PETITIONER:
KUNJUKUTTY SAHIB ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KERALA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1972
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
MITTER, G.K.
SIKRI, S.M. (CJ)
SHELAT, J.M.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1972 AIR 2097 1973 SCR (1) 326
1972 SCC (2) 364
ACT
Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963 (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1969-Amending Act not put in 9th Schedule to the Constitution-Whether protected by Art. 31-A of Constitution-Validity of s. 73 providing for liquidation of arrears of rent-Such arrears whether interest in land-Whether ’estate’ within meaning of Art. 31-A-Validity of s. 45-A, and of explanation to s. 85(1)-Reduction of ceiling limit under Act-Land above new ceiling but under original ceiling acquired without payment of market value compensation-Validity-Rights given to Kudikidappukars-Validiy of-Rights of landlords vis-a-vis the tenant, such as quarrying rights, whether vest in Government under s. 72.
HEADNOTE
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964) as originally enacted was specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and was thus protected under Art. 31-B of the Constitution., However the subsequent amending act namely the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act.1969, was not placed in the Ninth Schedule. The validity of the Act as amended was challenged in the High Court in the writ petitions out of which the present appeals arose. The State relied on Art. 31-A of the Constitution. The High Court help some of the provisions of the Act to be unconstitutional. In appeal by the State and by some of the writ petitioners the questions that fell for determination by this Court were : (i) whether arrears of rent being a charge on the interest of the tenant under s. 42 of the Act constituted an interest in land within the meaning of the word ’estate’ as defined in s. 31-A, and consequently whether s. 73; of the Act which provided for the liquidation of arrears of rent was protected by Art. 31-A although held violative of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution by the High Court; (ii) whether s. 45-A of the Act was valid it being conceded by the parties that its validity depended on that of s. 73: (iii) whether the explanation to s. 85(1) of the Act was violative of the second proviso to Art. 31-A (1); (iv) whether the amended Act when it reduced the ceiling limit and required surrender of the land held in excess of the limit fixed by the amended Act, without payment of compensation at market value, violated the constitutional inhibition contained in the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1); (v) whether the High Court after striking down s. 50-A(2) of the Act was justified in adding the rider that the finding would not affect the vesting of the landlord’s rights in the Government if they had so vested under s. 72; (vi) whether the rights given to the Kudikidappukars under the Act were a measure of agrarian reform even though the definition of ’Kudikidappukaran’ in s. 2(25) of the Act was not confined to agricultural labourers: and (vii) whether the extinguishment or modification of land-lord’s rights vis-avis the tenant would also be within the ambit of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. HELD:(i) The argument that arrears of interest is a charge on the estate and, being, therefore a right in land, can be extinguished as an estate was unacceptable on the language of the impugned statutory provisions. The liability to pay arrears of rent under the impugned Act, assuming the charge created by s. 42 is an interest in land, is not a 32 7 right in land; besides the liability being also a personal liability it would clearly amount to a debt, Acquisition or extinguishment of such a personal liability for payment of money cannot be covered by Art. 31-A, That money cannot be acquired is clear from the majority view of this Court’s decision in Kameshwar Singh’s case. Looking at the table incorporated in s. 73 it is obvious that the amount of rent to be paid for getting discharge of the whole debt has been arbitrarily fixed and does not seem to be founded on any rational, logical or just basis. [337 E--F] The amelioration of indebtedness of tenants is a laudable and desirable object. But the person to whom the arrears of rent are due to also entitled to seek protection of his legitimate right and if the acquisition of arrears of rent is outside the protection of Art. 31-A then the provisions cannot but be held invalid. It prima facie partakes of the character of forfeiture of confiscation of the discharged arrears. Art 39 of the Constitution to which reference was made can be implemented by other permissible means without violation or abridging the just and legitimate rights of those to whom the arrears of rents are clue. Section 73 was, therefore, rightly struck down by the majority opinion, [337 H-338 B] Pritam Singh Chahil v. Stale of Punjab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 536, State of Gujarat v. Jetawat Lalsingh Amarsingh & Ors., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 270, M. K. Subbachariar v, The State of Madras, I.L.R. [1967] 2 Mad. 646, Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 82, State of Bihar v. Umesh Jha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 687, State of Bihar v. Maharadhiraja Sir Kaineshwar Singh of Darbhanga, [1952] S.C.R. 889 at 1000- 1002, K. K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 887 and Khajamian Wakf Estates v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 161, referred to. (ii)On the above finding s. 45-A which broadly speaking provides that rent received after May 19, 1967 but before the commencement of the amendment Act of 1969, and appropriated towards arrears of rent for the period prior to May 1, 1966 shall be adjusted towards rent accrued due for period after May 1, 1966, must also be struck down as unconstitutional. [338 B-C] (iii) Theexplanation to s. 85(1) was rightly struck down by the" High Court. It is clear that by virtue of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1) landwithin the ceiling limit is expressly protected against acquisition by the State unless the law relating to such acquisition provides for compensation which is not less than its market value. No attempt was made to take the impugned explanation out of this constitutional limitation. [340 F--G] (iv)Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to market value, but once the ceiling limit was changed by the amended Act the second proviso to Art, 31-A(1) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates, only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law, at the given time. It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of the ceiling limit. But it was not contended that a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring theland in excess would offend any,provision of he Constitution. [341 C-E] (v)The High Court while holding s. 50-A,(2) invalid should not have added the rider that the finding would not affect the vesting of the land- 328 lord’s rights in the Government if they had so vested under s. 72. In none, of these cases artthem facts and circumstances on which the rider could operate. The precise point covered by the rider directly arises for determination in a numb& of other cases pending before the High Court. Expression of OPinion on the rider was not necessary for giving relief to the parties approaching the High Court in these cases, The question must, therefore, be left open to be determined by the High Court in cases in which the question directly arises. [341 H, 342 C] (vi)(a) The mere fact that the definition of ’kudikidappukaran’ in s. 2(25) of the Act was not confined to agricultural labourers did not make the provisions relating to the rights or Kudikidappukars invalid. In Ranjit Singh’s case this Court considered it proper to place a liberal construction on Art. 31-A so as to cover cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely designed to carry out agrarian reform and something ancillary thereto has to be undertaken to give full effect to such reforms. According to ’the High Court all the lands in the present cases were agricultural lands constituting estates within the contemplation of Art. 3 1 A(2) (a) (iii) and all the persons benefited by the impugned provisions were occupants of huts on such agricultural lands and were connected with agriculture. The erection of a homestead etc. cannot in the circumstances of these cases deviate from the general agricultural purpose. [343 BC, 348 C] Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 82, applied. Inder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 603, referred to. [The Court, however, made it clear that it was not expressing any opinion where the provisions of the Act were utilised for lands which are not agricultural lands and do not constitute estates nor where the beneficiary happens to be a person not substantially connected with agriculture, occupying nonagricultural land or where the facts are not covered by the general test laid down in the case of Ranjit Singh.] [348 E] (b)The objection that the area of land permitted to be purchased by Kudikidappukars is unreasonably excessive and there is no. obligation on them to use the land for agricultural purposes is without merit. The transfer is mainly of agricultural land to the landless occupant and it is likely to be used only for purposes of cultivation. This is ancillary to agrarian reforms. A part of the land is intended to be used for erecting a homestead etc., by the occupant. Such erection cannot deviate from the general agricultural purpose. [348 G-H] (vii)The question whether a landlord’s right to quarry would be affected by the vesting provision in s. 72 could not be considered because the question was not raised in the writ petition or the High Court. Such opinions partake of the nature of obiter. ’Without dealing with any hypothetical question it was sufficient to point out that extinguishment or Modification of landlord’s rights vis-avis the tenant would also be within the ambit of Art. 31-A of the Constitution if otherwise it was related to agrarian reforms. [349 C-E]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 143. 203 to 242, 274 and 309 of 1971. Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 14, 1970 of the Kerala High Court in Original Petitions Nos. 723 of 1970 etc. etc. 329 T.Subramania Iyer and A. Sreedharan Nambiar, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 143 of 1971). M. M. Abdul Khader, Advocate-General for the State of Kerala, K.M. K. Nair and Varghese Kaliath, for the appellants (in C. s. Nos. 203 to 242 of 1971) and Respondent No. 1 (in C. A s. No,-, 143, 274 and 309 of 1971). T.Subramania Iyer, C. M. Devan, S. Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate, for the appellants (in C.A. 274 of 1971). G. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, C. M. Devan, S. Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate, for the appellant (in C.A. 309 of 1971). N.Sudhakaran and P. Kesava Pillai, for respondent No. 8 (in C.A. No. 203 of 1971). A.Sreedharan Nambiar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 5 (in C.A. No. 206 of 1971) and the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 208, 219 and 235 of 1971). C.S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 210 and 216 of 1971). T.Subramania Iyer, and P. Kesava Pillail for the respondent (in C.A. No. 214 of 1971). S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 221 of 1971). M. Veerappa, for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 (in C.A. No. 240 of 1971). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. These are 43 appeals (C.As. Nos. 143, 274, 309 and 203 to 242 of 1971), 40 appeals (C.As. Nos. 203 to 242 of 1971) being by the State of Kerala and the Land Board and the remaining three by some of the writ petitioners in the High Court. Most of the material provisions of the amended Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act No. 1 of 1964 (hereinafter called the impugned Act) were challenged in the High Court as violative of Arts. 14, 19, 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution. Quite a number of writ petitions, however, assailed the entire impugned Act on that score. The sole defence in sustaining the constitutional validity of the impugned Act was based on Art. 31A of the Constitution. The High Court struck down several provisions of the impugned Act. In the State appeals (C.As. Nos. 203 to 242 of 1971) the judgment of the High Court is questioned only in so far as it struck down s. 73 and explanation to s. 85(1) of the impugned Act. The judgment 330 appealed from is reported as V. N. Narayana Nair v. State of Kerala(1). Raman Nair, C.J., and Raghavan J., expressed their conclusions through the Chief Justice thus :
"In the result we declare the following
provisions of the Act void; Section 29-A,
Section 32 in so far as (-and only in so far
as) it bars a Civil Court from prohibiting a
person who has made an application for
determination of fair rent from entering on
the land to which the application relates so
long as the application is pending. Section
45-A, sub-section (2) of Section 50-A, section
73, the Explanation to sub-section (1) of
Section 85 and sub-section (7) of section 125.
For the rest we dismiss the petitions but make
it clear that this dismissal involves no
pronouncement regarding provisions which we
have not expressly considered. We make no
order as to costs." Mathew J., in a separate judgment upheld the validity of s. 73 but on a other points he agreed with the majority. It may at the outset be pointed out that the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act No. 1 of 1964) as originally enacted was specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution (item No. 39 in that Schedule) and is, therefore, immune from constitutional challenge founded on the ground that the provisions of the said Act are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution : vide Art. 31-B. it is only the s ubsequent amendment of the original Act which. having not been specified in the Ninth Schedule, is open to attack as violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Section 73 of the impugned Act which was substituted for the old s. 73 of the original Act reads : "73. Discharge of arrears of rent.-
(1)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being
in force, or in any contract, or in any
judgment, decree or order of any court or
tribunal, the landlord of a tenant specified
in column (1) of the Table below shall be
entitled to recover towards arrears of rent
accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1968
and outstanding at the commencement of the
Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969,
only the amount specified in the corresponding
entry in ’column (2) of the Table (1) A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 98. 331
Provided that where an intermediary has
collected rent from his tenant for any period
prior to the 1st day of May, 1968 and has not
paid the rent payable by him to his landlord
for the period for which he has so collected,
he, shall also be liable to pay the rent
payable by him for such period to his landlord
Provided further that, subject to the
foregoing proviso, no intermediary shall be
liable to pay to his landlord anything in
excess of what he is entitled to receive under
this subsection. Class of tenant Amount of rent to be paid for
discharge
(1) (2) Tenant possessing not more than 5 One year’s rent or the acers actual amount of land in in arrears, whichever is the aggregate, whether as less owner mortgage, lessee or otherwise. Tenant possessing more than 5 acres Two year’s rent or the but actual amount not more than actual amount in arrears 10 acres of land in the whichever is less aggregate, whether as owner, mortgage, lessee or otherwise. Tenant possessing more than 10 acres Three years’ rent of land in the aggregate, whether or the actual amou as owner,mortage, lessee or nt in arrears, whichotherwise. ever is less.
