PETITIONER:
KANNAN DEVAN HILLS PRODUCE COMPANY LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1972
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M. (CJ)
SHELAT, J.M.
RAY, A.N.
DUA, I.D.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1972 AIR 2301 1973 SCR (1) 356
1972 SCC (2) 218
ACT
Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 5 of 1971)-Competency of State legislature to enact- Sections 4 & 5 of Act do not fall under entry 52 List I but under entries 18 of List II and 52 of List III in Seventh Schedule of Constitution-Act whether has protection of Act 31A of Constitution-Land in question whether ’estate’.
HEADNOTE
The petitioner was in possession of an area of approximately 1,27,904 acres, commonly known as the ’Concession Area’ lying contiguously in the Kannan Devan Hills village. The concession was first given to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant company in 1877 by the poonjar Chief for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/. After some years a yearly sum of Rs. 3,000 was to be paid to the rent collector of the Chief. In 1878 the Maharaja of Travancore ratified the Concession on certain conditions. In 1886 the agreement called the Second Pooniat Concession was entered into modifying the previous deed of ratification. A Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 whereby the Poonjar Chief surrendered the propriety rights which he had exercised over the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills. According to the petitioner it had all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession land as the absolute owner thereof. The petitioner further alleged that it had established 23 tea estates, with factories in each estate for the manufacture of tea, hospitals, quarters, township and shopping centres. The Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act 1971 (Kerala Act 5 of 1971) the lands agricultural & non-agricultural situated in the Kannan Devan, Hills Village vested in the Government of Kerala.. The petitioner company filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging certain provisions of the Act. The questions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State of Kerala; (ii) whether the impugned Act was protected from challenge under Art 31A of the Constitution. HELD : (i) The State has legislative competence to legislate on entry 18 List It and entry 42 List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under entry 52 List 1. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matter. If a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List I it does not cease to be legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List Ill. The object of ss. 4 and 5 seems to be enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (e) of s. 4(i). These provisions are really incidental to the exercise of the power of acquisition. The State cannot be denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public interest. [369 C-D] The fact that the plantation was run as an integrated unit cannot impinge upon and take away the legislative power of the State in respect of List II entry 18. 370 [F-G] Chika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1956] S.C.R. 393, 420 and Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Attorney General, [1950] A.C. 122, 123, 140, applied. 357 Baijnath Kedai v. State of Bihar, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 100, Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 712 and State of Maharashtra v. Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712, referred to, There was no repugnance between the provisions of the impugned Act and the Tea Act. It was said that there is conflict because it is the Tea Board and not the Land Board, which should determine what land is necessary for the efficient working of the plantation-, but Parliament has not chosen even if it could, to say so. [373G-H] Paresh Chandra Chatterjee v. The State of Assam and Another, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 88, applied. (ii)On the material placed before the Court it was difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fell within the expression ’Janmam right’. It is stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmam and the Sircar becomes a Janmi by escheat, confiscation or otherwise. The effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi. [376F] Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 and Sakanuram Sabbayogam v. State of Karala, A.I.R. 1963 Kerala 101, referred to, (iii)From the Travancore Land Revenue Manual it would appear that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten square Miles Concession and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ’Pandaravaka Lands’, i.e., land belonging to the Sircar. It was held by this Court in Pushothaman Nambudri’s case that Pandaravaka Verumpattam lands could be regarded as local equivalent of an estate under cl. (2) of Art. 31A. If it is held that the land in question does not fall within the expression ’janmam right, it may possibly be covered by the decision of this Court in Purushottam Namboodri’s case but as no arguments were addressed on this point it was not necessary for the Court to express its final opinion. [379C-D] Purushothaman Nambudri V.. Sate of Kerala, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 753, referred to. (iii)The three purposes mentioned in s. 9 namely (1) reservation of land for promotion of agriculture; (2) reservation of land for the welfare of agricultural population and (3) assignment of remaining lands to agriculturists and agricultural labourers, were covered by the expression " agrarian reform" and the legislation was protected from challenge under Art. 31-A. [382] Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup v. Durga Nath Sarma, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 561, P. Vajravalu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614 and Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82. The wide wording of the first two purposes did not carry them beyond the concept of ’agrarian reform’. The definition of ’common purpose’ which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s case shows that the purposes sustained thereby would come under either the express "promotion of agriculture" or "welfare of agricultural population" in s. 9 Indeed some would fall under both. For instance, reservation of lands for manure pits water-works or wells, village water courses or water 358 channels and grazing grounds would promote agriculture; schools and playgrounds, dispensaries, public latrines etc. would be for the welfare of he agriculturists. [381C] If the State were to use lands for purposes which have no direct connection with the promotion of agriculture or welfare of agricultural population the State could be restrained from using the lands for these purposes. Any fanciful connection with these purposes would not be enough.
[381D] If the two purposes were understood to mean that these include only common purposes’, which were sustained by this Court and purposes similar thereto it would be difficult to say that they are not for agrarian reform. In a sense agrarian reform is wider than land reform. It includes besides land reform something more and something more is illustrated by the definition of "common purpose" which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s case. [381E-F] The third object-settlement of agriculturists and agricultural labour is clearly covered by the expression "agrarian reform". The main object of agrarian reforms has been to acquire excess land and settle landless labourers and agriculturists.- [382B-C] Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82 and State of Uttar Pradesh V. Raja Anand, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 362, applied. Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup v. Durga Nath Sarnia [1968] 1 S.C.R. 561 and P. Vajravalu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82, referred to.
