Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others

PETITIONER:
MAHARAJ SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/11/1976
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2602 1977 SCR (1)1072
1977 SCC (1) 155

ACT

U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act,

1950--Section 117--Scope of--State vests lands in Gaon

Sabha--Suit for ejectment--Gaon Sabha did not

appeal-State--If had locus standi.

Words & phrases--Vest Person aggrieved--Appurtenance--Mean-

ing of

HEADNOTE

By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land

Reforms Act, 1950, the right, title and interest of all the

intermediaries in every estate including hats, bazars and

melas stood terminated and vested absolutely in the State.

Section 9 provides’ that all wells, trees in abadi and all

buildings situate within the limits of an Estate, belonging

to an intermediary, shall continue to belong to or be held

by such intermediary and the site of the buildings which

is appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled with

him by the State Government. Section 117(1) empowers the

State Government to vest lands in Gaon Sabhas or other

local authorities. Under s. 117(6) the State Government

has power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands vested in

it. By a notification under s. 117(1 ) the State Government

vested the land in the village in the Gaon Sabha.

On the estate in dispute, the defendant who was the

quondam zamindar, had been conducting a cattle fair. The

estate had on it, among others, a few structures. The

plaintiffs’ (the State and the Gaon Sabha) suit for eject-

ment of the defendant from the estate was dismissed by the

trial court. The Gaon Sabha, however, did not appeal; but

the State went in appeal to the High Court as ’a person

aggrieved’. The High Court negatived the defendants conten-

tions that as a result of the notification under s. 117(1)

the land having vested in the Gaon Sabha, the State

Government had no locus standi and that it was not a person

aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all the struc-

tures and a space of 5 yards running round each building.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD: (1) The State has title to sustain the action in

ejectment. The Government, despite vesting the estates in

Gaon Sabhas has, and continues to have, a constant hold on

these estates, when it chooses, to take away what it had

given possession of to a Gaon Sabha. This is plainly

’present legal interest’ in the Government and a sort of

precarium tenans in the Sabha. [1082 D; 1079 F-G]

(a) The Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari

rights as part of land reform. Instead of centralising

management of all estates at State level, the Act gives an

enabling power to make over these states to Gaon Sabhas.

Apart from management, no power is expressly vested in the

Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely. If the State

thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declara-

tion or notification it can totally deprive the Sabha of,

and resume from it, any estate. The vesting in the State

was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to

possession and management subject to divestiture by

Government. Such a construction of vesting in two different

senses in the same section is sound because the word ’vest’

has many meanings. The sense of the situation suggests that

in s. 117(1) ’vested in the State’ carries a plenary conno-

tation, while ’shall vest in the Gaon Sabha’ imports a

qualified disposition confined to the right to full posses-

sion and enjoyment so long as it lasts. To postulate

vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the

declaration under s. 117(1) is to stultify s. 117(6). [1081

A-C; F-G]

1073

(b) The State is ’a person aggrieved’. He, who has a

proprietary right, which has been or is threatened by

violation, is an ’aggrieved person’. The right to a remedy

apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the

protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to

ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if

they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the

cause of action. The nexus between the lis and the plain-

tiff need not necessarily be personal. A person aggrieved

is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgen-

cies and felt necessities of our time. [1082 E-F]

(c) The amplitude of ’legal grievance’ has broadened

with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activi-

ties whose beneficiaries may be the general community even

though the legal right to the, undertaking may not vest in

the community. The State starts welfare projects whose

effective implementation may call for collective action from

the protected group or any member of them. Test suits,

class actions and representative litigation are the begin-

ning and the horizon is expanding with persons and organi-

sations not personally injured but vicariously concerned

being entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for

redressal of actual or imminent wrongs. [1083 A-C]

Dhabolkar [1976] 1 S.C.R. 306 followed.

’Locus standi’ has a larger ambit in current legal semantics

than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old.

Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to

appeal under s. 96 of the= Code. of Civil Procedure. [1084

D]

(2) Where a wrong against community interest is done,

’no locus standi’ will not always be a plea to non-suit an

interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. In

the instant case the Government is the ’aggrieved person’.

Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be

exercised in public interest will be seriously jeopardised

if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The

estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha

for community benefit, is controlled by the State through

directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to

be divested. The wholesome object of the legislature of

cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in local self-

governing units will be frustrated, if the State is to be a

helpless spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or

lost. [1083 H; 1084 A-B]

(3)(a) The touchstone of ’appurtenance’ is dependence of

the building on what appertains to it for its use as a

building. Obviously the hat, bazar, or mela is not an

appurtenance to the building. Even if the buildings were

used and enjoyed in the past with the whole. st.retch

of.vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurte-

nant to the principal subject granted by s. 9, namely,

buildings. [1085 G]

(b) The larger objective of s. 9 is to settle with the

former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurte-

nant to buildings, all the rest going to the State. for

implementation of the agrarian reform policy. [1084 G]

(c) The large open spaces cannot ,be regarded as

appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What

a integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of

subordination, something incidental or ancillary or depend-

ent is implied in appurtenance. That much of space required

for the use of the structures as such has been excluded

by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be

necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of

the chabutras as such. [1085 B-C]

(d) ’Appurtenance’ in relation to a dwelling, includes

all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes there-

of. The word ’appurtenances’ has a distinct and definite

meaning. Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is

strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or

grant. What is necessary for the enjoyment and has been

used for the purpose of the building, such as easement,

alone will be appurtenant. The. word ’appurtenance’ in-

cludes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the

land granted or demised such as rights of way, but does not

include lands in addition to that granted. [1086 D-E]

(e) What the High Court has granted viz., 5 yards of

surrounding space is sound in law. [1086 H]

1074

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1976.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 23-5-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal

No. 392/ 64.

Shana Bhushan, V.P. Goel and Subodh Markendeya, for

the Appellant.

L.N. Sinha, Solicitor-General of India and O.P. Rana,

for the Respondent No. 1.

Bal Kishan Gaur and Amlan Ghosh, for Respondent No. 2.

Yogeshwar Prasad and Rani Arora, for Respondent No. 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.--Two principal submissions, whose

implications’ perhaps are of profound moment and have public

impact, have been, at wide-ranging length, urged in this

appeal by certificate, by Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the

appellant/defendant and, with effective brevity, controvert-

ed by the Solicitor General, for respondent/1st plaintiff.

The two focal points of the controversy are: (a) Is the

appeal to the High Court by the State 1st plaintiff at all

competent, entitlement as a ’party aggrieved’ being absent,

having regard to the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Aboli-

tion and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) (for

short, the Act) ?; and (b) Is it sound to conceptualise

’area appurtenant to buildings’ in s. 9 of the Act so nar-

rowly as has been’ done by the High Court ? There were two

plaintiffs--the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Gaon Sabha of

Bedpura claiming common but alternative reliefs. The suit

was for injunction or ejectment, on title, of the sole

defendant who was the quondam zamindar of the ’estate’ which

is the ’subject matter of the suit. The trial Court dis-

missed the suit whereupon the 2nd plaintiff dropped out of

the litigation, as it were, and the State alone pursued the

matter by way of appeal against the decree. The High Court

partially allowed the appeal and the aggrieved defendant is

the appellant before us.

An expose of the facts may now be given to the extent

necessary for explaining the setting of the contention

between the parties. The State of Uttar Pradesh extin-

guished all zamindari estates by the Act and implemented a

scheme of settlement of lands with intermediaries, tenants

and others by first vesting all estates in the State and

empowering it to vest, divest and re-vest flora time to time

according to flexible needs and ad hoc requirements, the

same estate’s in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities.

Settlement of trees, buildings and other specified items in

the intermediaries was also part of the agrarian reform. A

skeletal picture of the legislation may now be projected.

But, before that, a short sketch of the actual dispute may

illumine the further discussion.

The suit lands were part of an estate owned and.pos-

sessed by the defendant-zamindarini. The statutory conse-

quence of the abolition of all zamindaris by force of s. 4

is spelt out in s. 6, to wit, the

1075

cesser of the ownership of the zamindar and vesting of title

and possession in the State. By a notification under s.

117(1) of the Act the area of lands was vested by the State

in the 2nd plaintiff Gaon Sabha. The legislative nullifica-

tion notwithstanding, the defendant who had been conducting

a lucrative bi-weekly cattle fair, the best in the district,

persisted in this profitable adventure strengthened by s. 9

of the Act which settles in the intermediary all buildings

and area appurtenant thereto. This resulted in possessory

disputes between the Gaon Sabha and the defendant--proceed-

ings under s. 145 upholding the latter’s possession and the

present suit for declaration of title and consequential

injunction or ejectment.

The estate, which is the site of the rural cattle mar-

ket, has a large number of trees on it, a temple in one

plot, a (veterinary) clinic in another and quite a number of

cattle stands and other auxiliary structures which are

facilities for the bovine display and transaction of

business. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act,

the defendant successfully claimed before the High Court

that the trees and the two plots with the shrine and the

oushadhalaya should be deemed to have been settled with her.

Her ambitious demand, based on some provisions which we will

presently X-ray more carefully, was that the entire estate

with all the buildings thereon was enjoyed as a unum quid

and th.e vacant lands were as much necessary for the mean-

ingful running of the cattle fair as the structures them-

selves. To dissect and detach the buildings from the vacant

spaces was to destroy the functional wholeness of the serv-

ice rendered. In short, the large intervening areas sur-

rounding the chabutras and other edifices were essential

adjuncts or appurtenant lands which, together in their

original entirety, should be settled under s. 9 of the Act

with the erstwhile intermediary viz., the defendant. The

High Court declined to go the whole hog with the defendant

but granted the plea to the limited degree of giving all the

structures and a space of 5 yards running round each ’build-

ing’. In the view of the Court hats, bazars, and melas

could not be held by a private owner under the scheme of the

Act and reliance on the conduct of the cattle market as an

indicator of ’appurtenant’ area was, therefore, impermissi-

ble. The suit was decreed pro tanto.

