PETITIONER:
LAKSHMI CHAND KHAJURIA & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. ISHROO DEVI
DATE OF JUDGMENT31/03/1977
BENCH:
KAILASAM, P.S.
GUPTA, A.C.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1694 1977 SCR (3) 400
1977 SCC (2) 501
ACT
Testamentary Will disposing of the ancestral property to
a far relation, whether valid under s. 27 of the Jammu &
Kashmir Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Scope of s. 27 and
explanation thereto--Whether income of a hereditary priest,
a hereditary Property--Mitakshara law as applicable to
Jammu & Kashmir--Though a wife cannot demand a partition
she is entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son
and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her
husband.
HEADNOTE
On the strength of a Will dated 25th May 1959, executed
in her favour by one Purohit Mani Ram, the respondent Smt.
Ishroo Devi filed a suit for recovery of the schedule
property in the plaint. It was alleged in the plaint that
the appellants (A-1, son; A-2, Wife; and A-3, grand-daughter
of Purohit Mani Ram) after the death of Purohit Mani Ram
wrongfully disposed her after getting the name of appellant
No. 1 mutated in the records and that the three items of the
schedule property were the separate properties of the testa-
tor and that he was entitled to dispose them under the Will.
The appellants averred in their written statement that the
properties belonged to the joint family of which the
first appellant and his father Purohit Mani Ram were members
and as the properties were joint family properties, they
cannot he disposed of by Will. It was further alleged that
the Will was a forged one and is fictitious. The trial
court, accepting the evidence of PW1, an advocate, who
advised in the preparation of the Will and also an attest-
ing witness, PW2 the scribe and PW3 who deposed the fact
that the properties were self-acquired ones of late Purohit
Mani Ram, decreed the suit as regards item No. 1 (a) of the
plaint schedule but dismissed the claim as regards items
l(b) and 2 holding that they were ancestral ones. On ap-
peal, the High Court accepted the findings of the trial
court and confirmed the decree as regards item l(a) of the
property but modified the order as regards item l(b) and
2 by allowing the claim of the respondent to the extent of
1/2 share since under s. 27 of the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu
Succession Act Mani Ram was entitled to dispose of his
interest in the joint family property by Will.
In appeal by certificate to this Court, the appellant
contended: (i) The Will was not a valid one for the reasons,
namely, (a) it was ante dated in order to escape the prohi-
bition against alienation introduced by Ordinance which came
into force in July 1959; (b) the signature on the Will was
forged; (c) the Will is a most unnatural one as it had not
provided for the son or the wife or any near relative but
has provided to a distant relative and (d) in a suit for
partition filed by the son against Mani Ram, the latter gave
an undertaking in the court not to alienate his properties
which would improbalise the execution of the Will; (ii)
The hereditary profession of Mani Ram being that of a
priest whatever he earned while practising that profession
and all his acquisitions should be held to be joint family
property. (iii) In view of the Mitakshara law applicable to
the estate when partition of the joint family property takes
place during the father’s life time at the instance of the
son, the mother also has a share equal to him.
The Court confirmed the decree in respect of item 1 (a)
of the property in favour of the respondent, modified the
decretal order of the High Court in respect of items 1(b)
and 2 of the schedule property as 1/3rd in favour of appel-
lant No. 1, 1/3rd in favour of appellant No. 2 and 1/3rd in
favour of respondent as entitled by the Will. The Court,
HELD: (1) The plea that the Will was executed after July
1959 when there was a prohibition against the alienation and
that it was pre-dated and not executed
401
on the day on which it purports to be is without any sub-
stance and against the evidence on record. [403 H, 404 A]
(2) The contention that the Will is an unnatural one is
also without substance. The non-disclosure of the execu-
tion of the Will is understandable because Mani Ram did not
want anyone, particularly his son, to know about his pos-
sessing of the property by Will. [404 B, D]
(3) The findings of the two lower courts that the Will
is a genuine one and was executed by Mani Ram by his own
free will cannot be assailed. In fact, there was no chal-
lenge to the gist of the Will noted by PW2, the scribe, in
one of his regularly kept record; there was no denial by the
first appellant, the son of Mani Ram that the signature
found in the Will was not that of his father and there is
no reason why the cogent evidence of PW 1, a respectable
advocate who spoke of his advising in the preparation of the
Will having seen the executant sign the Will in his presence
be not accepted. [405 A-C]
(4) The income from the practice of a hereditary profes-
sion will not be a joint family property. Item 1 (a) of the
Property is the self-acquisition of Mani Ram and the decree
of the appellate court so far as item No. 1 (a) is concerned
must be confirmed. [406 A, D]
Hanso Pathak v. Harmandil Pathak and Anr., AIR 1934
Allahabad 851, approved.
