PETITIONER:
GULRAJ SINGH GREWAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. HARBANS SINGH AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/01/1993
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)
VENKATACHALA N. (J)
CITATION:
1993 AIR 1574 1993 SCR (1) 149
1993 SCC (2) 68 JT 1993 (1) 146
1993 SCALE (1)109
ACT
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1948--Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) read with Section 2 (a), (d), (g) and (h)--Eviction of "scheduled building" for personal need--Held, all buildings fall into two categories, nonresidential and residential--’Scheduled building’ in Section 2(h) is a kind of ’residential building’ and ground of eviction for personal need available--Amendment Acts of 1956, 1957, 1966 and 1985--Section 13A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1948--Sections 13, 13A and 2(a), (d), (g) and (h)--Interpretation of statutes--Principle of harmonious construction--Omission of "scheduled building" by amendment in 1956, and its inclusion in provisions inserted by the 1985 amendment--Held, retention of "scheduled" in the provision when "residential building" includes scheduled building considered superfluous--Inserted in 1985 Amendment to avoid controversies.
HEADNOTE
The appellant took the suit premises situate in Ludhiana on a monthly rent of Rs. 800 from respondent 1. Both the respondents are medical practitioners. The respondent riled a petition for eviction of the appellant tenant on three grounds: their personal need under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a); change of user under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) and impairment of the value and utility of the rented building under Section 13(2) (iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1948. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The appellate authority held that the personal need of the respondents and the ground of change of user was proved. Since the building though let out to the tenant for a residential purpose was used partly for his profession and had become a ’scheduled building’ under Section 2(h), he could not be evicted on the ground of personal need. The order of eviction was, however, made on the ground of change of user of the building. Ile High Court on revision affirmed the finding and order of eviction made by the appellate authority. 150 In the Supreme Court, it was argued for the appellant that there was no change of user to justify the order of eviction on that ground and that the finding on the question of personal need was erroneous. Relying on legislative intent evidenced in amendments to the Act, it was further contended that no order of eviction can be made on the ground of personal need contained in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) in respect of a ’scheduled building’ since that ground is available for eviction only from a residential building. The omission of the words ’or a scheduled’ after the word ’residential’ in Section 13 (3) (a) (i) (a) in 1956 and their addition in Section 13A in 1985 were referred to advance the argument The respondents submitted that there was no ground to interfere with the order of eviction; that ’scheduled building’ In section 2(h) continues to be a ’residential building’ in section 2(g) and that personal need in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) is available as a ground for eviction; and that the finding of fact relating to personal need of the landlord in not open to challenge. In the alternative, if a "scheduled building’ is not a "residential building" then the ground of change of user, unilaterally was available. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1. The finding of fact of personal need is unassailable. That respondent 2 is carrying on his profession at some distance from Ludhiana is not sufficient to negative the landlords’ need. [155B] Non-examination of respondent 2 is immaterial when respondent 1 has examined himself and proved the need of the landlord; it Is at best a matter relating to appreciation of evidence, on which ground this finding of fact cannot be assailed particularly when it was not seriously challenged in the High Court. (pp.6/7) [155C] 2. All buildings are divided into two categories: "nonresidential" and "residential". Building,-* used for the purpose of business or trade are " non-residential" and the remaining buildings are all ’residential’. This is clear from the definitions in section 2(a), (d) and (g). (pp.23/24) [167D] 3.’Scheduled building as defined in section 2(h) is merely a kind of ’residential building, as defined in section 2(g), its characteristic being its part user for a scheduled purpose. (p.24) [167E] 151 4. ’The Act makes a distinction between a residential building which is being partly used for a scheduled purpose, i.e. a scheduled building, for the purpose of determination of fair rent. A separate definition of ’scheduled building’ in clause (h) while making it clear therein that it means a residential building used partly for a specific purpose does not, therefore indicate that a scheduled building ceases to be a residential building or is a category of building separate from a residential building for the purpose of eviction of tenants in the scheme of section 13 of the Act This is the only manner in which a harmonious construction can be made of these provisions. (pp.24/25) [167H, 168A] 5. The object of the 1956 amendment was to equate the Punjab tenants with the Delhi tenants and exclude the ground of landlord’s personal need for eviction of tenants of non-residential property. Obviously the definition of ’scheduled building’ in section 2(h) clearly indicating that scheduled building is residential building, the words ’or a Scheduled" after "residential" were considered superfluous. The use of the word "scheduled" after "residential’ in section 13A inserted in 1985 may have been used to avoid any controversy like the present raised on the basis of the 1956 Amendment. (p.26) [168D-E] 6. Section 13A which provides for an expeditious remedy is not a separate distinct provision but has to be read along with section 13 of the principal Act forming a part of the general scheme contained in section 13 for eviction of tenants on the ground of personal need from buildings which are not non-residential. (p.27) [168H] 7. This construction of section 13(3) (a) (i) as it stood after the 1956 amendment, is the only construction which can be made to harmonise with the definitions in section 2. (p.27) [169C] 8. The question of change of user is not necessary to be considered. However, the general principle is that if the express terms of lease restrict the user solely for purpose of residence, then use of any part thereof for even a scheduled purpose without the written consent of the landlord may amount to use of the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased.That, however, is a question of fact in each case. In that case while the ground of eviction in section 13 (3) (a) (i) (a) would remain available to the landlord for eviction of the tenant, in view of the express 152 covenant against user of any part of the residential building even for a scheduled purpose, it may make available also the ground of change of user under section 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act. (pp.28/29) [169G-170A] Bishamber Dass Kohli (dead) by L.rs. v. Smt. Satya Bhalla, referred to.