of spirit by wholesale
or retail and when the spirit is to be transported
or exported beyond the limits of the district in
which the distillery is situ 812
ated to a person holding a permit signed by the Excise
Superintendent of the district of destination or an
officer of that district authorised in this behalf.
(b) A person holding a permit signed by the Officer of
any other State referred to in clause (a) above
for the export of such spirit from the Andhra
Pradesh into that State.
(c) A person holding a permit signed by an Officer
duly authorised in that behalf for export of such
spirit to an Union Territory-
(d) A person holding a permit from the Excise
Superintendent of any district in Andhra Pradesh
or from officer referred to in clause (a) above of
any other State to transport or export rectified
spirits or wine, to such district or State."
On the basis of the amended provisions, the respondent Officer issued a notice to the appellant proposing to include a sum of Rs.4,49,09,552.40 representing the excise duty paid directly by buyers of appellant’s liquor in the appellant’s turnover for a part of the year 1982-83. Thereupon, the appellant again moved the High Court for quashing of the notice. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision of this Court. The High Court very appropriately felt bound by the decision of this Court and considered the effect of the amended Rules and held that the primary liability to pay excise duty was indisputably of the holder of the D-2 licence. It further found that the turnover related to liquor, excise duty which was payable by the appellant but had by amicable arrangement been paid by the buyer was actually a part of the turnover of the appellant and was, therefore, liable to be so included for determining liability for sales tax. On these findings the High Court dismissed the writ petition. When leave was granted by a Division Bench of this Court to appeal against the Judgment of the High Court, the correctness of the decision in appellant’s case reported in (1977) 1 S.C.R. 914, was doubted and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. That is how the appeal came to be heard by us. 813
Mr. Sorabji, appearing in support of the appeal at the very commencement of his submissions stated that there was no constitutional question involved in the appeal. He also fairly stated that the vires of the Excise Act and the Rules was not under challenge. Nor was the amendment of Rules in 1981 in dispute.
The Federal Court In The Province of Madras v. Messrs. Boddu Paidanna & Sons,(1) held:
"There is in theory nothing to prevent the Central
Legislature from imposing a duty of excise on a
commodity as soon as it comes into existence, no matter
what happens to it afterwards. whether it be sold,
consumed, destroyed, or given away.A taking authority
will not ordinarily Impose such a duty, because it is
much more convenient administratively to collect the
duty tax in the case of most of the Indian Excise Acts)
when the commodity leaves the factory for the first
time, and also because the duty is intended to be an
indirect duty which the manufacture or producer is to
pass on to the ultimate consumer, which he could not do
if the commodity had, for example, been destroyed in
the factory itself. It is the fact of manufacture which
attracts the duty, even though it may be collected
later; .. "
This view has been followed by this Court and the position has been put beyond doubt by a series of decisions. In R.C. Jall v. Union of India,(2) it has been observed:
"The Excise duty is primarily a duty on the
production or manufacture of goods produced or
manufactured within the country. Subject always to the
legislative competence of the taking authority, the
said tax can be levied at a convenient stage so long as
the character of the impost is not lost. The method of
collection does not affect the essence of the duty but
only relates to the machinery of collection for
administrative convenience." (1) [1942] F.C.R. 90. (2) [1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 436. 814
In Re. Sea Customs Act, (1) this Court said:
"With great respect, we accept the principles laid
down by the said three decisions (1939 F.C.R. 18; 1942
F.C.R. 90 and 1945 F.G.R. 179) in the matter of levy of
an excise duty and the machinery for collection
thereof."