JUDGMENT
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 44 of 1971. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights. M.C. Chagla, A. J. Rana, Joy Joseph, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner. M. M. Abdul Khader, Advocate-General for the State of Kerala, V. A. Seyid Muhammad, Verghese Kaliath and K. M. K. Nair, for the respondent. J. D. Dadachanji, for the interveners. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, C.J. Two main points arise in this petition under art. 32 of the Constitution, brought by the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the petitioners (1) Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 5 of 1971)-hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act-is within the legislative competence of the State of Kerala; and (2) whether the impugned Act is protected from challenge under art. 31A of the Constitution, and if so, to what extent. The petitioner is in possession of an area of approximately 1,27,904 acres, commonly known as the ’Concession Area’ lying contiguously in the Kannan Devan Hills village. The petitioner 359 grows and manufactures tea in the plantation set up and developed by it. The petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was one Mr. John Danial Munro, who obtained, what is called, the first Pooniat Concession from Punhatil Kayikal Kela Varma Valuja Raja, on July 11, 1877 (Mithunam 20, 1052). This Concession recited that an, application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation. The Concession conveyed the properties in consideration of Rs. 5,000/-. It was further stipulated in the Concession that "you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees." Various other conditions were mentioned but it is not necessary to refer to them because this Concession was superseded by another agreement called the Second Pooniat Consession. Before we refer to the terms of the Second Pooniat Concession, we may mention that H.H. the Maharaja executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877. This deed of ratification laid down the terms and conditions in regard to Government assessment and other matters under which the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land. These terms and conditions were declared in the Deed to be independent of any rents or payments due to the Poonjar Chief under the Grantee’s Agreement with him. Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that "the grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereafter be reserved namely, Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Bhony, Karoontbaly, Sandalwood; should he carry any timber without the limits of the grant it will be subject to the payment of Kooteekanom, or Customs Duty.......... The eleventh clause reads :
"The land granted shall be held in perpetuity
as heritable or transferable property, but
every case of transfer of the grant by the
grantee shall be immediately made known to the
Sircar, who shall have the right of
apportioning the tax, if a portion of the
holding is transferred."
The twelfth clause stipulates
"The discovery of useful mines and treasures
within the limits of the grant shall be
communicated to the Sircar, and the grantee
shall in respect to such mines and treasures,
abide by the decision of the Sircar." 360 The sixteenth clause provides :
"The grantee shall be bound to preserve the
forest trees growing on the banks of the
principal streams running through the tract to
the extent of fifty yards in breadth on each
side of the stream, the Underwood only being
permitted to be cleared and coffee planted
instead. Similarly he shall also be bound to
preserve the, trees about the crest of the
hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on
each side." On August 2, 1886, the agreement called the Second Pooniat Concession was entered into modifying the previous deed of ratification. It appears that by this time a company called the North Travancore Land Planting and Agricultural Society, Ltd. had acquired the rights in the said land from John Danial Munro. The Land Revenue Manual (Vol. 3, Part 1 Revised Edition 1936, p 7) summarises the main provisions. For our purposes we may only mention the following provisions of the deed :
(1) Assesment of one-half of a British Rupee
per annum on every acre of land, other than
grass land, which is opened up for the purpose
of cultivation or otherwise.
(2) Assessment of two annas and eight pies
per annum on every acre, of grass land brought
under cultivation or taken up for homesteads
and farmsteads, or reserved as shooting
reserves or for the grazing of cattle or for
any other purposes.
(6) The Society may use and appropriate to
its own use within the limits of the
Concession all timber except teak, cole-teak,
blackwood, ebony (Karunthaly) and sandalwood,
but should not fell any timber beyond what is
necessary for clearing the ground for
cultivation or for building, furniture and
machinery, within the limits of the grant. No
unvalued timber or articles manufactured
therefrom should be carried outside, the
limits of the grant except in conformity with
the rules of the Forest and Customs Depart-
ments for the time being in force.
( 10)The land is to be held in
perpetuity as heritable or transferable
property but every case of transfer of the
grant by the Society should be immediately
made known by the Society to the Government.
361
(11) On the discovery by the Society of any
useful or valuable mines, minerals or
treasures within the limits of the grant, the
same should at once be communicated to the
Government and the Society should, in respect
to such mines, minerals and treasures, abide
by the decision of the Government. A Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 (Kanni 9, 1075). It recites :
"Whereas we deem it expedient to clearly
declare the position of this State in respect
of the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan
Hills, we are pleased to declare as follows :
(1) The tract known as Anjanad and Kannan
Devan Hills is an integral portion of our
territory and all rights over it belong to and
vest in us.
(2) The inhabitants of the said tract and
all others whom it may concern are hereby
informed and warned that they are not to pay
any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other
payment to the Poonjar Chief or his
representatives or to any person other than an
officer of our Government authorised in this
behalf, in respect of anything in, upon or
connected with the said tract, with the
exception, however, of a payment of rupee
three thousand per annum from the successors
in interests of the late Mr. J. D. Munro of
London and Peermade now being paid to the said
Chief in virtue of a Lease deed executed by
the said Chief in favour of the said late Mr.
J. D. Munro on the 11th July, 1877, and which
we are pleased to permit the said Chief to
continue to receive.