Provided that where the tenant is in
possession of more than fifteen acres of land
in the aggregate, whether as owner, mortgagee,
lessee or otherwise, and the landlord is a
small holder, the tenant shall be liable to
pay the actual amount in arrears.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,
the rent for an year shall be deemed to be an
amount equal to the rent payable for the year
immediately preceding the commencement of the
Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and
which has accrued due before such
commencement.
(2) Where any suit, appeal, revision or
application which involves a claim by a
landlord for arrears of rent accrued due prior
to the 1st day of May, 1968, is pending,
before any court or Land Tribunal, such court
or Land Tribunal may, after such enquiry as it
deems fit, pass an order specifying.
(a) the amount to which the landlord is
entitled under’ sub-section (1); L128 Sup IC/72 332
(b) the costs, if any, awarded to the
landlord in connection with the conduct of the
proceedings after the commencement of the
Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969;
(c) the costs, if any, awarded to the tenant
in connection with-the conduct of the
proceedings after such commencement; and
(d) where such costs are awarded to the
tenant, the amount due to the landlord
deducting such costs.
(3) Where any decree or order has been
passed in favour of a landlord before the
commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1969, by any court or Land
Tribunal for the recovery of arrears of rent
accrued due prior to the 1st day of May, 1968,
such decree or order shall be enforceable only
to the extent of the amount due to such
landlord under sub-section (1); and to
determine such amount, any of the parties to
the decree or order may apply to the court or
the Land Tribunal, as the case may be, which
passed the decree or order, to amend such
decree or order in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (1).
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-
section (3), the court or the Land Tribunal,
as the case may be may, after such enquiry as
it deems fit, reopen the decree or order and
pass an order containing the particulars
specified in sub-section (2).
(5) Any landlord who has not instituted a
suit or applied under section 26 for recovery
of arrears of rent accrued due prior to the
1st day of May, 1968, before the commencement
of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,
1969, may apply to the Land Tribunal under
that section for recovery of the amount due to
him under sub-section (1) of this section.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in
section 26, on receipt of an application
referred to in subsection (5), the Land
Tribunal may, after such enquiry as it deems
fit, pass an order containing the particulars
specified in sub-section (2).
(7) The tenant shall deposit the amount
specified in an order under sub-section (2)
or subsection (4) or sub-section (6) as due
from him in the court or Land Tribunal which
passed the order within a period of six months
from the date of the order.
333
(8) If the tenant fails to deposit any
amount as required by sub-section (7), such
amount shall, on a written requisition from
the court or the Land Tribunal, as the case
may be, to the District Collector, be reco-
vered under the provisions of the Kerala
Revenue Recovery Act, 1968, together with
interest at the rate of six per cent per annum
from the date of the order under sub-section
(2) or sub-section (4) or subsection (6) as
the case may be.
(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this section a tenant who has paid the
amount as provided in
section 34 of the Kerala Agrarian Relations
Act, 1960, or in section 5 of the Kerala
Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars
Protection Act, 1962, for the discharge of arrea rs of rent outstanding on the 1 1th day
of April, 1957, or the arrears of rent accrued
due after that date and outstanding on the
15th day of February, 1961, on or before the
date specified in those Acts for the payment
of the amount, shall not be liable to pay any
amount towards arrears of rent for that
period.
(10) The assignment by a landlord of his
right to receive arrears of rent to any other
person shall not affect the benefits conferred
on a tenant under this section."
The majority opinion of the High Court, while
striking down this section, observed
"Under s. 73, all arrears of rent accrued due
before the 1st May, 1968 and outstanding at
the commencement of the amending Act are wiped
off except to the extent of one year’s rent in
the case of a tenant possessing not more than
five acres of I-and, of two years’ rent in the
case of a tenant possessing more than five
acres but not more than ten acres of land, and
three years’ rent in the case of a tenant
possessing more than ten acres. However, when
the tenant is in possession of more than
fifteen acres and the landlord is a small
holder the tenant is liable to pay the entire
arrears. This section, it seems to us, cannot
get the protection of Article 31-A. Rent yet
to accrue is no doubt a legal incident of the
property concerned-see Section 8 of the
Transfer of Property Act and the right to
receive rent in the future might well be
regarded as a right in the estate constituted
by the land. But rent in arrear only
constitutes a debt, and excepting perhaps to
the extent to which it is a charge on the
land, is not an interest therein. (See in this
connection A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252). ’Me effect
of Section 73 is not merely
334
to deprive the landlord of the charge
conferred on him by Section 42 but to wipe off
the debt itself and this debt not being an
interest in the land, it seems to us clear
that the section cannot have the protection of
Article 3 1 A. That protection is afforded
only in so far as the acquisition,
extinguishment or modification of rights in an
estate are concerned. That is an essential
element of agrarian reform and the so-called
incidental or ancillary provisions can get the
protection only in so far as they are
necessary for effectively implementing the
reform or are otherwise an integral part of
the reform. The liquidation of debt due, from
tenants cannot be said to be necessary for
implementing the law relating to the acqui-
sition, extinguishment or modification of
rights in estates or an integral part of that
law and cannot therefore have the protection
of Article 3 1 A. If it is necessary to
rehabilitate indebted tenants by relieving
them of their liability on account of arrears
of rent, that must, like any other measure for
relief of indebtedness, be justified in so far
as it affects the property rights of the
landlord as a reasonable restriction in the
interests of the general public within the
meaning of Clause (5) of Article 19.