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5086 of 1985. From the Judgment and Order dated 31.1.1985 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 1847 of 1984. A.B. Rohtagi, R.C. Mishra and Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the Appellant. M.S. Gujaral and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by’ VERMA, J. The appellant, Gulraj Singh Grewal, took the suit premises situate in Ludhiana on monthly rent of Rs. 800 from respondent No. 1, Dr. Harbans Singh, in March 1980. Respondent No. 2, Dr. Ravinder Singh, is son of respondent No. 1, Dr. Harbans Singh. Both the respondents are medical practitioners. The respondents filed a petition for eviction of the appellant-tenant on three grounds, namely, personal need of the respondents under Section 13(3) (a) (i) (a), change of user under section 13(2) (ii) (b) and impairment of value and utility of the rented building under section 13(2) (iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1948. The appellant contested the petition denying the existence of any of these grounds for eviction. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition holding that none of the three grounds had been proved. On appeal by the respondents, the appellate authority held that the personal need of respondent No. 2, Dr. Ravinder Singh, one of the landlords, was proved and the ground of change of user of the rented building by the appellant had also been proved. The third ground relating to impairment of value and utility of the rented building was rejected. The appellate authority further held that the building though let out for residential purpose was used by the appellant, a consultant engineer, partly for his profession on account of which it had become 153 a ’scheduled building’ as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act and, therefore, the ground for eviction based on personal need was not available for evicting the tenant from a ’scheduled building. However, an order of eviction was made on the ground of change of user of the rented building. The appellant then preferred a revision to the High Court which has been dismissed the findings and order of eviction made by the appellate authority. Hence, this appeal by special leave. The submissions of Shri Avadh Behari, learned counsel for the appellant are several. The first contention is that there was no change of user by the appellant-tenant to justify the order of eviction on that ground. The second submission is that the finding on the question of personal need of the landlord is erroneous. The last submission is that no order of eviction can be made on the ground of personal need contained in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) in respect of a ’scheduled building’ since that ground is available for eviction only from a ’residential building’ as defined in section 2(g) of the Act, a ’scheduled building’ defined in section 2(h) of the Act being a different kind of building. In reply, Shri M.S. Gujral, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the order of eviction is justified and there is no ground to interfere in this appeal. His submission is that a ’scheduled building’ defined in section 2(h) continues to be a ’residential building’ as defined in section 2(g), so that the ground for eviction based on personal need contained in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) is available in the present case. He also submitted that the finding of fact relating to personal need of the landlord is not open to challenge. His submission in the alternative is that in case a ’scheduled building’ is not ’residential building’, then the ground of change of user is available since the building was let out for residential purpose and its user has been changed unilaterally by the tenant without the consent of the landlord. The first question for our decision is: whether learned counsel for the appellant is right in contending that a ’scheduled building’ is not a "residential building’ for the purpose of the ground of eviction contained in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) ? In case it is held that this ground for eviction of the tenant is available in the present case and the finding of fact on the question of personal need of the landlord is not open to challenge, the order of eviction can be sustained on this ground alone and it is unnecessary to decide the question relating to the ground of change of user contained in section 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act. We would, therefore, consider 154 this question first. Admittedly, the appellant is a consultant engineer and the suit premises, a ’building as defined in section ’-’(a) of the Act, was let out to him solely for residential purpose. He has been using it as his residence while a part thereof is used by him as his professional office without the consent of the landlord. It is on the basis of use of a part of the building as appellant’s office that the appellant claims it to be a ’scheduled building’ as defined in section 2(h) of the Act. Apart from the question of change of user which is a separate ground for eviction, the question is whether the suit premises being treated as a ’scheduled building, the ground for eviction contained in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) is not available, that ground being available only in respect of a ’residential building’ as defined in section 2(g) of the Act. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the word ’scheduled’ which occurred along with ’residential’ in section 13(3) (a) (i) of the Act having been omitted by the amendment made in the principal Act in 1956, the obvious legislative intent is to exclude a ’scheduled building’ from the scope of that provision with the result that the grounds for eviction contained in section 13(3) (a) (i), of which personal need of the landlord is one, are not available for eviction of a tenant from ,scheduled building’ thereunder after that amendment. To buttress this argument, learned counsel referred to section 4 of the principal Act and Section 13A, inserted therein by an amendment made in 1985, wherein the expression ’scheduled building’ is expressly used in addition to the expression ’residential building’ and the separate definition of ’scheduled building’ in section 2(h) while defining ’residential building’ in section 2(g) in the principal Act from the very inception. The question is whether this contention can be accepted. Before dealing with the above question, it would be appropriate to dispose of the challenge made to the finding of fact of landlord’s personal need, on which this question arises. The finding on this question of fact recorded by the appellate authority has been affirmed by the High Court. Can this finding be reopended now? Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the personal need found proved is only of respondent No. 2, son of respondent No. 1, who did not enter the witness box and, as stated in an affidavit filed in this 155 Court, even he is carrying on his profession at a place about 25 kms, away from Ludhiana. In our opinion, this finding of fact is unassailable. The High Court has clearly observed that no meaningful argument could be advanced on behalf of the appellant to challenge this finding of the appellate authority. Respondent No. 1 who is the father of respondent No. 2, has supported and proved the need of respondent No. 2, who also is a landlord. The fact that for want of suitable accommodation in the city of Ludhiana, respondent No. 2 is at present carrying on his profession at some distance from Ludhiana is not sufficient to negative the landlord’s need. In these circumstances, the nonexamination of respondent No. 2 also, when respondent No. 1 has examined himself and proved the need of the landlord, is immaterial and, at best, a matter relating only to appreciation of evidence, on which ground this finding of fact cannot be reopened. This is more so when no serious challenge to this finding was made in the High Court. We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the personal need of the landlord is proved to make out the ground of eviction contained in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Act in case that ground of eviction is applicable to the suit premises treating it as a ’scheduled building. In order to fully appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant, the legislative history would be useful. The Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 was enacted to restrict the increase of rents on certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas in the Punjab. That Act was primarily to control the increase of rents and did not relate to eviction of tenants. Then came the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 which was enacted to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom. Provision was made in Section 4 of the Act for determination of fair rent, for which purpose ’non-residential building’, ’residential building’ and ’scheduled building’ were treated as three different categories prescribing different formula for each of these three categories. For this reason, separate definition of each of them was given in section 2 containing the definitions. However, for the purpose of eviction, in section 13 (3), a ’residential building or a ’scheduled building’ were clubbed together and treated similarly by providing the same grounds for eviction while a ’non. residential building’ or ’rented land’ were clubbed together and provided for separately. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that a ’residential building’ and a ’scheduled building’ were treated as different categories only for the determination of fair rent but were treated alike while prescrib- 156 ing the grounds for eviction of a tenant therefrom. The definition of ’scheduled building’ in section 2(h) of that Act also took care to provide that a ’scheduled building’ means a residential building which was being used partly for a specified purpose. In this manner, the definition of a ’scheduled building’ given in the Act was in consonance with the scheme of the Act treating it differently from a ’residential building’ for the purpose of determination of fair rent and similarly for eviction of the tenant. Then came the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1948 which repealed the 1947 Act and replaced it. The same scheme was retained in the 1949 Act which is the principal Act for our purpose. It is the relevant provisions of this Act, as amended from time to time, which are material for deciding the point raised by the appellant. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act No. 111 of 1948) was amended by the Amendment Acts of 1956, 1957, 1966 and 1985 whereby section 13 of the principal Act was amended and in 1985 the new section 13A was inserted. It is the amendments made in section 13 at the principal Act providing for eviction of tenants which are material for our purpose. The material provisions of the Act, including the amendments made in section 13 from time to time are mentioned hereafter. In the principal Act as originally enacted, the material provisions are as under :-
’2. Definitions. In this Act, unless there
is anything repugnant in the subject o r
context,
(a) ’building’ means any building or part of
a building let for any purpose whether being
actually used for that purpose or not,
including any land, godowns out-houses or
furniture let therewith, but does not include
a room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) ’non-residential building means a
building being used solely for the purpose of
business or trade;
xxx xxx
xxx
(g) "residential building" means any
building which is not a
157
non-residential building;
(h) "scheduled building means a residential
building which is being used by a person
engaged in one or more of the professions
specified in the Schedule to this Act, partly
for his business and partly for his residence;
xxx xxx
xxx
"4. Determination of fair rent.- (1) The
Controller shall on application by the tenant
or landlord of a building or rented land fix
the fair rent for such building or rented land
after holding such inquiry as the Controller
thinks fit.