(3) The lands within the said tract will be
dealt with by our Government in the same
manner as lands in other parts of our
territory with such modifications as the
circumstances and conditions of the said tract
may require and all taxes, rents and dues
hitherto paid, and that may hereafter be
imposed by our Government shall, with the
exception of the sum of rupees three thousand
aforesaid, be paid by the, occupants of lands
within the said tract whose occupation has
been or may be recognized or confirmed by our
Government, and of such portions of the said
tract as may from time to time hereafter, with
the per-
362
mission of our Government, be occupied, to the
officers of our Government who may be
authorised in this behalf." According to the Land Revenue Manual (Vol. III Pt. 1 page 9) "this Proclamation was the outcome of an arrangement made by-the Government, with the Poonjar Chief for the surrender of certain proprietary rights which he had been exercising over the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills." We have set out these facts in detail because it will be necessary to appreciate the significance of the documents in order to decide the question whether these lands fall within expression ’Janmam right’ in art. 31A of the Constitution. According to the petitioner it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof. The petitioner further alleges that it has established 23 tea estates, with factories on each estate for the manufacture of tea, hospitals, quarters and township, and shopping centres and is employing approximately 18,500 persons for the running of the said estates. The breakup of the area of 1,27,904 acres was given as follows
Tea Estates 1. Tea Planted area 23,570,95 acres 2. Fuel area 17,851 .55 3. Building sites, roads, Workers gardens,
Manner Township 2,605.35 4. Grazing land 1,453.75 5. Swamps and Streams 2,407.36 6. uncultivable lands, rocks, slips, barren
lands, ridges etc-. 6,789.51
31,107 -52 31,107 .52 acres 7. Lands interspersed within the boundaries of the tea plantation considered necessary for the protection and efficient management of the tea plantation
23,404 .00 acres
Total: 78,082.47 8. Forest Area 22,311.00 9. Set apart for Wild Life Preservation 21,353.60 10. Other grass lands 6,157.49
1,27,904.56 We may now notice the provisions of the impugned Act. The preamble reads as follows :
"Whereas the lands comprising the entire
revenue village of Kannan Devan Hills in the
Devicolam taluk of
3 63
the Kottayam district had been given on lease
by the then Poonjar Chief to late Mr. John
Daniel Munro of London and Peermade on the
11th day of July, 1877, for coffee
cultivation;
And Whereas the right, title and interest of
the lessor had been assumed by the former
Government of Travancore;
And Whereas by such assumption the lands have
become the property of the former Government
of Travancore;
And Whereas the Government of Kerala have be-
come the successor to the former Government of
Travancore;
And Whereas large extent of agricultural,
lands in that village has not been converted
into plantations or utilised for purposes of
plantation and such lands are not required for
the purposes of the existing plantation:
I And Whereas the Government consider that
such agricultural lands should be resumed for
the distribution thereof for cultivation and
purposes ancillary thereto." It would be noticed that in the preamble the State claims that the right, title and interest of the Poonjar Chief had been assumed by the former Government of Travancore and the lands had become the property of the former Government of Travancore and now the Government of Kerala. It will also be noticed that the object is to resume agricultural lands for their distribution for cultivation and purposes ancillary thereto. "Plantation" is defined in s. 2 (f ) of the impugned Act
" "Plantation" means any land used by a person
principally for the cultivation of tea,
coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon
(hereinafter referred to as "Plantation crops"
".
Section 3 may be set out in full
"3. Vesting of Possession of certain lands :
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, or in
any contract or other document, but subject to
the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3),
with effect on and from the appointed day, the
possession of all lands situate in the Kaanan
Devan Hills village in the Devicolam taluk of
the Kottayam district shall stand transferred
to and vest in the Government free from all
encumbrances, and the right, title and -L128SupCI/72 364 interest of the lessees add all other persons, including rights of mortgagees and holders of encumbrances) in respect of such lands, shall stand extinguished. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of- (a) plantations, other than plantations belonging to trespassers; (b) buildings, other than buildings belonging to trespassers, and lands appurtenant to, and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings; (c) play-grounds and burial and burning grounds; and (d) lands in the possession of the Central Government of any State Government or the Kerala State ’Electricity Board. (3) Nothing contained in tub-section (1) shall apply in respect of so much extent of land held by a lessee under his personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto." It will be noticed that what the section vests in the Government is not only agricultural lands but all lands situated in the kannan Devan Hills village in the Devicolam taluk of the Kottayam district. It extinguishes the rights of the lessees and other persons and vests the lands in the State subject to some exceptions which are contained in subss. (2) and (3) of s. 3. Sub-section (2) exempts plantations. Sub-section (3) does not have any bearing on the problem before us. Section 4 is a peculiar provision which has led the counsel for the petitioner to argue vehemently about the legislative competence of the State. It reads thus :
"4. Restoration of possession of lands in
certain cases.-(1) Where the person in
possession of a plantation considers that any
lands, the possession of which has vested in
the Government under sub-section (1) of
section 3,-
(a) is necessary for any purpose ancillary
to the cultivation of plantation crops in such
plantation or for the preparation of the same
for the market; or
365
(b) being agricultural land interspersed
within the boundaries of the area cultivated
with plantation crops, is necessary for the
protection and efficient management of such
cultivation; or
(c) is necessary for the preservation of an
existing plantation, he may, within sixty days
from the date of publication of this Act in
the Gazette, apply to the Land Board for the
restoration of possession of such land.
(2) An application under sub-section (1)
shall be in such form as may be prescribed.
(3) ’On receipt of an application under sub-
section
(1), the Land Board shall, after giving the
applicant an opportunity of being heard and
after such inquiry as it deems necessary by,
order determine, the extent of land necessary
for the purpose or purposes specified in the
application, and such order shall be final.
(4) As soon as maybe after determining the
extent of land necessary for the purpose or
purposes specified in the application under
sub-section (1), ’the Land Board shall cause
such land to ’be demarcated and put the
applicant in possession of such land.
(5) Any person Put in possession of any land
under sub-section (4) shall be entitled
to,possess that land on the same terms and
subject to the same conditions on or subject to wh ich he was holding such land immediately
before the appointed day." It will be seen that s. 4 proceeds on the basis that certain lands, which have vested in the State under s. 3, may be necessary for the efficient carrying on of the plantation. A procedure is laid down by which the Land Board shall determine, the extent of land necessary for purposes mentioned in s. 4 (a), (b) and (c) to be specified in the application of the landholder, and direct restoration of possession. Section 5 alleviates the rigour of s. 4 by giving the Collector power to remove the hardship, if any, on the management of the plantation on, the vesting of any land under sub-s. (1) of S. 3. Section 8 provides that no compensation shall be payable for the extinguishment under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the right, title and interest of the lessees or other persons or of the rights of mortgagees or holders of encumbrances. Section 9 may be set out in full. It reads thus 3 66
"9. Assignment of lands.-(1) The Government,.
shall, after reserving such extent of the
land, the possession of which has vested in
the Government under subsection (1) of section
3 (other than lands, the possession of which
has been restored under section (4), as may be
necessary for purposes directed towards the
promotion of agriculture or the welfare of the
agricultural population to be settled on such
lands, assign on registry the remaining lands
to agriculturists and agricultural labourers
in such manner, on such terms, and subject to
such conditions and restrictions, as may be
prescribed.
