PETITIONER:
KANTA GOEL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
B.P. PATHAK & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT01/04/1977
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1599 1977 SCR (3) 412
1977 SCC (2) 814
ACT
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958--Sec. 2(c)(1)-14--Government
officer required to vacate Government premises--Whether can
obtain possession of two dwelling houses let out to two
different tenants--Whether a co-owner can file a suit to
evict a tenant--Definition of a landlord.
HEADNOTE
The respondent no. 1 is an Under Secretary in the Central
Government He was in occupation of residential premises
allotted to him by the Central Government and was required
by the Government order to vacate such residential accommo-
dation on the ground that he owned in Delhi a residential
accommodation in his own name at Shakti Nagar. The Shakti
Nagar House is a two storeyed house. The first floor was
let out to the appellant-tenant and the ground floor to
another tenant. Relying on section 14A of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, the respondent evicted the tenant on the
ground floor. Thereafter, the respondent sought eviction
of the appellant on the same ground. The Controller direct-
ed eviction refusing leave to the tenant to contest the
application for eviction. The Revision Application filed
by the appellant before the High Court failed.
In appeal by special leave the appellant contended:
(1) In view of the eviction of the tenant on the ground
floor the right of the respondent to evict the tenant
under s. 14A was exhausted.
(2) The respondent no. 1 claims to be a legatee of the
deceased landlord under a Will. He has not got the will
probated.
(3) Respondent no. 1 is only one of the co-owners and,
therefore, cannot file the application for eviction.
(4) The respondent no. 1 has not let out the premises to
the appellant and the premises does not stand in the name of
the respondent no. 1.
At the hearing, the parties settled their dispute by agree-
ing that the appellant would vacate the first floor premises
consisting of 4 rooms and shift to the ground floor and
respondent no. 1 would be handed over the possession of the
first floor. The parties also agreed to certain adjustment
in the rent.
Disposing of the appeal in terms of the compromise the Court
observed:
(1) The landlord cannot use the same weapon. of s. 14A
in getting two dwelling houses vacated. It is contrary to
the intendment of s. 14A. The object of s. 14A is fulfilled
once the landlord recovers immediate possession of his
premises from one of his tenants. The right is exhausted
thereby and is not available for continual applications for
eviction against all other tenants holding under him. This
is made clear by the proviso to .s. 14A(1) which makes
plain that the section shall.not be construed as conferring
a right on a landlord owning two or more dwelling houses to
recover possession of more than one dwelling house. Of
course, it gives choice to the landlord to indicate the
particular house among a plurality owned by him, the pos-
session of which he intends to recover. [417 A-D]
(2) A co-owner is as much an owner of the entire proper-
ty as any sole owner of the property. He owns every part
of the composite property along with others and it cannot
be said that he is only a part owner. The absence of other
co-owners on record cannot disentitle the first respondent
from suing for eviction. From the definition of landlord in
s. 2(c) and tenant in s. 2(1) when read in the context of
the Rent Control Law is the simple sense of the situation is
that there should be a building which is let. There must be
a landlord who
413
collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he
recognises as landlord. The complications of estoppel or
the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not neces-
sarily or inflexibly be imported in the proceedings under
the Rent Control Law, tried by special Tribunals under a
special statute. The Court left open the question if some
co-owner seek eviction of a tenant and others oppose it
whether such application would be maintainable. [416 C-E]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 764 of 1977.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 21st January 1977 of the Delhi High Court in Civil
Revision No. 654 of 1976).
F.S. Nariman, D.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee, for the
appellant.
Prem Malhotra, for respondent No. 1
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA lYER, J.---So heartening to the judges’ bosom
iS the happy ending of a bitterly fought litigation where
the law is declared by the Court and justice is accomplished
by the parties settling the differences, assisted by activ-
ist judicial suggestions and promoted by constructive Coun-
selling by advocates. Such is the pleasing culmination of
this case which relates to an ejectment proceeding under
section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59
of 1958). ’the Controller directed eviction refusing leave
to the tenant to contest the application for eviction. The
High Court, in the revision filed by the tenant, went into
an elaborate discussion on many matters but somehow missed a
plea fatal to the landlord’s claim and affirmed the relief’
of eviction although on different grounds. The aggrieved
tenant sought special leave to. appeal which was granted
and, thanks to the landlord appearing by caveat even at the
preliminary hearing, leave was granted and the appeal itself
was heard the very next day. This at the Supreme Court level
quick justice has been meted out and fortunately our judg-
ment has resulted in a re-adjustment between the parties
and, hopefully, the healing of the wounds of litigation. A
protracted forensic proceeding makes foes of friends, but a
settlement of the dispute in accordance with law and justice
makes friends of foes.