In M/S. Guruswamy & Co. etc. v. State of Mysore & ors (2) Sikri, J. (as he then was), spoke for the majority and stated the ratio thus:
"These cases establish that in order to be an
excise duty (a) the levy must be upon ’goods’ and (b)
the taxable event must be the manufacture or production
of goods. Further the levy need not be imposed at the
stage of production or manufacture but may be imposed
later. "
In Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers’ Association v. Union of India & Anr., (3) Grover, J. after extracting a part of the Judgment in Jall’s case (supra) spoke for the Court thus:
"The above statement of law in no way supports the
argument that excise duty cannot be collected from per
sons who are neither producers nor manufacturers. Its
incidence certainly falls directly on the production or
manufacture of goods but the method of collection will
not affect the essence of the duty."
In A.B. Abdul Kadir & Ors. v. State of Kerala, (4) this Court restated the position thus:
"Excise duty, it is now well settled, is a tax on
articles produced or manufactured in the taxing
country, Generally speaking, the tax is on the
manufacturer on the producer, yet laws are to be found
which impose a duty of excise at stages subsequent to
the manufacture or production." (2) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 787. (3) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 548. (4) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 68. (1) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 219. 815
Thus, the incidence of excise duty is directly relatable to manufacture but its collection can be deferred to a later stage as a measure of convenience or expediency.
On an examination of the provisions of the Excise Act, the Rules framed thereunder and the pronouncements referred to above,) we are of the view that the conclusion of this Court at page 921 of the Reports that intending purchasers of the Indian liquors who seek to obtain distillery passes are also legally responsible for payment of the excise duty is too broadly stated. The "duty" was primarily a burden which the manufacturer had to bear and even if purchasers paid the same under the Distillery Rules, the provisions were merely enabling and did not give rise to any legal responsibility or obligation for meeting the burden. We do not propose, however, to examine this aspect any further for the change in Rule 76 of the Distillery Rules has clearly affirmed the position that liability for payment of excise duty is of the manufacturer. Provisions of rules 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 do not militate against the conclusion that the payment of excise duty is a liability exclusively of the manufacturer. In these rules detailed provisions have been made regarding obtaining of distillery pass, correct calculation and full payment of excise duty, the manner of depositing such duty and ultimately issue of the spirit under the pass from the distillery. These rules, therefore, do not detract from the position that payment excise duty is the primary and exclusive obligation of the manufacturer and ifpayment be made under a contract or arrangement by any other person it would amount to meeting of the obligation of the manufacturer and nothing more.
It was the stand of the appellant before the High Court that it makes a condition precedent for the buyer of its finished goods that he (the buyer) pays the excise duty to the excise authorise directly and only on production of the receipted challan, liquor is issued from the distillery by way of sale under the supervision of the excise authorities. In view of such an arrangement, the excise duty paid by the buyer does not become a part of the turnover of the appellant.
’Turnover’ is defined in s. 2(s) of the Sales Tax Act to mean "the total amount set out in the bill of sale or if there is no bill of sale, the total amount charged) as the consideration for the sale 816 or purchase of goods (whether such consideration be cash, deferred payment of any other thing or value) including any sums charged by the dealer for anything done in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the delivery of the goods and any other sums charged by the dealer, whatever be the description, name or object thereof."
The definition clearly indicates that the total amount charged as the consideration for the sale is to be taken into account for determining the turnover. Where a bill of sale is Issued (and obviously the bill has to state the total amount charged as consideration), the total amount set out therein is to be taken into account. In every transaction of sale, there is bound to be a seller at one end and a buyer at the other and transfer or title in the goods takes place for a consideration.
