PETITIONER:
LINKS ADVERTISERS & BUSINESS PROMOTERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF THE CITY OFB
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/04/1977
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
GOSWAMI, P.K.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1646 1977 SCR (3) 670
1977 SCC (3) 204
ACT
City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949--S.
136, third proviso, cl (e)--Scope of--Advertisement front-
ing a street put up within railway premises "Fronting"
meaning of.
Words and Phrases--"fronting" meaning of.
HEADNOTE
Section 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corpora-
tion Act, 1949 provides that every person who erects, exhib-
its etc., over any land or structure any advertisement or
who displays any advertisement to public view in any place
whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement
a tax levied by the Corporation. Clause (e) of the third
proviso to the section enacts that no such tax shall be
levied on any advertisement which is exhibited within any
railway station or upon any wall or other property of a
railway, except any portion of the surface of such wall or
property fronting any street.
An advertisement facing a public street was put up by
the appellant adjacent to the compound fencing of a railway
station but within the railway premises. The Municipal
authorities levied tax on the advertisement. The appel-
lant’s writ petition challenging the levy was dismissed by a
single judge of the High Court and this decision was upheld
by a division bench.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that the ex-
pression "fronting any street" occurring in the proviso
qualified the railway property and not the advertisement.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: 1. (a) Since the advertisements were fronting
public street and were exposed to public view. were not
covered by the exemption contemplated by the proviso and
were, therefore exigible to tax. [677 D]
(b) The word "fronting" qualifies not the wall or
property mentioned in the latter part of the proviso but
"advertisement". The test laid down by the proviso is that
the Court has to see if the advertisement affixed whether
inside the compound of the railway or not fronts the street.
If it fronts the street or faces the street, even if it
is within the railway premises it will be exigible to tax.
[674 D & F]
(c) The word "fronting" has been used in the proviso not
in any legal technical sense but it ordinary parlance. It
is not a term of art but one that signifies its meaning
according to common notions. [675 D]
The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The Oriental Mercan-
tile Company Ltd., Madras, [1966] 2 M.L.J. 440 and Ware
Urban District Council v. Gaunt & Others. [1960] 3 All E.R.
778, 787 distinguished.
2. The view of the single Judge that since the public
street to which the advertisements were facing, ran along
the railings with no other obstacle between the advertise-
ment and the public view, it could reasonably be said that
they were fronting public street is correct. On the other
hand, the view of the Division Bench that the proviso would
only apply to advertisements of such hoardings whose owner-
ship lay with the railway or which belonged to the rail-
way is not borne out by el. (e). The question of exigibili-
ty to tax is relatable not to the ownership of the hoardings
but their situs. [676 G-H]
671
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 325/1976.
(From the Judgment and Order dated the 3.12.1975 of the
Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 284/74).
V.S. Desai, Sanjev Aggarwal and R.B. Datar, for the
appellant.
S.S. Javali, Jagannath Shetty and B.P. Singh for resp.
No. 1.
S.N. Prasad and Girish Chandra, for the Intervener
Union of India.
Nemo for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.---Whether hoardings containing adver-
tisements fixed in the premises of a railway station front-
ing a ,public street are exigible to tax under the provi-
sions of s. 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corpora-
tion Act, 1949 (Act No. LXIX of 1949)-- hereinafter referred
to as ’the Act’--is the substantial question of law involved
in this appeal by certificate.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and
the point raised by counsel for the appellant is one of
first impression and undoubtedly requires serious consid-
eration. The appellant is a firm of advertising commer-
cial goods and other items by putting up hoardings contain-
ing advertisements on properties taken on lease licence from
various owners. The appellant also has been putting up
hoardings on railway lands in the compound of the Bangalore
Railway Station. In the instant case, we are only con-
cerned with the hoardings containing advertisements put up
adjacent to. the railway compound fencing but within the
railway premises by being placed on girders affixed to. the
earth. The fencing of the railway compound is adjacent to
and faces a public street. It is also not disputed by the
parties that the advertisements are put up at sufficient
height so. as to be clearly visible to and attract the
attention of the members of the general public passing
through the public street. The appellant has produced
photographs of some of the hoardings which demonstrate
these facts.
