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Mangal Sinhji Dolat Sinhji Etc. v. State of Gujarat

Supreme Court of India · 11 October 1991 · [1991] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 497

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
11 October 1991
Reported as
[1991] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 497
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Kania, M.H.
Length
4 pages
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PETITIONER:
MANGAL SINHJI DOLAT SINHJI ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF GUJARAT
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1991
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
RAY, G.N. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 221 1991 SCR Supl. (1) 497
1992 SCC (1) 182 JT 1991 (6) 529
1991 SCALE (2)947

ACT

Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949:

Section 6 ---Explanation--Expression "Uncultivated land"---Scope of--Land capable of cultivation but not cultivated continuosly for 3 .years prior to the enforcement of the Act--Held "uncultivated laird" and vested in the State.

HEADNOTE

The appellants were tenants of certain lands which formed part of a Taluqdari Estate. These lands though cultivable were not cultivated for a continuous period of 3 years prior to the coming into Iorce of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949.

In the tenant’s appeal to this Court, on the question whether these lands were uncultivated lands within the meaning of Section 6 of the 1949 Act and thus became vested in the State: Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1. The lands in question are clearly covered by the definition of the expression "uncultivated land" as set out in the Explanation to Section 6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949. [500-F].

1.1 Even according to the appellants themselves, the lands were under cultivation for some time prior to the coming into force of the said Act and hence it could not be said that they were uncultivable lands. They were in fact lands which were capable of cultivation and as a matter of fact had been subjected to cultivation for some-time but were not cultivated 1or continuous period of three years prior to the coming into force of the Act. Accordingly the lands must be regarded as "uncultivated lands" for the purposes of Section 6 of the Act and must be deemed to be vested in the State Government. [500 E-F, 499-C].

State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, [1980]1 SCR233, held inapplicable. 497 498

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1227 to 1230 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.1978 of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 54, 52, 53, 55 of 1973. B. Datta, J.P. Pathak and P.H. Parekh for the Appellants. R.N. Sachthey, Bimal Roy Jad and Anip Sachthey for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KANIA, J. These are the appeals by special leave from a common judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court disposing of the Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 52 to 55 of 1973 and also Letters Patent Appeal No. 50 of 1973. It is a common ground that the appellants are the tenants of certain lands which form part of the estate or wanta of a Taluqdar. The question is whether the provisions of Section 6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, are applicable to the lands in question, and whether under the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, which came into effect from 15th August, 1950, the said lands became vested in the State and all rights in the said land held by the Taluqdar became the property of the Government. Under the provisions of Section 6 of the said Act, inter alia, all uncultivated lands excluding the land used for building and other nonagricultural purposes, vest in the State. Section 6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, runs as follows: -

"All public roads, lanes and paths, the

bridges, ditches, dikes and fences on, or

beside, the same. the bed of the sea and of

harbours, creeks below high water mark, and of

rivers, streams, nailas, lakes, wells and

tanks, and all canals, and water courses, and

all standing and flowing water, all unbuilt

village site lands, all waste lands and all

uncultivated lands (excluding lands used for

building or other non-agricultural purposes),

which are not situate within the limits of the

wantas as belonging to a taluqdar in a taluq-

dari estate shall except in so far as any

rights of any person other than the taluqdar

may be established in and over the same and

except as may otherwise be provided by any law

for the time being in force, vest in and shall

be deemed to be, with all rights in or over

the same or appertaining thereto, the property

of the Government and all rights held by a

taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to

have been extinguished and it shall be lawful

for the Collector, subject to the

499

general or special orders of the Commis-

sioner, to dispose them of as he deems fit,

subject always to the rights of way and of

other rights of the public or of individuals

legally subsisting.

Explanation: For the purposes of this

section, land shall be deemed to be unculti-

vated, if it has not been cultivated for a

continuous period of three years immediately

before the date on which this Act comes into

force."

The question is whether for the purposes of this section the lands in question were uncultivated lands. It is an admitted position that the lands were leased by the Taluqdar to the tenants. There is also a clear and categorical finding of facts that these lands had remained uncultivated for a period of 3 years immediately before the said Act came into force. Prima facie it would appear that in view of the said explanation to section 6 the lands must be regarded as uncultivated lands for the purposes of section 6 of the said Act and must be deemed to be vested in Government. Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, contended that as the lands had been put to cultivation earlier for some time even though not cultivated for continuous three years prior to vesting they cannot be regarded as uncultivated lands. According to learned Counsel, if the land is capable of being cultivated, it cannot be treated as uncultivated land within the meaning of section 6. He relied on a decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal reported in [1980] 1 SCR page 233. Our attention has been drawn to the observation made at page 239 of the said report. After setting out the provision of Section 6 it has been observed, as follows:

"On a fair reading of the section, it would be

evident that the vesting is in respect of

properties which could be put to public use.

It leaves the private properties of the taluq-

dar untouched. The legislative intent is

manifested by clear enumeration of certain

specific properties not situate within the

wantas of a taluqdar. It begins by specifying

’All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges etc.’

and ends up with ’all village site lands, all

waste lands and all uncultivated lands’, and

these being public properties situate in a

taluqdar’s estate must necessarily vest in the

Government because they are meant for public

use. In spite of vesting of such property in

the Government, however, the conferral of the

rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under

section 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his

actual possession, is saved.

Pausing there, it is fair to observe that the

words in parenthesis ’excluding lands used for

building or other non-agricultural

500

purposes’, exemplify the intention of

the legislature not to deprive a taluqdar of

such land, even though such property is

uncultivated land, due to its inherent charac-

ter as well as by reason of the Explana-

tion.

It is, therefore, evident that the determina-

tion of the question whether a particular

category of property belonging to a taluqdar

in a taluqdan estate is vested in the Govern-

ment or not, and the determination of the

question whether the rights held by a taluqdar

in such property shall be deemed to have been

extinguished or not, will depend upon the

category of that property. The expression ’all

waste lands’ has been joined by conjunctive

’and’ with the expression ’all uncultivated

lands’. They, therefore, indicate two distinct

types of land. If the legislature had intended

that the aforesaid expression should indicate

one class of lands, the expression rather

would have been ’all waste and uncultivated

lands’ as against the expression ’all waste

lands and all uncultivated lands’. Here we

have, therefore, two distinct categories of

proporties viz. (1) waste lands, and (2)

uncultivated lands. The contention that the

grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapa-

ble of cultivation were ’waste lands’ or

’uncultivated lands’ within the meaning of

section 6 cannot be accepted ."

The said decision of this Court and the observation relied on by the learned Counsel do not come in the aid of the contention made by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Even according to the appellants themselves, the lands were under cultivation for some time prior to the coming into force of the said Act and hence, it could not be said that they were uncultivable lands. They were in fact, lands which were capable of cultivation and as a matter of fact subjected to cultivation for some time but, which as found by the High Court were not cultivated for continuous period of three years prior to the coming into force of the said Act. In these circumstances, the said lands are clearly covered by the definition of the expression "uncultivated land" as set out in the Explanation to section 6. As the said lands were uncultivated lands within the meaning of section 6, they must be deemed to have been vested in the Government and the contention of the appellants to the contrary must be rejected.

In the result, there is no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. T.N.A Appeals dismissed. 501

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