In Hindustan Sugar Mills v. Rajasthan State, (1) this Court observed:
"The test is, what is the consideration passing
from the purchaser to the dealer for the sale of the
goods. It is immaterial to enquire as to how the amount
of consideration is made up, whether it includes excise
duty or sales tax or freight. The only relevant
question to ask is as to what is the amount payable by
the purchaser to the dealer as consideration for the
sale...." The Court proceeded to say:
"take for example, excise duty payable by a dealer
who is a manufacturer. When he sells goods manufactured
by him, he always passes on the excise duty to the
purchaser. Ordinarily it is not shown as a separate
item in the bill, but it is included in the price
charged by him. The sale Price in such a case could be
the entire price inclusive of excise duty because that
would be the consideration payable by the purchaser for
the sale of the goods. True, the excise duty component
of the price would not be an addition to the coffers of
the dealer. as it would go to reimburse him (1) [1979] I S.C.R. 276. 817
in respect of the excise duty already paid by him on
the manufacture of the goods. But even so, it would be
part of the sale price because it forms a component of
the consideration for the sale of the goods that the
amount representing excise duty would be payable by the
purchaser. There is no other manner of liability,
statutory or other wise, under which the purchaser
would be liable to pay the amount of excise duty to the
dealer. And on this reasoning, it would make no
difference whether the amount of excise duty is
included in the price charged by the dealer or is shown
as a separate item in the bill."
We would like to add, that the position is not different when under a prior agreement, the legal liability of the manufacturer-dealer for payment of excise duty is satisfied by the purchaser by direct payment to excise authorities or to the state exchequer. In Paprica Ltd. & Anr. v. Board of Trade, (1) Lawrence, J. stated:
"Whenever a sale attracts purchase tax, that tax
presumably affects the price which the seller who is
liable to pay the tax demands but it does not cease to
be the price which the buyer has to pay even if the
price is expressed as ’X’ plus purchase tax."
This Court in Messrs. George Oakes (P) Ltd. v. The State of Madras, (2) quoted this extract with approval and also referred to the following passage in the Judgment of Goddard, L.J. in Low v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd (3):
"Where an article is taxed, whether by purchase
tax, customs duty, or excise duty the tax becomes part
of the price which ordinarily the buyer will have to
pay. The price of an ounce of tobacco is what it is
because of the rate of tax, but on a sale there is only
one consideration though made up, of cost plus profit
plus tax. So if a seller offers goods (1) [1944] All E.R. 372. (2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 570. (3) [1944] 1 All E.R. 618. 818
for sale, it is for him to quote a price which includes
the tax if he desires to pass it on to the buyer. If
the buyer agrees to the price, it is not for him to
consider how it is made up or whether that seller has
included tax or not So far as the purchaser is
concerned, he pays for the goods what the seller
demands, namely, the price even though it may include
tax. That is the whole consideration for the sale and
there is no reason why the whole amount paid to the
seller by the purchaser should not be treated as the
consideration for the sale and included in the
turnover. "
Admittedly, the bills issued by the appellant did not include the excise duty. As already found, payment of excise duty is a legal liability of the manufacturer; its payment ii a condition precedent to the removal of the liquor from the distillery and payment by the purchaser is on account of the manufacturer. According to normal commercial practice, excise duty should have been reflected in the bill either as merged in price or being shown separately. As a fact, in the hands of the buyer the cost of liquor is what is charged by the appellant under its bill together with excise duty which the buyer has directly paid on seller’s account. The consideration for the sale is thus the total amount and not what is reflected in the bill. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that excise duty though paid by the purchaser to meet the liability of the appellant, is a part of the consideration for the sale and is includible in the turnover of the appellant. The purchaser has paid the tax because the law asks him to pay it on behalf of the manufacturer.
Mr. Sorabji in the course of his submission relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Anand Swarup Mahesh Kumar v. The commissioner of Sales Tax. (1) This Court was considering the liability for Sales Tax under the corresponding U.P. Act in respect of a dealer carrying on business at Mandi Anandganj, Baraut in the District of Merrut. The Sales Tax authorities had included in the dealer’s purchase turnover ’market fee’ and the commission payable to the commission agent operating within the market area for the purpose of computing sales tax. The decision (1) [1981] 1 S.CR. 707 819 turned on the definition of ’turnover of purchase’ in the U.P. Act and the provision of the Adhiniyam and the Rules made thereunder. Market fee and commission payable to an agent are very different from excise duty and a very different position emerges in law in regard to them. No support is available from that decision for the appellant’s case. We would like to point out that the relevant consideration is not whether the law permits the incidence of the duty to be passed on to the purchaser but whether there is a prohibition against the passing of it. If there is no bar, the incidence would be passed on to the purchaser in accordance with normal commercial practice.