No material has been placed before us to show
that that is so. The produce from the land is
not solely of the tenant’s own making. The
landlord provides the capital asset necessary
for the purpose, namely, the land, I before
the Act it was not a crime to do so-and it
can-not be in the interests of the general
public to deprive him of his due share of the
produce. Provisions for the fixation of fair
rent have been in force throughout the State
at least from 1964, and, in the Malabar area,
from much earlier. For many years past,
seasons have been favourable and yields have
been good. The prices of agricultural produce
have been high, while rents, even when payable
in kind, are commuted into money at rates much
less than the prevailing prices, and it is
notorious that cultivators of land have been
making big profits even after paying rent.
The mere fact that since 1957 the legislature
has from time to time thought fit to stay pro-
ceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent
is not enough to show that tenants were not in
a position to pay rent, and there is nothing
to show that the arrears of rent accrued due
are anything more than what the landowner can
reasonably ask for his share or the tenant
can reasonably be expected to pay. There were
statutes in force by which, on the payment of
rent for one year or more, the entire arrears
could discharged, and it does not
33 5
seem to us either a reasonable restriction on
the rights of the landlords, or something
calculated to further the interests of the
general public that persons who declined to
take advantage of these statutes and would not
pay when they could, should be absolved of the
liability to pay their due debts. We hold
that Section 73 has not the protection of
Article 31-A and is violative of Article 19(1
) (f)." The dissenting opinion, upholding its validity, observed that in construing the reasonableness of the provisions of s. 73 it is legitimate to look to the provisions of Art. 39 in Part IV of the Constitution which emphasises the Directive Policy of the Government so as to give purposive content to the restriction which Part III imposes upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The I earned Advocate General, in support of the 40 appeals by the State of Kerala and the Land Board, heavily relied on Pritam Singh Chahil v. State of Punjab (1) in support of his attack on the majority view of the High Court and in his submission this decision completely covers the present case. While developing his argument the learned Advocate General referred us to s. 42 of the impugned Act which provides that arrears of rent due to the landlord together with interest thereon shall be a charge on the interest of the tenant, from whom they are due, in the holding and shall, subject to the priority of the rights of the Government and any local authority for arrears of land revenue, tax, cess or other dues, be a first charge on such interest of the tenant. According to the submission, creation of charge by this section creates a right in the land which means a right in the estate and, therefore, the discharge of arrears of rent in accordance with the table contained in s. 73 being extinguishment of a right in the estate, is protected ’by Art. 31-A. Reference in support of the argument that charge is an interest in property was also made to the decision in the State of Gujarat v. Jetawat Lalsingh Amarsingh & ors. (2) where, while construing s. 14(1) of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagir Abolition) Act, 39 of 1954 this Court observed in para 8
"We are also in agreement with the High Court
that the right to receive cash allowance of
Rs. 234/12/- annually from the Jagir is one of
those rights that have got to be compensated
under s. 14(1). That liability was not the
personal liability of the Jagirdar. The first
respondent was entitled to get that amount
from the Jagir. In other words it was a
charge on the Jagir. Therefore, it is an
interest in property." (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 536. (2) A.I.R 1969 S.C. 270. 336 It is noteworthy that S. 14(1) there covered the case of a person other than Jagirdar who, was aggrieved by the provisions of the impugned Act abolishing, extinguishing, or modifying "any of his rights to or interest in property" and such person’s right to get the allowance was held to amount to an interest in property. It was not held to be a right in property. Indeed, it was expressly observed at p. 272 of the report that it was "not necessary to consider whether that interest can be considered as a right in the property". Reliance in this connection was also placed by the learned Advocate-General on M. K. Subbachariar v. The State of Madras(2), Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2), State of Bihar v. Umesh Jha (3 ) and on the observations of S. R. Das, J., (as he then was) on the question of legality of acquisition of arrears of rent in State of Bihar v. Maharadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga(4). The majority view in Kameshwar Singh’s case (supra), it may be pointed out, was not in accord with these observations, for the majority held the acquisition of arrears of rent to be unconstitutional. The other decisions cited by the learned Advocate-General also do not support his submission. Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) is an authority for the view that the expression agrarian reform" calls for a wider meaning than was given to it by K. K. Kochunni v. State of Madras ( 5 ) and in Jha’s case (supra) the validity of s. 4(b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as amended in 1959 which authorised annulment of anticipatory transfer of land designed to defeat the object of the Act, was held to be protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. The Acts impugned in the Madras decision in Subbachariar’s case (supra) were held to fulfill the requirements of Art. 3 1 -A ( 1 ) (a), and, therefore, protected from attack founded on violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. After so holding the High Court observed :
"It follows that the validity of the Acts
cannot be questioned even on the ground that
no compensation whatsoever has been provided
for the acquisition of certain specific
interests.
On this conclusion strictly speaking it is
unnecessary to have any elaborate survey of
the provisions of the Acts and examine whether
and if so to what extent they are violative of
Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution." The decision of this Court in Kameshwar Singh’s case (supra) was distinguished. A passing reference was also made by the appellant to Khajamian Wakf Estates v. The State of Madras(6). But there (1) I.L.R. (1967) 2 Mad. 646. (3) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 687. (5) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 887. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82. (4) [1952] S.C.R. 889 at 1000-1002. (6) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 161. 337 the enactments challenged being laws providing for the acquisition by the State of "estate" as contemplated by Art. 31-A were held to be completely protected ’by Art. 31-A of the Constitution from the attack on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31. In regard to the provision reducing the liability of the tenant with respect to the arrears of rent the only challenge raised in that case questioned the competency of the legislature to make the law and this was repelled with the observation :-
"Those arrears are either arrears of rent or
debts due from agriculturists. If they are
treated as arrears of rent then the State
legislature had legislative power to legislate
in respect of the same under Entry 18 of List
II of the VIIth Schedule. If they are
considered as debts due from the agric ulturists then the State legislature had
competence to legislate in respect of the same
under Entry 30 of the same list." The precise question with which we are concerned was not canvassed there. The argument that arrears of interest is a charge on the estate and, being, therefore, a right in land, can be extinguished as an estate, is not supported by the true ratio of the decisions cited by the learned Advocate General and is otherwise too unacceptable on the language of the impugned statutory provisions. The liability to pay arrears of rent under the impugned Act, assuming the charge created by s. 42 is an interest in land, is not a right in land : besides the liability being also a personal liability it would clearly amount to a debt. Acquisition or extinguishment of such a personal liability for payment of money cannot be covered by Art. 3 1 A. That money cannot be acquired is clear, as already pointed out, from the majority view of this Court’s decision in Kameshwar Singh’s case(). Looking at the table incorporated in s. 73 it is obvious that the amount of rent to be paid for getting discharge of the whole debt has been arbitrarily fixed and does not seem to be founded on any rational, logical or _just basis.