The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bangalore being
of the opinion that the hoardings containing advertisements
put up by the appellant were exigible to tax issued a demand
notice dated March 7, 1973 calling upon the. appellant to
pay a sum o.f Rs. 5871-83 as the advertisement tax including
arrears. The appellant represented to the Municipal
authorities that as the hoardings containing advertisements
were situate within the railway premises they squarely fell
within clause (e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act.
The Municipal Corporation did not accept the contention of
the appellants and pressed for-paying up the tax.
The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High
Court of Karnataka praying that the order of the Corporation
demanding payment of tax be quashed, because the advertise-
ments were clearly
672
exempt from tax by virtue of the aforesaid proviso.. The
writ petition was in the first instance heard by a single
Judge who by his order dated April 4, 19.74 overruled the
contention of ’the appellant and dismissed the petition.
Thereupon the appellant filed an appeal under the Letters
Patent before a Division Bench which also affirmed the
order of the single Judge, though on different grounds. The
Division Bench later on being approached under Art. 133 of
the Constitution granted a certificate of fitness and hence
this appeal before us.
The only point that has been raised before us is that
the hoardings containing advertisements squarely fall within
the exemption contained in the third proviso to s. 136 of
the Act and, therefore, they are not belong to The High
Court found that as the advertisements did not exigible to
the Railway nor for the purpose of the Railway, the proviso
in question did not apply and the Single Judge was right in
holding that the advertisements were exigible to tax. The
single Judge had, however, found that as the advertisements
were much above the railings which faced the public street,
the proviso had no application.
Before examining the view of the High Court, it may be
necessary to extract the relevant portions of the statute
which we are called upon to interpret. The relevant part of
s. 136 of the Act runs thus:
"Every person who’ erects, exhibits, fixes
or retains upon or over any land, building,
wail, hoarding or structure any advertise-
ment or who displays any advertisement to
public view in any manner whatsoever, in
any place whether public or private, shall pay
on every advertisement which is so erected,
exhibited, fixed, retained or displayed to
public view a tax calculated at such rates and
in such manner and subject to such exemptions,
as the corporation may, with the approval of
the Government, by resolution determine:
x x x x
"Provided further that no such tax shall be
levied on any advertisement which is not a
sky-sign and which-
x x x x
(e) is exhibited within any railway station
of upon any wall or other property of a
railway except any portion of the surface of
such wall or property fronting any street.
Explanation 1.--The word ’structure’ in
this ’section shall include any movable board
on wheels used as an advertisementor an adver-
tisement medium." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Act which is the charging section clearly
shows that the intention of the statute was to tax certain
types of advertisements. The pith and substance of the
entire section, therefore, is the taxation of advertisements
fixed, erected or exhibited on any land, building wall,
hoarding, structure etc. Thus it is manifest, that s.
136 contemplates tax on advertisements and not tax on prem-
ises or
673
buildings. This clear distinction has to be kept in mind
in construing the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act which
falls for determination in this case, particularly in view
of some of the authorities relied upon by the appellant
which deal with tax on premises rather than tax on adver-
tisements.
The essential conditions necessary for the application
of s. 136 of the Act are--
(i) that a person should erect, exhibit,
fix or retain any advertisement upon any land.
building, wall, hoarding or structure or
display any advertisement in any manner;
(ii) that erection, exhibition, fixation
or retention or display of that advertisement
must be exposed to public view; and
(iii) that the advertisement must be
exhibited in any place public or private.
The sine qua non for the application of this section is,
therefore, that the advertisements displayed by any person
must be to public view in any manner whatsoever. Once
these conditions are satisfied, the person who exhibits the
advertisements is liable to pay tax on such advertisements
As, however, the Act was merely to regulate the premises
falling within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, it is
obvious that the premises which did not fall within the
Corporation or which belonged to other autonomous authori-
ties could not be exigible to tax unless expressly so pro-
vided. Furthermore, it appears that the object of the
Municipal Corporation in charging tax was to keep the public
premises clean and water-tight and protect advertisements
which may amount to nuisance, because the ,Act lays down a
procedure which has to be followed before the advertisements
could be exhibited. Consistent with this object, there-
fore, the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act grants an
exemption from tax on any advertisement which is exhibited
in any railway station or upon any wail or other property of
a railway. Here also an exception is carved out which is
that if such an advertisement, even though on any portion of
the railway property, faces any street it will not earn the
exemption.
