PETITIONER:
JANGBIR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MAHAVIR PRASAD GUPTA
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 27 1977 SCR (1) 670
1976 SCC (4) 682
ACT
Second Appeal--Disturbance of a concurrent finding of
fact without considering the objects of the notifications or
discussing any principle of construction of documents which
could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for a
decision is patently exceeding the jurisdiction of the High
Court--Civil Procedure Code (Act V) 1908. S. 100.
Interpretation of documents--Principles applicable to
interpretation of documents--Notifications Nos. F. 9/5/59-
R&S published in gazette dated 17-1-60 u/s 507 of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notifica-
tion--GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59
of 1958) gazetted or, 21-4-62--Whether the whole of Mauza
Chowkri Mubarakabad and whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura
were meant to be notified.
HEADNOTE
Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad was included within the
limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by a
notification dated 7th January, 1960. By a notification
dated 12th April 1962, the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 was extended to the localities mentioned
in the schedule to the, notification dated 7th January 1960.
The respondent landlord who purchased a house situated in
Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1 situated at village Chowkri
Mubarakabad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar Nagar
II, filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant tenant of a
room in the said house and for recovery of rent. The trial
court and the first appellate court held that the juris-
diction of the civil court was barred by the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. However on second appeal, a single judge
of the High Court disturbed the findings of fact and re-
versed the judgments of the courts below. Dismissing the
appeal by special leave the Court,
HELD: (i) There cannot be any doubt, that, in the in-
stant case, by deciding to set aside the concurrent findings
of fact, ignoring the law laid down by this Court, and,
before that by the judicial committee of the Privy Council,
the High Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under s.
100 .C.P.C. without considering the objects of the
notifications or discussing any principle of construction of
documents which could indicate that a point of law had
really arisen for decision. [673 D--F]
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v.S. Hanyamayya & Ors., AIR
1959 SC 57; Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga
Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. 1962(2) SCR 509; Nedunuri Kameswaramma
v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR 208; Bhusawal Borough
Municipality v. Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. & Am’.
1964(5) SCR 905; Secy. of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam &
Ors., AIR 1934 PC 112; Anup Mahto v. Mita Dusadh & Ors. AIR
1934 PC 5 and Narayanrao Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao
Deshmnkh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171; applied
(ii) The well known principles of interpretation of
documents are: (a) firstly, a document must be construed as
a whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so construed as not to
reduce what was meant or being done by it to a patent ab-
surdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column. appears
to have been carelessly made, so as not to give a correct
indication Of what was otherwise clearly capable of being
inferred from the objects and. rest of the contents of such
a notification, the slight error., due obviously to inadver-
tance, would not matter on an application of the principle:
Falsa Demonstrated non nocet."
[675 B-C]
671
(iii) Unless interpretation of a document involves the
question of application of a principle of law, mere infer-
ences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally
raises only a question of fact. [674 C]
Nedanuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963 (2) SCR
208; explained.
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax,
Madras, 1956 SCR 691; referred to
(iv) In the instant case, it is evident that the proviso
does not require the mention of anything more than the urban
areas which is to be included or excluded from the limits of
the Municipal Corporation. That area was sufficiently
clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant, for
the Revenue Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the vil-
lage. The whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad and the
whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to be noti-
fied. The mere fact that the last column was not filled up
in such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra
number lay did not affect the question whether the area to
be included was sufficiently indicated or not. The provi-
sions of Section 1(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as
wellas of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra
nos. which are convenient divisions for the purpose of
indicating what lay within each area. [674 H, 675 A--B, GH]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 768 of 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 24-8-71 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 137/67.
G.N. Dikshit and R.N. Dikshit, for the Appellant.
O.P. Malhotra, S.N. Mehta, Uma Datta, Sat Pal and M.
Iyengar, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court .was delivered by
BEG, J.--Jangbir, appellant, is a tenant of a room in a
house which was purchased by the respondent Mahavir Prasad
Gupta on 15th May, 1956, for Rs. 1930/- shown in his sale
deed as situated in "Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1, situated
at Village Chowkri Mubarkabad, Delhi Province, within the
abadi of Onkar Nagar-II". The landlord owner had filed a
suit for the ejectment of the appellant and for recovery 9f
rent which was dismissed by a Subordinate Judge of Delhi on
26th May, 1966 on the ground that the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958,
(hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) which provided the
only modes of relief for aggrieved landlords by proceeding
under the Act.
The respondent landlord had alleged that the suit lay in
the ordinary Civil Court and that it was governed by the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as the
house, in which the appellant was the tenant of a room, fell
outside the area to which the Act was applicable. The short
question on which the case was decided was whether the house
of the respondent was situated in an area to which the Act
had been applied by a notification under Section 507(a) of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, dated 7th
January, 1960. published in the Delhi Gazette on 17th
January, 1960 read with the notification dated 12th April,
1962 under Section 1, sub. s. (2) of the Act. published in
the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962.