(2) In fixing the fair rent under this
section, the Controller may first fix a basic
rent taking into consideration
xxx xxx xxx
(3) In fixing the fair rent of a residential
building the Controller may allow. If the
basic rent-
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In fixing the fair rent of a scheduled
building the Controller may allow, if the
basic rent-
xxx xxx
xxx
(5) In fixing the fair rent of a non-
residential building or rented land the
Controller may allow, if the basic rent
xxx xxx xxx
’11. Conversion of a residential building
into a nonresidential building No person shall
convert a residential building into a non-
residential building except with the
permission in writing of the Controller."
"13. Eviction of tenants. (1) A tenant in
possession of a building or rented land shall
not be evicted therefrom in execution of a
decree passed before or after the commencement
158
of this Act or otherwise and whether before or
after the termination of the tenancy, except
in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant
shall apply to the Controller for a direction
in that behalf. If the Controller, after
giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the applicant, is
satisfied
(i)..............
(ii)that the tenant has after the commencement
of this Act without the written consent of the
landlord-
(a)..............
(b) used the building or rented land for a
purpose other than that for which it was
leased. or
(iii)that the tenant has committed such acts
as are likely to impair materially the value
or utility of the building or rented land, or
the Controller may make an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession of
the building or rented land and if the
Controller is not so satisfied he shall make
an order rejecting the application :
Provided that the Controller may give the
tenant a reasonable time for putting the
landlord in possession of the building or
rented land and may extend such time so as not
to exceed three months in the aggregate.
(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the
Controller for an order directing tenant to
put the landlord in possession-
(i) in the case of a residential or a
scheduled building if
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
159
(b) he is not occupying another residential
or a scheduled building, as the case may be,
in the urban area concerned; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building
without sufficient cause after the
commencement of this Act in the said urban
area:
(ii) in the case of a non-residential
building or rented land, if-
(a) he requires it for his own use;
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area
concerned for the
purpose of his business any other such
building or rented land, as the case may be,
and
xxx xxx xxx
"19. Penalties. (1) If any person
contravenes any of the provisions of sub-
section (2) of section 9, sub-section (1) of
section 10, section 11 or section 18, he shall
be punishable with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees.’
The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 1956 (Punjab Act No. 29 of
1956) amended section 13 in the following
manner:-
2. Amendment of section 13 of East Punjab
Act III of 1949. In clause (a) of sub-section
(3) of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter
referred to as the principal Act
(i) (a) In sub-clause (i), the words ’or a
scheduled" shall be omitted.
(b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words "or a
scheduled" and the words "as the case may be"
shall be omitted.
(ii) (a) In sub-clause (ii) the words ’a non-
residential building or’ shall be omitted.
(b) In sub-paragaph (b), the words "building
or" and the words Was the case may be’ shall
be omitted"
160
(c) In sub-paragraph (c), the words ’a
building or" shall be omitted.
(iii)For sub-clause (iii), the following shall
be substituted, namely:-
(iii)In the case of any building or rented
land, if he requires it to carry out any
building work at the instance of the Govern-
ment or local authority or any improvement
Trust under some improvement of development
scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit for
the human habitation.-
(iv) In sub-clause (iv), for the words ’any
building", where they first occur, the words
’any residential building shall be sub-
stituted.
(v) In the second proviso, for the words "a
residential a scheduled or non-residential
building or rented land’, the words "a
residential building or rented land" shall be
substituted.
