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CaseMinister › Judgments › Supreme Court › 1976 › Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvementtrust Board v. H.

Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvementtrust Board v. H. Narayanaiah Etc. Etc.

Supreme Court of India · 16 August 1976 · [1977] 1 S.C.R. 178

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
16 August 1976
Reported as
[1977] 1 S.C.R. 178
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Beg, M. Hameedullah
Length
15 pages
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PETITIONER:
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, CITY IMPROVEMENTTRUST BOARD
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
H. NARAYANAIAH ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT16/08/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2403 1977 SCR (1) 178
1976 SCC (4) 9

ACT

Land acquisition--City of Bangalore Improvement Act,

1945, ss. 16 18 and 27--Notification under ss. 16. and 18

on different dates--Date for determining market value for

awarding compensation for acquisition of land.

Evidence Act (1 of 1872) s. 43 and Code of Civil Proce-

dure (ACt 5 of 1908) O. 41, 27--Admission of Judgments in

land acquisition proceedings as additional evidence.

HEADNOTE

The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, is con-

cerned with the improvement and future expansion of the

city, and for the appointment of a Board of Trustees with

special powers to carry out that purpose. As. an incident

of such improvement and expansion, it provides for acquisi-

tion of land also. .Section 16 of the Act provides for the

publication of a notice so that any representations which

objectors may make may be considered by the Board itself

under s.. 17. The object of the two sections is to provide

for the notification similar to that under 5. 4(1), Mysore

Land Acquisition. Act. 1894, and for hearing of objections

as under s. 5A, of that Act. Section 18 of the Bangalore

Act provides for the publication in the Gazette of the

declaretion that the land is acquired for a public; purpose.

Section 27 provides that acquisitions otherwise than by

agreement, shall be regulated by the provisions of the

Acquisition Act in so far as they are applicable and by

certain further provisions in the section. Section 27(1)

provides that upon the passing of a resolution by the Board

that an improvement scheme under s. 14 is necessary in

respect of any locality, it shall be lawful for any person,

authorised by the Board to do all such acts in respect of

the land as it would be lawful for an officer duly autho-

rised by the Government under s. 4(2) of the Acquisition

Act; and under s. 27(2) the publication Of a declaration

under s. 18 shall be deemed to be the publication of a

declaration under s. 6, Acquisition Act

In the present case, the notifications under s. 16 of

the Bangalore Act were issued in 1960 and the notifications

under s. 18 were published in 1967. On the question as to

which date was to be taken for the determination of the

market value for the purpose of awarding compensation, the

High Court held that the date of notification under s. 18 is

the relevant date. The High. Court held that decision of

Full Bench of the High Court in Venkatamma v. Special Land

Acquisition Officer (AIR 1972 Mysore 193) covered the ques-

tion: and it also relied on another decision of the Court,

determining compensation with respect of the acquisition of

certain other lands, as relevant evidence for the purpose of

determining compensation in the instant case. In appeal to.

this Court the respondent also supported the judgment of the

High Court on the ground that s. 23(1) of the Acquisition

Act which provides that the determination of the market

value should be as on the date of the publication of a

notification under s. 41(1), would not apply, because, (a)

no. principle o.r procedure governing award of compensation

is specified in the Bangalore Act, (b) the words "so far as

applicable", used in s. 27, are equivalent to "in so far as

they are specifically mentioned"; and s. 23(1) is not so

specifically mentioned; and, (c) since no. procedure or

principle is laid down for the= award of compensation in the

Bangalore Act, it would be equitable to hold that the market

value should be determined with reference to the late.r date

of. the notification under s 18 of the Act.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD: The matter should be remanded to the High Court for

determination of the market value of the land as on the date

of the notification under

179

s. 16 of the Bangalore Act, which corresponds to. the

notification under s. 4(1 ) of the Acquisition Act, after

affording opportunities to the parties whether the judgment

sought to be offered as additional evidence could be so

admitted shall be decided. [193 E-F]

(1)(a) The Full Bench of the High Court, while inter-

preting the City of Mysore Improvement Act, 1903, observed

that the Acquisition Act had been amended in 1927 so as to

make compensation payable as on the date of the notification

under s. 4(1) of that Act instead of the date of notifica-

tion under s. 6 according to the unamended law and but that,

in the Mysore Act, there was no corresponding amendment.

Therefore, the Mysore Act had to be construed with refer-

ence to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as it

stood in 1903. [182 F-G]

But, the Bangalore Act, even though its corresponds

substantially with the provisions of the Mysore Act of 1903,

should be interpreted with reference to the Acquisition Act

as it stood in 1945, because, the Bangalore Act was,

enacted in 1945. [182 H]

(b) The Full Bench also held that if there was long delay

between the two notifications, the acquisition itself would

be unconstitutional, and the.re.fore the date of notifica-

tion under s. 18 would be the relevant date. The delay

between the dates of notification under s. 16 and under s.

