PETITIONER:
KALUMIYA KARIMMIYA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/01/1977
BENCH:
GOSWAMI, P.K.
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 497 1977 SCR (2) 606
1977 SCC (1) 715
ACT
Land Acquisition Act 1894--Secs. 4, 5A, 6--Reasonable
opportunity in inquiry under sec. 5A--Whether collector
bound to give copy of the report submitted to Government
to the owner of land--Effect of not giving the copy--Delay
between sec. 4 & 6 notifications --Effect of--What is
unreasonable delay--Vagueness of s. 4 notification.
HEADNOTE
A notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 on 7.6.1966 intending to acquire a
total area of 13,900 sq. yds of land including 474 sq. yards
of the appellant’s land in Surat City. After considering
the objections under s. 5A a notification under section 6
was issued on 13.1.1969. The appellant filed a writ peti-
tion in the High Court challenging the said notifications
which was summarily dismissed. The High Court, however,
granted a certificate under Art. 133(1) (b) & (c) of the
Constitution on the question of vires of sections 4, 5A and
6 of the said Act.
Appellant contended:
(1) In spite of the appellant’s request for furnishing a
copy of the report under s. 5A the Collector did not give
him a copy and, therefore, he did not have adequate and
proper hearing under s. 5A.
(2) There was considerable delay between the notifica-
tion under sections 4 and 6.
(3) Notification under s. 4 does not contain the public
purpose as the requirement for "fire station". The notifi-
cation merely mentions" station workshop and parking pur-
pose."
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) Ordinarily there should be no difficulty in
furnishing a copy of the report under s. 5A to an objector
when he asks for the same. However, it is not a correct
proposition that hearing under s. 5A is invalid because of
failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of
the proceeding under the said Act, [608 F-G]
(2) A second hearing by the State Government after the
report is furnished by the Collector is not necessary.
[608-H]
Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
[1968] (1) SCR 597, followed.
(3) Since other dags of land belonging to numerous
persons were the subject matter of acquisition and individu-
al objections had to be heard there was no inordinate delay
in making the section 6 notification. Even the appellant
has not submitted before the High Court a copy of his writ-
ten objection. Nor has the same been produced in this Court
with the result that one does not know how much delay was
caused by the appellant himself. The delay in the present
case is about 2-1/2 years and there is not even a clear
statement of the appellant about delay to be attributable
to the Government. [609 B-D]
(4) Submission that s. 4 notification does not contain
the public purpose is made on the basis of the copy of the
notification annexed in the paper book. Even in the state-
ment of case the appellant has not raised this objection.
On
607
the other hand it was conceded that the purpose was fire
station, workshop and parking place and the objection was
that the appellant’s 1 and was not suitable for con-
struction of fire station. [609E-F]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2731 of
1972.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 20-11-1970 of the
Gujarat High Court in Special Appeal No.. 1247/70).
Vimal Dave and Miss Kailash Mehta, for the appellant.
D.V. Patel and M.N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.
L.N. Sinha, Sol. Genl and Girish Chandra, for respondent
No.2.
K.C. Vakharia, P.H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley, for re-
spondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J.--This appeal by certificate under Article
132 (1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution is from the judgment
of the Gujarat High Court. The certificate was granted on
October 21, 1972, before coming into force of the Constitu-
tion (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972.
Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the appellant, does not
press before us the challenge to the validity of sections 4,
5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
We will now state the facts as will appear from the
statement of case filed on behalf of the appellant.
A notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly the Act) on June 7, 1966,
intending to acquire a total area of 13900 sq. yds of land
including 474 sq. yds. of the appellant’s land in Ward No
11 of Surat City included in City Survey Nos. 2365 and 2366.
We are informed that only the appellant in raising objection
to the. acquisition and the plan has not yet been implement-
ed on account of the pending litigation. The appellant
submitted his objections under section 5A(1) of the Act to
the Collector who gave him a hearing under sub-section (2)
of section 5A. In due course the Collector submitted his
report to the State Government and after consideration of
the same the Government issued a declaration under section 6
on January 15, 1969 that the land was required for the
public purpose noted in the preliminary notification under
section 4.
608
The appellant in para 3 of the statement of case while
referring to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act
averred as follows :--
"It was stated in the said notice that
the suit lands were likely to be needed for
fire station, workshop and parking purpose of
the Surat Municipality as indicated in Govern-
ment Notification dated 7-6-1966".
In para 4 of the said statement it was averted "that the
appellant contested the notice by raising an objection that
the respondent No. 3--the Corporation--was not in need of
the suit land for the purpose of the fire station, etc."
