PETITIONER:
MANJUSRI RAHA & ORS ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
B.L. GUPTA & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT09/02/1977
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1158 1977 SCR (2) 944
1977 SCC (2) 174
ACT
Motor Vehicles Act 1939--Sec. 95(2)(d)--Sec.
110A--Principles to determine compensation payable for death
in a bus accident--Increments and pensionary benefits,
whether to be taken into account.
HEADNOTE
Satindra Nath Raha and Uma Shankar Shastri were trav-
elling by a bus owned by Gupta of M.P. Speedways Company.
They were travelling from Bhind to Gwalior. On the high
way, a bus owned by Bhuta came from the opposite direc-
tion. On account of negligence of drivers of both the buses
there was a head-on collision of the two buses, as a conse-
quence of which Raha and Shastri sustained fatal injuries to
which they succumbed on the same day in the hospital. Widow
of Raha claimed a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- under s.
110A of the Motor Vehicles Act and Mrs. Shastri claimed a
sum of Rs. 1.20,000/- as compensation. The Claims Tribunal
decreed the claim of Mrs. Raha to the extent of Rs. 60,000/-
and of Mrs. Shastri to the extent of Rs. 40,000/-. The
compensation awarded to Mrs. Raha is on the basis of the
salary which Mr. Raha would have earned upto the age of
55 years after deducting half the salary. The quantum
awarded by the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court. Gupta
and Mrs. Raha field the present appeals in this Court.
Gupta contended that the compensation awarded was very
excessive and Mrs. Raha contended that the compensation
granted was grossly inadequate and should be enhanced.
Allowing the appeal filed by Mrs. Raha and dismissing
the appeal filed by Gupta,
HELD: 1. The contention of Gupta that he should not be
made liable to pay the compensation since no negligence was
alleged against the driver Ram Swarup negatived. Although
the plaint is loosely drafted but it clearly contains the
relief of compensation against Gupta and Ram Swarup, the
driver. Pleadings have to be interpreted not with formalis-
tic rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal
literacy of poor people. The Claims Tribunal and the High
Court overlooked two important and vital considerations.
Firstly the increments which Mr. Raha would have earned
while reaching the maximum of his grade long before his
retirement and secondly the pensionary benefits which he
would have obtained had he retired. It would be reasonable
to expect that if the deceased had not died due to the
accident he would have lived at least upto the age of 65
years. The Court, therefore, enhanced the compensation of
Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-. [948 F, G, 949A-B, 950A-B]
2. It is unfortunate that section 95(2)(d) of the Motor
Vehicles Act restricts the liability of the Insurance Compa-
nies to Rs. 2,000/- only in case of a third party. The
court suggested that the Legislature should increase the
liability of the Insurance company. The court observed that
it was anamolous that if a passenger dies in a plane acci-
dent he gets the compensation of Rs. 1 lac and a person who
dies in the road accident should get only Rs. 2,000/-.
[946 D-E]
3. Expressing its concern for the need for creating no
fault liability by a suitable legislation, the Court ob-
served:
The time is ripe for serious consideration of creating
no-fault liability. Having regard to the directive princi-
ples of State policy, the poverty of the ordinary run of
victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature of
insurance of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general
insurance companies and the expanding trend towards nation-
alisation of bus transport, the law of
945
torts based on no-fault needs reforms. Where the social
need of the hour requires that precious human lives lost in
motor accidents leaving a trial of .economic disaster in the
shape of their unprovided for families call for special
attention of the law makers to meet this social need by
providing for heavy and adequate compensation particularly
through Insurance Companies. Our .country can iII-afford
the loss of a precious life when we are building a progres-
sive society and if any person engaged in industry, office,
business or any other occupation dies, a void is created
which is bound to result in a serious set back to the indus-
try or occupation concerned. Apart from that the death of a
worker creates a serious economic problem for the family
which he leaves behind. In these circumstances it is only
just and fair that the Legislature should make a suitable
provision so as to pay adequate compensation by property
evaluating the precious life of a citizen in its true per-
spective rather than devaluating human lives on the basis of
an artificial mathematical formula. [916 C--950 D-F]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 231.0 &
1826 of 1968.
(From the Judgment and Decree dated the 30th August,
1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeals
Nos. 219 and 220 of 1965) and
Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1969
(From the Judgment and Decree dated the 30th August,
1967 of the Madhya Pradesh.High Court in Misc. First Appeal
No. 203 of 1965).
G.L. Sanghi, Talat A nsari, R.K. Sanghi and K.J.