The Gaon Sabha, when defeated in the trial Court,

discreetly stepped out of the risks of an appeal but the

Government, first plaintiff, claiming to be gravely ag-

grieved, challenged the dismissal of the suit and was faced

with the plea that the land having vested in the Gaon Sabha,

on the issue of the notification under s. 117 (1 ) of the

Act, .the State had no surviving interest in the property

and, therefore, forfeited the position of a person ag-

grieved, who alone could competently appeal against a de-

cree. This contention, negatived by the High Court. has

been reiterated before us with resourceful embellishments

and that, logically, is the first question of law falling

for our decision and is the piece de resistance, if we may

say so, in this appeal. If the 1st plaintiff’s entire

interests, by subsequent plenary vesting in the 2nd plain-

tiff, have perished, the former cannot, as of right, appeal

under s. 96 C.P.C. Survival after death is unknown to

1076

real property law and suits, without at least apprehended

injury, are beyond the ken of the procedural law. To put it

in a nutshell, has the State current interest in the estate,

sufficient to sustain an appeal ?

The anatomy of the Act, so far as this dispute is con-

cerned, needs to be’ set out and alongside thereof, the

exercises in statutory construction necessary to resolve the

two legal disputes. The Act had for its primary object, as

testified by its Preamble, the extinction of intermediary

rights viz., zamindaris and the like. The goal of the

legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial

choice of meanings of words of ambiguous import or plurality

of significations is made. Section 4 is the foundational

provision, the very title deed of the State; and it runs, to

read:

"s. 4. Vesting of estates in the State.--

(1 ) As soon as may be after the commence-

ment of this Act, the State Government may, by

notification, declare that, as from a date to

be specified, all estate situate in the Uttar

Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from

the beginning of the date so specified (herin-

after called the date of vesting), all such

estates shall stand transferred to and vest

except as hereinafter provided, in the State

free from all encumbrances.

(2) It shall be lawful for the State

Government, if it so considers necessary, to

issue, from time to time, the notification

referred to in sub-section (1) in respect only

of such area or areas as may be specified and

all the provisions of sub-section (1), shall

be applicable to. and in the case of every

such notification."

Section 6 sets out the legal consequences of such vesting

more specifically. We may extract the provision:

"6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate

in the State.--

When the notification under section 4 has

been published in the Gazette then, notwith-

standing anything contained in any contract or

document or in any other law for the time

being in force and save as otherwise provided

in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter

set forth shall, from the begining of the date

of vesting, ensue in the area to which the

notification relates, namely--

(a) all rights, title and interest of all the

intermediaries--

(i) in every estate in such area including

land (cultivable or barren), grove-land,

forests whether within or outside village

boundaries, trees (other than trees in village

abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks,

ponds, water-channels, fernes, pathways, abadi

sites, hats, bazars and meals other than

hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which

clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of

Section 18 apply, and

1077

(ii) in all sub-soil in such estates

including rights, if any in mines and miner-

als, whether being worked or not;

shall ’cease and be vested in the State of

Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances;

* * * *

Reading the two sister sections together, certain clear

conclusions emerge. Emphatically, three things happened on

the coming into force of the Act. By virtue of s. 4 the

right, title and interest of all intermediaries in every

estate, including hats, bazars and melas, stood terminated.

Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came to be vested

in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the

vesting being absolute. ’Thirdly, one and only one species

of property in hats, bazars and melas was expressly excluded

from the total vesting of estates in the State, viz., such

as had been held on lands to which s. 18(1)(a) to (c) ap-

plied. Section 9, at this stage, needs to be read since it

is geared to the nationalisation of zamindaris by providing

for settlement, under the State, of some kind’s of landed

interests in existing owners or occupiers. Section 9

states:

"Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings

to be settled with the existing owners or

occupiers thereof--

All wells, trees in abadi, and all build-

ings situate within the limits of an estate,

belonging to or held by an intermediary or

tenant or other person, whether residing in

the village or not, shall continue to belong

to. or be held by such intermediary, tenant or

persons, as the case may be,, and the site, of

the wells or the buildings which are appurte-

nant thereto: shall be. deemed to. be settled

with him by the State Government on such terms

and conditions as may be prescribed"

A close-up of this section is called for since the basic

plank of the defendant’s case is the claim to the whole set

of plots as building and appurtenant area of land statutori-

ly settled with her. If she is such a settlee, the substan-

tive merit of the plaintiff’s title fails. We will

examine this aspect after a survey of the sections relevant

to the locus standi of the State is done.

So we shift to Chapter VII which relates to Gaon Sabhas

vesting by the State of resumed estates in them and the

limitations and other conditions to which it is subject.

Attributed legal personality by s.3, the Gaon Sabhas are

bodies corporate which, under the various provisions of

Chapter VII, have been invested with legal viability right

to own and hold property, to transfer and otherwise deal

with movables and immovables and manage their landed assets

through the executive agency of Land Management Com-

mittees. This comprehensive ’proprietary personality of the

Sabha is indisputable but unhelpful for our purpose.

1078

The controversy before us comes into focus when we read s.

117 (1), (2) and (6), all the limbs being taken as belong-

ing to a legally living corporate body. Section 117, cls.

(1) and (2), provide:

"117. Vesting of certain lands etc., in

Gaon Shabhas and other local authorities.--

(1 ) At any time after the publication of

the notification referred to in Section 4, the

State Government may, by general or special

order to be published in the manner pre-

scribed, declare that as from a date to be

specified in this behalf, all or any of the

following things, namely--

* * * * *

(v) hats, bazars and melas except hats,

bazars, and melas held on land to which, the

provisions of clauses (a) to (c) of sub-sec-

tion (1) of section 18 apply or on sites and

areas referred to in section 9, and

* * * * *

which had vested in the State under this Act shall vest in

the Gaon Sabhas or and other local authority established

t.or the whole or part of the village in which the said

things are situate, or partly in one such local authority

(including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another:

Provided that it shall be lawful for the State Govern-

ment to make the declaration aforesaid subject to such

exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notifi-

cation.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in

this Act or in any other law’ for the time

being in force, the State Government may, by

general or special order to be published in

the manner prescribed in the Gazette, declare

that as from a date to be specified in this

behalf, all or any of the things specified in

clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (1) which

alter their vesting in the State under this

Act had been vested in a Gaon Sabha or any

other local authority, either under this Act

or under section 126 of the Uttar Pradesh

Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 (U.P. Act II

of 1959) shall vest in any other .local au-

thority (including a Gaon Sabha) established

for the whole or part of the village in which

the said things are situated."

Section 117(6) injects a precarious does into the system of

estates vested in Gaon Sabhas by sub-s.(1) and goes on to

state:

"117(6). The State Government may, at

any time, by general or special order to

be published in the manner prescribed, amend

or cancel any declaration or notification made

in respect of any of the things aforesaid.’

whether

1079

generally or in the case of any Gaon Sabha or

other local authority, and resume such thing

and whenever the State Government so resumes

any such thing, the Gaon Sabha or other. local

authority, as the case may be, shall be enti-

tled to receive and be paid compensation on

account only of the development, if any,

effected by it in. or over that thing:

Provided that the State Government may,

after such resumption, make a fresh declara-

tion under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)

vesting the thing resumed in the same or any

other local authority (including a Gaon

Sabha) and the provisions of sub-sections (3),

(4) and (5) as the case may be, shall mutatis

mutandis, apply to such declaration.

* * * * *

Before moving further, we may glance at a group of

sections which have more than peripheral impact on the legal

equation between Government and Sabha visa vis estates

vested in the latter by the former. Section 119 carves out

a power for the State Government to take away hats, bazars

and melas vested in a Gaon Sabha and transfer them to a

zilla parishad or other authority. Sections 122A and 122B

create and regulate the Land Management Committee which is

to administer the estates vested in the Sabha and s. 126,

quite importantly, gives the power to the State Government

to issue orders and directions to the Management Committee.

Pausing here for an instant, let us look back on the

status of the State which, through its Executive branch,

vests a resumed estate in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at

any time, and without conditions or even compensation (save

for actual developmental work done), to divest the land so

vested and make it over to another like local authority.

In such a situation where the State remains the legal

master with absolute powers of disposition over the land

vested pro tempore in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be

postulated that it has no legal interest in the preservation

of that over which it has continuous power of operation,

creation and deprivation? Government, despite vesting

estates in Gaon Sabhas on the wholesome political princi-

ple of decentralisation and local self-government, has and

continues to have a constant hold on these estates, may be

like a brooding omnipotence descending, when it chooses, to

take away what it had given possession of to a Sabha. This

is plainly present legal interest in Government and a sort

of precarium tenans in the Sabha, notwithstanding the illu-

sory expression ’vesting’ which may mislead one into the

impression that an absolute and permanent ownership has

been created.

An overview of these legal prescriptions, makes one

sceptical about the statutory ideology of autonomous village

self-government since, so far as estates are concerned,

these Sabhas have been handcuffed and thrown at the mercy or

mood of the State Government. The pragmatics of the Act has

reduced Gaon Sabhas to obedient

1080

holders, for the nonce, of the limited bounty of estates

vested in them --a formal, fickle, homage to Art. 40 of the

Constitution!

Shri Shanti Bhushan did draw our attention to certain

cousin statutes and other ’remotely related provisions but

the soul of his submission does not suffer by their omission

in the discussion. We pass on to the spinal issues agitat-

ed before us.

Locus standi

The estates first vest in the State. The fulfilment of

the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the corner-

stone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical

language used, especially ’free from all encumbrances’,

leave no doubt in our minds, nor was it disputed before us,

that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the

scheme of abolition. The consequence of vesting articulated

by s. 6 only underscore this conclusion.