Chalabhai Gaurishankar v. Hargowan Ramji & Ors. I.L.R.
36 Born. 94, over-ruled.
(5) Under the Mitakshara law excepting Madras, in the
other states referred to in the decisions cited when there
is a partition between the son and his father the mother is
entitled to a share equal to that of the son. In the in-
stant case the case of the first appellant was that the
joint family consisted of himself and his father alone,
though in the earlier partition suit filed by him he
claimed 1/3rd share conceding that his father and mother are
entitled to the other 2/3rd share. As no decision in re-
spect of the interest of the male Hindu in Jammu & Kashmir
was cited the question is remitted to the High Court for
decision as to what is the extent of the interest as regards
items I(b) & 2 of the plaint Schedule properties. [406
E-F, 407 B-E]
Dular Koeri v. Dwarkanath Misser ILR 32 Cal. 234; Sumrun
Thakoor v. Chunder Mun Misser & Ors., ILR 8 Cal. 17; Hos-
banna Devanna Naik v. Devanna Sannappa Naik and Ors. ILR
48 Bom. 468 and Pratap Singh v. Dalip Singh ILR 52 All. 596,
approved.
(6) In view of s. 27 of the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 which provides that any Hindu male may dispose of
by Will any property which capable of being disposed of by
him in law and also explanation to that section which makes
it clear that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakahara
coparcenary property be deemed to be property capable of
being disposed of by him within the meaning of the sub-
section, in the instant case Mani Ram can dispose of his
share under a Will. Admittedly the respondent, will be
entitled to 1/3rd share in respect of item l(b) and 2 of the
plaint schedule in addition to the decree in her favour in
respect of item 1 (a). [406 D-E, 407 E-F]
[The Court remitted the case back for the determination
of the interest which Mani Ram had in the joint family
property at the time of his death which he could dispose
of by his Will and grant a decree accordingly.]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 2330 of 1968
(From the Judgment and Order dated the 12th March, 1968
of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Civil First Appeal No.
9 of 1966.)
G.B. Pai, S.K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga; for the appel-
lants.
402
O. P. Malhotra, K.J. John and Shri Narain for the respond-
ent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KAILASAM, J.---This appeal is preferred by the defendant
in the suit on a certificate of fitness granted by the High
Court of Jammu & Kashmir under Article 133 of the Constitu-
tion.
The respondent, Ishroo Devi, filed a suit for a decree
for possession of all the three items of property mentioned
in the plaint and for future mesne profits. It was al-
leged that the three items of property mentioned in the’-
plaint were the self-acquired properties of one Purohit
Mani Ram. He executed a will on 25th May, 1959, out of
his own free will in favour of the respondent. The origi-
nal will was attached to the plaint. Purohit Mani Ram
died on 24th March, 1960, at Jammu and the respondent
claimed to be the sole owner of the properties.
The first appellant is the son, the second appellant is
the wife and the third appellant is the grand-daughter of
Purohit Mani Ram. In the plaint it is alleged that the
first appellant after the death of Purohit Mani Ram got
rent deed executed in his favour and also recorded mutations
in his name and dispossessed the respondent. The respond-
ent also claimed that the three items of property were the
separate properties of Purohit Mani Ram and that he was
entitled to dispose of them under a will. In the written
statement the appellants averred that the properties be-
longed to the joint family of which the first appellant and
his father, Purohit Mani Ram, were members and as the
properties were joint family properties, they cannot be
disposed of by will. It was further alleged that the will
was a forged one and is fictitious.
The respondent examined Janak Lal Sehgal, an advocate
of the Supreme Court, and the scribe of the will one Bodh
Raj. P.W. 1, the advocate, stated that Mani Ram executed
the will on 25th May, 1959, in favour of the respondent.
He saw Mani Ram affix his signature on the will the words
(in vernacular) under which Janak Lal had signed as wit-
ness, were under the words (in vernacular) where Purohit
Mani Ram had signed. Janak Lal had given the date with his
own hand where he had signed as witness. The witness also
testified that the mental condition of Purohit Mani Ram was
good and he executed the will of his own free will and no
pressure or fraud was played on him. P.W. 2 Bodh Raj, is
the scribe of the will. He stated that he wrote the will at
the instance of Mani Ram and after reading the. will and
explaining it to the testator, the testator affixed his
signature and admitted it to be correct. According to the
witness the will was executed on 25th May, 1959, and on the
same date the signature of the testator and those of the
witnesses were affixed. At the time of the examination the
witness stated that the physical and the mental condition of
the testator was good and he read out the will at the
house of Janak Lal Sehgal and obtained the signatures of
Mani Ram and that of P.W. 1, the advocate. P.W. 3, Lodra
Mani, stated that Mani Ram was the A.D.C. of Maharaja Pratap
Singh and was in service for Maharaja’s Puja, and that the
Maharaja was giving
403
lot of money to Purohit Mani Ram as present. The witness
also stated that item 1 of the properties was constructed by
Mani Ram with his own income.