John.--In CAs. Nos. 132/69 & 1826/68 for the Appellant in
132 & in 1826/ 68.
G.S. Chatterjee & D.P. Mukherjee.--for Respondents 1-3.
1. N. Shroff & H.S. Parihar--for Respondent No. 8.
H.K. Puri and A.G. Ratnaparkhi.--for Respondent No. 6
for Respondents 9 to 11.
G.S. Chatterjee & D.P. Mukherjee, in CA No. 2310 of 1968
for the appellants.
G.S. Sanghi, Talat Ansari, R.K. Sanghi and K.J.John for
respondent No. 1.
H.S. Parihar & 1. N. Shroff for respondent No. 3.
H.K. Puri for respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.--With the emergence of an ultra-moderd
age which has led to strides of progress in all spheres of
tile, we have switched from fast to faster vehicular traffic
which has come as a has boon to many, though some times in
the case of some it has also
946
proved to be a misfortune. Such are the cased of the
victims of motor accidents resulting from rash and negligent
driving which take away quite a number of precious lives of
the people of our Country. At a time when we are on the way
to progress and prosperity, our country can iII-afford to
lose so ’many precious lives every year, for though the
percentage of deaths caused by motor accidents in other
countries is high, in our own country the same is not by any
means negligible, but is a factor to be reckoned with. Our
lawmakers being fully conscious of the expanding needs of
our nation have passed laws and statutes to minimise motor
accidents and to provide for adequate compensation to the
families who face serious socio-economic problems if the
main bread-earner loses his life in the motor accident.
The time is ripe for serious consideration of creating no-
fault liability. Having regard to the directive principles
of State policy, the poverty of the ordinary run of victims
of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature of insurance
of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general insurance
companies and the expanding trend towards nationalisation of
bus transport, the law of torts based on no-fault needs
reform. While s. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for
the constitution of Claims Tribunals for determining the
compensation payable, s. 110-A provides for the procedure
and circumstances under which the family of a victim of a
motor accident can get compensation and lays down the var-
ious norms, though not as exhaustively as it should have.
The Courts, however, have spelt out and enunciated valuable
principles from time to time which guide the determination
of compensation in a particular situation. Unfortunately,
however, s. 95(2)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act limits the
compensation to be paid by an Insurance Company to Rs.
2,000/- only in respect of death to any third party and this
is one disconcerting aspect on which we shall have to say
something in a later part of our judgment.
With this little preface we now take up the facts in the
appeals by certificate filed by B.L. Gupta and Smt. Manjus-
hri Raha in this’ Court, and which after being consolidated
have been disposed of by one common judgment both by the
Claims Tribunal as also by the High Court. Manjushri Raha,
the main appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2310 of 1968 will, in
short, be referred to hereafter aS "Raha", whereas respond-
ents Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company would be
referred to as "Oriental Company" and the New India Insur-
ance Company as "New India Company". Smt. Manjula Devi
Bhuta representing the owner of vehicle No. MPG-4615 will be
referred to as "Bhuta", whereas B.L. Gupta the owner of
vehicle No. MPG-4307 belonging to the M.P. Speedways Company
would be referred to as "Gupta". Padmavati Shastri, the
respondent in one of the appeals, would be referred to as
"Shastri". The appeals arise in the following circum-
stances.
Claim Case No. 6 of 1962 was filed by Raha along with
her two minor children against Bhuta, Sushil Kumar driver of
vehicle No. MPG-4615, Oriental Company, New India Company,
Gupta owner of the M.P. Speedways Company and Ram Swaroop
driver of vehicle No. MPG-4307. The applicant Raha claimed
compensation for a
947
sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- against the respondents Under s. 110-A
of the Motor Vehicles Act. Similarly Shastri filed Claim
Case No. 5 of 1962 against the respondents mentioned above
claiming Rs. 1,20,000/- as compensation from the aforesaid
respondents. Both these claims were consolidated and heard
and decided by one common judgment by the Claims Tribunal,
Gwalior. The facts giving rise to the claims of Raha and
Shastri were that on April 10, 1962 Satyendra Nath Raha the
husband of Raha and Uma Shanker Shastri the husband of
Shastri were travelling in vehicle No. MPG-4397 (owned by
Gupta of the M.P. Speedways Company) from Bhind to TM Gwali-
or. When the bus travelled a distance of about 26 miles on
the Bhind-Gwalior road another bus bearing No. MPG-4615
belonging to Bhuta was seen coming from the opposite direc-
tion. The driver of the M.P. Speedways Company was Ram
Swaroop while that of the bus belonging to Bhuta was Sushil
Kumar. When the two buses were approaching in opposite
directions, both the drivers being negligent and having
failed to take the necessary precautions of keeping to their
left led to a head-on collision of the two buses as a conse-
quence of which the two persons, namely, Satyendra Nath Raha
and Uma Shanker Shastri sustained fatal injuries to which
they succumbed on the ’same day in the Gohad Hospital. The
facts and circumstances under which the accident took place
have not been disputed by counsel for the parties, nor have
the essential findings of fact given by the Claims Tribunal
and the High Court been challenged before us. The appeal,
therefore, lies within a very narrow compass.