But the learned Advocate General contended that without discharging the arrears of rent or at least a major part of it, the object of the land reforms would be stultified as the indebtedness of the tenants would remain unameliorated. To reduce the indebtedness of the tenants appreciably is a reasonable restriction on the rights of the creditors and the law thus providing for amelioration of indebtedness of tenants deserved to be upheld as constitutional. We grant that amelioration of indebtedness of tenants is a laudable and desirable object. But the person to whom the arrears of rent are due is also entitled to seek protection of his legitimate right and if the acquisition of arrears of rent is outside the protection of Art. (1) [1952] S. C. R 889. 338 31 A then the impugned provision cannot but be held invalid. It prima facie partakes of the character of forfeiture or confiscation of the discharged arrears. Article 39 of the Constitution to which reference was made can be implemented by other permissible means without violating or abridging the just and legitimate rights of those to whom the arrears of rents are due. Section 73, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly struck down by the majority opinion. It was conceded before us that if s. 73 goes, then, s. 4/5-A must also be struck down as unconstitutional. Section 45-A, broadly speaking, provides that rent received after May 19, 1967 but before the commencement of the amendment Act of 1969, and appropriated towards arrears of rent for the period prior to May 1, 1966 shall be adjusted towards rent accrued due for period after May 1, 1966. This takes us to the explanation to s. 85(1) which was the only other provision with respect to which the judgment of the High Court was assailed by the learned Advocate General in this Court. That provision, so far as relevant, reads : "85. Surrender of excess lands.-
(1) Where a person owns or holds land in
excess of the ceiling area on the date
notified under s. 83, such excess land shall
be surrendered as hereinafter provided
Provided that where any person bona fide
believes that the ownership or possession of
any land owned or held by such person or,
where, such person is a member of a family, by
the members of such family, is liable to be
purchased by the cultivating tenant or
kudikidappukaran or to be resumed by the
landowner or the intermediary under the
provisions of this Act, the extent of the land
so liable to be purchased or to be resumed
shall not be taken into account in calculating
the extent of the land to be surrendered under
this sub-section.
Explanation.-Where any land owned or held by a
family or adult unmarried person owning or
holding land in excess of the ceiling area was
transferred by such family or any member
thereof or by such adult unmarried person, as
the case may be, after the 18th December,
1957, and on or before the date of publication
of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the
Gazette, otherwise than--
(i) by way of partition; or
(ii) on account of natural love and
affection; or
339
(iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant
of the holding before the 18th December, 1957,
and continued to be so till the date of
transfer; or
(iv) in favour of a religious, charitable or
educational institution of a public nature
solely for the purposes of the institution,
the extent of land owned or held by such
family or adult unmarried person shall be
calculated for purposes of fixing the extent
of land to be surrendered under this section
as if such transfer had not taken place, and
such family or adult unmarried person shall be
bound to surrender an extent of land which
would be in excess of the ceiling area on such
calculation, or, where such family or person
does not own or hold such extent of land, the
entire land owned or held by the f amily or
person; but nothing in this Explanation shall
affect the rights of the transferee under the
transfer."
The High Court struck down this provision with
the following observations :
"Section 85 provides for the surrender of
excess land, but sub-section (1) thereof
contains an explanation which we think cannot
stand. Under the explanation, subject to
certain exceptions, any land transferred by a
person holding land in excess of the ceiling
area between the 18th December, 1957 (the date
of publication of the Kerala Agrarian
Relations Bill) and the date of the
publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill,
1963 (here we think that ceiling means the
ceiling area under the Act, for it does not
appear there was any ceiling area during the
period in question) is to be regarded as still
held by him for the purpose of fixing the
extent of land to be surrendered by him and
such surrender is to be made out of the land
still held by him. his can lead to absurd
results. For example, supposing a person
holding land just one cent in excess of the
ceiling area had transferred some lands
between the dates mentioned and bought the
lands now held by him, possibly at a higher
price, he will have to surrender all his land
for the nominal compensation provided by
section 88. No doubt, absurdities like this
can only be attacked under Articles 14, 19 or
31 which are not available in the case of a
legislation protected by Art. 31-A, but, there
is the second proviso to sub-clause (a) of
clause (1) of the article which enjoins the
payment of compensation not less than the
34 0
market value for the acquisition of any land
within the ceiling limit under the law for the
time being in force. The effect of the
explanation is to offend this proviso since it
means that even land held by a person within
the ceiling limit applicable to him under the
Act (the law for the time being in force
within the meaning of the article) can be
taken away for the nominal compensation
payable under section 88, by the fiction of
regarding lands disposed of by him within the
dates mentioned as if those lands were still
held by him although the transfer remains
untouched, in other words, as if the ceiling
limit for such a person is different from
the ceiling limits for persons who had not
disposed of land between the relevant dates,
That is not so. The ceiling limits imposed by
the Act are the same for all, but, in the case
of a person who has so disposed of land, that
1-and is to be regarded as still held by him
(although, in fact, it is not) for the purpose
of calculating the extent of the land to be
surrendered by him, and the surrender is to be
made out of the land still held, even if its
effect be to leave him with land less than the
ceiling limit, indeed with no land at all. If
a fiction by which land not held by a person
could be taken into account for the
determination of the excess land to be
surrendered by him, and he could be forced to
surrender land actually held by him although
it is within the ceiling limit without payment
of the market value thereof, were permitted,
the proviso in question could easily be
rendered nugatory. That would be to mock the
