Kehar Singh and Anr. Etc. v. Union of India and Anr.

Court

Supreme Court of India

Decided

16 December 1988

Case no.

0

Bench

Pathak, R.S. (Cj),Venkataramiah, E.S. (J),Misra Rangnath,Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J),Ojha, N.D. (J)

Facts

Kehar Singh was convicted under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Following his conviction, a review petition was dismissed on September 7, 1988. Subsequently, on October 14, 1988, Kehar Singh's son submitted a mercy petition to the President, claiming his father's innocence and requesting a personal hearing. The President's office declined the request for a hearing, citing established practices regarding mercy petitions. The petition was ultimately rejected, prompting Kehar Singh to file writ petitions and a special leave petition to the Supreme Court.

Arguments

Petitioner Arguments

The petitioners argued that

• The evidence presented during the trial established Kehar Singh's innocence.
• The verdict was erroneous and warranted reconsideration.
• The President should grant a personal hearing to discuss the merits of the case.

The court addressed these arguments by asserting that the President's power under Article 72 does not include reviewing the merits of a case already adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The court maintained that the constitutional framework does not provide for an oral hearing in such petitions, thus dismissing the petitioners' claims for a personal audience.

Respondent Arguments

The respondents, representing the President of India, contended that

• The President is not empowered to review the merits of a case decided by the Supreme Court.
• The decision to deny an oral hearing is consistent with established practices and constitutional provisions.

The court upheld the respondents' arguments, reinforcing the notion that the President's discretion in pardoning is a constitutional responsibility that does not allow for judicial review of the merits of the case.

Precedents considered

The court referenced the case of W. I. Biddle v. Vuco Perovich, which underscores the constitutional nature of the pardon power. This precedent was used to illustrate that the power to pardon is a significant constitutional responsibility, not subject to judicial scrutiny regarding the merits of the underlying case.

Legal principles

The court considered several legal principles, including

• The constitutional framework of Article 72, which grants the President the power to grant pardons.
• The distinction between the exercise of this power and the judicial review of criminal convictions.
• The absence of a right to an oral hearing in mercy petitions.

Decision and reasoning

Rationale

The court reasoned that the power to pardon is a constitutional prerogative that must be exercised with discretion and is not open to judicial review. The court emphasized that allowing a review of the merits would undermine the finality of judicial decisions and the authority of the Supreme Court. The rejection of the request for an oral hearing was justified based on established practices and the constitutional mandate.

Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition and the writ petitions, affirming the President's rejection of the mercy petition. The court reiterated that the President's decision is final and not subject to judicial review regarding the merits of the case.

Conclusion

This judgment reinforces the principle that the power of pardon under Article 72 is a constitutional responsibility that cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny. It highlights the separation of powers and the finality of judicial decisions, emphasizing that the President's discretion in granting pardons is not an avenue for re-evaluating criminal convictions.

Read the full judgment on the Supreme Court website (PDF)