PETITIONER:
MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SESHRAO BALWANT RAO CHAVAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/04/1989
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
KULDIP SINGH (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 1582 1989 SCR (2) 454
1989 SCC (3) 132 JT 1989 (2) 276
1989 SCALE (1)996
ACT
Marathwada University Act, 1974: Sections 8, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 27 and 84--Vice Chancellor of every university--Conscious keeper and constitutional ruler--Responsible for over all administration of academic affairs--To act firmly to put down indiscipline and malpractice--Executive Council has power of removal ’to regulate the work and conduct of the officers’--Whether implies power to take disciplinary action.
Administrative Law: Delegation of power--When statute prescribes a particular body to exercise power--That body alone and none else can exercise it--Unless it is delegated--Ratification--Cannot cure an ultra vires action.
HEADNOTE
The respondent was a Deputy Registrar of the appellant University. As the Controller of Examinations had proceeded on leave the respondent was discharging the duties of Controller of Examinations. A complaint alleging that the respondent had delayed the payment of the bills of an outstation party who had printed the question papers for the annual examination was received by the University. The Executive Council of the University appointed an Enquiry Officer to hold an enquiry to find out whether the bills were deliberately kept pending with any ulterior motive. The Enquiry Officer gave a clean chit to the respondent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Controller of Examinations.
The Executive Council of the University did not take any decision on the report of the Enquiry Officer, but entrusted the question to the Vice-Chancellor who was present at the meeting. The Vice-Chancellor directed a departmental enquiry against the respondent and appointed an advocate as the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer by his report held the respondent guilty of all the charges levelled against him. The Vice Chancellor after giving a show cause notice and considering the reply of the respondent, dismissed him from service. The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 chal- 455 lenging his dismissal. When the writ-petition was taken up for hearing the High Court directed the entire matter to be placed before the Executive Council for an appropriate decision. The Executive Council considered the matter at its meeting and passed a resolution ratifying the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, and confirming the dismissal of the respondent. At the final disposal of the writ petition, the High Court examined the matter on merits and held that the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor being without any authority or power, these defects could not be cured by ratification by the Executive Council in its subsequent resolution. The High Court accordingly quashed the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent, and also the order of termination of his services.
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the University: (i)That on a true construction of the several provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974, the termination of services of the respondent cannot be assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the part of the Vice-Chancellor, and (2) that if the order was defective or without authority, the ratification by the Executive Council had rendered it immune from any challenge. Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,
HELD: 1. The Vice-Chancellor in every university is the conscious keeper of the University and the constitutional ruler. He is the principal executive and academic officer of the University. He is entrusted with the responsibility of overall administration of academic as well as non-academic affairs. [464A-B]
2. As the principal executive officer the Vice-Chancellor also carries with him an implied power, the magisterial power. This power is essential for him to maintain domestic discipline in the academic and non-academic affairs. In a wide variety of situations in the relationship of tutor and pupil, he has to act firmly and promptly to put down indiscipline and malpractice. It may not be illegitimate if he could call to aid his implied powers and also emergency powers to deal with all such situations. [464D-E]
3. The Marathwada University Act, 1974 confers both express and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express powers include among others, the duty to ensure that the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned. [Section 11(3)] He has a right to regulate the work and conduct of 456 Officers and teaching and other employees of the University [Sec. 11(b)(a)]. He has also emergency powers to deal with any untoward situation [Section 11(4)] a very significant power. If he believes that a situation calls for immediate action, he can take such action as he thinks necessary, though in the normal course he is not competent to do so. However he must report to the concerned authority or body, who would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with the matter. [464B-C]
4. The power ’to regulate the work and conduct of the officers’ cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal. [464F]
5. When a statute prescribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. [464G] Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 1, 4th Edn. page 32, referred to.
