PETITIONER:
M. MANIKLAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MYSORE
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/11/1976
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1977 AIR 361 1977 SCR (2) 165
1977 SCC (1) 231
ACT
City of Bangalore Improvement Act 1945, Section 15(3),
16(2)-- Rule 10 Notice of acquisition to persons in Revenue
register--Whether person whose land is acquired is entitled
to allotment of plot in housing scheme.
HEADNOTE
The appellant purchased the land in question from Gili-
teppa and Nanjappa during the pendency of the land acquisi-
tion proceedings under the city of Bangalore Improvement Act
1945. The acquisition was for building a house colony by
the Housing Board whose statutory responsibility is to
implement housing schemes. The appellant challenged the
acquisition before the High Court by filing a writ petition.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
In an appeal by special leave the appellant contended :
1. There was non-compliance with the
mandatory requirement of s. 16(2) of the Act
which requires the service of notice on "every
person whose name appears in the Land Revenue
Register as being primarily liable to pay the
property tax or land revenue".
2. Section 15(3)’provides that the main
scheme may provide for the construction of
buildings for the proper and working classes
including the whole or part of such classes to
be displaced in the execution of this scheme.
The appellant whose land is acquired being
displaced is entitled to allotment of land for
construction of a building. for his own
residence.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) The High Court on evidence rightly held that
in the revenue register the names of predecessors in title
of Giliteppa and Nanjappa were shown and that he was given
due notice. The document produced by the appellant was not
the revenue register as contemplated by section 16(2).
[167A-C, F]:’
(2) Section 15(3) does not impose a compulsory duty or a
right in appellant to Claim a plot. It is clear from rule
10 made under the Act that the person displaced by the
acquisition may be accomodated. However, this is a benefi-
cient consideration and not a necessary obligation. [168A-C]
[The Court observed that in case any land is available,
and if the appellant fulfils the other criteria prescribed
by the rules the respondent may consider his claim.]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1948 of
1968’.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st Sept.,
1967 of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 1168/65.
S.V. Gupte with S.S. JavaIi and B. Dutta for the appellant.
N. Nettar and K.R. Nagaraja, for respondents.
166
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. Two short legal issues--both apparently
devoid of merit--were urged unsuccessfully before the High
Court and repeated, with a somewhat similar fate, before us,
ii we may anticipate our conclusion. A Judgment of affirma-
tion may usefully be an abbreviation and so, we shall brief-
ly deal with Shri Gupta’s twin submissions on behalf of the
appellant writ petitioner. The appeal is by special leave
and the subject-matter is land compulsorily acquired under
the City of Bangalore Improvement Act 1945 (for short the
Improvement Act) (Mysore Act V of 1945).
A concise narration of the necessary facts may conven-
iently be compressed into a paragraph or two. The appellant
purchased two portions of S. No. 211 within the District of
Bangalore from two persons Giliteppa and Nanjappa during
the pendency of land acquisition proceedings under the
Improvement Act. These proceedings were for acquisition of
land in S. No. 211 for making a lay-out plan for a building
colony. This limited objective was completed after due
formalities were complied with and thereafter the land was
made over to the Housing Board whose statutory responsibili-
ty is to implement housing schemes. We are told that houses
have been built on the land already although there is some
doubt as to whether 5 acres out of the total extent still
remain vacant. If the contentions of the appellant are
sound the whole scheme will be shot down, a disaster a
socially conscious court should try to avert unless com-
pelled by fundamental legal laws.
What, then, are the alleged vital weaknesses in the
acquisition proceedings which vitiate them altogether ?
Firstly, a technicality technically countered; and secondly,
a compassionate consideration which has no invalidatory
effect.
The appellant has urged before us that Section 16(2) of
the Improvement Act has a mandatory requirement that service
of notices shall be effected on "every person whose name
appears in the ............ in the land revenue register
as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land
revenue assessment on.........land which it is proposed to
acquire in executing the scheme" .......... This perempto-
ry mandate has not been complied with and that is the first
vital flaw pressed before us. The second contention is
based upon Section 15 (3 ) of the Improvement Act whereunder
every improvement scheme "may provide for the construction
of buildings for the accommodation of the poorer and working
classes, including the whole or part of such classes to be
displaced in the execution of the scheme." This provision,
it is argued. clothes the appellant, in his capacity as a
displaced person with a right to allotment of land for
construction of a building for his own residence. We will
presently consider these two submissions seriatim.
To make short work of the first point we may straightway
state that the obligation under section 16(2) is to serve
notices on persons whose names appear in the land revenue
register as being primarily liable to pay the land revenue
assessment. The complaint made is that the predecessors of
the appellant Giliteppa and Nanjappa were.