The central argument put forward before us by Mr. V. 8.
Desai counsel for the appellant is that the expression
"fronting any street" appearing in cl. (e) of the third
proviso to s. 136 qualifies the railway property and not the
advertisement so that the fact that the advertisement
fronting the street or which is exposed to public view or
is visible to the public from the public street will not
make the advertisement exigible to tax, if the advertise-
ment is within the railway premises or is adjacent to the
compound wall or any other property which itself is fronting
the street. In other words, the contention was that having
regard to the terminology of the word "fronting" it is not
possible to conceive that two portions of the property can
front a street at one and the same time unless they are in
the same
674
line. From the photographs produced before us, as also
before the High Court, it appears that the hoardings con-
taining the advertisements are no doubt fixed just 2 or 3
feet behind the compound fencing of the railway station
premises. Mr. Desai, therefore, contended that once the
compound wall which is in front of the girders on which the
advertisements are fixed faces the street, there is no.
question of the advertisement facing the street. Secondly,
it was contended that the test of fronting the street as
contained in the third proviso is that what is fronting
the street is not the advertisement but the property of the
railway. In other words, it was argued that as in the
instant case the compound wall already fronted the street,
the hoardings containing the advertisements being behind the
compound wall, though adjacent to it, cannot be said to
front the street, because two properties cannot front the
street at the same time. We have given anxious considera-
tion to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for
the appellant, but on a proper interpretation of the proviso
we are unable to accept the same. To. begin with, if the
proviso is read with reference to the context, then it is
absolutely clear that the verb "fronting" qualifies not the
wall or the property but the advertisement. The central
subject-matter of s. 136 as also of the proviso is not a
place or building but advertisement which alone attracted
tax. If we read the third proviso in the following man-
ner, then the intention of the statute becomes absolutely
clear:
"Provided further that no such tax shall
be levied on any advertisement
(e) which is exhibited within any railway
station or upon any wall of other property of
a railway except any portion of the surface of
such wall or property/fronting any street."
(Emphasis supplied)
The verb "fronting",’ therefore, does not qualify wall or
property mentioned in the latter part of the. proviso. but
the noun advertisement. The test, therefore, laid down by
this proviso is that the Court has to see whether the adver-
tisement affixed whether inside the compound of the railway
or not fronts the street. If the advertisement fronts the
street or faces the street even if it is within the railway
premises, it will be exigible to tax. For instance if the;
hoardings containing the advertisements were affixed just
behind the compound wall and the advertisements did not face
the street at all but faced the other side of the railway
station their back being to the street, then the advertise-
ments will certainly be exempt from tax and the proviso
would clearly apply. This seems to us to be the natural
interpretation of the proviso having regard to the context
in which it is placed.
Mr. Desai learned counsel for the appellant relied on
the definition of the word "fronting" as used in Stroud’s
Judicial Dictionary, 4th End., at p. 1121, where the learned
author while defining "fronting" observed thus:
"Fronting. (1) Premises "fronting,
adjoining, or abutting" on a STREET, and as
such chargeable with expense
675
of road-making under Public Health Act 1875
(c. 55), s. 150, did not need to be absolutely
contiguous."
In the first, place the author defines the word "fronting"
within the meaning of the Public Health Act, 1875, which
levied tax on premises. The author was not at all con-
cerned with tax on advertisement as in the instant case.
In the case referred to in the book, the Court was called
upon to judge the expenses on road-making under the Public
Health Act. It is, therefore, manifest that these consider-
ations would not apply to the facts of the present case.
On the other hand in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary Vol. I, the word
"front" used as a verb is defined thus:
"something that confronts or faces
forward: as (1): a face of a building; esp.
the face that contains the principal
entrance ........................... put a
facing upon (e.g. the building with brick) 5:
to face or look forward have the front toward,
opposite, or over against the houses the
street)."
According to the aforesaid dictionary meaning "fronting"
merely means that the article should face or have its front
toward, opposite or over against the house or the street.
In our opinion the word "fronting" has been used in the
proviso not in any legal or technical sense but as used in
ordinary parlance. It is not a term of art but one that
signifies its meaning according to common notions. For
these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that
as the advertisements upon the hoardings in the instant case
were undoubtedly facing or fronting the street they were
exigible to tax and the fact that they were a f[axed on the
earth which formed the compound of the railway premises
would make no difference in view of the plain and unambigu-
ous language of the proviso.
Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision
of the Madras High Court in The Corporation of Madras v.
Messrs The Oriental Mercantile Company Ltd., Madras. C)
This authority, however, can have no application to the
facts of the present case, because to begin with, there is
nothing to show that the hoardings containing the advertise-
ments were in any way fronting or facing the street. On
the other hand, the advertisements were merely on the out-
side wall within the railway compound. In these circum-
stances, therefore, this case does not appear to be of any
assistance to the appellant.
Reliance was then placed on a decision of the Queen’s
Bench Division in Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt and
Others(2) and particularly on the observations of Ashworth,
J., where the Judge observed as follows:
"The remaining issue is, in a sense, the
most troublesome of all, namely, whether it is
open to the appellants to apportion part of
the expense on premises situate on the wester-
ly
(1) [1966] 2 M.L.J. 440,
(2) [1969] 3 All E.R. 778, 787.
4--707SCI/77
676
side of Walton Road but separated from it b,y
the public footpath. This issue involves as
an ancillary problem the question whether part
of the expense should in any event be appor-
tioned on’ the public footpath. Section 6 of
the Act of 1892 provides, inter alia, that
".:..the expenses incurred by the urban
authority in executing private street works
shall be apportioned (subject as in this Act
mentioned) on the premises fronting, adjoin-
ing, or abutting on such street or pan of a
street." "
The observations extracted above will show that there also.
the Court was dealing not with a tax on advertisements but a
tax on premises, and the question of the frontage was inter-
preted having regard to the place where the premises were
situate. In the same judgment, the learned Judge observed
as follows:
"In each case, as it seems to me, regard
must be paid to the context in which the words
appear and, quite apart front any decided
cases, I am inclined to think that the context
in the present case points to an enlarged
rather than a restricted meaning of the word
"adjoin"."
(Emphasis ours)
It is, therefore, clear that the meaning of the words used
in a particular statute has to be construed with reference
to the context and not in isolation, not is it possible to
lay down any rule of universal application in a matter like
this. For these reasons, therefore, this authority also
does not appear to be apposite so far as the present case is
concerned.
The Single Judge of the High Court, while interpreting
the proviso, observed as follows:
"These advertisements in question are
displayed on the hoardings standing close to
the cement fencing at the outer mark of the
railway property. The cement railings are
hardly about 3 feet in height and the adver-
tisement boards are very much above the rail-
ings. The Public street to which the adver-
tisements are facing runs along the cement
railings, with no other obstacle between the
advertisement boards and the public view.
Therefore, it can reasonably, be said that
they are fronting the Public Street."
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken
by the Single Judge.
The Division Bench of the High Court, however, while
upholding the judgment of the Single Judge, observed as
follows:
"In the instant case, we are not faced
with any situation as the one envisaged in the
second part of the exemption clause relative
to advertisement on a wall or other property
677
of the railway ’frontage by street’. We
are concerned herein with the case of a hoard-
ing put up by and belonging to the appellant
and not the railway. Hence, it is plain that
no exemption on that score could be claimed on
behalf of the appellant."
The High Court does not appear to have interpreted the
proviso correctly. The view of the High Court that the
proviso would only apply to advertisements of such hoardings
whose ownership lies with the Railway or which belong to
the Railway is not borne out by cl. (e) of the third proviso
to s. 236. In other words the question of exigibility to
tax is relatable not to the ownership of the hoarding but
its situs. Even if the hoarding does not belong to the
Railway but to some private party, if it does not front the
street and is situated within the Railway premises or within
the compound of the railway premises it is clearly exempt.
We, therefore, do not approve of the line of reasoning
adopted by the Division Bench.
On a close and careful interpretation, therefore, of cl.
(e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act we are clearly
of the opinion that on the facts proved in the present case
as the hoardings,containing the advertisements were front-
ing the public street and were clearly exposed to public
view and the members of the public passing through the
street, they are not covered by the exemption contemplated
by the proviso and are, therefore, exigible to tax. The
demand notice, therefore, served on the appellant by the
Municipal Corporation for payment of tax is not legally
erroneous.
The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed
678