(2) The Government may be notification in the
Gazette, delegate their power of assignment
under subsection (1) to the Collector, subject
to such restrictions and control as may be
specified in the notification." The position taken by the State in its reply is as follows : The petitioner is not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the Proclamation issued by H.H. the Mahaxaja. The lands to which the provisions of the Act apply, fall within the definition of ’estate’ under art. 31A(2) of the Constitution. If the petitioner is the absolute owner of the lands subject to levy of basic tax, as contended, the lands held by the petitioner are ’estate’ because they are held in Janmam rights or at any rate as the local equivalent of ’estate’ in its basic concept as understood in the decisions of this Court falling under art. 3 1 A (2) (a) (i) of the Constitution. In the alternative it is alleged that treating the lands as a lease-hold under the State, these are undoubtedly lands held or let for the purposes of agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto coming within the inclusive definition of ’estate’ under art. 3 1 A (2) (a) (iii) of the Constitution. It is denied that the lands were held primarily for development of the petitioner’s tea industry. It is alleged that the petitioner had used large tracts of land for diverse agricultural purposes as was clear from the averments in the petition. It is further asserted that the impugned legislation is a law relation to the agrarian reform. During the course of the hearing, the petitioner’s counsel said that he was willing to argue on the basis that the petitioner was a lessee and not a full proprietor. After we had heard the arguments for some time and it became necessary to adjourn the case, the State obtained permission to amend its reply and raised the point that the lands of the petitioner were gestate’ within the purview of art. 3 1 A (2) (a) (i) being janmam right. We may reproduce the relevant paras. "The Raja of Poonjar was admittedly the Janmi of the said lands at the time of letting as per Annexures B & C to the Writ Petition. By the Royal Proclamation of 1899 (Annexure R-1) the Janmam right of the lessor, the Poonjar Chief, 367 got vested in the Government of Travancore." [Para 4(1)]. "After the said vesting the writ petitioner is a lessee under a Janmi the Sircar, the State." [Para 4(2)]. Para 4(4) refers to pages 314 and 315 of Travancore State Manual- Vol. III where it is recorded that the lands of Poonjar Chief are Janmam lands. Further reference is made to Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. IV, which we will discuss a little later. In the sur-rejoinder affidavit the petitioner denies that Poonjar Chief or Raja was the Janmi of the land covered by the impugned legislation. It is further alleged that "even asuming without admitting that the Poonjar Chief was a Janmi, the Janinam rights of the Chief became vested in the Sircar by the Royal Proclamation of 1899 (Annexure R-1), the lands became part of and merged with the Sircar land. The Sircar as the overlord and the Ruler of the State became the sole owner of the land and the petitioner became a permanent and perpetual lessee of Sircar with heritable and alienable rights. The impugned legislation in no way deals with the Janmam rights, if any, vested in the Sircar." It is further stated that "in any event, without prejudice to the other contentions, it is submitted that Article 3 1 A (2) (a) (i) speaks only of "Janmam right" and not "Janmam" land as such." We may first deal with the question of legislative competence. We have set out the relevant provisions of the impugned legislation. It seems to us clear that in pith and substance it is a law dealing with entry 1 8 of List II and entry 42 of List 111. Entry 1 8 reads :
"Land, that is to say, rights in or over land,
land tenures including the relation of
landlord and tenant, and the collection of
rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural
land; land improvement and agricultural loans;
colonization."
Entry 42 List III reads
"Acquisition and requisitioning of property." This Court has upheld the legislative competence of States to deal with land reforms under entry 18 of List 11 and entry 42 of List III in various cases. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that ss. 4 and 5 of the impugned Act are a law with respect to entry 52 List I. These provisions, according to him, regulate the carrying on of tea industry, within the competence of Parliament, by controlling the land available for tea plantation. He says that it is impossible to run an efficient plantation except by having sufficient land (1) for purposes ancillary to cultivation and plantation of the
368 crop and (2) for the preparation of the same for the market. He says that it is also necessary. to have land interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated with plantation for the preservation of the existing plantation. He urges that if the effect of the legislation is. to control, the working of the tea plantation the legislation must be regarded, as legislation with respect to entry 52 List I. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to various reports to show, that the plantation is a self-contained unit of Organisation. In para 1. 1 1 of the Report of the Study Group for Plantation (Tea) it is stated :
"1.11. The cultivation and manufacture of tea
do not exhaust the activities associated with
tea plantations. A typical plantation covers
a wide area, having a large resident
population in a number of settlements.
Management of plantations involves
construction and maintenance of roads and
buildings, running of hospitals, schools,
creches, and canteens, etc. and in a miniature
form, transport and,, public health
activities. In short, a plantation is a self-
contained unit of Organisation."
In the report of P. C. Borooah Committee on
Tea Industry following measures were
recommended :
"1. 18. Taking into consideration the
difficulties faced by the industry because of
Government enactments and in view of our
recommendation in regard to the necessity for
undertaking extensions of plantings to achieve
the plan targets laid down by Government and
the need for replacement to increase foreign
exchange earnings of the country’ the
Committee recommends that the following
measures should be taken by Government :-
(i) The Central Government should take steps
to convene a conference of all representatives
of tea producing State Governments to frame a
well-considered policy in regard to land
required for expanding tea production. Where
land is proposed to be resumed by the State
Governments concerned, the Tea Board should be
taken into consultation.