18 would not have any bearing on the question of the date on

which the market value is to, be determined, because, if a

particular acquisition becomes unconstitutional due to an

unreasonable mode. of exercising the statutory powers of

acquisition, the meaning of provisions, which are relevant

for determining the date of market value, could not be

affected. [183 F-H, 184 A]

(2) Under s. 43, Evidence Act, judgments other than

those falling under ss. 40 to 42, Evidence Act are irrele-

vant unless they fall under some other provisions of the

Evidence Act. In the present case, the earlier judgment of

the High Court cannot operate as resjudicata because it is

not between the same parties. Such judgments are also not

judgments in rem. However, in Khaja Fizuddin v. State of

Andhra Pradesh (CA. No. 176 dt.. 10-4-1963) this Court held

that such judgments would be relevant if they relate to

similarly situated properties and contain determinations of

value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a

case. BUt, in the present case, the appellant was not given

any opportunity of showing that the earlier judgment related

to dissimilar land. The High Court also did not comply with

the provisions of 0.41 r. 27, C.P.C. before admitting the

earlier judgment as additional evidence. It had recorded no

’reasons to show that it had considered the requirements or’

the rule and why it found the admission of such evidence to

be necessary.

[191 G-H, 192 B-H 193 A-B]

Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Lakhamsi

Ghelabhai, AIR 1960 Bom. 78, referred to.

(3)(a) Section 27 of the Bangalore Act enables the procedure

in the Acquisition Act to be utilised except tel the extent

to which the procedure in the bangalore Act may differ from

that in the Acquisition act. These difference s. 27(2) and

(2); are: (i) that the Board of Trustees could do the:

things provided for in s. 4.(2) of the Acquisition: Act

without a notification under s. 4(1); and (ii) the notifica-

tion under s. 18 of the Bangalore Act is equated to the one

under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, even

though s. 23 of the Acquisition Act is’ not specifically

mentioned in the Bangalore Act, the obvious purpose of the

opening words of s. 27 of the Bangalore Act, and the effect

of non-specification of a different principle in the Banga-

lore Act, is that the award of compensation, which is a

necessary part of any law providing for acquisition must be

governed by s. 23 of the Acquisition Act, which is the only

provision applicable; for determining the date of market

value.[189 D-G]

(b) The words "so far as they are applicable" cannot be

equated to in so far as they are specifically mentioned."

The words are used to exclude only those provisions of the

acquisition Act which become inapplicable, because

180

of the special procedure prescribe.d by the Bangalore Act.

They cannot be construed as excluding the application of

general provisions such as s. 23 of the Acquisition Act.

They amount to stating that what is not either expressly or

by necessary implication excluded must be applied. [190 H,

191 A-B]

(c) Equity supplements but does not supplant law. If,

in the face of the provision that the notification under s.

18, Bangalore Act is equated with a notification under s. 6

of the. Acquisition Act for the purpose of determining the

market value for awarding compensation, some transcendental

principle of’ equity is applied, then, it would be supplant-

ing the law laid down in s. 27 of the Bangalore Act read

with s. 23 of the Acquisition Act. It would also be absurd

to hold that a notification under s.18, Bangalore Act, could

be equated with a notification under s. 4(1) Acquisition

Act. Therefore, the relevant date would be the date of

notification under s. 16, because, the objects achieved by a

notification under s. 16, Bangalore Act, and one under s. 4,

Acquisition Act are identical. In the Full Bench decision

of the High Court, it was held. relying on s. 23 of the City

of Mysore Improvement Act, 1903 that s. 14 of that Act

should be equated to s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. But in

view of the provisions of r. 27 of the Bangalore Act, the

only result of equating a resolution under s. 14 of the

Bangalore Act with a notification under s. 4(1) of the

Acquisition Act would be to shift the date of ascertaining

of market value still further back which is not the conten-

tion of the respondents. [191 A, F]

OBITER: An additional compliance with s. 4(1) of the

Acquisition Act is not necessary in view of the special

procedure unders. 16 of the Bangalore Act: and, it would be

reasonable for the authorities to exercise the powers pro-

vided for by s. 27(1) of the Bangalore Act, corresponding to

those in s. 4(2) of the Acquisition Act, only after the

notification under s. 16 of the Bangalore Act. [185 B.C]

M. Manicklal v. The State of Mysore 1967 (2) M.L.J. 239

approved.

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 644-650/74.

(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 21-6-1975 of the Karnataka High Court in Misc. First

Appeal Nos. 77, 444-450/70 respectively).

K. Sen, V.M. Tarkunde, H.B. Datar and R.B. Datar for

the appellant.

S. Rangaraj, M. Qamaruddin, P.N. Purl, S.K. Mehta for

Mr. K.R. Naggrain, for respondent in CA. No. 644/74.