After the declaration under section 6 of the Act, .as
stated earlier, a notice under section 9 of the Act was
served on the appellant but he did not submit any claims
with regard to compensation under that section. On Septem-
ber 22, 1970, the appellant filed an application under
Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of
Gujarat challenging the aforesaid notifications under the
Act. The High Court by its order of November 30, 1970,
rejected the petition. The High Court, however, by its
order of October 21, 1972, granted certificate under
Article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution on the ques-
tion of vires of sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisi-
tion Act.
Mr. Dave confines his submissions before us only to, the
following points, which we will deal with seriatim:
First, that in spite of the appellant’s request for
furnishing a copy of the report under section 5A the Col-
lector did not grant him a copy. He complains that there
was no proper and adequate heating under section 5A(2) of
the Act. According to the learned counsel a proper hearing
would include furnishing of a copy of the report under
section 5A. We are unable to accept this submission. Al-
though, ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in fur-
nishing a copy of the report under section 5A to an objec-
tor, when he asks for! the same, it is not a correct
proposition that bearing under section 5A is invalid because
of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion
of the hearing under the said section. Unless there are
weighty reasons, a report in public enquiry like this,
should be available to the persons who take part in the
enquiry. But failure’ to furnish a copy of the report of
such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is other-
wise not open to any valid objection. Apart from this
solitary ground, our attention has not been drawn to any
infirmity in the hearing under section 5A. We are, there-
fore unable to hold that the said enquiry under section 5A
was invalid.
The matter would have been different if a second enquiry
were essential under the law at the stage when the State
Government was considering the report under section 5A for
issuing its declaration under section 6 of the Act. We
are, however, clearly of opinion that there is no reason to
hold that a second hearing by the State Government at that
stage is necessary under section 6 of the Act,
609
(See Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &
Ors.(1) Since that is the position in law, failure to fur-
nish a copy, of the report under section 8A is innocuous.
The matter, again, may be different if there is a proper
allegation of mala fide against the Collector or the
State Government. There is no such allegation in this case.
The first submission of the learned counsel is, therefore,
devoid of substance.
The learned counsel next contends that there was con-
siderable delay between the notification under section 4
which was issued on June 7, 1966, and the declaration under
section 6 made on January 13, 1969. Since numerous dags of
land belonging to a number of persons were the subject
matter of acquisition and individual objections had to. be
heard, we do not think that there has been any inordinate
delay in making the notification. Even. the appellant has
not submitted before the High Court a copy of his written
objection nor is the same produced before us to indicate
when his objections were actually filed and whether he was
not also responsible for some delay in the conclusion of the
enquiry. The delay in this case is only about 21/2 years
and, as we have said, there is not even a clear statement of
the responsibility for delay which may be attributable to
the Government. The second submission of the learned coun-
sel is also of no avail.
Mr. Dave lastly submits that the notification under
section 4 did not contain the public purpose as the require-
ment for "fire station". The notification, says counsel,
mentioned station, workshop and parking purpose. He is
able to make this submission from a copy of the notification
in the Paper Book at page 20 (Ex. A). We are, however,
unable to agree with counsel that the notification under
section 4 did not in fact contain the purpose as fire sta-
tion. Even in the statement of case of the appellant which
we have set out earlier, no objection was ever taken against
the so-called vague description of the requirement in the
notification. On the other hand, it was conceded, therein,
that the purpose was fire station, workshop and parking
purpose and the objection was that the appellant’s land was
not "suited for the construction of fire station". There
is, therefore, no substance in this submission.
This Court rather liberally grants prayers for dispens-
ing with statement of case when such requests are made by
parties. Indeed, the form in vogue, in which statements of
case are submitted in this Court, has perhaps outlived
its practical utility in hearings before this Court. If
anything, besides being expensive, it causes delay in
making appeals ready for hearing.
We, however, feel, instead of the usual statements of
case by both the parties, a very succinct statement of case
and a list of dates submitted by the appellant alone. with
material facts necessary for deciding the questions of law
together with the findings of fact
(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 597.
610
of the court below and pinpointing the only legal
issues to be raised in this Court will be of advantage in
expeditious disposal of appeals before this Court.
For once, on occasion, we are able to; say that the state-
ment of case in this appeal is of use to us in visiting the
appellant with the forfeiture of his right to make his last
submission with regard to the vagueness or ambiguity of the
purpose mentioned in the notification under section 4 of the
Act.
All the submissions having failed, the appeal is dismissed.
Having regard to the fact that there was a certificate by
the High Court, we will make no order as to costs.
P.H.P.
Appeal dismissed.
611