On behalf of the appellants a handwriting expert, Philip
Hardless, and three witnesses were examined in addition to
the first appellant.
The trial court accepted the evidence of P.W. 1, the
advocate, and P.W. 2, the scribe and held that the will was
proved. Holding that items 1 (b) and 2 of the plaint
schedule properties were ancestral properties found that
Mani Ram had no authority to dispose of these two items of
properties by will. Therefore while decreeing the suit as
regards item No. (1)(a) of the plaint schedule properties
dismissed the claim as regards items 1 (b).and 2.
On appeal by the appellants a Bench of the Jammu &
Kashmir High Court agreeing with the finding of the trial
court and accepting the testimony of P.W. 1, the advocate,
and P.W. 2, the scribe of the will, found it to be genuine
and executed by Mani Ram. The appellate court also con-
firmed the finding of the trial court that the item l(a) of
the property is self-acquired property of Mani Ram while
items l(b) and 2 are the ancestral properties. While
confirming the decree of the trial court as regards item
l(a) it allowed the respondent’s claim regarding items 1
(b) and 2 to the extent of one.half share holding that under
section 27 of the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Succession Act,
Mani Ram was entitled to dispose of his interest in the
joint family property by will. Aggrieved by the decision
of the Bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court the appel-
lants have preferred this appeal.
Though the Concurrent finding of both the courts below
is that the will was a valid one and was executed by Mani
Ram of his own free will and when possessed of all his
faculties Mr. Pai, the Counsel for the appellants, strenous-
ly contended that the finding should not be accepted. He
submitted that a look at the signature of Mani Ram in the
will and his signatures in admitted documents would prove
that the signature in the will is not that of Mani Ram. He
next contended that the will was antedated in order to
escape the prohibition against alienation introduced by an
Ordinance which came into force in July, 1959, Thirdly, he
submitted that the will is a most unnatural one as it had
not provided for the son, or the wife’ or near relatives but
had given the entire property to a distant relation.
Fourthly, he submitted that in a suit which was filed by the
son for partition against Mani Ram, the latter gave an
undertaking not to alienate his properties and taking into
account the proceedings it is most unlikely that he would
have executed the will at time which it purports to be as he
would have mentioned about his execution of the will in the
proceedings. We have examined all these points very care-
fully and we find that there is no substance in any one of
them.
The plea that the will was executed after July, 1959,
when there was a prohibition against the alienation and it
was pre-dated is without any substance. The will is dated
25th May, 1959, and a contemporaneous record of the sub-
stance of the will is made by P.W. 2
404
in one of his regularly kept books. We see no need for
predating of the will and the basis of the argument that the
will was not executed on the day on which it purports to be
is without substance.
Regarding the next contention that the will is an unnat-
ural one it has to be seen that the son had filed a suit for
partition and in the written statement the father had gone
so far as to disown his paternity. It is common ground that
the relationship between Mani Ram and his son was greatly
strained and it is not surprising that he has disowned him,
in unmistakable terms in the will. The submission that
the will would not have been executed in mid 1959 is based
on the plea that he had made a statement in December, 1959,
that he had not alienated any property. The son in the
suit prayed for an order against Mani Ram restraining him
from alienating the joint family properties except with the
permission of the court. A consent order was passed di-
recting Mani Ram not to alienate joint family properties.
There was no need for Mani Ram to mention about the will
for it is not an alienation and in any event the will ac-
cording to Mani Ram did not relate to joint family proper-
ties. The nondisclosure of the execution of the will is
understandable because Mani Ram did not want anyone particu-
larly his son to know about his dispossessing of the proper-
ty by will. This ground also is without substance.
The main ground of attack was that on the face of it, it
is apparent that the signature is not that of Mani Ram.