(ii) The principles underlying all resumption
of land should be such as to ensure that tea
estates should have enough land available for
extensions and for other ancillary purpose for
their viability and protection. Land within
an estate should in no case be taken over as
the integrity of estates must at all costs be
maintained." 369 In the, Second five, Year Plan, While considering the question of exemption from ceilings one of the factors taken into account was the "integrated nature of operations, especially where industrial and agricultural work are undertaken as a composite enterprise." It was recommended that "if these considerations are kept in view there would appear to be an advantage in exempting the following categories of farms from the, operations of ceilings which may he proposed: (1) tea, coffee and rubber plantation It seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legislate on entry 18 List 11 and entry 42 List 111. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under entry 52 List 1. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matter. If a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List I it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List 111. The object of ss. 4 and 5 seems to be, to enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of s. 4(1). These provisions are really incidental to the exercise of the power of acquisition. The State cannot he denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public interest.
The case of Baijnath Kedai v. State of Bihar(1) relied on has no relevance. It was held in that case that entry 23 List 11 was subject to entry 54 of the Union List and once a declaration was made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation to the extent laid became an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. The scope of entry 52 of the Union List is slightly different. Once it is declared by Parliament by law to, be expedient in the public interest to control the industry, Parliament can legislate on that particular industry and the States would lose their power to legislate on that industry. But this would not prevent the States from legislating on subjects other than that particular industry.
In Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2) Bhagwati, J., observed :
"Industry in the wide sense of the term would
be capable of comprising three different
aspects : (1) raw materials which are an
integral part of the industrial process, (2)
the process of manufacture or production, and
(3) the distribution of the products of the
industry. The raw materials would be goods
which would be comprised in Entry 27 of List
II. The process of manufac- (1) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 100. (2) [1956] S.C.R. 393,420. 370
ture or production would be comprised in Entry
24 of List 11 except where the industry was a
controlled industry when it would fall within
Entry 52 of List I and the products of the
industry would also be comprised in Entry 27
of List 11 except where they were the products
of the controlled industries when they would
fall within entry 33 of List 111. This being
the position, it cannot be said that the
legislation which was enacted by the Centre in
regard to sugar and sugarcane could fall
within Entry 52 of List 1. Before sugar
industry became a controlled industry, both
sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of
List 11 but, after a declaration was made by
Parliament in 1951 by Act LXV of 1951, sugar
industry became a controlled industry and the
product of that industry viz., sugar was
comprised in Entry 33 of List III taking it
out of Entry 27 of List II." In Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India(1), Tikka Ram’s case (supra) was referred to but the Court held that it was not necessary for the purposes of that case to attempt to define the expression "industry" precisely or to state exhaustively all its different aspects. The Court observed :
"But we are satisfied in the present case that
the manufacture of gold ornaments by
goldsmiths in India is a "process of
systematic production" for trade or manu-
facture and so falls within the connotation of
the word "industry" in the appropriate
legislative entries." In State of Maharashtra v. Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand (2 the point was left open whether the, State legislature had or had not the authority to legislate adversely on matters falling within entry 52 List I. None of these cases assist the petitioners. The fact that the plantation is run as an integrated unit was strongly relied on but this cannot impinge upon and take away the legislative power of the State in respect of List II entry 18. The Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. v. Attorney General(3) dealing with a similar matter observed
"But their Lordships can find neither
principle nor authority to support the
competence of the Parliament of canada to
legislate on a matter which clearly falls
within the enumerated heads in s. 92 and
cannot be brought (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 479. (3) [1950] A.C. 122, 123, 140. (2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712. 371
within any of the enumerated heads in s. 91
merely because the activities of one of the
parties concerned in the matter have created a
unified system which is widespread and
important in the Dominion."
The facts in that case are set out briefly in
the head note follows :
,,The appellant, the Canadian Pacific Rly.,
Co., which owned and managed the Empress Hotel
in Victoria, British Columbia, while not
denying that the regulation of hours of work
was ordinarily a matter of "property and civil
rights in the province" under head 13 of s. 92
of the British North America Act, 1867, and
accordingly within the legislative competence
of the provincial legislature, contended,
inter-alia, that the company’s activities had
become such an extensive and important element
in the national economy of Canada that the
Dominion Parliament was entitled under the
general powers conferred by the first part of
s. 91 of the Act of 1867 to regulate all the
affairs of the company, even where that
involved legislating in relation to matters
exclusively reserved to the provincial
legislatures by s. 92." It is not necessary to consider the situation where State legislation on a topic in List 11 makes the control of industry by the Union virtually impossible. No such question arises now. Coming now to the question of repugnancy : The object of the Tea Act, 1953, is to-provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the control, in pursuance of the international agreement now in force, of the cultivation of tea in and the export of tea from India. Chapter 11 sets up a Tea Board. Section 10 sets out the functions of the Board. Broadly the duty of the Board is to promote by such measures as it thinks fit the development under the control of the Central Government of tea industry. Measures contemplated are listed in sub-s. (2) as follows :
" (2) Without prejudice to the generality of
the provisions of sub-section (1), the
measures referred to therein may provide for-
(a) regulating the production and extent of
cultivation of tea;
(b) improving the quality of tea;
(c) promoting co-operative efforts among
growers and manufacturers of tea;
as
372
(d) undertaking, assisting or encouraging
scientific, technological and economic
research and maintaining or assisting in the
maintenance of demonstration farms and
manufacturing stations;
(e) assisting in the control of insects and
other pests and diseases affecting tea;
(f) regulating the sale and export of tea;
(g) training in tea tasting and fixing grade
standards of tea;
(h) increasing the consumption in India and
elsewhere of tea and carrying on propaganda