What next ensues. when the State Government, acting

under s.117(1), notifies a further vesting in a Gaon Sabha

is the cardinal question. Does the State retain a residu-

ary legal interest, sufficient to make it a ’person ag-

grieved’, competent to challenge in appeal an adverse de-

cree? And can the State canvas for the position that a

proprietary right persists in it albeit its act of vesting

the same estate earlier in a local authority? Does the key

word ’vest’ connote and denote divergent things in the same

section and Act visa vis Government and the Gaon Sabha? Had

drafting skills been better, this unlovely ambiguity could

have been avoided. But courts have no choice but to take

the text as it is. Zeroing in on the relevant provisions,

we are inclined to concur with the High Court. With certi-

tude one may assert that the State has that minimal interest

to follow the proprietary fortunes of the estate so as to.

entitle it to. take legal action to interdict its getting

into alien hands.

The legislative project and the legal engineering visua-

lised by the Act are clear and the semantics of the words

used in the provisions must bend, if they can, to subserve

them. To be literal or be blinkered by some rigid canon of

construction may be to miss the life of the law itself.

Strength may be derived for this interpretative stand from

the observation in a recent judgment of this Court(1)

"A word can have many meanings. To find out

the exact connotation of a word in a statute,

we must look to the context in which it is

used. The context would quite often provide

the key to meaning of the word and the sense

it’ should carry. Its setting would give

colour to it and provide a cue to the inten-

tion of the legislature in using it. A word,

as said by Holmes, is not a crystal, trans-

parent and unchanged; it is the skin of a

living thought and may vary greatly in colour

and content according to the circumstances and

the time in which it is used."

(1) Thiru Manickaru & Co. v. The State of Tamil Nadu.

[1977] 1 S.C.R. 950.

1081

In the instant case the Act contemplates taking over of all

zamindari rights as part of land reform. However, instead

of centralising management of all estates at State level,

to stimulate local self-government, the Act gives an ena-

bling power--not obligatory duty--to make over these estates

to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are in their hands,

will look after them through management committees which

will be under the statutory control of Government under

s.126. Apart from management, no. power is expressly vested

in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely. The

fact that as a body corporate it can own and sell property

does not mean that the estates vested in a Sabha can be

finally sold away, in the teeth of the provisions striking a

contrary note. For, under s.117(6), if, for any reasons of

better management or other, the State (Government is but the

operational arm of the State and cannot, as contended, be

delinked as a separate entity, in this context) the. State

thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declara-

tion or notification, it can totally deprive the Sabha of,

and resume from it, any estate. This plenary power to

emasculate or extinguish the Sabha’s right to the estate is

tell-tale. True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the

vesting is not an incident of the estate created but is

provided for by the Act itself. Even so, we have to envi-

sion, in terms of realty law, what are the nature and inci-

dents of the interest vested in the Sabha--full ownership

divestible under no circumstances or partial estate with the

paramount interest still surviving in praesenti in the State

?

It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions

to reach a solution which will be least incongruous with

legal rights we are cognisant of in current jurisprudence.

Novelty is not a favoured child of the law. So it is right

to fix the estate created by s.117 into familiar moulds if

any. Such an approach lends to the position that the

vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the

Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to

divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of

’vesting’ in two different senses in the same section, sound

? Yes. It is, because ’vesting’ is a word of slippery

import and has many meanings. The context controls the

text and the purpose and scheme Project the particular

semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even

definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by con-

textual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests

that in s.117(1) of the Act "vested in the State’ carries a

plenary connotation, while ’shall vest in the Gaon Sabha’

imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to

full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexico-

graphic support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Black’s

Law Die-

1082

tionary gives as the sense of ’to vest as ’to give an imme-

diate fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe

with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an

estate, to give seisin’. Webster’s III International Dic-

tionary gives the meaning as ’to give to a person a legally

fixed immediate right of present or furture enjoyment’.

The High Court has sought some Engilsh judicial

backing(1) for taking liberties with strict and pedantic

construction. A ruling of this Court(2) has been aptly

pressed into service.

There is thus authority for the position that the ex-

pression ’vest’ is of fluid or flexible content and can if

the context so dictates, bear the limited sense of being in

possession and enjoyment. Indeed, to postulate vesting of

absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declara-

tion under s.117(1) of the Act is to stultify s.117(6). Not

that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what

has been completely vested but that an explanation of the

term ’vesting’ which will rationalise and integrate the

initial vesting and the subsequent resumption is prefera-

ble, more plausible and better fulfils the purpose of the

Act. We hold that the State has title to sustain he action

in ejectment.

Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view

that the 1st plaintiff is a person I aggrieved and has the

competence to carry an appeal against the dismissal of the

suit. Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has

been or is threatened to be violated, is surely an ’ag-

grieved person’. A legal injury creates a remedial right

in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a

larger circle of persons can move the court for the protec-

tion of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward

off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they

are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause

of action. The nexus between the lis and the plaintiff

need not necessarily be personal although it has to be more

than a wayfarer’s allergy to an unpalatable episode. ’A

person aggrieved’ is an expression which has expanded

with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our

times. Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to

respond to societal changes and challenges:

"Law necessarily has to carry within it the

impress of the past traditions, the capacity

to respond to the needs of the present and

enough resilience to cope with the demands of

the future. A code of law, especially in the

social fields, is not a document for fastid-

ious dialectics; properly drafted and rightly

implemented it can be the means of the order-

ing of the life of a people."(3)

(1) Richardson v. Robertson (1862) 6 L-R 75; & .Hiride

v. Chorlton (1866) 2 CP 104, 116.

(2) Fruit & Vegetable Merchant’s Union v. The Delhi

Improvement Dust, AIR 1957 SC 344.

(3) Address by--Khanna 1. at the Birth Centenary of Sir

Tej Bahadur Sapru d/16-10-76 at Allahabad.

1083

The classical concept of a ’person aggrieved’ is delin-

eated in Re : Sidebotham ex p. Sidebotham (1880 14 Ch.D.

258). But the amplitude of ’legal grievance’ has broadened

with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activ-

ities whose beneficiaries may be the general community even

though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in

the community. The State starts welfare projects whose

effective implementation may call for collective action from

the protected group. or any member of them. New movements

like consumerism, new people’s organs like harijan or mahila

samajams or labour unions, new protective institutions like

legal aid societies operate on the socio-legal plane, not to

beat ’their golden wings in the void’ but to intervene on

behalf of the weaker classes. Such burgeoning of collec-

tive social action has, in turn, generated gradual processu-

al adaptations. Test suits, class actions and representa-

tive litigation are the beginning and the horizon is ex-

pending, with persons and organisations not personally

injured but vicariously concerned being entitled to. invoke

the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of actual or

imminent wrongs.

In this wider perspective, who is a ’person aggrieved ’?

Dhabolkar (1974 1 SCR 306) gives the updated answer:

"The test is whether the words ’person ag-

grieved’ include a person who has a

genuine grievance because an order has been

made which prejudicially affects his inter-

ests’."

(p. 315)

"American jurisprudence has recognised, far

instance, the expanding importance of consumer

protection in the economic system and permit-

ted consumer organisations to. initiate or

intervene in actions, although by the narrow

rule of ’locus standi’, such a course could

not have been justified (see p. 807--New York

University Law Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In

fact, citizen organisations have recently been

compaigning for using legal actions for pro-

tection of community interest, broadening the

scope of ’standing’ in legal proceedings (see

p. 403--Boston University Law Review, Vol.51.

1971).

In the well-known case of Attorney-General of

the Gambia v. Peirra Sarr N. ’Jie 1961 A.C.

617), Lord Denning observed about the Attor-

ney-General’s standing thus:

" .... The words ’person aggrieved’ are of

wide import and should not be subjected to a

restrictive interpretation. They do not in-

clude, of course, a mere busy body who is

interfering in things which do not concern

him; but they do include a person who has a

genuine grievance because an order has been

made which prejudicially affects his

interests." (p. 324-325)

Where a wrong against community interest is done, ’no

locus standi’ will not always be a plea to non-suit an

interested-public body chasing the wrong-doff in court. In

the case before us, Govern-

1084

ment, in the spacious sense of ’person aggrieved’ is

comfortably placed. Its, right of resumption from the Gaon

Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest, will be

seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of

a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested

in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by

the State through directions to the Land Management Commit-

tee and is liable to be divested without ado any time.

The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decen-

tralised vesting of estates in local self-governing units

will be frustrated, if the State, the watchdog of the whole

project, is to be a helpless. spectator of its purposeful

bounty being wasted or lost. It must act, out of fidelity

to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to sal-

vage public property for public use. Long argument is

otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a situation of

peril and, after all, the star of processual actions pro

bono publico has to be on the. ascendant in a society where

supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic

rule of law is to fulfil itself. ’Locus standi’ has a

larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted,

individualistic jurisprudence of old. The legal dogmas of

the quiet past are no longer adequate to. assail the social

injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in

the present case, is entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

The second, and from a practical point of view equally

potent ground of defence, is that ’appurtenant’ space

envelops the whole area around the buildings and the suit

for recovery of possession deserves to be dismised in toto.

Let us examine this submission.

Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to settle

(indeed, it is deemed to be settled) with the intermediary

certain items in the estate. That provision has been set

out earlier. The short enquiry is whether the entire land

is ’appurtenant’ to the buildings. The contention of the

defendant flows along these lines. The structures accepted

by the High Court as ’buildings’ within the scope of s. 9

were part of a cattle fair complex. Even the mandir and

the oushadalya fitted in to the hat total and the integrity

of the whole could not be broken up without violating the

long years of common enjoyment. It would also be, a double

injury: (a) to the defendant; and (b) to the community. The

hat or mela could not be held by the defendant if the land

were snatched away and the Government could do. nothing on a

land without the buildings belonging to the defendant.

Maybe there is some sociological substance in the: presenta-

tion but the broader purpose of the’ section cannot be

sacrificed to the marginal cases .like the. present. The

larger objective is to settle with the former intermediary

only. such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings,

all the rest going to the State for implementation of the

agrarian reform policy.