A.R. Somnath Iyer, S. Laxminarasu, for respondents in

CA. Nos. 645-650/74.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG, J. Civil Appeals Nos. 644. to. 650 of 1974 are by

special leave against the judgment of a Division Bench of

the Karnataka High Court. The common and principal question

of law which arises is: Does the City of Bangalore Improve-

ment Act, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’ or ’the

Bangalore Act’), applying the provisions of the Land Acqui-

sition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). (hereinafter

referred to as ’the Acquisition Act’), to acquisitions of

land in Bangalore require the determination of market value,

for purposes of awarding compensation, on a date correspond-

ing to the date of notifi-

181

cation under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act or to the date

corresponding to that of the notification under Section 6 of

the Acquisition Act

The facts of the cases are not really material for the

determination of the question of law stated above. A few

facts relating to the lands acquired may, however, be men-

tioned. They have a bearing on a connected question dealt

with at the end of this judgment.

The seven appeals by special leave arise out of land

acquisition proceedings in which the 1st of the preliminary

notifications, under Section 16 of the Bangalore Act, took

place in the Mysore Gazette from 1960 onwards; and, the

subsequent notifications, under Section 18 of the Bangalore

Act, equated by Section 27(2) of the Bangalore Act with

notifications under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, were

made in 1967. All the lands involved in these appeals are

situated in Birmamangala Village, Bangalore North Taluk, and

are .shown to have been acquired for the purposes. of a

scheme known as ’Bhinnamangala Lay Out II Stage or Indira

Nagar Extension’.

The Bangalore Act, as its preamble states, is really

concerned with the "improvement and future expansion of the

City of Bangalore and for the appointment of a Board of

Trustees with .special powers to carry out the aforesaid

purposes;". As an incident of this improvement and expansion

it provides for acquisition of land also.. It does not,

however, contain a separate code of its own for such acqui-

sitions. But, Section 27 of the Bangalore Act lays down:

"27. Provisions applicable by the acquisition

of land otherwise than by agreement.--The acquisi-

tion otherwise than by agreement of land within or

without the City under this Act shall be regulated

by the provisions, ,so. far as they are applicable,

of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and by

the following further provisions, namely :--

(1) Upon the passing of a resolution by the

Board that an improvement scheme under Section 14

is necessary in respect of any locality, it shall

be lawful for any person either generally or spe-

cially authorised by the Board in this behalf and

for his servants and workmen, to do all such acts

on or in respect of land in that locality as it

would be lawful for an officer duly authorised by

the Government to act under Section 4(2) of the

Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and for his

servants and workmen to do thereunder; and the

provision contained in Section 5 of the said Act

shall likewise be applicable in respect of damage

caused by any o.f the acts first mentioned.

(2) The publication of a declaration under

section 18 shall be deemed to be the publication of

a declaration under section 6 of the Mysore’, Land

Acquisition Act, 1894.

182

(3) For the purposes of section 50(2) of the

Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Board shall

be deemed to be the local authority concerned.

(4) After the land vests in the Government

under section 16 of the Mysore Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon

payment of the cost of the acquisition, and

upon the Board agreeing to pay any further costs

which may be incurred on account of the acquisi-

tion, transfer the land to the Board, and the land

shall thereupon vested in the Board".

The Mysore Land Acquisition Act of 1894 exactly

reproduces our Central Land Acquisition Act 1 of

1894. Therefore, the term ’Acquisition Act’ in

this judgment covers references to both the Mysore

Land Acquisition Act as well as the Central Land

Acquisition Act 1 of 1894. It was stated by Counsel

that the Mysore Land Acquisition Act was also

correspondingly amended whenever provisions of the

Central Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 were

altered .so that the two could be treated as iden-

tical for our purposes.

The judgment and orders of the Division Bench,

under appeal before us, purports to follow a Full

Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Venka-

tamrna v. Special Land Acquisition Officer(1),

where it was held that the relevant date for deter-

mining the market value of the property to be

acquired is the date of notification under section

18 of the City of Mysore Improvement Act of 1903.

It appears that the provisions of the last men-

tioned Mysore Act of 1903 largely correspond with

the provisions of the Bangalore Act before us.

It has, however, to be remembered that the Act

which the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court was

interpreting was. enacted in 1903. It had, there-

fore, to be construed with reference to the provi-

sions of the Acquisition Act as it stood in 1903.

The Mysore Full Bench had observed that the Mysore

Land Acquisition Act had been amended by the Mysore

Act 1 of 1927 "so as to make compensation payable

as on the date of publication of the notification

under section 4(1) of that Act" instead of with

reference to the date of notification under

section 6 according to the unamended law. It said:

"It is significant to note that the Mysore Legis-

lature did not make any corresponding amendment

in the Act" (that is to say, the City of Mysore Act

of 1903). The Bangalore Act, even though it may

Correspond substantially with the provisions of the

Mysore Improvement Act 3 of 1903, was enacted in

1945. Hence, references in the Bangalore Act to

the Acquisition Act, which had been amended

considerably between 1903 and 1945, could not have

the same effect as similar references to the Acqui-

sition Act in the Mysore Act of 1903. We think

that the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court overlooked this vital distinction.