Some facts need to be narrated for getting the hang of
the case and the issues of law raised. The respondent is an
Under Secretary to Government in the Housing Ministry. He
was in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by
the Central Government and was required by government order
to vacate such residential accommodation on the ground that
he owned in Delhi a residential accommodation in his own
name. The building we are concerned with is 23/6, Shakti
Nagar. It is a two-storeyed house but the litigation cen-
tres round part of the first-floor. The whole building
belonged to one Pandit Saraswati Das who let out a portion
of the first floor consisting of 4 rooms and a small enclo-
sure somewhere in August 1968 to the appellant. Shri Das
died in 1972 leaving behind the 1st respondent, two other
sons (respondents 2 & 3) and a daughter (respondent 4). It
may be stated even here that the proceeding before the
Controller was started by the 1st respondent and an objec-
tion was raised
414
by the appellant that the other heirs of the late Das were
necessary parties they were not impleaded at this stage
although the Controller ordered eviction over-ruling the
objection. The High Court however, impleaded the other two
Sons and the only daughter (respondents 2 to 4) and taking
the view that their presence was necessary for the maintain-
ability of the action, the learned Judge decreed eviction.
A crucial objection, lethal to the case of the landlord,
considered by the Controller but negatived by him, was
raised in the revision petition but was not adverted to or
adjudicated upon by the High Court. Before us Shri Nariman
has pressed it again and the fate of this case, so far as we
are concerned, rests on the validity of that point. The
landlord-1st respondent, after receiving the order from
government to vacate, as contemplated fin section 14A of the
Act, applied for eviction of another tenant who was occupy-
ing a three-room tenement on the first floor of the same
building. In fact, the first floor of the house consists of
two dwelling apartments as it were, one consisting of three
rooms and the other of 4 rooms. By definition, ’premises
means any part of a building which is, or is intended to be,
let separately for use as a residence ........ In the
present case the three room tenement being part of a build-
ing and let separately to a tenant, fell within the defini-
tion of ’perraises’. Admittedly, the landlord exercise his
right under section 14A to recover immediately possession of
those premises. He succeeded, secured possession and kept
it vacant. Even at the present time those premises which
are adjacent to the suit promises are in his vacant posses-
sion. Shri Nariman’s argument is that while it is open to a
landlord who is a government servant directed to vacate
allotted premises, and clothed with a new right to recover
possession of any premises let out by him, to exercise it
once, he cannot repeat the exercise ad libitem and go on
evicting every tenant of his by using the weapon of section
14A. He relies on the proviso to section 14A(1) to rein-
force his submission and we will deal with it presently.
Two other contentions urged by the appellant are that
the first respondent is not his landlord and therofore is
disentitled to evict him, under the Act, and secondly, the
premises are not in his name and have not been let out by
him. In any case, the claim of the first respondent that
the building in its entirety had been allotted by the late
Shri Das by his will to the 1st respondent and his brother
the 3rd respondent and that, subsequently, there had been an
oral partition between the two whereunder the first floor
was allotted in toto to the 1st respondent making him the
sole owner and therefore the exclusive landlord, was con-
tested by the appellant-tenant and this plea should have
been allowed to be raised by grant of leave under section
25B by the Controller. The presence of the co-heirs at the
High Court level was inconsequential, according to the
appellant, and their absence at the trial stage vitiated the
order of the Controller. We will examine these contentions
briefly.
The scheme of the statute is plain and has been earlier
explained by this Court with special reference to sections
14A and 25B. The government servant who owns his house,
lets it out profitably and
415
occupies at lesser rent official quarters has to quit but,
for that very purpose to be fulfilled, must be put in quick
possessioon of his premises. The legislative project and
purpose turn not on niceties of little verbalism but on the
actualities of rugged realism, and so, the construction of
section 14A(1) must be illumined by the goal, though guided
by the word. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding
that section 14A(1) is available as a ground, if the prem-
ises are owned by him as inherited from propositus in whose
name the property stood. In his name, and let out by him
read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to
the words of the section, clearly convey the idea that the
premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be
under him directly, which is the case where he, as heir,
steps into his father’s ’shoes who owned the building in his
own name and let it out himself. He represents the former
owner and lessor and squarely falls within section 14A. The
accent on ’name’ is to pre-empt the common class of benami
evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism.
Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality the
ownership and landlordism as the touchstone.
Nor do we set much store by the submission that the 1 st
respondent is not a landlord, being only a co-heir and the
will in his favour having been disputed. Equally without
force in our view is the plea that one co-lessor cannot sue
for eviction even if the other co-lessors have no objection.
Section 2(e) of the Act defines ’landlord’ thus:
"2(e) ’Landlord’ means a person. who,
for the time being is receiving, or is enti-
tled to receive, the rent of any premises,
whether on his own account or on account of or
on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other
person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver
for any other person or who would so receive
the rent or be entitled to receive the rent,
if the premises were let to a tenant."