But before dealing with the appeals, it-may be necessary
to indicate the reliefs granted by the Claims Tribunal to
the parties concerned. The Claims Tribunal decreed the
claim of Raha to the extent of Rs. 60,000/- only against all
the respondents holding that the drivers of both the buses
were negligent. The claim of Shastri was decreed only to
the extent of Rs. 40,000/- against Bhuta, Sushil Kumar
driver and Oriental Company. No decree was passed against
Ram Swaroop driver of the M.P. Speedways Company and New
India Company because there was no allegation of negligence
against these persons in the claim flied by Shastri.
Against the decision the Claims Tribunal, Gupta
field Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 203 of 1965 against
Bhuta, Raha and others which was dismissed by the High
Court. Civil Appeals Nos. 1826 of 1968 and 132 of 1969 in
this Court arise out of the aforesaid appeal before the High
Court. Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 219 of 1965 was filed
by Bhuta against Raha, Gupta and others which was also
dismissed by the High Court, but Bhuta has not filed any
appeal to this Court against the decision of the Tribunal
and the High Court in that appeal. But Bhuta had flied an
appeal in the High Court being Miscellaneous First Appeal
No. 220 of 1965 against Shastri which was allowed by the
High Court to this extent that the decree against Gupta and
Ram Swaroop was made joint and several along with the appel-
lant Bhuta. Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 222 of 1965 was
flied before the High Court by Oriental Company against
Shastri but that was also dismissed. Similarly Miscellane-
ous First. Appeal No. 223 of 1965 was flied before the High
Court by Oriental Company against Raha which was also dis-
missed along with the cross objection
948
which was filed by Raha for enhancement of the compensation.
The High Court, however, held in Miscellaneous First Appeal
No. 223 of 1965 that Oriental Company was to pay a total
compensation of Rs. 20,000/- out of which Rs. 8,000/- was to
be paid to Shastri and Rs. 12,000/- to Raha.
The present appeals in this Court have been filed by
Gupta and Raha. Neither Shastri, nor Bhuta, nor any of the
Insurance Companies have filed any appeal before this Court.
The short point raised by Mr. Sanghi appearing for Gupta was
that in the circumstances the compensation awarded by the
Claims Tribunal to Raha was too high and at any rate the
High Court ought not to have made the appellant Gupta
liable jointly-and severally with others. In the appeal
filed by Raha it is claimed that the compensation granted by
the Claims Tribunal was grossly inadequate and should be
enhanced. It has been stated before us by Mr. Sanghi, though
not admitted by the other side, that Gupta and the Insurance
Companies have paid a total amount of Rs. 29,000/- (Rs.
15,000/- by Gupta and Rs. 14,000 by insurance Companies) in
full and final settlement of the claim of Raha and, there-
fore, the appeal should be decreed in terms of the compro-
mise. It was further contended that even if the amount
awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Raha is enhanced that
should be payable by Bhuta alone and not by the appellant
Gupta, who has settled the claim with the appellant Raha.
There can be no doubt that if really a settlement has been
reached between Gupta and Raha then no further decree can be
passed as against Gupta. The appellant further undertook to
pay Rs. 10,000/- to Shastri in fulfilment of her claim. As
Rs. 10,000/- has already been paid to Shastri with the
result that Bhuta has yet to pay Rs. 20,000/- being her
share to Shastri.
Finally, it was contended that as there was no allega-
tion of negligence against Ram Swaroop the driver of the
M.P. Speedways Company the High Court ought not to have
decreed the c1aim of Raha against the appellant Gupta. We
have perused the plaint before the Claims Tribunal, which is
rather loosely drafted, but it clearly contains the relief
of compensation even against Gupta and Ram Swaroop driver.