The key to the solution of the dispute lies in ascer-

taining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held

was appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of

its use for the hat. The Solicitor General made a two-

pronged attack on the defendant’s proposition.

1085

Firstly, he argued that hats, bazars and melas were a dis-

tinct interest in the scheme of Indian agrestic life and

agrarian law. This right had been virtually nationalised by

the Act and only the State or the Gaon Sabha. save where s.

18(a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a ’fair. A

ruling by this Court on an analogous subject lends support

to this contention (See State of Bihar v. Dulhin Shanti

Devi: AIR 1967 SC 427 relating to Bihar Land Reforms Act).

The heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need

not detain us further also because of our concurrence with

the second contention of the Solicitor General that the

large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the

terraces, stands and structures. What is integral is not

necesarily appurtenant. A position of subordination,

something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in

appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidi-

ary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment

of the buildings qua buildings? that much of space required

for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by

the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be

necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of

the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in

front of a club house for various games like golf. But all

these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to

the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is

confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real.

"Appurtenance’, in relation to a dwelling, or to a school,

college .... includes all land occupied therewith and used

for the purpose thereof (Words and Phrases Legally

Defined---Butterworths, 2nd edn). "The word ’appurtenances’

has a distinct and definite meaning ....Prima facie it

imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to

the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would,

in truth, pass without being specially mentioned:Ordinarily,

what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for

the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will

be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoy-

ment of the building is alone covered by the expression

’appurtenance’. If some other purpose was being fulfilled

by the building and the lands, it is not possible to contend

that those lands are covered by the expression ’appurte-

nances’. Indeed ’it is settled by the earliest authority,

repeated without contradiction to the latest, that land

cannot be appurtenant to land. The word ’appurtenances’

includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the

land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of

common ...but it does not include lands in addition to that

granted’. (Words and Phrase, supra).

In short, the touchstone of ’appurtenance’ is dependence

of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a

building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an

appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the

clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and

enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space

for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the prin-

cipal subject granted by s. 9, viz., buildings.

This conclustion is inevitable, although the contrary

argument may be ingenious. What the High Court has grant-

ed, viz., 5 yards of

1086

surrounding space, is sound in law although based on

guess-work in fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed but,

in the circumstances, without costs.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

13.385CI/76---GIPF.

INDEX

ACCOMPLICE:

Whether a pointer an accomplice

[See Representation of the People Act.] ...... 525

ACCUSED PLEADED GUILTY

If lesser sentence could be awarded.

Murlidhar Meghraj Loya etc. v.

State of Maharashtra etc. .. 1

ADMISSIONS:

admissibility in evidence

[See Evidence Act] .. 967

ADMINISTRATION OF EVACUEE PROPERTY ACT, 1950--S.40(4) (a)

and rule 22--Scope of, S. 10(2) (n) out of the funds in his

possession meaning of.

Custodian of Evacuee Property v.

Smt. Rabia Bai .. 255

ALTERNATE REMEDY

--Whether a bar to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the

Constitution under Art 226 of the

constitution. .. 64

[See Constitution of India, 1950] ... 64

ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) Electricity Supply

Undertaking(Acquisition) Act (Andhra 15of 1954), Ss.

5(3)(vi), 6(2)(a) (iii) and 10(2)(b)(iii)--Amounts due to

undertaking from consumers prior to vesting in State-If can

be recovered by State from the licence.

Vijayawada Municipal Council v. Andhra Pradesh State Elec-

tricity Board and Anr. .. 846

ANDHRA PRADESH GENERAL SALES TAX ACT, 1957--Excise and

countervailing duty paid by the buyers directly into the

Treasury --Neither the invoice nor books of the assessee

(manufacturer) show the excise duty--Excise duty. If fails

under "any sums charge by the dealer" occurring in the

definition of "turnover".

M/s Mc Dowell & Company Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Office

VII Circle Hyderabad etc.

APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITT OF AN OFFENCE OF CONSUMING

LIQUOR--Mem because the High Court took view that a fur-

ther charge "possession of liquor" she have been framed

setting aside the acquittal without find whether the order

of acquittal erroneous and ordering re-t is bad--Bombay

Prohibition A 1949 (Bern. XXV Sec. 66(1) r/w Sec. 378

Criminal Procedure Code (Act 11 of 1974) 1973.

Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat

ARBITRATION ACT, 1940, Contract between lay parties not be

thwarted by narrow pedal and legalistic interpretatic

Intendment of parties regarding validity of arbitraror’s

appointment, whether material.

Union of India v. M/s D.M. R. &Co ....

ATTESTING WITNESS

[See Succession Act]

BENAMI TRAINSACTION--Pr of Benami nature.

Union of India v. Moksh Buil and Financiers and Ors. ..

BIHAR AND ORISSA EXC ACT, 1951 as amended Amending Acts of

1970 and 1 --Ss. 22 and 29--Power of State

2

to auction exclusive privilege to vend liquor-Nature of

payment received.

Lakhan Lal etc. v. The State of Orissa and

Ors. . .811

BIHAR ELECTRICITY DUTY ACT, 1948 (As amended)

S.3(2)

(e)--Scope of.

Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar and Ors. ..

118

HAR LAND REFORMS ACT, 1950--Ss. 4(a) and 10--Lessee of

nines--If a tenure-holder or intermediary under the Act.

Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. The General Mining

Synidicate (P) Ltd. .. 359

BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946--S. 98(1)(a)--schedule

III item 6(ii)--Scope of -Workmen laid off--Lock out de-

clared later alleging unruly behaviour--Lockout if illegal.

priya Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Maharan Mandal,

Baroda .. 709

BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT, 949 (Bom. XXV) Sec. 66(1)(b).

[See Appeal against acquittal]

.. 872

BOMBAY PROVINCIAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, As applied

in Gujarat (Bom. 59 of 1949), S.284N--Applicability of .5A,

Land Acquirition Act.

Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corpora-

tion of the City of Ahmedabad and

Anr. .. 71

BOMBAY RENT, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES ACT, 1947

Sub. Section 13(1)(B)--Suit for eviction on the grond of

bonafide and personal need of a landlord --Whether right to

sue survives to his heirs--Requirement of firm in which

landlord is a partner whether his requirement--Whether

decree passed in favour of landlord can be disturbed on his

death.

Shantilal Thakordas and Ors. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala

.. 341

2. Sec. 15A--Sec. 5(4A)--Indian Easements Act 1882--Sec.

52-62(c)--Revocation of licence by efflux of time--Presiden-

cy Small Causes Courts Act 1882--Sec.’ 47--Effect of

filing of application for eviction Meaning of licence

under a Subsisting agreement--Interpretation of

statutes--Practice.

D.H. Manjar & Ors. v. Waman Laxman Kudav . .403

BOMBAY VILLAGE PANCHAYAT ACT (BOM. 6 OF 1933)

S.89--’House’ if includes ’building’.

Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchay-

at pimpri Waghere. .. 306

BURDEN OF

--establishing urgency under the . Land Acquisition Act

[See Land Acquisition Act] .. 763

CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICE (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND

APPEAL) Rules, 1965-Scope of--Rules applicable only

when disciplinary proceedings are taken.

Union of India and Anr. v.K.S. Subramanian .. 87

CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956

1. Sec. 2(b) 9--Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957,

Central Government selling foodgrains and fertilisers,

whether a dealer--Profit motive, if relevant--Whether

State carried on business.

Joint Director of Food, Visakapatham v. The State of Andhra

Pradesh. .. 59

3

2. S. 15(b)--Scope of--Assessee bought declared goods

and paid States Sales Tax--Sale by way of inter-state

sale-If entitled to refund of State Sales Tax.

Thiru Manickam and Co. v. The State of

TamilNadu . .950

3. (74 of 1956) S. 8(3)(6) and Central Sales Tax (Regulation

and Turnover) Rules, 1957, r. 13Goods used in the manufac-

ture or processing of goods for sale --Scope of--Fertilizers

used for growing tea plants, if could be included in goods

used in the manufacture of tea for sale.

Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka &

Ors... 755

4. (74 of 1956) S.9(1), proviso-Scope of.

M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. State

of Uttar Pradesh and Ant. .. 25

CHARGE--Fresh charge on appreciation of evidence can be

ordered to be framed by the High Court in exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction--Criminal Procedure Code (Act.

II of 1974), 1973 Secs. 386(a), 464(I) and 462(2)(a).

Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872

CITY OF BANGALORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SERVICES (GENERAL)

CADRE AND RECRUITMENT REGULATIONS 1971, Reg. 3’Absorption of

Senior Health Inspectors by Corporation contrary to provi-

sions in Reg. 3--Effect of.

C. Muniyappa Naidu etc. v. State of Karnataka &

Ors. . .791

CITY OF MYSORE IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1903, Ss. 16, 18 and

33(1)--Relevant date for determining market value for

purposes of compensation, what is.

Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trust

Board, Mysore v.P. Govindan. .. 549

CIVIL SERVICE

1. Powers of relaxation--Whether rules can be made retro-

spectively --Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Serv-

ices Rules 1962--Rule 47--Andhra Pradesh Civil’ Services

(Co-operation Branch)

Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Sri D. Janardhana

Rao and Anr. .. 702

2. Seniority--Irregular recruitment-Regularisation-

Appointments through Public Service Commission--Recruitment

through centralised recruitment scheme.

P.C. Patel and Ors. v. Smt. T.H. Pathak and

Ors. .. 677

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1. S.I 1 Res Judicata, whether invocable in subsequent

stage of same proceedings.

Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. patil .. 320

2. Ss. 79 and 80, suit for compensation against railway

administration whether impleading Union of India as a

party necessary.

State of Kerala v. The General Manager, Southern

Railway Madras. .. 419

3. S.80 Whether applicable to suits filed under s.9(1) of

the (M.P.) Public Trusts Act, 1951.