(1) A.I.R. 1972 Mysore 193.

183

The Full Bench of the Mysore High Court ex-

pressed the view that the contention that a notifi-

cation under Section 16 of the Mysore Act of 1903

could be equated with a notification under section

4 of the Acquisition Act was negatived by the

provisions of Section 23 sub. s. (1) of the

Mysore Act of 1903. It said (at p. 198):

"Section 23 (1) of the Act states that upon the passing

of a resolution by the Board that an improvement scheme

under Section 14 is necessary, it would be lawful for any

person authorised by the Board to enter upon the land

carry out the several acts on the land in question as provid

ed under section 4(2) of the Acquisition Act and the pro

visions of section 5 of the Acquisition Act would likewise

be applicable in respect of damage caused by any of the

acts of servants or workmen of the Board".

It, therefore, thought that what was sought to be achieved

by notification under section 4( 1 ) of the Acquisition Act

was done by a resolution under section 14 of the Mysore Act.

Taking the view that such a resolution could only be

anterior to the publication of the notification under sec-

tion 16, it equated the notification under section 16 of the

Mysore Act with a notification under section 6 of the

Acquisition Act. Thus, the Mysore. Full Bench found in

Section 23 (1) of the Mysore Act of 1903, a justification

for equating provisions of section 14 of that Act with,

those of section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. But, we do

not find either in section 23 of the Bangalore Act, which

deals with an entirely different subject matter, or, any-

where, apart from section 27, additional provision (1) of

the Bangalore Act, a similar provision which could ;indicate

that proceedings under a section other than those under

section 16 of the Bangalore Act could possibly correspond

with those under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. And,

we think that to equate a resolution under section 14 of the

Act with a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisi-

tion Act, on a similar reasoning, would be to miss the very

different purposes meant to be served by a resolution under

section 14 of the Bangalore Act and a notification under

section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. Such reasoning appears

to us to be very far fetched.

Another reason given by the Full Bench of the Mysore

High Court, for holding that market value should be deter-

mined as on the date of notification under section 18 and

not that of notification under section 16 of the City of

Mysore Improvement Act (both these sections, correspond to

section 16 and 18 of the Bangalore Act) was that a delay of

20 years between the two notifications would make the

acquisition unconstitutional. We are unable to appreci-

ate the bearing of this consideration on a decision of the

statutory requirements as to the date on which market value

is to be determined for purposes of compensation. If a

particular acquisition becomes unconstitutional due to an

unreasonable mode of exercising the statutory powers of

acquisition, neither the provision which is so misused

nor the meaning. of other provisions, which are relevant

for determining the date of market value, is affected.

We are constrained to observe that some of the reasons

184

given by the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court as well as

the Division Benches of the Karnataka High Court have little

connection with the date on which the market value has to be

determined according to statutory provisions. A pure ques-

tion of interpretation of fairly clearly expressed legis-

lative intent which should not have been permitted to be

fogged by adverting to irrelevant matters.

It is true that the Bangalore Act has its own distinct

purposes and prescribed modes in which they are to be car-

ried out. Acquisition of land, as already observed, is a

mere incident in the carrying out of those purposes. Sec-

tion 26 of the Act gives, it the power to acquire land by

agreement. Section 27 of the Act reproduced above, enables

the procedure ’found in the Acquisition Act to be utilised

except to the extent to which the procedure for compulsory

acquisition in the Bangalore Act may differ from that con-

tained in the Acquisition Act. Section 27 of the Banga-

lore Act gives certain "further provisions" indicated

under four heads. Apparently. these are meant to dis-

place corresponding actions under the Acquisition Act. We

have to identify the corresponding provisions only for the

purposes of applying Section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act.

It is evident that the first of these additional provi-

sions enables the Board of Trustees, by virtue of section

14, to undertake what could have been done under the

Acquisition Act only after a notification under section 4(1

) of the Acquisition Act. In other words, the deviation

from the procedure laid down in the Acquisition Act is that,

whereas the Agents of the Govt. could not undertake any-

thing provided for by section 4(2) of the Acquisition Act

without a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition

Act, the Board of Trustees could do those very things with-

out any notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition

Act. Even if we could equate the resolution under section

14 of the Bangalore Act with a notification under section

4(1) of the Acquisition Act, we could not dispense with the

requirements of section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act which

is the only provision applicable for determining the date

of the market value. The only result of equating a

resolution under section 14 with a notification under

section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act could be to shift the

date of as certainment of market value farther back. But,

that is not what the respondents contend for.