The High Court has pointed out that even though there is no
clear plea of negligence in the claim of Raha, the facts
alleged and proved in the case dearly show that Ram Swaroop
the driver of the M.P. Speedways Company was both rash and
negligent. Pleadings have to be interpreted not with forma-
listie rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal
literacy of poor people. We fully agree with the finding of
the High Court and see no reason to disturb it. We also
agree with the order of the High Court by which it makes
Gupta and Bhuta jointly and severally liable. That was the
only decree which could have been passed in the circum-
stances.
Coming now to the’appeal filed by Raha, counsel for the
appellant submitted that the compensation awarded by the
Claims Tribunal is grossly inadequate and certain important
factors have not been taken into consideration. On a perus-
al of the judgment of the Claims Tribunal it would appear
that the only basis on which the compensation has been
awarded is the total salary which the deceased Satyen-
949
dra Nath Raha would have got upto the age of 55 years which
has been taken at Rs. 1,20,000/- and after deducting half
which would normally have been spent, the actual income lost
to the family was Rs. 60,000/-. It seems to us, however,
that in making the calculation, the Claims Tribunal and the
High Court overlooked two important and vital considera-
tions. In the first place, while the admitted position was
that the deceased Satyendra Nath Raha was working in the
grade of Rs 590-30-830-35-900 and was getting a salary of
Rs. 620/- p.m. at the time of his death, the Courts below
have not taken into account the salary which he would have
earned while reaching the maximum of his grade long before
his retirement. It is admitted that the deceased Satyendra
Nath Raha was 37 years of age at the time of the accident
and at this rate he would have reached the maximum of the
grade of Rs. 900/- at the age of 46 years i.e. full 9 years
before his superannuation. The claimant has produced a
certificate Ext. P-4 from the office of the Accountant
General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, which shows that from
April 11, 1962 (i.e. the date next to the date of the death
of Satyendra Nath Raha) to October 15, 1980 which would be
the last working day of the deceased Raha, the deceased
Raha would have drawn Rs, 1,89,402 including the increments
earned and the maximum grade drawn. This figure may be
rounded off to Rs. 1,88,000/-. Even if half of this be
deducted as being rightly taken to have been spent by the
deceased to cover day to day domestic expenses, payment of
incometax and other charges, the actual income lost to the
family including the value of the estate and the loss to.
the dependents would be Rs. 94,000/-. This will be a fair
estimate which does not take into account the economic value
of the deprivation to the wife of her husband’s company for
ever and the shock felt by the children. It was suggested
by the High Court that as the deceased Raha was not a perma-
nent employee, the amount taken into account by the Compen-
sation Tribunal was correct. This is, however, not a con-
sideration which could have weighed with the Claims Tribunal
in making the assessment because it was purely contingent.
On the other hand with the rise in price index it could well
have been expected that there would be several revisions in
the grade by the time the deceased Raha had attained the age
of superannuation, which, if taken into account, would
further enhance the amount. In these circumstances, there-
fore, we think that the amount of Rs. 90,000/- would
represent the correct compensation so far as the salary part
of the deceased Raha is concerned.
The Courts below have also not considered the effect of
the. pensionary benefits which the deceased Raha would
undoubtedly have got after retirement, and in fact the
Claims Tribunal has restricted the span of the life of the
deceased only to the age of 55 years i.e. the age of super-
annuation, whereas in the present economic conditions the
life of an average Indian has increased more than two-fold.
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that if the deceased
had not died due to accident, he would have lived up at
least upto the age of 65 years, if not more, so as to earn
the pensionary benefits for 10 years after retirement.
According to the certificate Ext. P-4 the deceased Raha
would have been entitled to a monthly pension of Rs. 337-50
which
950
would mean about Rs. 4,050/- per year. There can be no
doubt that whole of this amount would have to be spent,
there being no other source of income and, therefore, this
amount cannot be said to be lost to the estate. The certif-
icate Ext. P-4 further shows that the deceased Raha would
have got death-cum-retirement gratuity to the extent of Rs.
13,500/- calculated on the basis of the presumptive aver-
age emoluments and presumptive last emoluments. If the
deceased had lived after superannuation, he might probably
have got this amount. After adding this amount of Rs.
13,500/- to. Rs. 90,000 the total amount would come to Rs.
1,03,500/- which may be rounded off to roughly Rs.
1,00,000/-. In any view of the matter, therefore, the
appellant Raha was entitled to a compensation of Rs.
1,00,000/-, and the Courts below erred in completely over-
looking these two important aspects which we have dis-
cussed.
It appears that the appellants Raha as also Padmavati
Shastri could have got heavier compensation from the Insur-
ance Companies, but unfortunately the Motor Vehicles Act
has taken a very narrow view by limiting the liability of
the Insurance Companies under s. 95 (2) (d) to Rs. 2,000/-
only in case of a third party.