’Tenant’, by definition [s. 2(1)] means any person by whom
or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is
payable. Read in the context of the Rent Control law, the
simple sense of the situation is that there should be a
building which is let. There must be a landlord who col-
lects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he
recognizes as landlord. The complications of estoppel or
even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not
necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings
under the rent control law, tried by special Tribunals under
a special statute. In this case, rent was being paid to the
late Das who had let out to the appellant, on the death of
the former, the rent was being paid by the 1st respondent
who signed his name and added that it was on behalf of the
estate of the deceased Das. At a later stage the rent was
being paid to and the receipts issued by the 1st respondent
in his own name. Not that the little change made in the
later receipts makes much of a difference, but the fact
remains that the tenant in this case had been paying the
rent to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the latter fell
within the definition of ’landlord’ for the purposes of the
Act. we are
12--436SCI/77
416
not impressed with the investigation into the law of real
property and estoppel between landlord and tenant, Shri
Nariman invited us to make. A fair understanding of the
relationship between the parites leaves little room for
doubt that the appellant was the tenant of the premises.
The 1st respondent, together with the other respondents,
constituted the body of landlords and, by consent, implicit
or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them
representing them all, was collecting rent. In short, he
functioned, for all practical purposes as the landlord, and
was therefore entitled to institute proceedings qua land-
lord.
This Court, in Sri Ram Pasricha(1) clarified that a co-
owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole
owner of the property is: "Jurisprudentially, it is not
correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner.
He owns very part of the composite property alongwith others
and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a
fractional owner of the property .. It is therefore, not
possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff, who is
admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises, is not
the owner of the premises within the meaning of section
13’(1) (f). It is not necessary to establish that the plain-
tiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of
section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the
property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of
the defendants." That case also was one for eviction under
the rent control law of Bengal. The law having been thus
put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the
other co-owner on record disentitled the first respondent
from suing for eviction, fails. We are not called upon to
consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of
the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the
relief claimed by the evicting co-owner.
Shri Nariman urged that the will had not been proved and
that he had not been given an opportunity to establish his
challenge of the will of Shri Das. In the High Court the
other co-heirs were parties and there is nothing on record
to show that they objected to the claim of the 1st respond-
ent to the first floor on the strength of the will from his
father. An objection for the sake of an objection which has
no realistic foundation, cannot be entertained seriously for
the sake of processual punctiliousness. We do not agree
with the contention.
The last, and yet the lethal objection which had been
lost sight of in the High Court, although raised there,
loomed-large before this Court, in Shri Nariman’s arguments.
The admitted fact is that on the same ground of the govern-
ment’s order to vacate, the first respondent had evicted a
dwelling house on the first floor and is keeping it vacant.
He is again using the same Order to vacate passed by the
government to evict the appellant’s dwelling house. This is
obviously contrary to the intendment of section 14A and is
interdicted by the proviso to section 14A(1). It is true
that when an officer is sought to be evicted by the govern-
ment from its premises he has to be rehabilitated in his own
house by an accelerated remedial procedure provid
(1) (1976) 4 s.c.c. 184
417
ed by section 14A read with section 28B of the Act. But
this emergency provision available merely to put the govern-
ment servant back into his own residential accommodation
cannot be used as a weapon for evicting several tenants if
he has many houses let out to various persons. The object
of section 14A is fulfilled once the landlord recovers
immediate possession of his premises from one of his ten-
ants. The right is exhausted., thereby and is not available
for continual applications for eviction against all other
tenants holding under him. This is made clear by the. provi-
so which makes plain that the section shall not be construed
as conferring a right on a landlord owing two or more dwell-
ing houses to recover possession of more than one dwelling
house. Of course it gives him the choice since the proviso
states that it shall be lawful for such landlord to indi-
cate, the particular dwelling house among a plurality owned
by him, possession of which he intends to recover. He can
ordinarily recover one dwelling house ’but no more. In the
present case, admittedly he has recovered one dwelling house
consisting of a three-room apartment on the first floor by
using the precise ground under section 14A(1). It neces-
sarily follows that he cannot use section 14A for evicting
the’ tenant-appellant from another dwelling house. On the
last ground, therefore, the appeal must be allowed, although
in the circumstances we .direct the parties to: bear their
costs throughout.
Counsel on both sides; on the suggestion by the court,
calculated to produce a salutary relationship between the
parties, agreed that the three-room dwelling house which
lies vacant (having been evicted under section 14A) will be
given possession of to the appellant in exchange for the
appellant making over possession of the 4-room
apartment--the premises involved in the present case--to-
gether with the appartement space. The appellant has agreed
to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- per month by way of rent for the
adjacent three-room apartment into which he will move,
within one month from today and surrender possession of the
4-room apartment simultaneously. In case the parties are
able to adjust their differences and the 1st respondent
makes over the additional space attached to the 4-room
tenement for the use of the appellant, he will pay an extra
sum of Rs. 75/- per mensem or other negotiated figure. On
these terms agreed to before us by counsel on both sides,
after taking instructions from their parties, we direct that
the 1st respondent do make over possession of the three-room
dwelling house on the first floor and take in exchange the
4-room dwelling house which is the subject matter of the
present eviction proceedings. We record this undertaking
as indicated above and with this modification, allow the
appeal.
P.H.P. Appeal allowed.
418