6. The Marathwada University Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally includes the power to remove. This power is located under Section 24(1) (XXIX) of the Act. [464F-G]
7. The resolution of the Executive Council at a meeting, at which the Vice Chancellor was also present, gave full power to the Vice-Chancellor ’to take a decision on this question’. By the power delegated under the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject the report with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any other action. [465F-G] : 8. The resolution was also not in harmony with the statutory requirement. Approval of the Chancellor to the delegation of power by the Executive Council to the Vice- Chancellor was mandatory under section 24(1)(xii) read with section/84 of the Marathwada University Act. The resolution not being in conformity with the statutory requirement could not confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action j against the respondent. [465H; 466A-C]
9. Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. The principles of ratification in the context of the law of agency apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of power conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and 457 any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified. [468A-B]
Friedman’s Law of Agency (5th Edn.) Chapter 5at page 73, Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at page 39, Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 304 and Bernard v. National Dock Labour Board, [1953] 1 All Eng. Law Reports 1113.
In the instant case, there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice- Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained. [469F]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3927 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6. 1986 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1980.
S.K. Dholakia, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the Appellant.
V.M. Tarkunde, Karanjawala, Mrs. Karanjawala and H.S. Anand for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave is from a decision of the Bombay High Court which allowed the respondent’s petition for a writ of certiorari. In so doing the court quashed departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent and the resultant order terminating his services.
The facts are substantially undisputed and may briefly be stated as follows:
Respondent-Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan was at the relevant time the Deputy Registrar of the Marathwada University. One Mr. Yelikar was working then as Controller of Examinations. In or about April 1976, Mr. Yelikar proceeded on leave and the present respondent was directed to discharge the duties of the Controller of Examinations. Accordingly, he joined his new assignment and continued to hold 458 that post when the controversy which culminated in his dismissal took place.
It is said that one Mr. Swaminathan from Madras was entrusted with the printing works needed to conduct annual examinations of the University for the years 1974 and 1975. Mr. Swaminathan submitted his bills amounting about Rs.6,00,000 for the work performed by him. The bills were not cleared immediately, and Mr. Swaminathan complained to the University authorities. He also submitted a petition to the Prime Minister of India which was forwarded to the University for immediate action. This led to an enquiry to find out whether the bills were deliberately kept pending with any ulterior motive. The Executive Council of the University appointed a four-member committee including the Vice-Chancellor to enquire into the matter. The committee after investigation submitted a report in November 1977 making some prima facie observations against the respondent. Thereupon, the Executive Council desired to have the matter thoroughly examined by another committee. It appointed Mr. N.B. Chavan for the purpose. Mr. Chavan made a detailed enquiry but found nothing against the respondent. On December 23, 1978, he submitted a report stating inter alia that there was no delay in clearing the said bills and if there was any delay, it was justified in the circumstances. He has stated that the University utilised the time for internal audit in which it was found that the claim of Mr. Swaminathan was excessive to the extent of Rs.48,000 and odd. The report of Mr. Chavan thus gave a clean chit to the respondent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Controller of Examinations.
If the Executive Council had accepted the report and closed the matter that would have been better. But unfortunately, it was not done and another chapter was opened. On March 22, 1979, the report of Mr. Chavan was placed before the Executive Council which without taking any decision entrusted the question to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice- Chancellor was present in that meeting-and agreed to take a decision in about a month. But what he did was entirely different. Purporting to act under the powers given to him by the Executive Council, he directed departmental enquiry against the respondent. He appointed Mr. Motale, Advocate as an Inquiry Officer who flamed three charges: First charge impeached the respondent of intentionally delaying the clearance of the bills of Mr. Swaminathan and thus tarnishing the image of the University. Second charge alleged that the respondent did not place before the Executive Council, the letters , addressed by the Chancellor of the University on July 23, 1976 and 459 August 19, 1976. Third charge accused the respondent for not producing all the available papers for scrutiny by the oneman committee headed by Mr. Chavan.
On October 25, 1979, Mr. Motale submitted his’ enquiry report to the Vice-Chancellor holding the respondent guilty of the charges. After a usual procedure of giving show cause notice and considering the reply thereto, the Vice-Chancellor decided to dismiss the respondent. On January2, 1980, he accordingly made an order. The matter did not rest there. The respondent moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal. When the writ petition first came up for hearing in November 1985, the High Court took a very curious stand. It observed that the entire matter be placed before the Executive Council for taking an appropriate decision. As per this observation, the matter came up before the Executive Council in the meeting held on December 26/27, 1985. The Executive Council passed a resolution inter alia, ratifying the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor and confirming the dismissal of the respondent. This has added a new dimension to the case.