proviso." This reasoning seems to us to be unexceptionable and the learned Advocate General was wholly unable to offer any serious criticism of these observations. It is clear that by virtue of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1) land within the ceiling limit is expressly protected against acquisition by the State unless the law relating to such acquisition provides for compensation which is not less than its market value. No attempt was made to take the impugned explanation out of this constitutional inhibition. We therefore, do not find any reason to differ from the conclusions of the High Court. These were the only provisions with respect to which the learned Advocate-General addressed us in support of his appeals. The result, therefore, is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. We now turn to the three appeals (C.As. Nos. 143, 274 and 309 of 1971). In C.As. Nos. 274 and 309 of 1971. the first point urged before us was founded on Art. 31-A(1), second proviso by 3 41 virtue of which the State can have no power to acquire any portion of land held by a person under his personal cultivation in the estate, which is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under a law unless the law empowering acquisition provides for compensation at a rate not less than the market value of such land. According to the argument when the amended Act reduced the ceiling limit and required surrender of the land held in excess of the limit fixed by the amended Act, without payment of compensation at market value, it violated the constitutional inhibition contained in the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1). We are unable to sustain this contention. It was not disputed that the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix; nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unmended Act by itself debarred the legislature from further reducing the ceiling limit so fixed. Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value, but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended Act the second Proviso to Art. 3 1 -A ( 1 ) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law, at the given time. I It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit. But it was not contended that a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring the land in excess would offend any provision of the Constitution. This submission must, therefore, be rejected. The next point urged in C.A. 274 of 1971 relates to s. 50- A(2) of the amended Act. According to this sub-section where The tenant in respect of a nilam is a varamdar and the fishing right in that nilam is exercised by the landlord then such right of the landlord shall cease to exist and the tenant shall be entitled to exercise such right., "Nilam", it may be pointed out, means land adapted for the cultivation of paddy : s. 2(38). "Varamdar" means the person who undertakes cultivation under a varam arrangement and "varam" means an arrangement for the cultivation of nilam with paddy and sharing the produce, made between the owner or other person in lawful possession of the nilam and the person who undertakes cultivation under such arrangement, and includes the arrangements known as pathivaram, pankuvaram and pankupattam: s. 2(60). Section 50-A(2) operates notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract or any judgment, decree or order of the court. The High Court has struck down this provision but has added a rider. This is what the High Court has observed 342
"Accordingly, we strike down this provision,
but might add that this cannot in any way
affect the vesting of the landlord’s rights in
the Government if they have so vested under
Section 72. That the income derived from
fishing might not be taken into account in
determining the compensation payable for the
vesting cannot affect the provision for
vesting so long as it has the protection of
Art. 31-A". It is agreed at the bar that there is no case before us on the facts and circumstances of which this rider can operate. It is also stated at the bar that a number of cases are pending in the High Court in which the precise point covered by the rider directly arises for adjudication. In our view, the High Court should not have expressed any opinion on this point in the manner it has been done, such expression of opinion being unnecessary for giving relief to the parties approaching the High Court. This question must, therefore, be left open to be determined by the High Court in cases in which the question directly arises. The next question raised in C.As. Nos. 143 and 274 of 1971 ,relates to the rights of kudikidappukars. The argument raised before us on behalf of the appellants in these two appeals is that the definition of "kudikidappukaran" is not confined to agricultural labourers alone but it covers even non-agriculturists with the result that it cannot be held to be covered by the provision which protects legislation dealing with agrarian reform. The High Court, dealing with this challenge has observed
"The principal objection taken to the
provisions relating to kudikidappukars is that
having regard to the definition of
"kudikidappukaran", the rights will be
available even to persons who have no
connection with agriculture, in occupation
of huts on land which is not agricultural. The
conferment of rights on such persons would not
be agrarian reform, and, therefore, the
provisions cannot have the protection of
Article 31-A. But, in no case before us is
it alleged that there is any such person
claiming or likely to claim the ’benefit of
the provisions in question. In fact, as we
have said, all the lands with which these
petitions are concerned are agricultural lands
constituting estates, and, to deny the pro-
tection of Article 31-A to any particular
provision it must be shown that that provision
is not a measure of agrarian reform. As we
have already remarked, the mere possibility
of the provisions in question being applicable
to cases not falling within Article 31 -A is
no ground for denying the protection of that
article in respect of the cases falling within
its ambit.
343
It is pointed out that the proviso to Section
2(25) makes a kudikidappukaran even of a
trespasser so long as he was in occupation on
the 16th August, 1968-the Bill of the amending
Act was published on the 15th August-and
continued to be in occupation till the com-
mencement of the Amending Act, namely, till
the 1st January, 1970. And that would be so
even if the landowner has obtained a decree
for possession against him. To encourage
trespass by conferring rights on trespassers,
even on trespassers against whom there is a
decree for possession, cannot, it is said, be
regarded as a measure of agrarian reform.
That might well be so, but, we are not called
upon to consider the validity of the proviso
in question since, so far as the cases before
us are concerned, the application of the
proviso is a mere theoretical possibility. In
none of the cases is it said that there is any
person claiming the benefit of the proviso
against the petitioner concerned, and the
challenge to the proviso must be left to be
decided in a case where the question actually
arises.
Generally speaking, it might be said that a
kudikidappukaran is a hutment dweller in
permissive occupation of the land on which his
hut stands and who holds no land on which he
could erect a homestead. Three cents of land
in a city or major municipality, five cents in
any other municipality and tenents in any
panchayat area or township (it is said that
there is no place in this State which is not
comprised within a city or a municipality or a
panchayat or’ a township) is regarded as the
minimum land required for the purpose of
erecting a homestead and it is only if the
person concerned holds land in excess of there
limits that he is disqualified. It would
however, appear from Explanation I to the
definition in Section 2(5) that the total
extent of all the land held by a person, not
necessarily land continuously situated, is to
be taken into account for the purpose of the
disqualification, the conversion being made on
the basis that three cents of land in a city
or major municipality is equivalent to five
cents in any other municipality and to ten
cents in a panchayat area or township.