167
entitled to notice under this provision and ’that they had
not been so given. Of course, there is no affidavit from
these two vendors of the appellant that they have not re-
ceived any notice. Apart from that the burden is on the
appellant to prove that his vendors were persons whose
names were borne on the land revenue register. This is a
question of fact but the moot point debated before the High
Court was what in law was the land revenue register. Cer-
tainly notice has been given to Khatedars. The return of
the respondents states that "notified Khatedars were
notified of the acquisition". Ex. R-I produced alongwith
the return shows one Somayaji as the Khatedar, not the
vendors of the appellant. This disputed point was investi-
gated by the High Court with a thoroughness and intimate
acquaintance with the local revenue laws which elicits our
appreciation. Considering the documentary evidence adduced
and the authoritative revenue laws bearing on the subject
and scanning the meaning of the entries in the extracts
before Court, the learned Judges reached the conclusion that
the Khatta produced by the appellant was "a mere tentative
compilation of information transmitted to the Revenue De-
partment by the Inams Abolition Department" and not "Khetwar
Patrak" which was the land revenue register within the
meaning of section 16(2) of the Improvement Act. The High
Court concluded:
"We are of the opinion ’that the land
revenue register to which section 16(2) refers
is no other than the register of lands the
Khetwar Patrak, and, that register is not the
Khatta which is something very different."
Further, on, after full discussion the Court
crystallized its conclusions thus:
"Even though a person may be an occupant
in the sense in which that word has to be
understood, so long as it is not proved that
his name appears in the land revenue register,
at the material point of time, we should not
pronounce against the validity of the
acquisition or the publication of a
declaration under section 18 on the slender
foundation of insufficient material such as
the certified copy of a tentative Khata which
we have referred."
Indeed, the appellant produced some wrong documents but the
Court was too cute to be misled as is evident from its
observation:
"It emerges from the discussion so far
made that that land revenue register is no
other than the register of lands or the
Khetwar Patrak which has to be maintained in
form No. 1 which is set out in volume 2 of the
Mysore Village Manual at page 8(a), and, we do
not have before us either that register of
lands or a certified copy of it and no
exlplanation has been offered to us as to
why the petitioner did not obtain a copy of
that register or produce it."
After hearing Shri Gupte at some length we are not disposed
to be dislodged from the finding painstakingly recorded by
the High Court. The first point, therefore, fails.
168
The only other point seriously pressed before us by Shri
Gupte is that under section 15(3) there is an obligation on
the part of the Board of Trustees to provide a plot to the
displaced appellant. There is nothing in Section 15(3) of
the Improvement Act which warrants. such a compulsive duty
or creates a right to claim a plot. Of course, the Board
may consider providing some land for the persons from whom
acquisitions have been made. This is a beneficient
consideration, not a necessary obligation. That this is so
clear also from the rules for the allotment of sites. Rule
10 settles the principle for selection of applicants for
allotment of sites. Rule 10(1) reads:
"10. Principles for selection of applicants
for allotment of sites.--(1) The Board shall
consider the case of each applicant on its
merits and shall have regard to the following
principles in making selection and fixing the
priority for allotment :--
(i) applicants whose lands or houses have
been acquired by the Board provided they are
otherwise qualified for allotment;
(ii) the status of the applicant, that is,
whether he is married or single and has
dependent children;
(iii) the income of the applicant and his
capacity to purchase a site and build a house
thereon for his residence;
(iv) the number of years the applicant has
been waiting for allotment of a site and the
fact that he did not secure a site earlier
though he is eligible and had applied for a
site."
The facts before us are that the lands acquired have already
been transferred to the Housing Board and houses have al-
ready been built at least on a substantial part of the land.
All that we can say, at this stage, is that having regard to
the compassionate factor that the appellant’s lands have
been acquired and he has perhaps been displaced from the
entirety of his building sites, it should be a fair gesture-
on the part of the Housing Board if there are vacant lands
still avail able--the order of stay granted by this Court is
strongly suggestive of some land being still available as
not built upon--to consider ’the claim of the appellant, if
he applies within three months from today for allotment of a
site for a house, subject, of course, to his eligibility for
allotment and other criteria for comparative evaluation of
claims prescribed by the rules in this behalf. It follows
that beyond this is not for the Court to direct and less
than this is not fair play to the appellant.
The High Court had gone into the question of delay
disentitling the appellant in maintaining his writ petition.
In the view that we have already taken on the merits of the
substantive points, we are not
169
called upon to consider the deadly effect of the delay such
as there is between the dates of the acquisition notifica-
tion and the institution of the writ petition. The appeal
is dismissed but having consideration for the conspectus of
circumstances present in this case we direct that the par-
ties will bear their own costs throughout.
P.H.P. Appeal
dismissed.
170