At the final disposal of the writ petition, the High Court, however, examined the merits of the matter. The High Court held that the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor was without authority of law. As to the ratification made by the Executive Council, the High Court held: "That the acts done by the Vice-Chancellor remain the acts without any authority or powers and that defects cannot be cured by the subsequent resolution." With these conclusions, the High Court quashed the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent and also the order of termination of his services.
Being aggrieved by the judgment, the Marathwada University by obtaining special leave has appealed to this Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant put his contention in two ways: First, he said that on the true construction of the relevant provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974, the termination of services of the respondent cannot be assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the part of the Vice-Chancellor. Counsel next said that if the order was defective or without authority, the ratification by the Executive Council has rendered it immune from any challenge. In order to appreciate these submissions, we must outline the 460 statutory provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974 (called shortly "the Act"). Section 8 specifies the officers of the University. The Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers. Section 10 provides for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. He shall be appointed by the Chancellor and shall ordinarily hold office for a term. of three years. Section 11 reads, so far as material, as follows:
"11(1): The Vice-Chancellor shall be
the principal executive and academic officer
of the University, and shah in the absence of
the Chancellor, preside at the meetings of the
Senate and at any Convocation of the Universi-
ty .... "
"11(3): It shah be the duty of the
Vice-Chancellor to ensure that the provisions
of this Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and
Regulations are faithfully observed. The
Chancellor shall, for this purpose, have the
power to issue directions to the Vice-Chancel-
lor who shall give effect to any such direc-
tions."
11(4): If there are reasonable
grounds for the Vice-Chancellor to believe
that there is an emergency which requires
immediate action to be taken, he shall take
such action as he thinks necessary and shall,
at the earliest opportunity, report in writing
the grounds for his belief that there was an
emergency, and the action taken by him, to
such authority or body as would in the ordi-
nary course, have dealt with the
matter . ...."
11(6)(a): It shall be lawful for the
Vice-Chancellor, as the principal executive
and academic officer, to regulate the work and
conduct of the officers, and of the teaching,
academic and other employees of the Universi-
ty, in accordance with the provisions of this
Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and
Regulations."
"11(7): The Vice-Chancellor shah
exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties as are prescribed by the Stat-
utes, Ordinances and Regulations."
Section 19 enumerates the authorities of
the University. The Executive Council is one
of the authorities specified thereunder.
Section 23 to the extent necessary is in the
following terms:
461
"23(1): The Executive Council shall
be the principal executive authority of the
University, and shall consist of the following
members, namely,: (i) the Vice-Chancellorex-
officio Chairman."
Section 24 deals with the powers and
duties of the Executive Council. These powers
and duties are wide and varied and it is
sufficient if we read sub-sections (1), (xxix)
and (xii) of sec. 24. They are as follows:
"24(1): Subject to such conditions as
are prescribed by or under this Act, the
Executive Council shall exercise the following
powers and perform the following duties,
namely ........ "
"24(1)(xxix): appoint officers and
other employees of the University, prescribe
their qualifications, fix their emoluments,
define the terms and conditions of their
service and discipline and where necessary,
their duties."
"24(1)(x1i): delegate, subject to
the approval of the Chancellor, any of its
powers (except the power to make Ordinances),
to the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar or the
Finance Officer, or such other officers or
authority of the University or a committee
appointed by it, thinks fit."
Two other provisions are material, namely,
secs. 37 and 84. Section 37, omitting the
unnecessary, is in these terms:
Sec. 37 Subject to the conditions prescribed
by or under this Act, the Senate may make the
Statutes to provide for all or any of the
following matters namely:
(xvi): The term of office, duties and condi-
tions of service of officers, teachers and
other employees of the University, the provi-
sions of pension, insurance and provident fund
and the manner of termination of their service
and other disciplinary action and their quali-
fications, except those of teachers."