672
The operative part of the notification of the Delhi
Administration reads as follows:
"No. F. 9/5/59-R&S--In exercise of the powers
conferred by clause (a) of Section 507 of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), the
Corporation with the previous ’approval of the
Central Government hereby declares that the fol-
lowing localities mentioned in the Schedule given
below, hitherto forming part of the rural areas,
shall cease to be rural area".
Thereafter, was given a schedule and then came
the heading: "Shahdara Zone". The schedule has 5
columns. The first is for the "Serial No." The
second is for the name of the "Revenue estate",
which is translation of Mauza, said to be an area
composed of several villages. The third column is
for the name of the actual village or colony of the
Mauza. It is headed "Name of Colony Village pro-
posed to be included in the urban area". The
fourth column is for what is called the "square
number". The last and the fifth column was headed:
"Khasra/Killa Nos. covered by the Colo-
ny/Villages". We are. concerned here with serial
No. 7 which has the entries indicated below made
under the appropriate number of each column:
"1. No. 7.
2. Chowkri Mubarakabad.
3. Onkar Nagar. Lekhu Pura.
4. Square No. Not given.
5. Across "Onkar Nagar" are shown: "238, 242,
240, 234, 235, 236, 234, 231, 230 and 271"; and,
across "Lekhu Pura" are shown: "215 to 217,
211,212, 199 to 203".
The notification published in the Gazette of
India on 21st April, 1962, may be reproduced in
toto. It reads:
"New Delhi, the 12th’ April, 1962.
G.S.R. No. 486--In exercise of powers con-
ferred by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958),
the Central Government hereby extends all the
provisions of the said Act :--
(a) to the areas which immediately before the
7th April, 1958, were included in the Notified Area
Committee, Najafgarh and the Notified Area Commit-
tee, Narela; and
(b) to the localties mentioned in the schedule
to the notification of the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi No. F-9/5/59-R&S, dated the 28th December,
1959, published in the Delhi Gazette Part IV, dated
the 7th
673
January, 1960, and which by virtue of that notifi-
cation have formed part of the urban areas within
the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
(No. 35/8/61-Delhi-I)
A.V. Venkatasubban, Deputy Secretary".
The Subordinate Judge, very rightly observed that there
was no dispute between the parties that Mauza Chowkri Muba-
rakabad was included. within the limits of Delhi Municipal
Corporation by the notification dated 7th January, 1960. He
pointed out that there was no indication of a sub-diviSion
of Khasra No. 203 showing that any part of it was divided or
separately numbered.
The disappointed plaintiff landlord was, however, not
content with so obviously correct a finding. He appealed to
the District Judge who agreed entirely with the Trial Court
and also recorded a finding of fact that Khasra No. 203,
situated in the Mauza or Revenue Estate of Chowkri Mubara-
kabad, was covered by the notifications. It seems to us
that no other inference was reasonably possible.
The plaintiff respondent seems, in a gambling spirit, to
have decided to try his luck by a second appeal to the High
Court. What surprises . us is that a learned Judge of the
Delhi High Court, without considering the objects of the
notifications or discussing any principle of construction of
documents which could indicate that a point of law had
really arisen for decision before him, decided to set aside
the concurrent findings of fact, and, thereby, patently
exceeded the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
100 Civil Procedure Code. We need hardly say that there
cannot be any doubt that he did so. We are surprised that
the law laid down by this Court, and, before that, by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should have been so
completely ignored. By way of example we may refer to the
following cases: Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v.S. Hanyamayya &
Ors. (1); Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga
Ramanuja Jeer & Anr.(2); Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati
Subba Rao(3); Bhusawal Borough Municipality v. Amalgamated
Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr.(4); Secy. of State v. Rameshwa-
ram Devasthanam & Ors.(5);Anup Mahto v. Mira Dusadh &
Ors.,(6) Sahebrao Narayanrao Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao
Deshmukh & Ant.(7)
It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the con-
struction of a document is always a question of law. Reli-
ance was placed upon Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The
Commissioner of income-tax, Madras,(8) and Nedunuri Kames-
waramma v. Sampati Subba Rao (Supra). This Court has never
laid down that inferences from contents of a documents
always raise questions of law. Indeed, in
(1) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 57. (2) [19621
(2)S.C.R. 509.
(3) [1963] (2) S.C.R. 208. (4) [1964] (5)
S.C.R. 905.
(5) A.I.R. 1934 PC. 112. (6) A.I.R. 1934 P.C.
5.
(7) A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 171. (8) [1956] S.C.R.
691.
674
Nedunuri Kameshwaramma’s case (supra), this Court observed
(atp. 215-216):
"A construction of documents (unless they
are documents of rifle) produced by the parties to
prove a question of fact does not involve an issue
of law, unless it can be shown that the material
evidence contained in them was misunderstood by the
Court of fact. The documents in this case, which
have been the subject of three separate considera-
tions, were the Land Registers the Amarkam, and
Bhooband Accounts and the Adangal Registers, to-
gether with certain documents derived from the
Zamindari records. None of these documents can be
correctly described as a document of title, whatev-
er its evidentiary value otherwise".