While our Legislature has made laws to cover every possi-
ble situation, yet it is well nigh impossible to make provi-
sions for all kinds of situations. Nevertheless where the
social need of the hour requires that precious human lives
lost in motor accidents leaving a trail of economic disas-
ter in the shape of their unprovided for families. call for
special attention of the law makers to meet this social need
by providing for heavy and adequate compensation par-
ticularly through Insurance Companies. It is true that
while our law makers are the best judges of the requirements
of the society, yet it is indeed surprising that such an
important aspect of the matter has missed their attention.
Our country can ill-afford the loss of a precious life when
we are building a progressive society and if any person
engaged in industry, office, business or any other occupa-
tion dies, a void is created which is bound to result in a
serious set back to the industry or occupation concerned.
Apart from that the death of a worker creates a serious
economic problem for the family which he leaves behind. In
these circumstances it is only just and fair that the Legis-
lature should make a suitable provision so as to pay ade-
quate compensation by properly evaluating the. previous
life of a citizen in its true perspective rather than deval-
uing human lives on the basis of an artificial mathematical
formula. It is common knowledge that where a passenger
travelling by a plane dies in an accident, he gets a com-
pensation of Rs. 1,00,000/.- or like large sums, and yet
when death comes to him not through a plane but through a
motor vehicle he is entitled only to Rs. 2,000/-. Does it
indicate that the life of a passenger travelling by plane
becomes more, precious merely because he has chosen a par-
ticular conveyance and the value of his life is considerably
reduced if happens to choose a conveyance of a lesser
value like a motor vehicle ? Such an invidious distinction
is absolutely shocking to any judicial or social conscience
and yet s. 95(2)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act seems to.
suggest such a distinction. We hope and trust that our
law-makers will give. serious attention to this aspect of
the matter and remove this serious lacuna in s. 95(2)(d) of
the Motor
951
Vehicles Act. We would also like to. suggest that instead
of limiting the liability of the Insurance Companies to a
specified sum of money as representing the value of human
life, the amount should be left to be determined by a Court
in the special circumstances of each case. We further hope
our suggestions will be duly implemented and the observa-
tions of the highest Court of the country do not become a
mere pious wish.
In M/s. Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India
Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. (1) this Court has clearly
held that an Insurance Company is not liable to pay any sum
exceeding Rs. 2,000/upto a maximum of Rs. 20,000/- on the
plain words of s. 95 (2) (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act and
the only remedy to provide for adequate compensation for a
precious life of a human life is for the Legislature to take
a practical view of the loss of human life in motor acci-
dents.
In P.B. Kader & Ors. v. Thatcharoma and Ors.(2) a
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, while dwelling on
this aspect observed as follows:
"It is sad that an Indian life should be
so devalued by an Indian law as to. cost only
Rs. 2,000/-, apart from the fact that the
value of the Indian rupee has been eroded and
Indian life has become dearer since the time
the statute was enacted, and the consciousness
of the comforts and amenities of life in the
Indian community has arisen, it would have
been quite appropriate to revise this fossil
figure of Rs. 2,000/- per individual, in-
volved in an accident, to make it more realis-
tic and humane, but that is a matter for the
legislature; and the observation that I have
made is calculated to remind the lawmakers
that humanism is the basis of law and
justice."
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the obser-
vations made by the Kerala High Court in the aforesaid case
and we would like to remind the law-makers that the time has
come to take a more humane and practical view of things
while passing statute like the Motor Vehicles Act in regu-
lating compensation payable by Insurance Companies to vic-
tims of motor accidents. We have not the slightest doubt
that if the attention of the Government is drawn, the lacuna
will be covered up in good time.
The result is that Civil Appeals Nos. 1826 of 1968 and
132 of 1969 are dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 2310 of 1968
is allowed to this extent that the claim preferred by Raha
is enhanced from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-. As no
authentic proof of any settlement between Gupta and Raha has
been produced before us, the decree passed by us will be
jointly and severally recoverable from Gupta and Bhuta after
giving credit for the amounts received by Raha. It will,
however, be open to the executing court on proof of any full
and final settlement of the claims of Raha with Gupta or any
other Judgment debtor to adjust the claims accordingly under
0.23 r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the circum-
stances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs
in this Court.
P.H.P. C.A. 1826 of 1968 and 132 of 1969 dismissed.
C.A. No. 2310 of 1968 allowed.
(1) A.I.R 1971 S.C. 1624.
(2) A.I.R. 1970 Kerala 241.
952