State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Shri Chartder Kant .. 993

4. S.115--Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with

the Trial Court’s discretionary order, when exercisable.

4

M/s Mechelec Engineers & Manu facturers v. M/s Basic

Equipment Corporation. .. 1060

5. (Act 5 of 1908) Order VI r/w Order, XIV, rule

1(5)--Courts should not allow parties to go to trial in the

absence of proper pleadings.

Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal .. 979

6. (Act v of 1908) Order V], Rule 17.

[See Pleadings] .. 728

7. Act V of 1908-- Section 11 Principle of res

judicata--Applicability when gratuity was awarded in a

previous proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act i.n the

teeth of the clear provision of Rule 8.01--Scope of Rule

8.01.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Hyderabad

v. Venkateswara Rao etc. ..... 248

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1908

1. Whether Magistrate has jurisdiction to recall dismissal

order made u/s 203--Application for recalling dismissal

order, whether amounts to fresh complaint.

Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh .. 125

2. S.99 A--Scope of --Whether ’Statement of grounds’ a

mandatory provision.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav ..616

3. (Act 2 of 1974)Ss. 235 and 465 Scope of.

Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab

..229

4. (Act II of 1974), 1973 S. 378. [See Appeal against ac-

quittal] .. 872

5. (Act 2 of 1974)--S.494 Prosecution applying for with-

drawal of prosecution--Principles to be considered by

Court in granting consent.

State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapalra & Ors. .. 335

COMPULSORY RETIREMENT--

Compulsory retirement made in public interest under the

Government of lndia Decision No. 23 dated 30th November

1962 below Fundamental Rule 56 (later substituted as a

new rule FR 56(i)--Mere reference to a non-subsisting

rule does not invalidate the order when retirement is in

public interest and bona fide.

Mayconghoan Rahamohan ,Singh v. The Chief

Commissioner(Administration) Manipur and Ors. ..1022

2. [see Constitution of India] ..128

CONDONATION OF DELAY

--in applying for renewal of stage permits under the Motor

Vehicles Act.

[See Motor Vehicles Act] .. 503

CONDUCT OF ELECTION RULES 1961, rr. 42 and 56(6)-.

Tendered ballot paper, what is and use of.

Dr. Wilfred D’Souza v. Francis Menino Jesus Ferrao .. 942

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. Art. 14---Combines Seniority Scheme introduced by the

Reserve Bank of India to equalise opportunities of confirma-

tion and pro-motion of Clerks--Some Clerks affected ad-

versely by unforseen circumstances--if violative of equal

opportunity clause--Right of State to integrate Cadres and

lay down principles of seniority..

Reserve Bank of India & Ors. v.N. C. Paliwal &

Ors. .. 377

5

2. Arts. 14, 16--Civil Service---Seniority--Direct Re-

cruits and promotees--Quota--Whether roster implicit--Bene-

fit of service-Words and Phrases "As far as

practicable."

N.K. Chauhan and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. .. 1037

3. Art. 15(4)--Reservation of seats for socially and educa-

tionally backward classes in educational

institutions--Annual family income test---if valid.

Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. The State of Kerala and

Anr. .. 194

4. Art. 19(6)(ii) and 269(g):

[See Central Sales Tax Act] .. 59

5. Art. 3IA(1) Second Proviso-Art. 31(b)--Meaning of right

conferred--9th Schedule-Whether different ceiling can

be imposed for different persons-Whether second proviso

to Art. 31(A)(1) imposed a feter on the legislative

competence --Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act

1961 (Gujarat Act 27 of 1961)--Section 2 (21), 6.

Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat &

Ors. .. 103

6. Art. 131--Disputes between State and Union --Jurisdic-

tion of High Court--Charge of Excise Duty-- Condition of-

Whether an article manufactured or produced before the

levy is imposed is excisable.

Union of India v. State of Mysore .. 842

7. Art.-- 136 Practice and Procedure-Whether a Court of

Criminal Appeal--Whether can interfere with concurrent

findings of fact--Interference when grave and substantial

injustice.

Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab . .280

8. Art. 226--High Court--if could interefere with the

Appellate orders of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under

Art. 226.

Income Tax Officer, Lucknow v. M/s S.B. Singbar Singh and

Sons and Anr. . .214

9. Art. 226--When alternative remedies available,

whether writ petition maintainable.

G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and

Ors. .. 64

10. Art. 226, whether concurrent findings of facts by the

Revenue Authorities, can be reopened in writ petition.

Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. Patil .. 32

11. Art. 235--Disciplinary action over subordinate

judiciary-Governor--If bound by the recommendation of the

High Court--Consultation with State Public Service Commis-

sion-If warranted by Art. 235.

Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High

Court and Ors. ..425

12. Art. 288(2)--Scope of.

Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar and Ors. ..

118

13. Arts. 309, 310 and 311---Scope of Art. 310 Visa Vis

Arts. 309 and 311.

Union of India and Anr. v. K. S. Subramanian .. 87

14. Art. 311--Termination of services of temporary

servant-Protection of Article when applicable.

State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi .. 462

15. Art. 311(2), violation of --Penalty of compulsory

retirement-Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification, Control

and Appeal Rules,) reasonable opportunity of defence at the

stages of enquiry and punishment--

6

Consideration of extraneous matters in recommendation of

penalty by High Court Chief Justice, whether valid.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.N. Nizamuddin Ali Khan ..

128

CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT (ACT NO. 70 OF 1971) Ss. 2(b) 10 and

12(1) read with Article 215, Constitution of India-

Remitting the punishment awarded after accepting the apolo-

gy, tendered by the contemnor and ordering him to pay the

cost of paper books, whether valid-Whether endorsing to

the Registrar a copy of the wireless message, addressed to

the State Counsel for information only amounts to contempt.

Arun Kshetrapal v. Registrar, High Court, Jabalpur &

Anr... 98

2. 1971, S.19(1)(b)--Finding of committal of contempt is

basis of acceptance of apology--Judge exposing himself to

public controversy cannot shelter behind his office.

Ram Pratap Sharma and Ors. v. Daya Nand and

Ors. . .242

CONTRACT OF SALE OF GOODS

--Whether interstate or intra state Sale.

[See sale] .. 631

CORRUPT PRACTICE:

[See Election] . .490

COSTS:

tax matters when there is conflict among High Courts.

[See Practice] .. 9

CUSTOMS ACT, 1962, Ss. 28, 131(1)(3) and (5):

[See Limitation] . .983

DEALER:

----Whether Central Government selling foodgrains and ferti-

lizers a dealer.

[See Central Sales Tax Act, 1956] . .59

DELEGATION OF POWERS TO OFFICERS for execution of contracts

under s.122(1) of Jammu & Kashmir Constitution-- Contracts

containing arbitration clause validity executed on behalf of

the Government cannot be questioned on the plea of violation

of s. 122(1.).

Timber Kashmir (P) Ltd. etc. v. Conservator of Forests,

Jammu and Ors. .. 937

DEVELOPMENT REBATE

--Whether dividend when withdrawn.

[See Income Tax Act] .. 638

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT (CLASS II

POSTS) RECRUITMENT (AMENDMENT) RULES, --1974, Rule 2, inter-

pretation of --whether officer on special duty in the same

grade as Development Officers.

S. Ramaswamy v. Union of India and Ors. .. 221

DISCIPLINARY ACTION :

---Over subordinate judiciary by High Court.

[See Constitution of India] . .425

DISMISSAL ORDER, recall of

[See Code of Criminal Procedure]

.. 125

DOCTRINE OF WAIVER--Bar of waiver, whether applicable to

later grievance against ’bias.’

G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and

Ors. . .64

ELECTION--Representation of the People Act, 1951--Sec.

123(2)--Sec. 100(1)(b)--Corrupt practice --Undue influ-

ence--Conduct of Election Rules 1961--Rules 39(2) --Ballot

paper containing mark on the reverse of the symbol--

7

Can be rejected as invalid-Charge of Corrupt practice--If

of quasi criminal nature--Degree of proof----Interference

with appreciation of evidence by High Court --Whether elec-

tion result can be lightly interfered with.

M. Narayana Rao v.G. Venkata Reddy & Ors. ..490

ELECTRICITY ACT 1910 Section 22B--Electricity Supply Act.

1948--Sections 18, 49 and 79(j) --Whether section 49

invalid for excessive delegation--Whether Electricity Board

can reduce the quota of consumption if the State Government

has done so--Board having determined the quota, whether

can further reduce it-Whether Board can fix the quota with-

out framing regulations--Practice and Procedure--Whether

appellant can be allowed to raise a new question of facts

for the first time.

Adoni Cotton Mills etc. etc. v. The Andhra Pradesh State

Electricity Board and Ors. . .133

EMPLOYEES’ STATE INSURANCE ACT, 1948--Sec. 61--If debars

grant of sick leave--If the Act deals with all aspects of

sickness.

The Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. Baroda and Ors. v. The

Workmen and Ors. .. 80

ESCAPED ASSESSMENT

[See Income Tax ] .. 207

ESTATE DUTY ACT (34 of 1953)

1. Ss. 2(15), 9 and 27--Scope of.

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam-

lal . .9

2. S.5--Land covered with wild. and natural forest

growths--of agricultural land.

Controller of Estate Duty, Kerala v V. Venugopala Verma

Rajah .. 346

3. S.10--Gift of property the deemed to be part of the

State of deceased-doner.

Controller of Estate Duty, Keral v. M/s R.V. Vishwanathan

and Ors. .. 64

EVIDENCE ACT (1 of 1872)

1. Ss. 17 and 33--Evidence of admission--Admissibility.

Union of India v. Moksh Builder and Financiers and

Ors. .. 96

2. S.43 and Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) 0.41 r.

2 Admission of Judgments in land acquisition preceedings

an additional evidence.

The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board

v. H. Narayaniah etc. etc.

3. S.68--Discharge of onusproban by propounder-when execut-

ic of will surrounded by suspicious circumstances.

