PETITIONER:
KHUSHIRAM BEHARI LAL & CO.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/10/1976
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2372 1977 SCR (1) 752
1976 SCC (4) 322
ACT
Writ jurisdiction of the High Court--Scope for interfer-
ence with findings of departmental authorities.
HEADNOTE
In response to a notice from the assessing authority
under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act that the appellant
had not filed a return in respect of the assessment year
1959-60, the appellant claimed that the firm had ceased to
do any work since February. 1961 and that a formal document
to that effect was executed in August, 1961. The assessing
authority made an order of assessment in March 1962. In a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed’
by the appellant; the High Court directed the Sales Tax
Officer to enquire and report if the appellant-firm had
proved its dissolution in August 1961 or before the date of
assessment order. The Sales Tax Officer reported that it
had not, The High Court itself examined the matter and came
to the s.me conclusion of that reached by the Sales Tax
Officer. It also found that though intimation was required
to be given under s. 16 of the Act regarding the dissolution
of the firm within 30 days of such dissolution no such
intimation was given under April, 1962 and dismissed the
writ petition.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) There is no sufficient ground to interfere
with the judgment of the High Court. The facts and circum-
stances referred to by the High Court throw a considerable
doubt upon the correctness of the appellant’s statement that
it had stood dissolved in August, 1961. [754 D & B]
(2) The High Court was dealing with the matter on the
writ side. In a writ petition, the scope for interference.
with a finding of the departmental authorities is much more
restricted and the court can normally interfere only if the
finding is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence or
is otherwise perverse. The same cannot be said of the
finding of the sales tax authority embodied in its report
sent to the High Court in the present case. [754 C]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 442 of 1974.
(From the Judgment and Order dated the 17th of August,
1970 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No.
413/62).
V.C. Mahajan and O.P. Sharma, for the Appellant.
Harbans Singh, for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J. This is an appeal on certificate against the
judgment of the Punjab ’and Haryana High Court whereby the
High Court held that the appellant-firm had failed to prove
that it had stood dissolved on a date prior to the date of
assessment, viz., March 12, 1962.
The appellant-firm carries on business as commission
agents of cotton and food grains. In respect of the year
1959-60, the appellant did not submit any return under the
Punjab General Sales Tax Act. A notice was thereupon
issued to the appellant-firm and the
753
case was fixed for July 1, 1960. The appellant challenged
the validity of the assessment proceedings by means of a
writ petition in the High Court. The High Court during the
pendency of the petition, stayed the proceedings. Ulti-
mately, it seems, the writ petition was dismissed and the
assessment proceedings were resumed on November 30, 1961.
Various dates were fixed thereafter. February 17, 1962 was
fixed as the final date of hearing. On that date, intima-
tion was given on behalf. of the appellant that the appel-
lant-firm had ceased to do any work since February 1961. It
was also represented that a formal document had been exe-
cuted on August 8, 1961. The assessing authority despite
that intimation proceeded to make an order of assessment
dated March 12, 1962. The appellant thereupon filed anoth-
er petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the
Punjab High Court, praying for the quashing of the assess-
ment order. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that
the appellant-firm had been dissolved before the date of
assessment order and as such, the sales tax authorities
could not make an order for assessment. The High Court
dismissed the petition on the ground that the assessment
proceedings had been initiated long before the alleged date
of dissolution of the firm. The appellant thereafter came
up to this Court in appeal against the said decision of the
High Court. This .Court set aside the judgment of the High
Court, following its decision in the case of State of Punjab
v. M/s Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate.(1) The case was
remanded to the High Court as no definite finding had been
given by the High Court regarding the dissolution of the
appellant-firm and about the fact as to whether the said
dissolution had taken place before the date of the order of
assessment, namely, March 12, 1962.
After remand, the High Court called upon the sales tax
officer to make an enquiry and submit a report on the point
as to whether the appellant-firm had been dissolved on
August 8, 1961 as alleged by the appellant. The sales tax
officer thereafter made an enquiry and submitted a report
that the appellant-firm had not proved its dissolution on
August 8, 1961 or before the date of assessment order. The
High Court, ’after receipt of the report, itself examined
the matter and came to the conclusion that on the material
on record brought by the appellant, it had not been proved
that the appellant-firm had stood dissolved on a date
prior to March 12, 1962. It is the correctness of the
above decision of the High Court which has now been assailed
before us by the appellant in this appeal.
We have heard Mr. Mahajan on behalf of the appellant and
find no cogent ground to take a view different from that of
the High Court. The High Court, in the course of its judg-
ment, has pointed out that though the assessment order was
made on March 12, 1962 a large number of hearings took place
between March 8, 1961, the alleged date of dissolution and
March 12, 1962. At no hearing, was any intimation given
by the appellant to the assessing authority that the firm
had stood dissolved. All that was intimated on February
17, 1962 was that the firm had ceased to do work in February
1961 and
(1) 119661 2 S.C.n. 457.
754
that a formal document had been executed on August 8, 1961.
It was also not the case. of the appellant that all the six
partners of the appellant firm, had signed that document.
Another factor which weighed with the High Court was that
though intimation is required to be given under section 16
of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act regarding the dissolu-
tion of a firm within thirty days of such dissolution no
such intimation was given by the appellant-firm until April
2, 1962, i.e., nearly eight months after the alleged date of
dissolution.
In our opinion, the facts and circumstances referred to
by the High Court throw a considerable doubt. upon the
correctness of the statement made on behalf of the appel-
lant-firm’ that it had stood dissolved on August 8, 1961.
It has to be borne in mind that the High Court was dealing
with the matter on the writ side. In a writ petition, the
SCOpe for interference with a finding of the departmental
authorities is much more restricted and the court can nor-
mally interfere only if the finding is based upon no evi-
dence or is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence
or is otherwise perverse. The same cannot be said of the
finding of the sales tax authority embodied in its report
sent to the High Court in the present case. We see no
sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment of the High
Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be
no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Appeal
755