PETITIONER:
HUKAM RAJ KHINVSARA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/03/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI
ACT
HEADNOTE
JUDGMENT
ORDER
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
This appeal, by special leave, arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, made on April 16,1996 in O.A No. 466/94.
The appellant was initially suspended and charge sheet was laid against him on April 29, 1974, His order of dismissal was ultimately set aside and thereafter he was reinstated into the service by the Tribunal’s order dated March 13, 1992 in O.A. No. 261/91. It would appear that while setting aside the order of dismissal the Tribunal had passed the order that the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits which he could have earned had he been in service. since in spite of his representations, he was not given consequential benefits, he filed contempt application of December 11, 1992, which was dismissed by the Tribunal on July 29, 1993. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present O.A. for a direction to implement the order dated March 13, 1992. The Tribunal dismissed the same by the impugned order dated April 16,1996 on the ground that the application of the appellant was barred by limitation. Thus this appeal by special leave.
The only question is : whether the application seeking implementation of the earlier order of the Tribunal was barred by limitation of the earlier order of the Tribunal was barred by limitation? section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, ’the Act’) envisages thus:
"27. Execution of orders of a
Tribunal.
Subject to the other provisions of
this Act and the rules, the order
of a Tribunal finally disposing of
an application or an appeal shall
be final and shall not be called in
question in any court (including a
High court) and such order shall be
executed in the same manner in
which any final order of the nature
referred to in clause (a) of sub
section (2) of Section 20 ( whether
or not such final order had
actually been made) in respect of
the grievance to which the
application relates would have been
executed.
Relevant part to sub section (2) of Section 20 of the Act postulates that:
"(2) for the purposes of sub
section (1) of Section 20, a person
shall be deemed to have availed of
all the remedies availed to him
under the relevant service rules as
to redressal of grievances,
(a) if a final order has been made
by Government or other authority or
officer or other person competent
to pass such order under such
rules, rejecting any appeal
preferred or representation made by
such person in connection with the
grievance;
Section 21 prescribes limitation in that behalf. Sub section (1) (a) of Section 21 postulates that:
"(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an
application.
(a) in a case where a final order
such as is mentioned in clause (a)
of sub section (2) of Section 20
has been made in connection whit
the grievance unless the
application is made within one year
from the date on which such final
order has been kame."
Thus it could be seen that the final order passed by the Tribunal is executable under Section 27 of the Act within one year from the date of its becoming final. Admittedly, the final order was passed on March 13,1992 Consequently, the appellant was required to file the execution application within one year from the said date unless the order of the Tribunal was suspended by this Court in a special leave petition/appeal which is not the case herein. Admittedly, the application came to be filed by the appellant on December 13, 1994 which is well beyond one year. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the application was barred by limitation.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Tribunal would have condoned the delay in filing the application. It is not his case that he made an application for condonation of delay and the Tribunal had rejected the application without examining the grounds for the delay occasioned by him. Under these circumstances, we need not go into further question of refusal to condone the delay by the Tribunal.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed, No costs.