The second additional provision under section 27(2) seems

designed, by way of abundant caution, to clarify the mean-

ing of provisions of section 18 of the Act, Obviously, it

prevents any construction which could enable a notifica-

tion under section 18 of the Bangalore Act to be equated

with section 4(1) of the Act. To hold that a notification

under section 18 of the Bangalore Act could be equated with

section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, in the face of this

clear provision, equating it with a notification under

section 6 of the Acquisition Act, is to countenance the

obvious absurdity that there is no difference between a

notification under section 4(1) and section 6 of the Acqui-

sition Act.

A possible line of argument, in view of the 1st addi-

tional provision in section 27 of the Bangalore Act, could

be that, since the

185

general procedure under the Acquisition Act applies, a

notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act

itself should precede any action under section 14 of the Act

which is to be equated with section 4(2) of the Acquisi-

tion Act. But, that has not been the argument of any side

either in the Karnataka High Court or before us. Had that

been necessary and no notification under section 4(1) of the

Act had taken place, the validity of the whole acquisition

proceedings could have been challenged, but, the validity

of the Acquisition proceedings is not assailed before us at

all. Such a line reasoning would be also shut out by the

principle that the particular and the especially provided

procedure ;would exclude the more general if we hold, as we

have to having regard to Section 16 of the Act, that the

special procedure was meant to take the place of and to

serve the same object as the general. The argument that

an additional compliance with section 4(1) of-the Acquisi-

tion Act was necessary despite the special procedure in

section 16 of the Act, which fulfils the same function, is

also repelled by the correct view taken in M. Manicklal v.

the State of Mysore (1) by the Mysore High

court.

The real question before us is whether the market value

should be determined with reference to the date of notifica-

tion under section 16 of the Act. As we find that the

notification under section 18 has been actually equated, by

the second additional provision contained in section 27 of

the Bangalore Act, with a notification under section 6 of

the Acquisition Act, so that it could not be also equated

with any notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition

Act and, as we also find that the provisions of section 16

of the Bangalore Act and section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act

show that the obvious intention behind and objects achieved

by a notification under section 16 of the Act and one under

section 4(1 ) of the Acquisition Act are identical, we think

that it is most reasonable to hold that it is not necessary

at all, in such cases, to comply with section 4(1) of the

Acquisition Act in addition to complying with section 16

of the Bangalore Act. The general provisions of section

4(1) of the Acquisition Act are displaced by the special

provisions of section 16 of the Act.

Here, we may set out the provisions of section 4 of the

Acquisition Act and section 16 of the Bangalore Act to indi-

cate the identity of purposes and the extent of similarity

of procedure.

Section A of the Acquisition Act provides:

"4. Publication of preliminary notification

and powers of officers there upon.--(1) Whenever it

appears to the appropriate Government or the Deputy

Commissioner that land in any locality is needed or

is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a

notification stating the purpose for which the land

is needed, or likely to be needed, and describing

the land by its survey number, if any, and also by

its boundaries and its approximate area; shall be

published in the official Gazette, and its

Deputy Commissioner

(1) 1967 (2) M.L.J.p.239

1414--1003SCI/76

186

shall cause public notice of the substance

of such notification to be given at convenient

places in the said locality. The Deputy Commis-

sioner may also cause a copy of such notification

to be served on the owner, or where the owner is

not the occupier, on the occupier of the land.

Explanation.--The expression ’convenient places’

includes, in the case of land situated in a vil-

lage, the office of the panchayat within whose

jurisdiction the land lies.

(1A) The notification under sub-section (1)

shall also specify the date, (such date not being

less than thirty days from the date of publication

of the notification) on or before which, and the

manner in which, objections to the proposed acqui-

sition may be made, under section 5A.

(2) On the publication of such notification it shah

be lawful for any Officer, either generally or

specially authorized by such Government or by the

Deputy Commissioner in this behalf, and for his

servants and workmento enter upon and survey and

take levels of the land; to dig or bore into the

sub-soil;

to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether

the land is adapted for such purpose;

to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to

be taken and the intended line of work (if any)

proposed to be made thereon;

to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing

marks and cutting trenches; and

where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and

the levels taken and the boundaries and line

marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any

standing crop, fence or jungle:

Provided that no person shall enter into any

building or upon any enclosed court or garden

attached to a dwelling house (unless with the con-

sent of .the occupier thereof) without previously

giving such occupier at least seven days notice in

writing of his intention to do so.

(3 ) Where the acquisition is for a company, an

officer of such company may be authorised by the

appropriate Government or the Deputy Commissioner

to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section

(2).

(4) The Officer authorised, under sub-section

(2)or sub-section (3) shall complete his investiga-

tion and submit his report to the Deputy Commis-

sioner within a period of three months (or within

such longer period not exceeding six months in all

as the Deputy Commissioner may allow), from the

date of the publication of the notification under

subsection (1). with his remarks to the appropriate

Government along-with his report under sub-section

(2) of section 5A".