The appellate court has found that Mani Ram was an illiter-
ate person and that he had no standard signature. His
signature is not well formed, but his signature in the
Vakalatnama and in the will bear striking, resemblance as
found by the Bench of the High Court. Though there are
certain dissimilarities between the signature in the will
and in those of admitted documents we are unable to say that
the signature in the will is not that of Mani Ram. In this
connection we have examined the evidence of the handwriting
expert who gave evidence on behalf of the appellants. We
feel that his qualifications are not such as to accept him
as a handwriting expert. He has hardly done any work as an
expert after 1950 and we find in his deposition that he
has exceeded the limits as an expert and supported the
appellants in matters which were not within his province.
We have no hesitation in agreeing with the High Court and
rejecting his testimony. A comment was made on the fact
that the date and endorsement in the will is in a different
ink and probably was not written at the same time. In this
connection a discrepancy in the evidence of the scribe, P.W.
2, as to where actually the date was noted whether it was in
his house or that of the lawyer’s was made much of. We do
not think that this discrepancy would affect the. truth of
the matter. It is seen that P.W. 2 in his record entered
summary of the will on the same day. It is significant that
in the cross examination no question was asked challenging
the genuineness. The entry with regard to the will was
made by P.W. 2 in the Register which is a public register
and on examination we find there is nothing suspicious about
it. It
405
may also be noted that the first appellant, the son of Mani
Ram, has not stated that the signature found in the will is
not that of his father. Apart from all these circumstances
we find the evidence of P.W. 1 a respectable advocate, who
speaks of his advising in the preparation of the will, his
seeing the executant sign the will in his presence can be
safely accepted. Excepting that a statement which he made
as a witness was rebutted by a District Judge nothing else
has been suggested against him. We have no hesitation in
accepting the evidence of these two witnesses, as the two
lower courts have done. There is no ground at all for
rejecting the evidence of P.W. 2, the scribe, whose evidence
has been accepted by both the courts. The scribe had
immediately noted the gist of the will in one of his regu-
larly kept records which has not been challenged. We have,
therefore, no hesitation in accepting the finding of the two
lower courts that the will is a genuine one. and was execut-
ed by Mani Ram of his own free will.
Mr. Pai, counsel for the appellants, submitted that the
High Court was in error in holding that item 1 (a) of the
properties is the self acquired property of Mani Ram.
According to the learned counsel the hereditary profession
of Mani Ram was that of a priest and whatever he earned
while practising that profession and all his acquisisions
should be held to be joint family property. The evidence
is that Main Ram was not only a priest but worked in three
posts. He was a priest and at the same time was in the
private office of the Maharaja and was also an A.D.C. of the
Maharaja and the Maharaja used to give presents to him. It
is in evidence that the Maharaja had given. the land and
himself constructed the Kothi before giving it to Mani
Ram. In support of the contention that the income
derived from practice of a hereditary profession should be
construed as ancestral property, the learned counsel re-
ferred us to two decisions in Ghelabhai Gavrishankar v.
Hargowan Ramit & Others(1), and Hanso Pathak v. Harmandil
Pathak and Another.(2). Neither of the cases support the
contention of the learned counsel. In the first case the
question that arose for consideration was about the nature
of the office of a hereditary priest. It was held that the
hereditary right of the priest is immovable property.
Chandavarkar J. pointed out that hereditary priesthood
vested in particular families is regarded as vritti or
immoveable property but we do not find any support for the
contention that the income of the hereditary priest will
also be hereditary property. In fact in Hanso Pathak v.
Harmandil Pathak and Anr. (supra) it has been made clear
that in the United Provinces the income received as amounts
paid by Yajamans at their discretion either by way of chari-
ty or by way of remuneration for personal services rendered
by the priest, cannot be claimed as of right, and cannot
amount to a family property. Chief Justice Sulaiman ex-
pressed his view that the income received as amounts paid by
people at their discretion either by way of charity or by
way of remuneration for personal services rendered cannot be
claimed as of right amount to family property. Mukerji,
J.in a concurring judgment after distinguishing
1. I.L.R. 36 Bom. 94.
2. A.I.R. 1934. All. 351.
406
Ghelabhai Gavrishankar v. Hargowan RamIi & Others (supra)
held that the income is "Vidyadhana" which is the same thing
as "gains of science" or what has been acquired by exercise
of learning cannot be divided by partition. We agree with
the view thus expressed by the Allahabad High Court and find
that the income from the practice of a hereditary profession
will not be joint family property.
Mani Ram was getting Rs. 100 as A.D.C. and was in addi-
tion drawing a salary of Rs. 140 a month as an employee in
the private Department of the Maharaja. Thus he had ample
means to acquire item 1 (a) of the property from his self-
acquisition. On the other hand there is hardly any evi-
dence to prove that he had any ancestral nucleus. It is
stated that the family had some jewels and cash which were
kept in the safe of the Maharaja and there is nothing to
indicate that any thing out of the cash or jewellery was
used in purchasing item 1 (a) of the property. I was
also contended that the property that belonged to Mani Ram
was only the house and not the land attached to the house.