for that purpose;
(i) registering and licensing of
manufacturers, brokers, tea waste dealers and
persons engaged in the business of blending
tea;
(j) improving the marketing of tea in India
and elsewhere;
(k) collecting statistics from growers,
manufacturers, dealers and such other persons
as may be prescribed on any matter relating to
the tea industry; the publication of
statistics so collected or portions thereof or
extracts therefrom;
(1) securing better working conditions and
the provisions and improvement of amenities
and incentives for workers;
(m) such other matters as may be
prescribed." Chapter III contains provisions to enable control to be exercised over the extension of tea cultivation. Section 15(1)(a) proceeds on the basis that land which is planted with tea can be compulsorily acquired for in that eventuality the owner of the tea estate in which such land is situated is permitted to apply to the Board for permission to plant tea on land not planted with tea. Tea Act does not prohibit voluntary sale or compulsory acquisition. We may mention that no body has challenged the validity of the Tea Act and we are proceeding on the basis that the Act is valid. In this connection entry 14 of List I (...... implementing of treaties...... ) may be kept in mind. If the Act is within the competence of Parliament and the impugned Act is within the competence of the State the petitioners must show that the impugned Act is repugnant to the Tea Act but we can see no conflict between the provisions of the impugned Act and the Tea Act. 373 in Paresh Chandra Chatterjee v. The State of Assam and Another(1) the validity of Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was challenged partly on the ground that it was ultra vires the State Legislature insofar as it provided for the requisitioning and acquisition of tea estate. As it was a pre Constitution Act and there was no Federal Law then declaring that the development of tea industry was expedient in the public interest, the Act was held to be constitutionally valid. The Court then examined the question whether the impugned Act would continue in force, under art. 372 of the Constitution in face of the Tea Act of 1953. This Court held that the impugned Act provided only for requisition or acquisition of lands in public interest and’ it had nothing to do with tea industry. After examining the scheme of the Act, Subba Rao, J., observed :
"It is, therefore, manifest that the Tea Act
mainly concerned with the development of the
tea industry, and it has nothing to do with
the requisition or acquisition of lands,
though the said lands may form part of a tea
estate or used for purposes incidental to the
tea industry. Indeed, s. 1 5 (1) (b) of the
Tea Act provides for the contingency of a part
of a land on which tea is planted being
compulsorily acquired under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894)
or by any other law for the time being in
force and no longer carries tea. In such an
event, the said section authorises the owner
of the tea estate in which such land is
situate to apply to the Board for permission
to plant tea on land not planted with tea.
The Tea Act, therefore, not only does not
expressly prohibit the acquisition of any
land, but also in express terms provided for
the replacement of the area acquired by
other land for the purpose of tea plantation."
"A comparative study of both the Acts makes it
clear that the two Acts deal with different
matters and were passed for different
purposes." It was said that there is conflict because it is the Tea Board and not the Land Board, which should determine what land is necessary for the efficient working of the plantation but Parliament has not chosen, even if it could, to say so. For the reasons mentioned above we have come to the conclusion that the State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act and that it is not repugnant to the Tea Act. (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 88. 374 Coming to the second point, namely whether the impugned Act is protected from challenge under art. 3 1 A of the Constitution, three points arise out of the contentions of the parties : (1) Do the lands acquired fall within the expression "janmam right" in art. 31 A (2) (a) (i) ? (2) If not, do they fall within the expression "testate" as defined in art. 31A(2) ? and (3) If not, do any of the ’lands fall within the lands described in art. 31 A (2) (a) (iii) ? Art. 31A(2) may be set out for the sake of convenience. "31A(2) In this article,-
(a) the expression "estate" shall, in
relation to any local area, have the same
meaning as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relating to
land tenures in force in that area and shall
also include-
(i) any jagir, janam or muafi or other
similar grant and in the States of Madras and
Kerala, any Janmam right; any land held under
ryotwari settlement;
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of
agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto,
including waste land, forest land, land for
pasture or sites of buildings and other
structures occupied by cultivators of land,
agricultural labourers and village artisans;
(b) the expression "rights", in relation to
an estate, ,shall include any rights vesting
in a proprietor, sub proprietor, under
proprietor, tenure-holder, (raiyat, under
raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights
or privileges in respect of land revenue." Dealing with the first point there is no doubt that the Poonjar Raja was a janmi when the First Concession was granted to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, and if nothing had transpired after that the whole lands would have fallen within the expression ’janmam right’. But the Royal Proclamation dated September 24, 1899, changed the situation. The Poonjar Chief surrendered certain rights which he had been exercising over the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Mills. What is the effect of this surrender ? According to the learned Advocate-General, the janmam rights still subsisted and instead of the Poonjar Chief H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi. The nature of ’janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras(1). Subba Rao, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed : (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. 375
"Under the definition, any janmam right in
Kerala is an "estate". A janmam right is the
freehold interest. in a property situated in
Kerala. Moor in his "Malabar Law and Custom"
describes it as a hereditary proprietorship.
A janmam interest may, therefore, be described
as "proprietary interest of a landlord in
lands", and such a janmam right is described
as "estate" in the Constitution. Substituting
"janmam right" in place of "estate" in cl. 2
(b), the "rights" in art. 3 1 A ( 1 ) (a) will
include the rights of a proprietor and
subordinate tenure holders in respect of a
janmam right. It follows that the
extinguishment or modification of a right
refers to the rights of a proprietor or a
subordinate tenure-holder in respect of a
janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi
or his subordinate tenure-holder has certain
defined rights in a "janmam right". Land-
tenures in Malabar are established by
precendents or immemorial usage. Janmam right
is a freehold interest in property and the
landlord is called "janmi". He can create
many subordinate interests or tenures
therein."
In the Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume 4
it is, stated
"9. A Jamni differs from such landlords in
that he does not derive his title to lands
from the Sircar & Co. His title to the Janmam
lands is inherent. ..............
12. Janmam lands are precisely what are in
Europe called allodial properties as contra-
distinguished from feudal.