187

Section 16 of the Bangalore Act enacts:

"16. Procedure on completion of

scheme.--(1) Upon the completion of an improvement

scheme, the Board shall draw up a notification

stating the fact of a scheme having been made and

the limits of the area comprised therein, and

naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a

map of the area comprised therein and a statement

specifying the land which it is proposed to acquire

and of the land in regard to which it is proposed

to recover a betterment fee may be seen at all

reasonable hours; and Shall-

(a) Copy of notification of scheme to be

communicated to May or of the Corporation-Communi-

cate a copy of such notification to the Mayor of

the Corporation who shall, with in thirty days from

the date of receipt thereof forward to the Board,

for transmission to the Government as hereinafter

provided, any representation which the Corporation

may think fit to make with regard to the scheme;

(b) Publication of notification.--Cause a copy

of the said notification to be publication during

three consecutive weeks in the Mysore Gazette and

posted up in some conspicuous part of its own

office, the Deputy Commissioner’s office, the

office of the Corporation and in such other places

as the Board may consider necessary.

(2) Service of notices on owners of property to

be acquired in executing the scheme.--During the

thirty days next following the day on which such

notification is published in the Mysore Gazette the

Board shall serve a notice on every person whose

name appears in the assessment list of the Corpora-

tion or the Municipality or local body concerned or

in the land revenue register as being primarily

liable to pay the property tax or land revenue

assessment on any building or land which it is

proposed to acquire in executing the scheme, or in

regard to which the Board proposes to recover a

betterment fee, stating that the Board proposes to

acquire such building or land or to recover such

bettermentfee for the purpose of carrying out an

improvement scheme and. requiring an answer within

thirty days from the date of service of the notice

stating whether the person so served,dissents or

not to such acquisition of the building or land or

to the recovery of such betterment fee, and if the

person dissents, the reasons for such dissent.

(3) Notice how to be served.--Such notice shall be

signed by, or by the order of, the Chairman and

shall be served-

(a) by delivery of the same personally to the

person required to be served or if such person is

absent or cannot be found, to his agent, or if no

agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the

land or building; or

(b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known

place of abode or business of such person as afore-

said; or

188

(c) by registered post addressed to the

usual or last known place of abode or business of

such person".

It will be set that Section 16 of the Bangalore Act

provides even more elaborately for the publication

of the initial notice which is given in section

4(1) of the Acquisition Act so that any representa-

tions which the objectors may have to make may be

considered by the Board itself under section 17 of

the Bangalore Act. Thus, the object of the

procedure provided by section 16 and section 17

seems to be to take the place of the notification

under section 4(1) and the hearing of objections

under section 5A of the Acquisition Act. Under the

Bangalore Act, it is the Board itself which gives

notices and considers objections to a scheme before

communicating the scheme to the Govt. for sanction.

It is true that the Board has not been specifically

given the power by the Bangalore Act to rescind the

scheme. The Bangalore Act only mentions the

Board’s power to modify the scheme, if it considers

that to be necessary. After that, the Act directs

the Board to send it to the Government for sanc-

tion. Of course, the Govt. could either sanction or

reject the scheme. And, in suitable cases, the

Board could perhaps revoke its own resolution.

But, we need not consider or decide that question

here. All we need observe here is that a corre-

sponding special procedure, which we find in the

provisions of section 16 of the Bangalore Act, need

not necessarily be identical with the general

procedure, serving the same object, which we find

in section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. We are

concerned more here with the identity of objects

and functions of provisions rather than with that

of precise steps prescribed or words used in them.

The next stage is found in section 18 which lays

down:

"18. On receipt of sanction, declaration to

be published giving particulars of land to be

acquired-

(1) (a) On receipt of the sanction of the Govern-

ment,. the Chairman shall forward a declaration for

notification under the signature of a Secretary to

the Government, stating the fact of such sanction

and that the land proposed to be acquired by the

Board for the purposes of the scheme is required

for a public purpose.

(b) The declaration shall be published in

the Mysore Gazette and shall state the limits;

within which the land proposed to be acquired is

situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its

approximate area and the place where a plan of the

land may be inspected.

(c) And upon such publication Board to

proceed to execute the scheme.--The said declara-

tion shall be conclusive evidence that the Land is

needed for a public purpose, and the Board shall,

upon the publication of the said declaration,

proceed to execute the scheme.

(2) Board to have power to alter any part

of the Scheme.--(a) If at any time it appears to

the Board that an improvement can be made in any

part of the scheme, the Board may alter the scheme

for the purpose of making such

189

improvement, and shall, subject to the provisions

contained in the next two clauses of this sub-

section forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as

altered.

(b) If the estimated cost of executing the

scheme as altered exceeds, by a greater sum than

five per cent the estimated cost of executing the

scheme as sanctioned, the Board shall not,

without the previous sanction of the Govern-

ment, proceed to execute. the scheme as altered.

(c) If the scheme as altered involves the

acquisition otherwise than by agreement, of any

land other than that specified in the schedule

accompanying the scheme under section 17(2)(e), the

provisions of sections 16 and 17 an sub-sec-

tion (1) shall apply to the part of the scheme so

altered, in the same manner as if such altered part

were the scheme".