We have no hesitation in rejecting this desperate plea. The
result is we confirm the findings of the courts below that
item 1 (a) of the property is the self-acquisition and the
decree of the appellate court so far as item 1 (a) is
concerned is confirmed.
Regarding items 1 (b) and 2 the appellate court has
found that they are joint family properties. It is admit-
ted by both the parties that under section 27 of the Jammu &
Kashmir Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the interest of the
coparacener in a joint Hindu family property can be disposed
of by will. Section 27 provides that any Hindu may
dispose of by will any property which is capable of being
disposed by him in law. The EXplanation to the section
makes it clear that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitak-
shara coparacenary property be deemed to be property capa-
ble of being disposed of by him within the meaning of the
sub-section. As the joint family consisted of Mani Ram and
his son, the first appellant, the appellate court gave a
decree in favour of the respondent so far as one-half share
of items 1 (b) and 2 of the properties are concerned. The
counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellate court
was in error in determining the interest of the testator as
one-half share in the two items of joint family property.
He submitted that according to Mitakshara law except in
Madras when there is a partition between the son and his
father, mother is entitled to a share equal to that of the
son. In support of his contention the learned counsel
referred to Mulla’s Hindu Law, 14th Ed., p.403, paragraph
315, where it is stated that while the wife cannot demand a
partition, but if a partition does take place between her
husband and his sons, she is entitled to receive a share
equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share
separately even from her husband. To the same effect is the
passage in Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th Ed., p. 534, paragraph
434, where it is stated "According to the Mitakshara law,
the mother or the. grandmother is entitled to a share when
sons or grandsons divide the family estate between them-
selves, but she cannot be recognised as the owner of such
share until the division is actually made, as she has no
pre-existing right in the estate except a right of mainte-
nance." Reference
407
was also made to the decisions reported in Dular Koeri v.
Dwarkanath Misser(1), where it was held that under the
Mitakshara law when partition of joint family property
takes place during the father’s lifetime at the,instance of
the son, the mother of the son is entitled to a share equal
to that of her husband and her son and she is entitled o
have the share separately allotted and to enjoy that share
when so allotted. In Sumrun Thakoor v. Chunder Mun Misser
& Others ,(2) it was held that under the Mitakshara law
where a paration takes place between a father and a son, the
wife of the father is entitled to a share. In Hosbanna
Devanna Naik v. Devenna Sannappa Naik and Others(3), it was
held that a step-mother is entitled to a share on parti-
tion between the father and his sons. In Partap Singh v.
Dalip Singh, (4) in a partition between a Hindu father and
his son it was held that the wife of the .father has a right
to a share equal to that of the father or the sons. In
Madras, though Mitakshara law is applicable it has been
held that on a partition between the sons and the father,
the mother is not entitled to any share. (Mulla’s Hindu
Law, 14th Ed., p.403--"Madras State.--In Southern India the
practice of allotting shares upon partition to females has
long since become obsolete."). So far as Jammu & Kashmir is
concerned there is no decisions regarding the interest of a
male Hindu in property. This question as. to what is the
interest of Mani Ram in the joint family property at the
time of his death was not, raised before the High Court. In
fact, the case first appellant was that the joint family
consisted of himself and his father alone, though in the
partition suit filed by him he claimed onethird share con-
ceding that his father and mother are entitled to the other
two-third share. Though the question was not raised in any
of the courts below, we feel that being a pure question of
law, interests of justice require that the question be
decided. The High Court will decide the interest which Mani
Ram had in the joint family property at the time of his
death which he could dispose of by his will. In remitting
this question to the High Court, we decree he suit of the
respondent in respect of item 1 (a) one-third share in items
1 (b) and 2 of the plaint schedule properties as to that
extent her share is not questioned. The question as to what
is the extent of the interest as regards items 1 (b) and 2
of the plaint schedule properties which can be bequeathed by
Mani Ram in favour of the respondent is remitted to the High
Court for its determination. If the High Court finds that
the respondent is entitled to one-third share it will decide
accordingly. If it comes to the conclusion that Mani Ram
was. entitled to bequeath a greater share it will grant a
decree accordingly. There will be no order as to
costs--appeal disposed of accordingly.
S.R. Decree granted.
(1) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 234.
(2)I.L.R. 8 Cal. 17.
(3) I.L.R. 48 Bom. 468.
(4)I.L.R. 52 All. 596.
408