PETITIONER:
KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, TRIVANDRUM
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
T.P.K.K. AMSOM AND BESOM, KERALA
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/10/1976
BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 282 1977 SCR (1) 996
1976 SCC (4) 634
ACT
Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137,--Whether confined to
applications under the Code of Civil Procedure--Applicabili-
ty to petitions under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, S.
16(5).
HEADNOTE
The appellant cut and removed some trees from the re-
spondent’s land for laying electric lines, and assessed the
compensation. Later, the respondent filed a petition
under-section 16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885,
claiming an enhanced compensation. The Appellant opposed
the petition contending that it was time-barred under Arti-
cle 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The respondent con-
tended that Article 137 of the Limitation Act was not ap-
plicable to petitions to the District Judge under the Indian
Telegraph Act. The District Judge dismissed the petition as
time-barred, but in revision, the High Court set aside the
order and remanded the matter for disposal in accordance
with law.
Allowing the appeal, the Court.
HELD: (1) Article 137 will apply to any petition or
application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. The words
"any other application" under Article 137 cannot be said on
the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under
the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in
part I of the third division. [998 E-G, 1000 B-C]
Nityananda M. joshi & Ors. v.L.I.C. of India & Ors.
[1970] 1 SCR 396. applied.
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer
Labour Court, HubIi & Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 51, overruled.
Shri Mulchand & Co. Ltd. (In liquidation) v. Jawahar
Mills Ltd. (1955 SCR 351) referred to.
(2) The District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a
Civil Court in dealing with applications under section 16
of the Telegraph Act. The petition is one contemplated by
the Telegraph Act for judicial decision and is an
application falling within the scope of Article 137 of
the 1963 Limitation Act. [1001 E-G]
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The Post-master-General
[1913] A.C. 546 applied.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Paravathi Amma I.L.R.
[1973] 2 Kerala 524 Referred to.
Town Municipal Council Athani v. Presiding Officer
Labour Court, HubIi and Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 51 and Nityananda
M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India &
Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 396 distinguished.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1975.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 3.6.1974 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. No. 302 of
1974)
S.T. Desai and A. C. Puddissary for the appellant.
K.T. Harindranath and T.T. Kunhikanan, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAY, C.J.--This appeal is by special leave from the
judgment dated 3 June, 1974 of the High Court of Kerala.
The respondent filed a petition under sections 10 and
16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 read with section 51
of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 claiming compensation
against the appellant.
The Kerala State Electricity Board is constituted under
section 5 of the Indian Electricity Supply Act, 1948. The
Board ’cut and removed some trees standing on the property
of the respondent for the purpose of laying electric line
from Calicut to Cannanore. The Board assessed the compensa-
tion at Rs. 1619.90.
On 10 March, 1972 the respondent filed a petition before
the District Judge, Tellicherry under section 16(3) of the
Indian Telegraph Act 1885 claiming an enhanced compensation
of Rs. 19,367.60. The Board raised several objections. One
of the objections was that the petition was barred by time
under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Board
contended that the notice intimating the fixing of the
compensation was served on 4 March, 1969 and therefore the
petition was barred by time. The respondent contended that
Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act did not apply to
applications to the District Judge under the Indian Tele-
graph Act. The District Judge held that the application was
governed by Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act, and,
therefore, the petition was filed beyond three years and was
barred by time.
The respondent filed revision petitions to the High
Court of Kerala. The respondent also applied for condonation
of delay in filing the revision petitions in the High
Court. The High Court condoned the delay in filing the
petitions. The High Court in view of the decision of the
High Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Parvathi
Amma(1) set aside the order of the District Judge and remit-
ted the matter back to the court for disposal in accordance
with law.
The provision contained in Article 137 of the Limitation
Act 1963 is as follows :--
Description of Period of Time from which pe-
application limitation riod begins to run
Any other application for When the right to apply
which no period 3 years accrues.
of limitation is provided
elsewhere in this Division.
The view of the Kerala High Court is that Article 137 of
the Limitation Act 1963 has the same meaning as Article 181
of the Indian Limitation Act 1908.
(1) I.L.R. [1973] 2 Kerala 524.
908 Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was as
follows :--
Description of Period of Time for which pe-
application limitation riod begins to run
Applications for which no When the right to appeal
period of limitations Three accrues.
years is provided elsewhere in
this schedule or by section 48
of the Code of Civil procedure.
In the Kerala State Electricity Board case (supra) the
High Court held that in view of the decision of this Court
in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer
Labour Court, Hubli & Ors(1). the same construction should
be put upon Article 137 as had been put upon Article 181.
In the Ahani Municipal Council case (supra) the workmen
applied to the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefit in re-
spect of over time. The Labour Court accepted’ the applica-
tion of the workmen. The Athani Municipal Council challenged
the decision of the Labour Court in a writ petition. On
appeal to this Court it was contended, that the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court was barred by the provisions of Minimum
Wages Act 1948 and second the applications to the Labour
Court were time barred under Article 137 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. This Court held as follows: The altera-
tion in the 1963 Limitation Act in Article 137, namely,
the inclusion of the words "other proceedings" in the
long title to the 1963 Limitation Act, the omission of
the preamble and the change in the definition so as to
include petition in the word "application" do not show any
intention to make Article ’137 applicable to proceedings
before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial
tribunals and executive bodies. The word "other" in the
first column of the Article giving the description of the
application "any other application for which no period of
limitation is provided elsewhere in this division" indi-
cates that the interpretation of Article 181 in the 1908
Limitation Act on the basis of ejusdem generis should be
applied to Article 137. The application was presented to
the Labour Court, a tribunal which was not a court governed
by the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes, and, therefore,
the applications are not governed by Article 137 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
In Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation
of India & Ors. (2) the appellants filed applications
against the respondent under section 33C(2) of the Industri-
al Disputes Act for computing in terms of money, the benefit
of holidays and for recovering the amount. The Labour Court
dismissed the applications in so far as the claim was for a
period beyond three years on the ground that the applica-
tions
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51. (2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 396.