We think that, unless interpretation of a
document involves the question of application of a
principle of law mere inferences from or the evi-
dentiary value of a document generally raises only
a question of fact.
We think that, if the learned Judge of the High
Court had cared to consider the provisions of law
relating to the extension of the Act to urban
areas. or to bear in mind the correct principles of
construction. of documents, or, tried to appreciate
the true nature of the case before him, he could
not have possibly interfered with the concurrent
findings of the two Courts below simply because the
number of the Khasra in which the house of respond-
ent lay was not mentioned against both the portions
of Chowki Mubarakabad but wholly against Lekhu
Pura. In so far as the assumption, from the en-
tries in column 5 of’ the notification, could be
that the whole of No. 203 fell in Lekhupura, it was
an obviously erroneous assumption. A clerical
error was the most that was indicated by such an
entry. But, even so, it left no doubt that the
whole Khasra No. 203 was duly notified.
"1. (1) This Act may be called the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958.
(2) It extends to the area included within
the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee
and the Delhi Cantonment Board and’ to such urban
areas within the limits of the Municipal Corpora-
tion of Delhi as are specified in the first
ScheduIe;
Provided that the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, extend this
Act or any provision thereof, to any other urban
area included within the limits of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi or exclude any area from the
operation of this Act or any provision thereof".
It is evident that the proviso does not require
the mention of anything more than the urban area
which is to be included or excluded from the limits
of the Municipal Corporation, That area was suffi-
ciently clearly indicated by entries in columns 2
and 3 meant for’ the Revenue
675
Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the village.
It is clear from these that the whole of Mauza
Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole of Onkar Nagar
and Lekhupura were meant to be notified. The mere
fact that the last column was not filled up by
whoever drew up the notification in such a manner
as to show precisely where each Khasra number lay
did not affect the question whether the area to be
included was sufficiently indicated or not. The
well-known principles of interpretation applicable
to such cases are: (a) Firstly, a document must be
construed as a whole. (b) Secondly, it has to be
so construed as not to reduce what was meant or
being done by it to a patent absurdity. (c) Third-
ly, if any entry of a column appears to have been
carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indi-
cation of what was otherwise clearly capable of
being inferred from the objects and rest of the
contents of such a notification, the slight error,
due obviously to inadvertence, would not matter on
an application of the principle: Falsa Demonstra-
tio non nocet. A deliberate intention to omit a
part of a Khasra number the whole of which is given
in the notification of 7th January, 1960, could not
possibly be inferred.
When we look at Section 507 of the Delhi Munic-
ipal Corporation Act, 1957, we find the relevant
part runs as follows:
"507. Notwithstanding anything contained in
the foregoing provisions of this Act,--
(a) the Corporation with the previous approv-
al of the Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, declare that any portion
of the rural areas shall cease to be included
therein and upon the issue of such notification
that portion shall be included in and form part of
the urban areas;
(b) the Corporation with the previous ap-
proval of the Central Government may, by notifica-
tion in the Official Gazette,--
(i) exempt the rural areas or any portion
thereof from such of the provisions of this Act as
it deems fit.
(ii) Levy taxes, rates, fees and other charges
in the rural areas or any portion thereof at rates
lower than those at which such taxes, rates, fees
and other charges are levied in the urban areas or
exempt such areas or portion from any such tax,
rate, fee or other charge;"
Thus, we find the provisions of Section 1 (2)
of the Act as well as of Section 507(a) and (b) of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act refer only to
"areas" and not to mere Khasra Nos. which are
convenient divisions for the purposes of indicating
what lay within each area. The Khasra is often
spoken of as the "village map". Khasra for "abadi"
areas even indicate. the type of construction which
may lie within a particular number or the use to
which a piece of land was being put. The term
"urban area" or "rural area" is used for much
larger units than Khasra Nos. It would, obviously,
be quite impossible to think of one particular
number, within an "abadi" area, left out or
676
dropped deliberately, without any rhyme or reason, from the
notifications mentioned above. No conceivable reason has
been suggested for such an omission. Indeed, there is not
even an omission the effect of which may have been helpful
to the appellant. It was only a case where the whole number
is shown against one village only instead of being shown
against two.
The learned High Court Judge, by basing his whole judg-
ment on a farfetched conjecture from supposed omission of
No. 203 in column 5, against Onkar Nagar, adopted a con-
struction of the Notification, if that is what the learned
Judge was doing, which was quite unintelligible with refer-
ence to the facts of the case or purposes of such notifica-
tions. The learned Judge would have been well advised to
rest content with the obviously correct position that what
the two Courts below had done was to arrive at a pure find-
ing of fact as to whether a particular Khasra number con-
taining the house in question was included within a Mauza to
the whole of which the provisions of the Act had been plain-
ly extended. In view of all the facts of the case, no other
conclusion was reasonably possible.
Consequently, we allow this appeal, by special leave,
with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the High
Court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit. As no counsel
appeared to hear the Judgment today’s costs are disallowed
to both the parties.
S.R. Appeal
allowed.
677