REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 498 OF 2006
LOUIS PETER SURIN
.. APPELLANT(S)
vs.
STATE OF JHARKHAND
.. RESPONDENT(S)
O
RDER
This appeal arises out of the following facts:
On 8th July, 1983 an agreement was executed by the
Deputy Commissioner, Palamu with M/s. Bharat Drilling for
doing some drilling work in the District. The appellant
was then employed as the Managing Director of the District
Rural Development Agency, Palamu, and as per his statement
had absolutely no role to play in the award of the contract
to M/s. Bharat Drilling. By order dated 16th July, 1983 the
appellant was transferred from his post as Managing
Director and he handed over the charge from that very date
to some other officer.
A first Information Report was registered on 14th
April, 1984 under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the
Indian Penal Code against the Deputy Commissioner who had
signed the contract with M/s. Bharat Drilling on 8th July
1983 and against the District Rural Development Agency
alleging that the Deputy Commissioner and the appellant had
entered into a conspiracy in awarding the
contract to M/s. Bharat Drilling for consideration. The
Investigating Agencies moved the State of Bihar for
sanction to prosecute the appellant but the same was
declined by the Governor on 2nd February, 1990 on the
premise that no prima facie case was made out against any
of the accused. A review of the order dated 2nd February
1990 was again sought which too was rejected vide order
dated 28th July 1992 for the same reason, the appellant
superannuated from service on 1st December 1997. On 16th
June, 1999 the dispute between M/s. Bharat Drilling and the
Government of Bihar was referred to Arbitration to the then
Superintendent Engineer who made an award in favour of
M/s. Bharat Drilling thereby settling the issue in its
favour. Apparently piqued with what had happened and taking
advantage of the fact that the appellant had retired in the
meanwhile and that sanction for prosecution ws no longer
required, a charge-sheet was submitted de hors the sanction
on 9th November 2001. The Special Judge Ranchi thereafter
took cognizance of the matter on 13th December, 2001. The
order of the Special Judge was challenged before the High
Court which by its order dated 23rd November, 2004 rejected
the challenge. The matter is before us in this appeal in
the above circumstances.
Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant has raised primarily one plea before us today.
He has pointed out that cognizance had been taken by the
Special Judge a full seventeen and half years after the
filing of the FIR and about four years after the appellant
had retired from service and in the light of the judgments
of this Court reported in (2002) 1 SCC 149 (Mahendra Lal
Dua vs. State of Bihar and Ors.) and (2002) 1 SCC 153
(Ramanand Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar and Ors.) this was
impermissible and the proceedings were liable to be quashed
as being belated and stale.
He has highlighted that after
the State Government, had on two occasions, declined the
sanction, on the ground that no prima facie case existed,
there was no change in circumstances except that the
appellant had superannuated in the meanwhile which was a
factor which could not justify cognizance after such a
long delay.
The learned counsel for the State of Jharkahnd has
however supported the orders of the Special Judge and the
High Court and has pointed out that the State Government
had not considered the matter in its proper perspective,
when it had declined sanction on the two occasions.
We see from the judgments cited by Mr. Vikas Singh
that they proceed on facts which are akin to the present
one. In both cases sanction was granted after a delay of
thirteen years while the officials concerned were still in
service under the State Government. We find in the matter
before us that the appellant had superannuated in the year
1997 and the cognizance had been taken by the Special
Judge four years thereafter in a matter arising out of an
F.I.R. registered in April 1984 even though the request for
sanction had been rejected by the State Government on two
occasions. In view of these peculiar facts we are of the
opinion that the initiation of proceedings against the
appellant was not justified.
We may however clarify that this judgment should not
be read to mean that sanction would be required in a case
where an employee has in the meanwhile superannuated.
We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the
impugned orders and quash the proceedings against the
appellant.
(HARJIT SINGH BEDI)
.................J.
(C.K. PRASAD)
New Delhi,
July 27, 2010.