999
were barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In
Nityananda Joshi’s case (supra) this Court held as follows:
Article 137 contemplates applications to ordinary
courts. Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides for the
contingency when the prescribed period for any
application expires on a holiday and the only
contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed".
Further under section 5 of the Limitation Act only a court
is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed
period has expired if the court is satisfied that the
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
application. The Labour Court is not a court within the
meaning of the Limitation Act.
This Court in Nityananda Joshi’s case (supra) said that
it was not necessary to express views on the first ground
given by this Court in Athani Municipal Council case
(supra). The first ground given in the Athani Municipal
Council case (supra) was that in spite of change the inter-
pretation of Article 181 would apply to Article 137 of the
Limitation Act. This Court in Nityananda Joshi’s case
(supra) said that it would require serious consideration
whether applications to courts under other provisions,
apart from Civil Procedure Code, are included within Article
137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not. The Athani Municipal
Council case (supra) is a two Judge Bench decision. Nitya-
nanda Joshi’s case (supra) is a three Judge Bench decision.
The Schedule to the Limitation Act is with reference to
section 2(j) and 3 of the Act. Section 2(j) of the Act
speaks of the period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by the Schedule and "prescribed
period" is the period of limitation computed in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
Section 3 of the Act states that subject to the provi-
sions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Act
every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
"Application" is defined in section 2(b) of the Act to
include a petition.
The Schedule is divided in three divisions. The first
division relates to suits. The first division consists of
10 parts and consists of 113 Articles. The first 10 parts
speak of 10 categories of suits. The second division speaks
of appeals. The second division consists of Articles 114 to
117. The third division speaks of applications. The third
division is in two parts. Part I speaks of applications in
specified cases. Part II speaks of other applications.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that
the petition before the District Judge for compensation
would be an application for which no period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in this division and would fall within
Article 137.
1000
This Court in Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. (In Liquida-
tion) v. Jawahar Mills(1) Ltd held that the construction put
upon Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 is that the long
catena of decisions under Article 181 may well be said to
have, as it were, added the words "under the Code" in the
first column of that Article.
The alteration of the division as well as the change in
the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation
Act 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation
Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137
are not applications confined to the, Code of Civil Proce-
dure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division
between applications in specified cases and other applica-
tion as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words "any other
application" under Article 137 cannot be said on the princi-
ple of ejusdem generis to the applications under the Civil
Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the
third division. Any other application under Article 137
would be petition or any application under any Act. But it
has to be an application to a court for the reason that
sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry
of prescribed period when Court is closed and extension of
prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies
the court and he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application during such period.
In the present case, the applications contemplated under
section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act are applications to. the
District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is
situate. Applications are contemplated if any dispute
arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be
paid under section 10 of the Telegraph Act. Section 10 of
the Telegraph Act states that the telegraph authority shall
pay compensation to all persons interested for any damages
sustained by them by reason of exercise of powers mentioned
in section 10 of the Telegraph Act 1885. Reference may also
be made to section 16(1) which states that if the exercise
of powers mentioned in section 10 in respect of property
referred to in clause (d)’is resisted or obstructed the
District Magistrate may order that the telegraph authority
shall be permitted to exercise them.
The provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplate
determination by the District Judge of payment of compensa-
tion payable under section 10 of the Act indicate that the
District Judge acts judicially as a court. Where by stat-
utes matters are referred for determination by a Court of
Record with no further provision the necessary implication
is that the court will determine the matters as a court. See
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The Postmaster-General. (2)
In the presence case the statute makes the reference to the
District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court.
In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge
under this particular title while the intention is to refer
to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in
section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District
Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge.
Section 16(4) of the’ Telegraph Act requires payment
into the
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 351. (2) [1913] A.C. 546.
1001
court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph
authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the
persons entitled to receive compensation. Again in
section 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to pay-
ment of court fees and issue of processes both of which
suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil
jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of
these disputes. Section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act
states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central
Legislature means the Judge of a principal civil court of
original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the
exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is
anything repugnant in the context. In the Telegraph Act
there is nothing in the context to suggest that the refer-
ence to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to
the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by
the definition applicable thereto. The District Judge under
the Telegraph Act acts as a ciVil court in dealing with
applications under section 16 of the Telegraph Act.
The changed definition of the words "applicant" and
"application" contained in section 2(a) and 2(b) of the 1963
Limitation Act indicates the object of the Limitation Act to
include petitions, original or otherwise, under special
laws. The interpretation which was given to Article 181 of
the 1908 Limitation Act on the principle of ejusdem generis
is not applicable with regard to Article 137 of the 1963
Limitation Act. Article 137 stands in isolation from all
other Articles in Part I of the third division. This Court
in Nityanada Joshi’s case (supra) has rightly thrown doubt
on the two Judge Bench decision of this Court in Athani
Municipal Council case (supra) where this Court construed
Article 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil
Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the
word "applications." These petitions and applications can
be under any special Act as in the present case.
The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963
Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application
filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we
differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this
Court in Athani Municipal Council case (supra) and hold
that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not
confined to applications contemplated by or under the
Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case
was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one
contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision.
The petition is an application failing within the scope of
Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.
For the foregoing reasons we accept the appeal and set
aside the judgment of the High Court. The appellant will
pay costs to the respondent in accordance with order made at
the time of granting special leave.
MR Appeal allowed
1002