13. It must be clear from what has been
stated that all the lands in the Travancore
belonged to a body of janmis. There are no
lands that do not belong to some janmi or
other.
14. Be it remembered that the Sircar itself
is one of these janmis, it having come to
possess janmam lands by gift, purchase,
escheat, confiscation and other ways. It is
only a great janmi, great in the sense that
its janmam property is extensive.
15. If any person wants land in Travancore,
he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some
one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the
Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some
other Janmi." (Sir T. Madava Row’s Memo.) 376 In Mr. Kunhiramam Nair’s Memo on Land ’Tenures it is stated:
"At present the Sircar is the largest Janmi
in the State. The janmam lands of all the
petty Rajas subdued in the last few centuries
and of several Madampies, have lapsed to the
State, and other causes such as escheat & c,
have tended ,to increase the extent of the
Janmam possession of the Sircar. About three-
fourths of the whole land in the State belong
on Janmam to the Sircar, the remaining one-
fourth being distributed among the classes
mentioned in para 32 It is interesting to note that in certain parts of Madras Janmam rights existed ’and the ’Government lands were called government janman lands. (See Government Order No. 1902 Revenue dated November 1, 1926) Para 3 of that order deals with the janmam estates and reads as under :
"3. JANMABHOGAM.-Paragraph 11 of ’the Board’s
Proceedings-"Lands have neither to been des-
cribed as-
(a) Government Janmam, i.e. lands which are
held directly from the Government and on which
taram assessment and janmabhogam are paid to
the Government and
(b) private janmam, i.e. lands which are
held directly from the Government and on which
taram assessment but not janmabhogam is paid
to the Government." It seems to us that on the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression "Janmam right". If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi. We are not concerned here with lands which were held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sukapurain Sabhayogain v. State of Kerala(1) to be held under Ryotwari tenure after the introduction of the Ryotwari Settlement in the Malabar area of Kerala State. Assuming that the lands do not fall with Janmam Right’, we may now deal with the second point: In the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III, Revised Edition, 1936, Registered Lands are described as follows (1) A.I.R. [1963] Kerala 101.
377
"Registered lands are lands registered in the
revenue accounts as held by or granted to
individuals‘ families, corporations or
institutions, and comprise all the different
kinds of tenures bearing either the full
assessment or wholly or partially free of
assessment. These lands comprise not only the
areas brought under cadastral survey but
include also coffee, tea, rubber and other
estates, cardamom gardens and other special
grants outside the limits of cadastral
survey." The Registered Lands include inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands. Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated :
"Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of
which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi
and whatever rights which vest in the ryots
are derived from the Sircar." Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands. The janmam lands ate dealt with as follows:
"19. Definition.-Jenmom land is defined in
the Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation, V of 1071 as
"land (other than Pandaravaka, Sripandaravaka,
Kandukrishi or Sircar Devaswom land,
recognised as such in the Sircar accounts)
which is either entirely exempt from
Government tax or if assessed to public
revenue, is subject to Rajabhogam only, and
the occupancy right in ;which is created for a
money consideration (Kanom) and is also
subject to the payment of Michavaram or custo-
mary dues and the payment of the renewal fees.
"This definition is intended for the purposes
of the Regulation, which regulates the
relations between janmis and their Kanapattom
tenants. A Janmi has not only Kanapattom
tenanats but has other tenants as well holding
on Adima, Anubhogam, Thiruvulam and similar
other. tenures and the Regulation is not
concerned with the latter class of tenants in
whose case the ordinary law of landlord and
tenant is applicable. Revenue law, on the
other hand, makes no distinction between a
Kanapattom tenant and a non-Kanapattom tenant
if he holds under a Janmi recogonised in the
revenue accounts. Hence for revenue purposes,
Jenmom lands are lands that are entered in the
revenue accounts under the heads of
Devaswomvaka, Brahmaswomvaka and Madampimar-
vaka i.e. to say a land to be classed as
Jenmom land should have been recognised as
such in the revenue accounts. The mere
circumstance that a land belongs.
378
to a Jenmi does not bring it under Jenmom
tenure and conversely the mere fact that
Janmom land is absolutely transferred to a
non-Jenmi does not any the less detract from
its original character. Jenmom lands are
allodial properties and the proprietary right
in them is considered as inherent in the
individual and not derived from the State." It thus appears that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ’Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar. The case of Pandaravaka lands from the erstwhile State of Cochin was considered by this Court in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala(1). Some of the lands in dispute there were classified by the land records maintained by the state as Pandaravaka holdings while the remaining lands were classified as Puravaka holdings. The petitioner there claimed that the lands did not constitute an ’estate’ under art. 3 1 A (2) (a). His case was that as regards Pandaravaka lands he was liable to pay rent to the State calculated as a proportion of the gross yield of the properties and the lands held by him as tenant under the State could not be an estate. It was further contended that he was not an intermediary between the State and the tiller of the soil and therefore the lands did not come within the purview of art. 31 A (2) (a). Under clause 13 of the proclamation dated March 10, 1905, the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure acquired full rights to the soil of the lands and held them subject to the liability to pay State assessments. This Court, by majority, held that the holders of land held as Pandaravaka Verumpattom were proprietors of the lands and held the, lands subject to the liability to pay the assessment to the State, and therefore Pandaravaka Verumpattom would be regarded as local equivalent of an estate under cl. (2) of Art. 31A. Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the. Court, observed :
"It seems to us that the basic concept of the
word "estate" is that the person holding the
estate should be proprietor of the soil and
should be in direct relationship with the
State paying land revenue to it except where
it is remitted in whole or in part. If
therefore a term is used or defined in any
existing law in a local area which corresponds
to this basic concept of "estate" that would
be the local equivalent of word "estate" in
that area. It is not necessary that there
must be an intermediary in an estate before it
can be called an estate within (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R .753. 379
the meaning of Art. 3 1 A (2) (a); It is true
that in many cases of estate such
intermediaries exist, but there are many
holders of small estates who cultivate their