Mr. Sorabji built up an argument in support of the appellant’s stand by referring to the amendment to the First Schedule to the Sales Tax Act. The relevant part of the Schedule provides thus : Item No Description of Point of levy. Rate of tax
goods 26. All liquors, other At the point
than country liquor of the first sale
2 (but including in the State.
Vodka) (1026)
(a) not covered by 3 (50 paise)
item (b) below in the rupee,
(b) Where the 3 (25 paise)
consideration for
in the rupee. the
sale or purchase of
liquor includes the
duties of excise
payable under the
Andhra Pradesh Excise
Act, 1968.
Apparently this amendment was brought about after the Judgment of this Court in the appellant’s appeal in 1976 and the position has been further altered by amendment in 1984. Sale of liquor has now been made exigible to tax at every point other than the point of last 820 sale in the State. The argument advanced before this Court is that the appellant had already paid tax on the basis of 50p. in the rupee on the footing that the consideration for sale of its liquor did not include duty of excise payable under the Excise Act and the appellant cannot, therefore, be made liable for sales tax on a different footing. This contention too has no force. Such a stand had not been taken in the writ petition before the High Court and there has been no factual examination of the position as to whether the classification indicated is not intended to cover a totally different situation. For resolving the dispute as to whether excise duty is a part of the turnover, reference to the Schedule ii indeed wholly irrelevant.
Mr. Sorabji relied heavily on the observations of Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court in the case of George Oakes (Private) Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Madras, (1) where it was said:
"It was pointed out by this Court (in 12 STC 476)
that the word ’price’ in so far as the purchaser is
concerned includes the tax also, and that in laws
dealing with sales-tax, turnover has, in England and
America also, been held to include the tax. The reason
for such inclusion is stated to be that dealer who
realises the tax does not hand it over forth with to
Government but keeps it with him, and turns it over in
his business before the parts with it. Thus, the tax
becomes, for the time being, a part of the circulating
capital of the tradesman, and is turned over in
business. Again it was said that the price paid by the
purchaser was not so much money for the article plus
tax but a composite sum. Therefore, in calculating the
total turnover, there is nothing wrong in treating the
tax as part of the turnover, because ’turnover’ means
the amount of money which is turned over in the
business."
According to Mr. Sorabji the excise duty had never come into the hands of the appellant and the Company had no occasion or opportunity to turn it over in its hands, and, therefore, the same could never be considered as a part of its turnover. The obser- (1) 13 S.T.C. 98. 821 vations made by this Court were in a very different setting and what was being considered was whether the additional tax levied under the Madras Act formed a part of the turnover. If we accept the observations of Hidayatullah, J. as laying down the test for general application, it would be very prejudical to the Revenue as between the seller and the buyer, by special arrangement, a part of what ordinarily would constitute consideration proper could even be kept out and the turnover could be reduced and tax liability avoided. We are of the view that the conclusion reached in the appellant’s case in (1977) 1 S.C.R. 914 on the second aspect of the matter, namely, when the excise duty does not go into the common till of the assesses and it does not become a part of the circulating capital, it does not constitute turnover, is not the decisive test for determining whether such duty would constitute turnover.
A further contention was advanced by Mr. Sorabji as his last submission that it is open to every one to so arrange his affairs as to reduce the brunt of taxation to the minimum and such a process does not constitute tax evasion; nor does it carry any ignominy. In support of this submission he relied on the observations of Shah, J. speaking for this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raman and Co.,(1) where it was said:
"The law does not oblige a trader to make the
maximum profit that he. can out of his trading
transactions. Income which accrues to a trader is
taxable in his hands: income which he could have, but
has not earned, is not made taxable as income accrues
to him . Avoidance of tax liability by so arranging
commercial affairs that charge of tax is distributed is
not prohibited.A taxpayer may resort to a device to
divert the income before it accrues or arises to him.