It will be seen that, but for the 1st additional provi-

sion, contained in section 27 of the Bangalore Act, perhaps

it could be urged that the powers contained in section

4(2) of the Acquisition Act and the fight to damages, con-

tained in section 5 of the Acquisition Act, do not apply at

all to acquisition under the Act. Hence, this additional

provision became necessary. We are not called upon to

determine here at what stage, powers under section 4(2) of

the Acquisition Act could or should reasonably be. exercised

in a case falling under the provisions of the Bangalore

Act. Nevertheless, we may mention that it would seem more

reasonable to exercise the powers provided for by section

27(1) of the Bangalore Act (i.e. powers in section 4(2) of

the Acquisition Act) only after a notification under section

16 of this Act.

An examination of the provisions of the Bangalore Act

and of acquisition proceedings under the Acquisition Act,

contemplated by it, would reveal that, whereas the procedure

from the notification under section 4 to the notification

under section 6 of the Acquisition Act gives place to the

procedure provided by sections 14 to 18 of the Bangalore

Act, the stage at which compensation is to be determined is

to be regulated entirely by the general provisions of sec-

tion 23 (1) of the Acquisition Act because there is no

special or separate provision in the Bangalore Act to regu-

late the compensation payable. It is true that section 23

is not specifically mentioned in the Bangalore Act. But,

the obvious purposes of the opening words of section 27 of

the Bangalore Act seems to us to be that award of compensa-

tion, which is a necessary part of any law providing for

acquisition, must be governed by section 23 of the Acquisi-

tion Act. The last mentioned section enacts:

"23. Matters to be considered in determining

compensation.--(1) In determining the. amount of

compensation to be awarded for land acquired under

this Act, the Court shah take into

consideration--

190

first, the market value, of the land at the date

of the publication of the ’notification under

section 4, subsection ( 1 );

secondly, the damage sustained by the person

interested, by reason of the taking of any standing

crops or trees which may be on the land at the

time of the Deputy Commissioner’s taking possession

thereof;

thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the

person interested, at the time of the Deputy Com-

missioner’s taking possession of the land, by

reason of severing such land from his other land;

fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained. by the

person interested, at the time of the Deputy Com-

missioner’s taking pOssession of the land, by

reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting

his other property. movable or immovable, in any

other manner, or his earnings;

fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of

the land by the Deputy Commissioner, the person

interested is compelled to change hie residence. or

place of business, the reasonable expenses (if

any), incidental to such change; and

sixthly, the damage (if any), bona fide result-

ing from diminution of the profits of the land

between the time of the publication of the

declaration under section 6 and the time of the

Deputy Commissioner’s taking possession of the:

land.

(2) In addition to the market-value of the

land, as above provided, the Court shall in every

case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such

market value, in consideration of the compulsory

nature of the acquisition".

Non-specification of a different principle or procedure

in the Act, governing award of compensation under the Banga-

lore Act, far from indicating, as learned Judges of the High

Court erroneously opined, that section 23(1) of the Acquisi-

tion was not applicable here at all, was one of the strong-

est arguments for holding that it is covered by the general

provisions applied by section 27 of the Bangalore Act. An

acquisition proceeding without providing for award of com-

pensation on some principle is unthinkable. Such a situa-

tion would have invited an attack on the validity of the

acquisition itself. But, as we have already observed,

there is n‘ such challenge here.

There was some argument on the meaning of the words "so

far as they are applicable", used in section 27 of the

Bangalore Act. These words cannot be changed into: "in so

far as they are

191

specifically mentioned" with regard to the procedure in the

Acquisition Act. On the other hand, the obvious intention,

in using these words, was to exclude only those provisions

of the Acquisition Act which become inapplicable because of

any special procedure prescribed by the Bangalore Act

(e.g. section 16)corresponding with that found in the Acqui-

sition Act (e.g. section 4(1). These words bring in or

make applicable, so far as this is reasonably possible,

general provisions such as section 23(1) of the Acquisition

Act. They cannot be reasonably construed to exclude the

application of any general provisions of the Acquisition

Act. They amount to laying down the principle that what is

not either expressly, or, by. a necessary implication,,

excluded must be applied. It is surprising to find mis-

construction of what did not appear to us to be reasonably

open to more than one interpretation.

Learned Counsel for the respondents, rather desparately,

attempted to argue that, as there was no procedure or prin-

ciple laid down at all for award of compensation in the

Bangalore Act, we should invoke the aid of Equity and hold

that the market value should be determined with reference

to the date of notification under section 18 of the Act. We

do not think that such an argument could be advanced at all

in the face of the provisions of section 27(2) which clearly

equate a notification under section 18 of the Bangalore Act

with the notification under section 6 of the Acquisition

Act. We know the maxim that "equity follows the law". We

have not heard of the proposition that some transcendental

Equity should be so used as to defeat or amend the’ law as

it stands. Maitland said long ago that equity came to

supplement and not to supplant the law. We think that, if

we were to aquate a notification under section 18 with the

notification under section 6 of the Act for purposes of

determining the market value, which is to be awarded, we

would be doing nothing short-of supplanting at least ’the

law as found clearly laid own in section 27 of the Banga-

lore Act read with section 23 of the Acquisition Act. We

think that the Division Bench of’ the Karnataka High Court

had seriously misdirected itself in not giving effect to

obvious meanings of the plain words used in statutes under

consideration.