Section 34 is as follows:
"Delegation of powers: Subject to the provi-
sions of
462
this Act and Statutes any officer or authority
of the University may, by order, delegate his
or its powers, except.the power to make Stat-
utes, Ordinances and Regulations, to any other
officer or authority under his or its control,
and subject to the conditions that the ulti-
mate responsibility for the exercise of the
powers so delegated shall continue to vest in
the officer or authority delegating them."
With these provisions, we turn to consider
the first question urged for the appellant.
The question is whether the Vice-Chancellor
was competent to direct disciplinary action
against the respondent. In this context, we
may make a few general observations about the
position and powers of the Vice-Chancellor.
The University Education Commission in its
report (Vol. I December 1948 to August 1949)
has summarised the powers and duties as fol-
lows (at 421):
"Duties of Vice-Chancellor--A Vice-
Chancellor is the chief academic and executive
officer of his university. He presides over
the Court (Senate) in the absence of the
Chancellor, Syndicate (Executive Council),
Academic Council, and numerous committees
including the selection committees for ap-
pointment of staff. It is his duty to know the
senior members of the staff intimately and to
be known to all members of the staff and
students. He must command their confidence
both by adequate academic reputation and by
strength of personality. He must know his
university well enough to be able to foster
its points of strength and to foresee possible
points of weakness before they become acute.’
He must be the ’keeper of the university’s
conscience’, both setting the highest standard
by example and dealing promptly and firmly
with indiscipline and malpractice of any kind.
All this he must do and it can be done as
constitutional ruler; he has not, and should
not have autocratic power. Besides, this he
must be the chief liaison between his univer-
sity and the public, he must keep the univer-
sity alive to the duties it owes to the public
which it serves, and he must win support for
the university and understanding of its needs
not merely from potential benefactors but from
the general public and its elected representa-
tives. Last, he must have the strength of
character to resist unflinchingly the many
forms of pressure to relax standards of all
sorts, which are being applied to universities
today."
463
This has been approved by the Education
Commission, 1964-66. In the report of the
Education Commission, 1971 (pages 610-11 para
13.32) it was stated:
"The person who is expected, above
all, to embody the spirit of academic freedom
and the principles of good management in a
university is the Vice-Chancellor. He stands
for the commitment of the university to schol-
arship and pursuit of truth and can ensure
that the executive wing of the university is
used to assist the academic community in all
its activities. His selection should, there-
fore, be governed by this overall considera-
tion."
Dr. A.H. Homadi in his wise, little study
about the role of the Vice-Chancellor in the
university administration in developing coun-
tries has this to state (at 49):
The President or the Vice-Chancellor:
"The President must be willing to accept a
definition of educational leadership that
brings about change to the academic life of
the institution. He must be fired by a deep
concern for education. He should instil a
spirit and keeness about growth and develop-
ment in such a way that the professiriate
feels that their goals are interlinked with
those of the University, that their success
depends upon the success of the University.
The professors should be given detailed infor-
mation about the jobs that they have to per-
form and their good performance should be
given due recognition by administration lead-
ership. Even such small encouragement will
boost theft morale to greater heights. The
President should have faith in his own abili-
ties as well as on the abilities of other
professors and administrators and should
provide guidelines about the kind of efforts
he would like his professors and administra-
tors to make, setting an example by his own
actions and exercises. The negative force of
fear, when used and no one denies that an
element of hard headedness is some times
required as a persuasive inducement to profes-
sors and administrators of university should
be employed judiciously. Under no circum-
stances should the apathy and belligerence of
the professors and administrators be aroused.