Seth Beni Chand (since dead) no by 1. rs. v. Smt. Kamla

Kunwar and Ors. .. 57

4. See. 116--Whether tenant cadeny the landlord’s title.

Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannat and Ors.

FINAL LIST, when may be set asid by Court.

Union of India v. Dr. R.D. Nanjia and Ors.

FINDINGS OF FACT

[See Constitution of India] .. 32

FIRST INFORMATION REPORT--delay in lodging.

[See Penal Code] .. 280

FUNDAMENTAL RULE 56(j):

[See Compulsory retirement]

.. 1025

GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 189’ --Section 3(42) Meaning of per-

son--Whether legislatur

8

bound to follow definition in General Clauses Act.

Hasmukhalal Dayabhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.

etc. .. 103

OLD CONTROL RULES, 1963,

whether includes smuggled gold within their ambit.

Triveni Prasad Ramkaran Verma State of Maharashtra .. 519

GRATUITY, entitlement to-whether a former employee of he

Nizam’s State Railway can claim gratuity aS of right in

addition to provident Fund--Government of Hyderabad

Railway establishment Code, 1949, Rule . 01, 8.02, 8.05,

8.12, 8.13, .15, 8.16, 8.17 and 8.19 read with para 17

Chapter VII-interpretation of.

Andhra Pradesh State .Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad

v. Venkateswara .Rao. etc. . .248

GUJARAT MUNICIPALITIES

1963, S. 38 (10)(b)(i) "act as Councillor"--ScoPe

of--President of the Municipality applying or lease of

land--If debarred taking land on lease--General power of

supervision conferred on the President--If resident should

be deemed to have acted within the meaning of 38(1)(b)(i)

when lease was ranted to him by the Chief officer.

Rustamji Nasorvanji Danger v. shri Joram Kunverji Ganatra

and Ors. .. 884

HINDU LAW

If a co-widow can relinquish ght of survivorship--Whether

after relinquishment, a widow an dispose of property by

will.

Rindumati Bai v. Nrarbada’ Prasad . .988

RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT-Hindu temple forming part of a Jain

Institution--When may be treated as a Hindu religious endow-

ment.

Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments

Mysore v. Sri Ratnavaram Heggde (deceased) by 1.

rs. . .889

IDENTIFICATION PARADE:

[See Penal Code] .. 280

INCOME TAX ACT 1922

1. S.2.(4)--When can single and isolated sale be a busi-

ness transaction within the meaning of -Onus probandi on the

Taxation Department--Initial purchase with intention of

advantageous sale--Earning profit on delivery of goods not

necessary.

Dalmia Cement Ltd., v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, New

Delhi. .. 5 54

2. (11 of 1922) Ss. 2 (6A)(e)’and 10(2) (vi-b)-Development

rebate treated as accumulated profits--Withdrawal of

amount by shareholder from Company’s account--if withdrawal

can be treated as dividend since amount withdrawn is within

accumulated profits.

P.K. Badiani v. The Commissioner of Income Tax,

Bombay . .638

3. S.9--Irrevocable rent--If could be deducted from income

from property of only one year-Exemption--If could be given

only once.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow v. Shri Madho Parsad

Jatia. .. 202

4. Sec. 23A(1)--Explanation 2(1) to Sec. 23A(1)--Meaning of

investment Companies, whether restricted to shares stocks

and other securities or used in contradistinction with

manufacturing processing and trading operations--Indian

Companies

9

Act 1913--Sec. 87(f)--Companies Act 1956--Sec. 372(11).

Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v. C.I.T., West Bengal .. 798

5. Ss. 23A and 35(1)--Whether income tax officer has

power under s. 35(1) to rectify an order passed under s.

23A.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur. v. M/s. J.K. Commercial

Corporation Ltd. etc. .. 512

6. Sec. 25A(3)--Claims for partition and disruption of the

Hindu Undivided family disallowed by I.T.O.--Appeal under

the Act filed against the orders of.I.T.O. also dis-

missed--No reference under the Act challenging the Tribu-

nal’s order dismissing the appeal was taken, but subse-

quentiy got a preliminary decree for partition passed by the

civil court during the pendency of the apPeal--Whether t he

Income Tax Authorities are bound by the subsequent parti-

tion decree of the civil court.

Narendra kumar J. Madi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Guja-

rat 11, Ahmedabad .. 112

7. Ss. 34 and 42, Income Tax Act (43 of 1961) s. 147 and

Income Tax Rules, 1922, r. 33 corresponding to r. 10 of 1962

Rules--One 0 f t he met hods mentioned in corresponding to

r. 10 of 1962 Rules--One of the methods mentioned in r.

33 applied for assessment--Higher tax liability if another

method in rule adopted--If a case of income escaping as-

sessment.

Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal- 1, Calcutta v.

Simon Carves Ltd. .. 207

8. S. 5(2)-Non-resident company receiving income outside

India-Income if accrued in India.

84SCI/77

The Performing Right Socio)Ltd. & Anr. v. The Commr.Income

Tax and Ors. .. 1

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES A( 1907--Sec. 2(00)-Meaning of

trenchment--Can termination service by efflux of time cover

by the expression retrenchment

Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The p siding Officer, Labour.

Court Orissa and Ors. .. 6

2. Sec. 36--When legal practioners can appear before the

Tribunal--Whether Secs. 36(1) an 36(2) is controlled by s.

’36(4)

Pradip Port Trust, Pradip Their Workmen .. 5

INTER-STATE SENIORITY

[See State’s Reorganisation Act]

. .82

INTERPRETATION

1. Amendment of a section--could be used to interpret

earlier provision in the Act.

Sone Valley Portland Cem Co. Ltd. v. The General Mini

Syndicate (P) Ltd. .. 3

2. "Refund meaning of--Subsequent amendment of Section If

could. be used to interpr earlier ambiguous provision.

Thiru Manickam & Co. v. Sic of Tamil Nadu .. 9

3. "should" contained in a clause "should" possesses a

post graduate degree and requist experience whether mandato-

ry or directory--"Post-gradual Meaning of.

Smt. Juthika Bhattacharya The State of Madhya prad and

Ors. .. 4

4. Contract-of.

[See Arbitration Act]

INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS--Principles application

10

to interpretation of document-Notifications Nos. F. 9/5/59

R & S published in gazette dt. 17-1-60 u/s 507 of the Delhi

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notifica-

tion GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of

1958) gazetted on 21-4-62 Whether the whole of Mauza

Chowkri Mubarakbad and whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhpura

were meant to be notified.

Jangbirv. Mahavir Prasad Gupta ..670

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

[See Bombay Rents/-Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control

Act, 1947] . .403

Estate Duty Act and other taxing statutes--Principles.

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam-

lal

Expressions not being terms of art whether to be construed

in technical sense or ordinary popular sense as used by

businessmen --Legislative history as guide to

construction--Genesis and development of law as key to

interpretation-Whether English decisions useful guides or

construction of analogous provisions, fundamental

concepts and general principles.

Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v.C.I.T., West Bengal .. 798

Provision in Act substituted by another--Amending provision

avoid- -Effect.

-State of Maharashtra v. The Central Provinces Manganese Ore

Co. Ltd. .. 1002

Rules as an aid--Use of Statement of objects and reasons.

Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat

Pimpri Waghere. .. 306

6. Statute when retrospective.

K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment Co. P. Ltd. ..

1026

7. When a statute could be read retrospectively.

State of Kerala v. philomina etc. & Ors. ..

273

JAMMU & KASHMIR CONSTITUTION, S. 122

[See Delegation of Powers] .. 937

JUDGMENT

S

Admission of judgments in Land Acquisition proceedings.

[See Land Acquisition] .. 178

JURISDICTION

1. --of High Courts to interfere with the trial Court’s

discretionary order.

[See C.P.C.] .. 1061

2. of High Court under Art. 226 to interfere with orders of

the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

[See Constitution of India ] .. 214

KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT, 1961, Ss. 107 and 133’Whether

applicable to land unauthorisedly held after expiry of

lease.

Corporation of the City of Bangalore v.B.T.

Kampanna . .269

KARNATAKA RECRUITMENT OF GAZETTED PROBATIONERS (Class I and

11 Posts appointment by competitive examination) Rules,

1966--R. 9 read with Part IV of Schedule II--Scope

of--Awarding block marks in interview--If violative of the

Rule.

State of Karnataka and Anr. v. M. Farida & Ors. ..

323

KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT

1. 1963 S. 84 Scope of interpretation--When a statute

could be read retrospectively.

11

State of Kerala and Ors. v. Philomina etc. and Ors. .. 273

2. 1964 Secs. 81, 83, 84, 85, 85A and 86--Voluntary trans-

fers made after notified date whether valid.

State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.A. Gangadharan .. 960

3. (Kerala 1 of 1964) as amended in 1969 and 1971, Secs.

3(1), 50A, 52, 73, 108, 125 and 132(3) Scope of.

K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment Co. P. Ltd.

.. 1026

LAND ACQUISITION ACT

1. City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, Ss. 16, 18 and

27--Notification under Ss. 16 and 18 on different

dates--Date for determining market .value for awarding

compensation for acquisition of land.

The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust, Board

v. 11. Narayaniah etc. .. 178

2. Act 1894 Ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of establishing

urgency On whom lies.

Narayan Govind Gayate etc. v. State of Maharashtra ..

763

3. (1 of 1894) s.6A--If mandatory- Effect of non-compliance

in case of beneficial schemes.

Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corpn. of

the City of Ahmedabad and Anr. . .71

LEGAL ENTITY

[See Railways Act, 1890] . .419

LIMITATION

1. for rectification under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948,

S. 22.

[See U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948]

. .25.

2. Period of limitation in respect of suo moto revision by

Central Government to annul or modify

any order of erroneous refund of duty when begins--Customs

Act, 1962, Sec. 28, 131(1)(3)(5) scope of.

Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India &

Ors. . .983

LIMITATION ACT

1. 1963 Ss. 5 and 29(23)-If applicable.

Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal M.P.

and Ors. .. 563

2. 1963, S.I 2(2) whether applicable to revision petitions

filed under section 10, U.P. Sales Tax Act. Time spent in

obtaining second--copy of. impugned order, whether to

be excluded in computing limitation period for filing revi-

sion petitions.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madan Lal and Sons Ba-

reilly. . .683

MADHYA pRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT 1956Sec.

138(b)--Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act Sec.

7---Must rental value under the Municipal Act follow the

standard rent under Accommodation Control Act When premises

let out--When used by owner.

Municipal Corporation, Indore, and Ors. v. Smt. Ratna

Prabha ana Ors. .. 1017

MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951s. 9(1):

[See Code of Civil Procedure]

..993

MADRAS GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1959, Schedule 11, items 7(a

and (b)--If ultra vires.

M/s. Guruviah Naidu and Sons etc v. State of T.N. and Anr.

MINES AND MINERALS (REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 1957--

12

1. State Government reserved certain areas for exploitation

of minerals in public sector--If had the power to do

so.--State Governments--If could reject application of

private persons.

Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and Ors. v. Union Government of

India and Anr .... 372

2. S.30A--Scope of.

State of Bihar and Anr. etc. v. Khas Karampura Collieries

Ltd. etc. .. 157

MINIMUM WAGES ACT 1948, Entry 22 Explanation Part 1 of

Schedule, construction of word includes--Whether ,potteries

Industry includes manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing

tiles.

The South Gujarat .Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Associations

and Ant. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr .. 878

MONOPOLY OF BUS ROUTES-Whether permitting the existing

private operators to operate till the date of expiry of

their permits creates a monopoly.

Sarjoo Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and

Ors. .. 661

MOTOR VEHICLES ACTS 1939

1. S. 43(1)--State Government can direct imposition of

fiscal rates on stage-carriage operators for carrying mails

as condition of permit--Ss. 48(3) and 59(3)(c) such direc-

tions do not interfere with quasi judicial functions of

Regional Transport Authority. Special provisions of s. 48(3)

(XV) do not override general provisions of s. 43(1)(d)(1).

Sree Gajana Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. The State of Karna-

taka and Ors. .. 665

2. Sec. 47--Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951--Rule

108(c)-Whether considerations in Sec.47 for grant of stage

permits to be mentioned in the order.

Ikram Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors.

.. 459

3. S.58(2) proviso--Delay in.applying for renewal of exist-

ing permit --If could be condoned--Chapter IVA--If a self

contained code --Renewal application under s.

68F(ID)--Whether s. 57 applicable.

Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.S. and

Ors. .. 563

4. Sec. 68D--Scope of ’Whether there should be a finding on

each and every separate objection raised.

Sarjoo prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. ..

661

MURDER:

--Distinction between S.299 and 300 I.P.C.

[See Penal Code] .. 601

NECESSARY PARTY:

[See Civil Procedure Code] .. 419

NEW CASE

---Courts’ Whether can make a

[See Partnership Act] .. 583

NEW DELHI HOUSE RENT CONTROL ORDER 1939---C1. Standard rent

of house fixed in 1944--Rateable value enhanced on the basis

of rent received in 1966-Whether rating should be correlated

to actual income.

New Delhi Municipal Committee v.M.N. Soi and

Anr. . .731

NEW PLEA

[See Adoni Cotton Mills v. Andhra Pradesh State Elec-

tricity Board] .. 133

NOLLES PROSEQUE:

--Principle to be followed by court (See Criminal Procedure

Code Act 2 of 1974) . .335

13

OTHER RIGHTS in Explanation 2 to s. 2(15) meaning of.

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam-

lal .. 9

PARTNERSHIP ACT 1932 Sec. 69 --Whether mandatory--Whether

suit can be filed by unregistered firm--Dissolution of

firm--Suit by a ’partner of erstwhile unregistered firm, If

other partners of erstwhile firm necessary parties --Materi-

al alterations in a document-Effect of--Suit for Specific

and ascertained amount-Whether court can make out new

case and grant partial relief on another basis.

Loonkaran Setia etc. v. Ivan E. Johan and Ors.

etc. .. 853

PENAL CODE--S.34--Specific evidence for infliction of fatal

wound not required--Community of intent with participatory

presence fixes constructive liability.

Harshadsingh @ Baba Pahalvansingh Thakura v. The State of

Gujarat .. 626

2. Ss. 299 and 300--Culpable homicide not amounting to

murder and murder--Distinction--Tests to be applied in each

case--S.300 Thirdly I.P.C.--Scope of.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr.

. .601

3. Section 302--Non-examination of eye witnesses--Interest-

ed witnesses--Meaning of--Necessity of examining independent

witnesses --Motive--Delay in lodging F/R and despatch to

Magistrate-Identification parade, necessity of.

Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab .. 280

PLEADINGS

1. Amendments to--Amendment to the pleadings to introduce

an entirely different case, under the guise of permisible

inconsistent pleas which is likely to cause prejudice to

the other side cannot be allowed--Civil Procedure Code

(Act V of 1908)--Order VI Rule 17.

M/s Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. M/s

Ladha Ram and Col . .728

2. Under section 70 of the Contract (Act 9) of 1872--Ingre-

dients necessary to be pleaded.

Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal. .. 979

POSSESSION "Possession" to attract criminal liability

must be "conscious possession".

Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872

POWERS OF OFFICER

to rectify an order passed u/s 23A

[See Income Tax Act] .. 512

POWER TO AUCTION

--exclusive privilege to vend liquor [See Bihar and Orissa

Excise Act. . .811

PRACTICE

1. Costs in tax matters when there is conflict among High

Courts

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujrart v. Shri Kantilal

Trikamalal ...

2. Duty of High Court when there is conflict between deci-

sions the Supreme Court--Upsetting concurrent findings of

fact second appeal-Propriety.

State of U.P . v. Ram Chandrs Trivedi ..

46:

3. Duty of High Court where there, is conflict between the

view expressed by Divisional bench and larger benches of the

Supreme Court.

Union of India and Anr. K.S. Subramanian.

14

4. Non-suiting for want of proper pleadings at the appellate

stage by the Supreme Court when parties went to trial and

issues were raised and the litigation went through the

course of trial and appeal is not desirable.

Union of India v. Sita .Ram Jaiswal .. 979

5. Supreme Court will not entertain a complaint on facts

and interfere with a finding of facts by the appellate Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1. Further plea taken in the affidavit rejoinder to the writ

petition shall not be allowed to be agitate Sarjoo Prasad

Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. .. 861

2. High Court’s duty to give reasons even in cases of sum-

mary dismissal.

Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao Patwardhan ..

411

3. Interference with findings on reliability of evidence

only in exceptional circumstances.

4. Harshadsingh@ Baba pahalvansingh Thakur v. The State ..

626

5. Re-appraisal of evidence by Supreme Court in spite of

concurrent findings of fact, proper when miscarriage of

justice has occurred.

Mohammad Aslam v. State of Uttar Pradesh .. 689

Whether High Court can direct a Minister to be impleaded as

a party and file his personal affidavit.

State of Punjab ana Anr. v. Y.P. Duggal and Ors. .. 96

PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947 Sec. 5(1)(e) and 5(1)(d)

Sec. 5(2) Misappropriating Govt. funds.--Retaining Govt.

Funds by a Govt. Servant--Evidence Act, Sec. 154--When can

witness be declared hostile--Can evidence of a hostile

witness be accepted--Evidence Act Sec.--

105--Onus of proving exceptions in IPC on accused--Degree of

proof--Criminal Trial--Effect of non--examination of materi-

al witness-Conviction on evidence of a solitary

witness--Whether adverse inference can be drawn against

accused for not leading evidence--Onus of prosecution-Pre-

sumption of innocence.

Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of

Orissa . .439

PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1910.

1. S. 16-Proviso--Scope of.

Murlidhar Meghraj etc. v. State of Maharashtra

etc. .. 1

2. sec. 16(1) (a) (2) (1)--2(1) (c) 2(1) (j)--2(1) Preven-

tion of Food Adulteration of Rules.Rules 23, 28 and 29 Can

conviction be based on sole testimony of Food Inspector--Can

an article fail under clause (j) and (i) of Sec. 2(i)--Are

they mutually exclusive or overlapping-When rules are silent

about colouring material can use of dye be punished--Do

provisions of Probation of Offenders Act apply to offences

under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

Prem Ballab and Anr v. The State (Delhi Admn.) .. 592

PRIVITY OF CONTRACT

When a company has severa branches and there is a contract

between the buyer and one of the branches, the contract of

sale is between the company and the buyer.

English Electric Company of India 1Ltd. v. The Deputy

Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631

15

PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958--Applicability to

cases under POFA

[See Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1950] .. 59

PROCEDURE--When a court of appeal can interfere in the

lower court’s Judgment.

Smt. Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors. .. 329

PROMOTIONS--Right to promotion-Whether promotion of class

III employees to Class is governed by "Advance Correction

Slip No. 7)" introducing w.e. f. March, 11, 1973, new rules

324 to 328 and substituting a new rule 301 in Chapter III of

the Indian Railway Establishment Manual Scope and applica-

bility of Rules 301 and 328 (2) (4) and (5)

S.K. Chandan v. Union of India and Ors. .. 785

PROPERTY

right to dispose of by will by a widow

[See Hindu Law] . .988

PROVIDENT FUND--Illegal payment of gratuity in the past will

not affect legal claims to Provident Fund.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyd. v.P.

Venkateswara Rao etc. ..248

PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT (Punjab Act 46 of 1948), S.

11(2) Notice under--Whether should be issued within a par-

ticular period.

The Indian Aluminium Ltd. & Anr. v. The Excise and Taxa-

tion Officer and Anr. . .716

PUNJAB CIVIL SERVICE RULES,

Vol. 1 Rules 2.49 and 3.10 to 3.16--Junior Vernacular

Cadre teachers officiating in senior vernacular cadre enti-

tled to benefit of their substantive post .