Kudikidappus are mainly a feature of the
coconut gardens in the coastal areas of the
State and are largely confined to the Cochin
and Travancore areas. As we have seen, the
occupation originates in permission, and,
although in most cases, the permission might,
in some measure, be prompted by charitable
considerations, it is
3 44
never wholly so. Some benefit in return,
other than spiritual, is always expected. In
some cases the kudikidappukars are
agricultural labourers who were in the earlier
days, expected to work for the holder of the
land for a lower wage than the prevailing
wage, and in all cases they are expected to
keep watch over the land and prevent theft or
trespass. In the case of coconut gardens, the
very existence of these dwelling houses in the
midst of the gardens is beneficial to the
trees in the immediate vicinity of the houses
and increases their yield. So far as
agricultural land is concerned, it seems to us
that there is in all cases some connection
between the existence of ,a kudikidappu
therein and the cultivation of that land so
that the conferment of benefits on
kudikidappukars must prima facie be regarded
as a measure of agrarian reform."
And again,
"The real controversy is centered round
Section 80-A to 80-G which by enabling a
kudikidappukaran to buy not merely the site of
his hut but also the surrounding land upto an
extent of three cents in a city or major
municipality or five cents in any other
municipality or ten cents in a panchayat area
or township for a price which, both with
regard to its amount and to the manner and
time of its payment, can only be described as
nominal, virtually make a gift of the land to
the kudikidappukaram. It has been argued that
such a transfer of land to a person who had
no manner of interest therein (by definition
of kudikidappukaran has no interest in the
land as such being only in permissive
occupation of the site of his hut) cannot come
within the ambit of subclause (a) of clause (
1 ) of Article 3 1 -A since it involves no
acquisition by the State and no,
extinguishment or modification of any rights
in the land constituting the estate. The
provision is really for the compulsory acqui-
sition of the land by the kudikidappukaran
without payment of compensation and the
circumstance that the article expressly
provides only for acquisition by the State is
a clear indication that acquisition by others
is not included within its ambit, even if such
acquisition might involve the extinguishment
of the rights of the person to whom the land
previously belonged. if the extinguishment
involved in a transfer of the land from one
person to another, namely, the extinguishment
of the rights of the original owner, were
comprised within the term, "extinguishment" as
used in the article, it was unnecessary to
have made separate and express provision for
:acquisition by the State. Therefore, it is
said, that
345
extinguishment within the meaning of the
article is extinguishment pure and simple and
not extinguishment which is only an incident
of something else like a transfer or an
acquisition. It means a total annihilation of
the rights, not the substitution of one person
by another in that right. So runs the
argument. But, although the argument sounds
attractive enough, we are afraid it has to be
rejected in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court in AIR 1959 S.C. 459 and AIR
1959 SC 519. In the former, it was held that
the transfer of a landlord’s right to a tenant
was an extinguishment, or, in any event, a
modification of the landlord’s right in the
estate, well within the meaning of these words
as used in the article. In the latter, which also deal with compulsory acquisition of a
landlord’s right by a tenant, it was pointed
out that provision for such acquisition was a
modification of the owner’s rights in the land
in that it obliges him to sell the land not at
his own price but at the price fixed by the
statute, and not to anyone he chooses but to
the person specified therein and in accordance
with its provisions. A transfer of his rights
by the owner of a land to a person like a
tenant already having some interest therein
stands on no different footing from a transfer
to a person having no interest in the land
from the point of view of the extinguishment
or modification of the rights of the trans-
feror. Although this is not expressly
mentioned, we think it is clear that the
purpose of the transfer of the land to the
landless occupant of the hut is only for pur-
poses connected with agriculture-we are here
speaking only of agricultural land. In the
case of such land, even if the
kudikidappukaran is not exclusively an
agricultural labourer, the land transferred to
him is likely to be used only for purposes of
cultivation like growing a kitchen garden as
an adjunct to his dwelling house. It is
hardly likely to be used in entirety for
building purposes (although there might be
some little extension of the dwelling house)
or for industrial or commercial purposes.
Thus, the transfer being of agricultural land
to a landless person primarily for
agricultural purposes-it would in all
probability make for more intensive
cultivation-we do not think that it can be
said that it is not a measure of agrarian
reform." It was contended on behalf of the appellants that a large number of kudikidappukarans are engaged in non-agricultural pursuits and they are free to deal with the homestead, the hut and the land transferred to them in any way they like. There being no obligation on them to personally use the land for agricultural purposes, 346 there is no question of agrarian reform being promoted by this provision. The learned Advocate-General--controverted the appellants’ contention and sought further to support the conclusions of the High Court by drawing our attention to the report of the Agrarian Problem Enquiry Committee published by the Government of Cochin in 1949, particularly relying on para 146 of that report, a copy of which was produced be-fore us in the course of hearing. The learned Advocate-General also drew our attention to the report of the Land Policy Committee, Travancore-Cochin published by the Government in 1950, abstracts of which were also produced before us in the course of hearing. Para 91 of this report was specifically relied upon. Our attention was further drawn by the learned Advocate-General to the proclamation promulgated by His Highness the Maharajah of Cochin in June, 1947, giving relief against eviction of kudikidappukars, as also to certain provisions of the Travancore Prevention of Eviction of kudikidappukars Act, 1949 and to the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act 1955. Placing reliance on the background as emerging from these reports the proclamation and the statutes, the learned Advocate- General submitted that providing for accommodation and some appurtenant land to kudikidappukars is an important part of agrarian reform and must be upheld. In the alternative, however, it was suggested that the provisions of the Act may be read down so as to confine the statutory benefit only to those kudikidappukars who are agricultural labourers. According to him the definition arid the relevant provisions of the statute can be so read down as to bring them within the object of agrarian reform as understood in the light of the decisions of this Court. Now as observed by the High Court in the passage already reproduced, transfer of land to the landless occupant of the hut, though not expressly so mentioned is only for the purposes connected with agriculture and the land in this passage is expressly stated to mean agricultural land. The term agricultural land, it may also be pointed out, is used in the judgment of the High Court in the sense of the definition contained in Art. 31A (2) (a) (iii) of the Constitution. The High Court has further stated, and it is not shown that this is incorrect, that in none of the cases before it, is there any allegation that any person unconnected with agriculture is claiming the benefit of ss. 75 to 80G of the Act. In fact all the lands, with which the present cases are concerned, are agricultural lands constituting estates as contemplated by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. This is what the High Court says in the Judgment
"It might be that the expression, ’agrarian
reform’ is wide enough to include ameliorative
measures for agriculturists, unrelated to
right’s in land, but, in the context
347
of Article 31 -A, it can comprise only
measures affecting rights in estates and we
shall hereafter use the expression in that
limited sense.