These call for strong but sympathetic leader-
ship in the President." 464
The Vice-Chancellor in every university is thus the conscious keeper of the University and constitutional ruler. He is the principal executive and academic officer of the University. He is entrusted with the responsibility of overall administration of academic as well as nonacademic affairs. For these purposes, the Act confers both express and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express powers include among others, the duty to ensure that the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned. (Section 11(3)). The Vice- Chancellor has a right to regulate the work and conduct of officers and teaching and other employees of the University (Section 11(6)(a)). He has also emergency powers to deal with any untoward situation (Section 11(4)). The power conferred under sec. 11(4) is indeed significant. If the Vice-Chancellor believes that a situation calls for immediate action, he can take such action as he thinks necessary though in the normal course he is not competent to take that action. He must, however, report to the concerned authority or body who would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with the matter. That is not all. His pivotal position as the principal executive officer also carries with him the implied power. It is the magisterial power which is, in our view, plainly to be inferred. This power is essential for him to maintain domestic discipline in the academic and non-academic affairs. In a wide variety of situations in the relationship of tutor and pupil, he has to act firmly and promptly to put down indiscipline and malpractice. It may not be illegitimate if he could call to aid his implied powers and also emergency powers to deal with all such situations.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the Vice-Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the University implies as well, the power to take disciplinary action against officers. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the work and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly, the Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally includes the power to remove. This power is located under sec. 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the Vice-Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act prescribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol.14th Ed. para 32) summarises these principles as follows: 465
"32. Sub-delegation of powers. In
accordance with the maxim delegatius non
potest delegare, a statutory power must be
exercised only by the body or officer in whom
it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of
the power is authorised by express words or
necessary implication. There is a strong
presumption against construing a grant of
legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as
impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the
same may be said of any power to the exercise
of which the designated body should address
its own mind."
The counsel for the appellant next submit-
ted that the Executive Council in the instant
case had delegated its disciplinary power to
the Vice-Chancellor and the Act provides for
such delegation. In support of the contention
he relied upon the following resolution of the
Executive Council:
"Full power be given to the Vice-
Chancellor to take a decision on this question
and the Vice-Chancellor informed the Executive
Council that he will take decision in about a
month- On this decision, Shri Gangadhar Pa-
thrikar gave his opinion that the Executive
Council should take a decision on the note
dated 16.1. 1979 submitted by him and other
two members and since it was not accepted, he
does not agree with the above decision."
This resolution, in our opinion, is basically faulty at least for two reasons. It may be recalled that the Executive Council without considering the report of Mr. Chavan, wanted the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision thereon. It may also be noted that the Vice-Chancellor was present at the meeting of the Executive Council when the resolution was passed. He was given "full power to take a decision" which in the context, was obviously on the report of Mr. Chavan, and not on any other matter or question. He said that he would take a decision in about a month. In our opinion, by the power delegated under the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject the report with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any other action.
The other infirmity in the said resolution goes deeper than what it appears. The resolution was not in harmony with the statutory requirement. Section 84 of the Act provides for delegation of powers and 466 it states that any officer or authority of the University may by order, delegate his or its power (except power to make Ordinance and Regulations) to any other officer or authority subject to provisions of the Act and Statutes. Section 24(1)(xii) provides for delegation of power by the Executive Council. It states that the Executive Council may delegate any of its power (except power to make Ordinances) to the Vice-Chancellor or to any other officer subject to the approval of the Chancellor. (underlying is ours). The approval of the Chancellor is mandatory. Without such approval the power cannot be delegated to the Vice-Chancellor. The record does not reveal that the approval of the Chancellor was ever obtained. Therefore, the resolution which was not in conformity with the statutory requirement could not confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action against the respondent.
This takes us to the second contention urged for the appellants. The contention relates to the legal effect of ratification done by the Executive Council in its meeting held on December 26/27, 1985. The decision taken by the Executive Council is in the form of a resolution and it reads as follows:
"Considering the issues, the Execu-
tive Council resolved as follows:
1. The Executive Council at its
meeting held on March 22, 1979, had by a
resolution given full authority to the Vice-
Chancellor for taking further proceedings and
decision in both the cases of the defaulting
officers.
2. In exercise of above authority,
the Vice-Chancellor appointed an Inquiry
Officer and as suggested by the Inquiry Offi-
cer issued Show Cause notices, obtained re-
plies from the Officers and lastly issued
orders for terminating their services;
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
It was further resolved that--
(i) There has been no inadequacy in the pro-
ceedings against both the officers;
(ii) The punishment ordered against both the
officers is commensurate with the defaults and
allegations proved
467
against both the officers; and
(iii) The Executive Council, therefore, whol-
ly, endorses the actions taken by the then
Vice-Chancellor against both the officers."