Another contention which found favour in the Karnataka

High Court was that a judgment filed by the respondents

claimants m Civil Appeals Nos. 644-650 of 1974, when they

appealed to the Karnataka High Court against the’ orders

passed by a Civil Judge of Bangalore, on a reference made

under the Acquisition Act, could be accepted as additional

evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. on the ground that

it. was relevant, evidence for the purpose of determining

compensation of lands which were the subject matter of

appeals before the High Court. The reasons given for admit-

ting, at the appellate stage, a judgment of the High Court,

which had not been filed before the Trial Court, were:

firstly, that it was not available when the proceedings

were pending in the Trial Court; and secondly, that lands

dealt with by the judgment were adjacent to the lands the

value of which needed determination, and that both sets of

192

lands were acquired at different stages of what is known as

the "layout scheme within the limits of Bhinnamangala vil-

lage’. The High Court overruled the objection that the

judgment admitted as additional evidence was not final

inasmuch as an appeal against it was pending in this Court.

We find that the High Court did not consider it, for some

reason, necessary to refer to the provisions of the Indian

Evidence Act which regulate the admissibility of all evi-

dence including judgments. There could be no question of

res judicata in such a case. The previous judgment was not

between the same parties. Furthermore, the appellant was

not given any opportunity of showing that the judgment

related to land which was at some distance from the lands

whose value was to be determined or that its site value was,

for some reason, higher. Even the time at which the value

of the other land was determined was not shown to be

identical. Such judgments are not judgments in rem. They

are judgments in personam. The general provision of law

governing admissibility of all judgments, whether they are

judgments in rem or judgments in personam operating as res

judicata, is section 43 of the Evidence Act which reads

as follows:

"43. Judgments, orders or decrees, other

than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42,

are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judg-

ment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is

relevant under some other provision of this Act".

It is apparent that section 43 enacts that judgments

other than those falling under sections 40 to. 42 are irrel-

evant unless they fall under some other provision of the

Evidence Act; and, even if they do fall under any such other

provision, all that is relevant, under section 43 of the

Evidence Act, is "the existence" of such judgment, order, or

decree provided it "is a fact in issue, or is relevant under

some other provision of this Act". An obvious instance of

such other provision is a judgment falling under section

13 of the Evidence Act. The illustration to section 13 of

the Evidence Act indicates the kind of facts on which the

existence of judgments may be relevant.

In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Lakhamsi

Ghelabhai,(1) Shelat J, held that judgments not inter

partes, relating to land acquired are not admissible merely

because the land dealt with n the judgment was situated near

the land of which the value is to be determined. It was

held there that such judgments would fall neither under

section 11 nor under section 13 of the Evidence Act. Ques-

tions relating to value of particular pieces of land depend

upon the evidence in the particular case in which those

facts are proved. They embody findings or opinions relating

to facts in issue and investigated in different cases. The

existence of a judgment would not prove he value of some

piece of land not dealt within at all in the judgment admit-

ted in evidence. Even slight differences in situation can,

(1) A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 78.

193

sometimes, cause considerable differences in value. We do

not think it necessary to take so restrictive a view of the

provisions of Sections 11 anti 13 of the Evidence Act as to

exclude such judgments altogether from evidence even when

good grounds are made out for their admission. In Khaja

Fizuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh,(1) a bench of three

Judges of this Court held such judgments to be relevant if

they relate to similarly situated properties and contain

determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the

relevant date in a case.

The Karnataka High Court had, however, not complied

with provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. which

require that an Appellate Courts should be satisfied that

the additional evidence is required to enable them either to

pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It

had recorded no reasons to show that it had considered the

requirements of Rule 27, Order 41, of the C.P.C. we are of

opinion that, the High Court should have recorded its rea-

sons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to

be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found

it necessary to admit it, an opportunity should have been

given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from

its existence by leading other evidence.

The result is that we allow these appeals and set aside

the judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court and

direct it to decide the cases afresh on evidence on record,

so as to determine the market value of the land acquired on

the date of the notification under section 16 of the

Bangalore Act. It will also decide the question, after

affording parties opportunities to lead necessary evi-

dence, whether the judgment, sought to be offered as addi-

tional evidence, could be admitted.

The parties will bear their own costs.

V.P.S. Appeal

allowed.

(1) C.A. No. 176 of 1962, decided on 10-4-1963.

194

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