It would appear that all the lands held by the
petitioners in these cases are agricultural
lands-at any rate, no arguments have been
addressed before us on the footing that any of
them are not; the assertions in some of the
petitions, such as that a paddy land is not
agricultural land because for part of the
year, when it is under water, fishing is
profitably conducted thereon, or that a
coconut garden is not agricultural land
because it happens to be situated within a
city, have been rightly forgotten. We might
here repeat that we are using the term, ’agri-
cultural land’ in the sense relevant in the
context of Article 31-A, namely, in the sense
of the definition in subclause (iii) of cl.
2(a) of that article. It is the purpose for
which the land is held, not its accidental use
at a particular point of time,, that
determines whether it is agricultural land or
not. If the land is held for purposes of
agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto
(such as, for pasture or for the residence of
cultivators of land, agricultural labourers or
village artisans), it is agricultural land.
Otherwise not. We suppose that something or
other can be, and often is, grown on any
vacant land, but that would not necessarily
make it agricultural land for our purposes.
To give an example, the possibility of
cultivating, or even the actual cultivation
of, what is essentially a building site in the
heart of a town would not make, it
agricultural land. It is the, purpose for
which it is held that determines its character
and the existence of a few coconut trees or a
vegetable, patch on the land cannot alter the
fact that it is held for purposes of building
and not for purpose of agriculture."
347 And again, after observing that constitutionally bad portion of the Act, if severable, is liable to be struck down while upholding the valid portions, the High Court adds :
"For the aforesaid reasons, we shall consider
the impugned provisions only in the in
application to agricultural land-was we have
said, these petitions are not concerned with
non-agricultural land, at any rate, not
directly. We wish to make it clear that we
are expressing no opinion whatsoever about
their validity or otherwise in their
application to non-agricultural land.
We do not think it can be denied that the, Act
as a whole is a measure of agrarian reform,
its main object -L128Aup CI/72 348
being to confer such benefits as fixity of
tenure and fair rent on cultivating tenants,
to abolish intermediaries like landlords,
between the cultivator and the State, and to
distribute lands held in excess of the ceiling
to the landless. The Act as a whole must,
therefore, get the protection of Article 31-A
even if portions thereof have to fail for want
of that protection." Nothing convincing was said in this Court against these observations. In Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) this Court considered it proper to place a liberal construction on Art. 31-A so as to cover cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely designed to carry out agrarian reform and something ancillary thereto has to be undertaken to give full effect to such reforms. This decision was approvingly referred in Inder Singh v. State of Punjab(1). These decisions were noticed and followed by the High Court. The learned Advocate-General in his reply also contended that we may, if necessary, read down the provisions of the Act so as to ,confine its beneficial operation to those kudikidappukars who are primarily agricultural labourers and to the transfer of agricultural land to them so as to restrict the statutory power to agrarian reform as enunciated by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) and other relevant cases. It may, however, be recalled that according to the High Court all the lands in the cases with which we are concerned are agricultural lands constituting estates within the contemplation of Art. 3 1 A (2) (a) (iii) and all the persons benefited by the impugned provisions are occupants of huts on such agricultural lands and are connected with agriculture. On the facts of these cases, therefore, there is no occasion for saying anything beyond what the High Court has said on this aspect. We should, however, like to make it clear that we express no opinion where the provisions of this Act are utilised for lands which are not agricultural lands and do not constitute estates nor where the beneficiary happens to be a person not substantially connected with agriculture, occupying nonagricultural land or where the facts are not covered by the general test laid down in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra). Finally the objection raised at the bar was that the area of land permitted to be purchased by kudikidappukars is unreasonably excessive and there is no obligation imposed on them to use the land for agricultural purposes. Here again, if as observed by the High Court, the main purpose of the transfer of agricultural land to the landless occupants is connected with agriculture and such land is likely to be used only for the purposes of cultivation, with which observation we are not persuaded to disagree, then, such (1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 603.
349 transfer can properly be held to be ancillary to agrarian reforms. The transfer appears to us to be mainly of agricultural land, a part of which is intended to be utilised for the purpose of erecting a homestead etc., by the occupants. Such erection of a homestead etc., cannot in the circumstances of these cases deviate from the general agricultural purpose. The appellants’ objection must on this view be held to be devoid of merit. In C.A. No. 309 of 1971 it was argued that under s. 72 what vests in the Government is only the landholder’s right vis-a-vis the tenant and that this does not amount to acquisition. The counsel added that other rights of the appellants as owners could not be adversely affected. By way of illustration reference was made to quarrying rights and it was suggested that the right to quarry could not be affected by this vesting. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question of the impact of the impugned provision of the Act on the rights to quarry as there was no allegation to this effect in the writ petitions. This point was not canvassed even in the High Court. This Court. as a rule, does not decide questions which are not necessary for determining or resolving the actual controversy arising in the case. Such opinions partake of the nature of ;biter. Without deciding any hypothetical question posed before us we consider it sufficient for our present purpose to point out that extinguishment or modification of landlord’s lights vis-a-vis the tenant would also be within the ambit of Art. 31-A of the Constitution if otherwise it is related to agrarian reforms. Section 72 is accordingly not liable to be struck down on this ground. With the foregoing observations these three appeals are also dismissed; but without any order as to costs. V.P.S. Appeals dismissed. 350