State of Punjab and Ors. v, Labh Ram and Ors. .. 832

RAILWAYS ACT, 1890 S. 3(6), Railway Administration, whether

a separate legal entity.

State of Kerala v. The General Manager. S.R. Madras . .419

RAILWAYS ESTABLISHMENT CODE--Para--157--Whether the para-

graph empowers the Railway Board to make rules for the

gazetted Railway servants--Construction of para 157.

S.K. Chandan v. Union of India and Ors.

785

RAILWAY ESTABLISHMENT MANUAL--Whether Rule 328 (2)

providing for the invalidity of promotions made in the

Diesel Locomotive Works from August 1, 1961 to March 11,

1973 casts an obligation on the Railway Board to recall all

promotions and to form a fresh panel--Meaning of "Promotion

made in the Diesel Locomotive Works in Rule 328 (2) and

promotion to the higher grades in Rules 328(4)".

S.K. Chartdan v. Union of India and

Ors. . .785

RATEABLE VALUE

(See New Delhi House Rent Control Order) .. 731

REAPPRAISAL

of Evidence by Supreme Court.

(See Practice and Procedure) ..689

REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY

See Constitution of India .. 128

2. to be heard.

(See State’s Reorganisation Act)

. .827

REHABILITATION ACT, 1954 S. 14(1) (b) "Such cash balances

--Meaning of.

16

Custodian of Evacuee Property, v. Smt. Rabia

Bai . .255

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1950.

Election petition--Not accompanied by impugned pamphlet-If

liable to be rejected--Printer-If could be called an accom-

plice --Failure to send pamphlet to District Magistrate as

required by s. 127 A(2) - If makes the printer an accom-

plice.

Thakur Virendra Singh v . Vimal Kumar .. 525

See. 15, 21, 22, 23"Preparation and revision of electoral

roll--Amendment, transposition or deletion of entries in

electoral roll--Provision of Sec. 23, if mandatory--Repre-

sentation of the People Act, 1951--Every person on elec-

toral roll whether entitled to vote even if name not brought

in accordance with law--Sec. 100(1) See. 123(1)

(A)--Bribery --Proof of--Quasi-criminal in nature--inter-

ference with appreciation of evidence by High Court, Bihar

and Orissa Act, 1922 Sec. 389.

Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha and four

Ors. . .741

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951.

S. 9A--Contract signed as President, Gram Panchayat

Rejection of nomination paper-If valid-- Improper

rejection-If courts could give relief under s. 100(1) (c).

Jugal Kishore Patnaik v. Ratnakar

Mohanty .. 49

Sec. 77 Incurring expenses in excess of what is per-

missible--Interference by this Court with appreciation of

evidence by High Court.

Nangthomban Ibomeha Singh v. Leisanghem Chandramoni Singh

and Ors, .. 573

RES JUDICATA.

(See Civil Procedure Code)..320

RETRENCHMENT

--Meaning of

(See industrial Disputes Act)

.. 586

RETROSPECTIVITY.

service rules.

(See Civil Service) . .702

REVISION

--suo moto limitation for

(See Limitation) .. 983

RIGHT OF MANAGEMENT Hindu Law--Joint Hindu Undivided

family--Whether a junior member of the family can act as

Karta with the consent of all the other members, if the

senior member gives up his right.

Narendra Kurnar J. Modi v. Commissioner of Income Tax

Gujarat 11. Ahmedabad .. 112

RIGHT TO PLEAD

--- by legal Practitioners before the Labour Tribunal.

(See IndustriaI Disputes Act).. 537

RIGHT TO SUE by the heirs (See Bombay Rents Hotel and

Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947) .. 341

RIGHT TO SUE for eviction --by a co-owner.

(See West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,

1956) . .395

SALE--Contract for sale of goods, whether inter-State sale

or intraState sale--Ingredients--Central Sales Tax Act

--Section 3(a).

English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. The Deputy

Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631

SALES REORGANISATION ACT (37 of 1956) s. 115--

Oppertunity to hear after final inter-state seniority list

is prepared

17

after giving opportunity to aggrieved officers to make

representation against provisional list--If should be given.

Union of India v. Dr. R.D. Nanjiah and

Ors. .. 827

SALES TAX --Central Provinces Bear Sales Tax Act, 1947 s.

2(g) Expln. II--Goods within States at the time of contract

of sale, mixed up outside state and the mixture sold ’sale’

if taxable.

State of Maharashtra etc. v. Central Provinces Manganese

Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002

2. Supply of crude oil by Oil and Natural Gas Commission

from Assam to refinery of Indian Oil Corporation in Bihar

--Supply under directions of Government at price fixed, by

Government-If inter-state sale liable to Central Sales Tax.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. State of Bihar and Ors...

364

SECOND APPEAL

1 Disturbance of concurrent finding of fact without consid-

ering the objects of the notification or discussing any

principle of construction of documents which could indicate

that a point of law had really arisen for a decision is

patently exceeding the jurisdiction of the High

Court--Civil Procedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100.

Jangbir v. Mahavir Prasad Gupta .. 670

2. -- Propriety of upsetting concurrent findings in

(See Practice) - .. 462

SENIORITY

1. -- Direct recruits of Promotees.

(See Constitution of India)

..1037

2. When recruitment irregular. (See Civil Service) .. 677

SENIORITY SCHEME

-- Right of State to lay down principles of seniority

(See Constitution of India) .. 377

SENTENCE

Judicial Jurisdiction to soften the sentence in economic

crimes and food offences.

(See Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954) ..

1

SICKNESS BENEFIT

(See Employees’ State Insurance Act,

1948) ..80

SOLE WITNESS

--conviction based on

(See Prevention of Corruption Act) . . .439

SPECIAL RULES 1962--Rule 4.

Government of A.P. and Ors. v. Shri D. Janardhana Rao

Anr. .. 702

SUCCESSION ACT, 1925--Sec. 6" legal will --Genuineness of

Suspicious circumstances--Burden of proof--Degree of proof.

Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur and Ors. .. 925

2. 1975, S. 63 (c), Attesting witness defined.

Seth Beni Chand (Since dead now by 1. rs. v. Smt. Kamh

Kunwar and Ors. .. 578

SUMMARY DISMISSAL

--Court’s duty to give reasons.

(See Practice and Procedure)

. .411

SUSPENDED OFFICER REINSTATED AND LATER COMPULSORILY RETIRED

--Effect of--- If order of suspension merge with order of

reinstatement.

Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High

Court and Ors, ....42

18

SUSPENSION ORDERS

--Whether merges with order of Retirement

(See Suspended Officer) . .425

TERMINATION

-- of services of temporary servants.

(See Constitution of India) .. 462

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (4 of 1882) S. 53A, Indian

Easements Act (5 of/882) s. 60(b) and Indian Contract Act

(9 of 1872) S. 221--Scope of.

Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangs bai Hariharrao Patwardhan ..

411

U.P. INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION ACT, 1921--Whether the

basic section of a college is within the scope of.

Commissioner, Lucknow Division and Ors. v. Kumari Prem Lata

Misra. . . 957

U.P. SALES TAX ACT, 1948

S. 3-A, Notification issued under-Rule for constructing

words--Whether carbon paper is taxable as ’Paper’ Whether

ribbon is accessory or part of typewriter.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s Kores (India) Ltd. ..

837

S. 22 Order of rectification passed within 3 years of

orginal order, but served beyond 3 years--/f barred by

limitation.

M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales ) Ltd. v. State

of U.P. and Anr. .. 25

U.P. ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT,

1950, -- Section 117--

Scope of--State vests lands in Gaon Sabha--Suit for eject-

ment--.Goan Sabha did not appeal-State--If had locus standi.

Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar 5. Pradesh and

Ors. .. 1072

UNION AND STATE DISPUTES

(See Constitution of India) .. 842

VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS

(See Kerala Land Reforms Act)

. .960

WEALTH TAX ACT (27 of 1957)

S.2(e)(i) --Agricultural Lands,

What are--Tests for determining.

Commissioner of Wealth Tax, A.P. v. Officer in charge

(Court of Wards ) Paigah. .. 146

WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956-- Sec. 13(1)

(f)--Whether one of the co-owners can file suit for eviction

without impleading other co-owners-Whether a co-owner,

an-owner for the purpose of an eviction suit--Stage for

raising objection about frame of suit.

Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors. .. 395

WILL

-- genuineness of legal will degree of proof.

(See Succession Act, 1925) .. 925

WORDS AND PHRASES

1. "As far as Practicable"

(See Constitution of India) ....1037

2. "House, if it concludes buildings".

(See Bombay Village Panchayat Act) .. 306

3. "Other rights" in Explanation 2 to S. 2(15) of the

Estates Duty Act, meaning of.

(See "Other rights") .. 9

4. "Out of the funds in his possession" and "such cash

balances". Meaning of

Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Smt. Rabia

Bai . .255

5. -- See "Person" meaning of General Clauses Act) .. 103

19

6. "Post graduate" Meaning of (See

Interpretation) . .477

7. "restoration" in Section 70 of the Contract Act, meaning

of.

union of India v. Sita Barn Jaiswal .. 979

8. "Substituted" meaning of.

State of Maharashtra etc. v. The General Provinces

Manganese Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002

9. -- Vest--Persons aggrieved-Appurtenance meaning of.

Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. .. 1072

WRIT JURISDICTION -- High Court cannot interfere with a

finding .of fact based upon relevant circumstances and when

it is not shown to be perverse--The Constitution of India,

Article 226.

Khazan Singh Ors. v. Hukan Singh and Ors. .. 636

WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT--Scope for interference

with findings of depart. mental authorities.

Mis Khushiram Behari Lal and Co. v. The Assessing Authority

Sangrur Anr. .. 752

M-- 184 SCI/77--2500- -9-8-77--GIPF.

1

1