Effectiveness of the device depends not upon
considerations of morality, but on the operation of the
Income tax Act. Legislative injunction in taxing
statutes may not except on peril of penalty, by
violated, but may lawfully be circumvented."
Support was also sought from the observations of the same learned Judge (as he then was) in the case of Commissioner of Income- (1) [1968] 67 I.T.R. 11. 822 tax Gujarat II v. B.M. Kharwar.(1) After quoting a passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax (2) this Court stated:
"The taxing authority is entitled and is indeed
bound to determine the true legal relation resulting
from a trans action. If the parties have chosen to
conceal by a device the legal relation, it open to the
taxing authorities to unravel the device and to
determine the true character of the relationship But
the legal effect of a transaction cannot be displaced
by probing into the substance of the transaction.
In Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax and Excise Profits Tax Bombay (3) this Court observed:
"Every person is entitled so to arrange his
affairs as to avoid taxation but the arrangement must
be real and genuine and not a sham or make-believe,..."
The Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Sakarlal Balabhai (4) said:
"Tax avoidance postulates that the assessee is in
receipt of amount which is really and in truth his
income liable to tax but on which he avoids payment of
tax by some artifice or device. Such artifice or device
may apparently show the income as accruing to another
person, at the same time making it available for use
and enjoyment to the assessee as in a case falling
within section 44D or mask the true character of the
income by disguising it as a capital receipt as in a
case falling within section 44E or assume diverse other
forms .... But there must be some artifice or device
enabling the assessee to avoid payment of tax on what
is really and in truth his income. If the assessee
parts with his income producing asset, so that the
right to (1) [1969] 72 I.T.R. 603. (2) [1940] 8 I.T.R. 522. (3) [1958] 34 I.T.R. 888. (4) [1968] 69 I.T.R. 186. 823
receive income arising from the asset which theretofore
belonged to the assessee is transferred to and vested
in some other person, there is no avoidance of tax
liability: no part of the income from the asset goes
into the hands of the assessee in the shape of income
or under any guise.-’
This decision has been affirmed by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sakarlal Balabhai.(1)
We may also recall the observations of Viscount Simon in Latilla v. I. R. (2)
"Of recent years much ingenuity has been expended
in certain quarters in attempting to device methods of
deposition of income by which those who were prepared
to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of residence in
this country while receiving the equivalent of such
incomes, without sharing in the appropriate burden of
British taxation. Judicial dicta may be cited which
point out that, however elaborate and artificial such
methods may be, those who adopt them are "entitled" to
do so. There is, of course, no doubt that they are
within their legal rights, but that is no reason why
their efforts, or those of the professional gentlemen
who assist them in the matter, should be regarded as a
commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of
the duties of good citizenship. On the contrary one
result of such methods, if they succeed, is of course
to increase pro tento the load of tax on the shoulders
of the great body of good citizens who do not desire,
or do not know how, to adopt these manoeuvres. Another
consequence is that the Legislature has made amendments
to our Income Tax Code which aim at nullifying the
affectiveness of such schemes."
Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by (2) [1972] 86 I.T.R. 2 (3) 25 T.C. 107. 824 resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges.
On this aspect one of us, Chinnappa Reddy, J. has proposed separate and detailed opinion with which we agree.
In our view, therefore, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 5,000. We would like to add that now that a clear picture of the situation has emerged the State of Andhra Pradesh should relationalise the law on the subject, if necessary, by making other a appropriate amendments.
While granting leave and allowing stay of proceedings, this Court had directed that bank guarantee be furnished for the tax to the satisfaction of the assessing authority and in the event of the respondent succeeding in the appeal, the appellant do pay interest at 12% per annum. The respondent may now proceed to collect the dues of the State in accordance with law. S.R. Appeal dismissed. 825