lands without any intermediary whatever. It
is not the presence of the intermediary that
determines whether a particular landed
property is an estate or not; what determines
the character of such property to be an estate
is whether it comes within the definition of
the word " estate" in the existing law in a
particular area or is for the purpose of that
area the local equivalent of the word "
estate" irrespective of whether there are
intermediaries in existence or not." It seems that if it is held that theland does not fall within the expression ’janmam right’ it may possibly be covered by the decision of this Court in Purushothaman Nambudiri’s case (Supra) but as arguments were not addressed to us on this point we do not express our final opinion. The next question which arises is : If the lands acquired by the impugned Act are an estate, is the impugned Act a law for effecting agrarian reforms ? Section 9 of the impugned Act envisages three purposes : (1) reservation of lands for promotion of agriculture; (2) reservation of land for the welfare of agricultural population; (3) assignment of remaining lands to agriculturists and agricultural labourers. Do the first two purposes fall within the concept of agrarian reforms ? Flood control and prevention of erosion are undoubtedly of great importance for promoting agriculture and yet it was held by this Court in Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup v. Durga Nath Sarma(1) that the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act had no relation to agrarian reforms, land tenure or the elimination of intermediaries. Acquisition for housing scheme and slum clearance in the city of Madras, though of great social and economic importance, was not included in the concept of agrarian reform by this Court in P. Vajravalu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (2 ) But a wide meaning was given to the concept in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab(3). The transfer of Shamlat deh owned by the proprietors to the village panchayat for the purpose of management in the manner stated in the Consolidation of Holdings Act and (1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 561. (2) [1965], 1 S.C.R. 614. (3) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82,94. LI286 Sup CI/72 380 conferment of proprietary rights in respect of lands in the Abadi deh was treated as effecting agrarian reforms. Hidayatillah, J., as he then was, observed :
"The scheme of rural development today
envisages not only equitable distribution of
land so that there is no undue imbalance in
society resulting in a landless class on the
one hand and a concentration of land in the
hands of a few on the other, but envisages
also the raising of economic standards and
bettering rural health and social conditions.
Provisions for the assignment of lands to
village Panchayat for the use of the general
community, or for hospitals, schools, manure
pits, tanning grounds etc. enure for the
benefit of rural population must be considered
to be an essential part of the redistribution
of holdings and open lands to which no
objection is apparently taken. If agrarian
reforms are to, succeed, mere distribution of
land to the landless is not enough. There
must be a proper planning of rural economy and
conditions and a body like the village
Panchayat is best designed to promote rural
welfare than individual owners of small
portions of lands."
The definition of "common purpose" is
reproduced below for convenience :
"Common purpose" means any purpose in relation
to any common need, convenience or benefit of
the village and include the following purposes
(i) extension of the village Abadi;
(ii) providing income for the Panchayat of
the, village concerned for the benefit of the
village community.
(iii) village roads and paths; village drains;
village wells, ponds or tanks; village water
courses or water channels; village bus stands
and waiting places; manure pits; hada rori;
public latrines; cremation and burial grounds;
panchayat ghar; Janj Ghar, grazing grounds;
tanning places; meta grounds; public places of
religious or charitable nature; and
(iv) schools and play-grounds, dispensaries,
hospitals and institutions of like nature,
water works or tube-wells whether such
schools, play-grounds,
381
dispensaries, hospitals, institutions, water-
works or tube-wells may be managed and
controlled by the State Government or not." We are bound by the judgment. What are the, implications of this judgment ? All the purposes mentioned above were held to be comprised within the concept of agrarian reform. It is urged that the wording of the first two purposes in, S. 9 is too wide. But if we look at the definition of "common purpose", which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s case, it shows that the purposes sustained thereby would come tinder either the expression "promotion of agriculture" or "welfare of agricultural population" in s. 9. Indeed some would fall under both. For instance, reservation of lands for manure pits, water works or wells, village water courses or water channels and grazing grounds would promote agriculture; schools and playgrounds, dispensaries, public latrines etc. would be for the welfare of agriculturists. If the State were to use lands for purposes which have no direct connection with the promotion of agriculture or welfare of agricultural population the State could be restrained from using the lands for those purposes. Any fanciful connection with these purposes would not be enough. It seems to us that if we read these two purposes to mean that these include only "common purposes", which were sustained by this Court and purposes similar thereto it would be difficult to say that they are not for agrarian reform. In a sense agrarian reform is wider than land reform. It includes besides land reform something more and that something more is illustrated by the definition of "common purpose", which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra). In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raja Anand(1), the acquisition of a grant in the nature of Jagir was upheld. It was observed:
"Mr. A. K. Sen further urges that the,
acquisition of the estate was not for the
purposes of agrarian reforms because hundreds
of square miles of forest are sought to be
acquired. But as we have held that the area
in dispute is a rant in the nature of Jagir
or inam, its acquisition like the acquisition
of all Jagirs, inams, or similar grants, was a
necessary step in the implementation of the
agrarian reforms and was clearly contemplated
in art. 31A." (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 362, 372. 382 These observations must be understood in the light of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the impugned Act in that case (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1964) had amended S. 3 (8) of that Act of 1950. This grant in the nature of the jagir stood in the same position as all the big zamindaris and jagirs in Uttar Pradesh. It has never been urged that the Act of 1950 was not a measure of agrarian reform. The third object-settlement of agriculturists and agricultural labour it seems to us, is clearly covered by the expression "agrarian reforms". The main object of agrarian reforms has been to acquire excess land and settle landless labourers and agriculturists. We are accordingly of the opinion that the three purposes the. first two reads as we have indicated-are covered by the expression "agrarian reform" and the legislation is protected from challenge by art. 31-A. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. S.C. Petition dismissed. 383