By this resolution, we are told that the
Executive Council has ratified the action
taken by the Vice-Chancellor. Ratification is
generally an act of principal with regard to a
contract or an act done by his agent. In
Friedman’s Law of Agency (Fifth Edition)
chapter 5 at p. 73, the/principle of ratifica-
tion has been explained:
"What the ’agent’ does on behalf of
the ’principal’ is done at a time when the
relation of principal and agent does not
exist: (hence the use in this sentence, but
not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas).
The agent, in fact, has no authority to do
what he does at the time he does it. Subse-
quently, however, the principal, on whose
behalf, though without whose authority, the
agent has acted, accepts the agent’s act, and
adopts it, just as if there had been a prior
authorisation by the principal to do exactly
what the agent has done. The interesting
point, which has given rise to considerable
difficulty and dispute, is that ratification
by the principal does not merely give validity
to the agent’s unauthorised act as from the
date of the ratification: it is antedated so
as to take effect from the time of the agent’s
act. Hence the agent is treated as having been
authorised from the outset to act as he did.
Ratification is ’equivalent to an antecedent
authority’ ."
In Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at p. 39) it
is stated:
"Every act whether lawful or unlaw-
ful, which is capable of being done by means
of an agent (except an act which is in its
inception void) is capable of ratification by
the person in whose name or on whose behalf it
is done ..... The words "lawful or unlawful",
however, are included primarily to indicate
that the doctrine can apply to torts. From
them it would follow that a principal by
ratification may retrospectively turn what was
previously an act wrongful against the princi-
ple, e.g. an unauthorised sale, or against a
third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a
legitimate one; or become liable for the tort
of another by ratifying." 468
These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.
The counsel for the appellant, however, invited our attention to the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 304. It was a case of termination of services of the Secretary of a Company. The Board of Directors decided to terminate the services of the Secretary. The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact terminated his services. Subsequently, in the meeting of the Board of Directors the action taken by the Chairman was confirmed. In the suit instituted by the Secretary challenging the termination of his services, the Court upheld on the principle that the action of the Chairman even though it was invalid initially, could be validated by ratification in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. Mathew, J. while considering this aspect of the matter, observed [at pp. 307 and 308]
"Even if it be assumed that the telegram and
the letter terminating the services of the
appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to
the invalid resolution of the Board of Direc-
tors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate
his services, it would not follow that the
action of the Chairman could not be ratified
in a regularly convened meeting of the BOard
of Directors. The point is that even assuming
that the Chairman was not legally authorised
to terminate the services of the appellant, he
was acting on behalf of the Company in doing
so, because, he purported to act in pursuance
of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was
open to a regularly constituted meeting of the
Board of Direction to ratify that action
which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf
of the Company. Ratification would always
relate back to the date of the act ratified
and so it must be held that the services of
the appellant were validly terminated on
December 17, 1953. The appellant was not
entitled to the declaration prayed for by him
and the trial court as well as the High Court
was right in dismissing the claim."
These principles of ratification governing
transactions of a company where the general
body is the repository of all powers not be
469
extended to the present case. We were also
referred to the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Barnard v. National Dock Labour
Board, [1953] 1 All Eng. Law Reports 1113 and
in particular the observation of Denning L.J.,
(at 1118 and 1119):
"While an administrative function
can often be delegated, a judicial function
rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can dele-
gate its functions unless it is enabled to do
so expressly or by necessary implication. In
Local Government Board v. Arlidge (2) the
power to delegate was given by necessary
implication, but there is nothing in this
scheme authorising the board to delegate this
function and it cannot be implied. It was
suggested that it would be impracticable for
the board to sit as a board to decide all
these cases, but I see nothing impracticable
in that. They have only to fix their quorum at
two members and arrange for two members, one
from each side, employers and workers, to be
responsible for one week at a time.
"Next, it was suggested that, even if
the board could not delegate their functions,
at any rate they could ratify the actions of
the port manager, but, if the board have no
power to delegate their functions to the port
manager, they can have no power to ratify what
he has already done. The effect of ratifica-
tion is to make it equal to a prior command,
but as a prior command, in the shape of dele-
gation, would be useless, so also is a ratifi-
cation."
These observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed. 470