Section 13 was again amended by the Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction ,Amendment) Act, 1957
(Punjab Act No. 21 of 1957) as under
’2. Amendment of section 13 of the East
Punjab Act No. 111 of 1949. After clause (c)
of sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (a) of sub-
section (3) of section 13 of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the
following shall be added, namely :-
"(d) it was let to the tenant for use as a
residence by reason of his being in the
service or employment of the landlord, and the
tenant has ceased, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, to be in such
service or employment:
Provided that where the tenant is a workman
who has been discharged or dismissed by the
landlord from his service or employment in
contravention of the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Ad, 1947, he shall not be
liable to be evicted until the competent
authority under that Act confirms the order of
discharge or made against him by the
landlord."
161
Thereafter, the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Punjab Act
No. 6 of 1966) further amended section 13 of
the principal Act as under
"2. Amendment of section 13 of punjab Act 3
of 1949. In section 13 of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949,
(i) in sub-section (3),
(a) after sub-paragraph (i) of
paragraph.(a), the following sub-paragraph
shall be inserted, namely :-
"(i-a) In the case of a residential building,
if the landlord is a member of the armed
forces of the Union of India and requires it
for the occupation of his family and if he
produces a certificate of the prescribed
authority, referred to in section 7 of the
Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that
he is serving under special conditions within
the meaning of section 3 of that Act.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-
paragraph
(1) the certificate of the prescribed
authority shall be conclusive evidence that
the landlord is serving under special
conditions; and
(2) "family’ means such relations of the
landlord as ordinarily five with him and are
dependent upon him;";
(c) in the first proviso in paragraph (a),
for the words "shall not be entitled, the
words ’shall not, except under sub-paragraph
(i-a), be entitled’ shall be substituted; and
(c) after paragraph (b), the following new
paragraph shall be added, namely :-
’(c) where an application is made under sub-
paragraph (i-a) of paragraph (a), it shall be
disposed of, as far as may be, within a period
of one month and if the claim of the landlord
is accepted, the Controller shall make an
order
162
directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building on a date to be
specified in the order and such date shall not
be later than fifteen days from the date of
the order."; and
(2)In sub-section (4), for the words ’does not
himself occupy it or, if possession, the words
’does not himself occupy it or, if possession
was obtained by him for his family in
pursuance of an order under sub-paragraph (i-
a) of paragraph (a) of sub-section (3), his
family does not occupy the residential
building, or, if possession" shall be
substituted."
Then the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 1985 (Punjab Act No. 2 of
1985) further amended section 13 and inserted
new section 13A in the principal Act as under
’Amendment of section 13 of Punjab Act 3 of
1949. 3. In the principal Act, in section 13,
after sub section (4), the following sub-
section shall be inserted, namely :-
’(4-A) Where a tenant is evicted from a
residential or scheduled building in pursuance
of an order made under section 13-A and the
specified landlord or, as the case may be, the
widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed
daughter-in-law of such specified landlord :-
(a) does not occupy it for a continuous
period of three months from the date of such
eviction; or
(b) within a period of three years from the
date of such eviction of the tenant, lets out
the whole or any part of such building, from
which the tenant was evicted, to any person
other than the tenant;
such evicted tenant may apply to the
Controller, for an order directing that the
possession of the building shall be restored
to him and the Controller shall make an order
accordingly.’
Insertion of new section 13-A in Punjab Act 3
of 1949. 4. In the principal Act, after
section 13, the following section shall
163
be inserted, namely:-
Right to recover immediate possession of
residential or scheduled building to accrue to
certain persons. "13-A. Where a specified
landlord at any time, within one year prior to
or within one yea after the date of his
retirement or after his retirement but within
one year of the date of commencement of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment)
Act, 1985, whichever is later, applies to the
Controller alongwith a certificate from the
authority competent to remove him from service
indicating the date of his retirement and his
affidavit to the affect that he does not own
and possess any other suitable accommodation
in the local area in which he intends to
reside to recover possession of his
residential building or scheduled building, as
the case may be, for his own occupation, there
shall accrue, on and from the date of such
application to such specified landlord,
notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere
in this Act or in any other law for the time
being in force or in any contract (whether
expressed or implied), custom or usage to the
contrary, a right to recover immediately the
on of such residential building or scheduled
building or any part or parts of such building
if it is let out in part or parts :
Provided that in case of death of the
specified landlord, the widow or widower of
such specified landlord and in the case of
death of such widow or widower, a child or a
grandchild or a widowed daughter-in-law who
was dependent upon such specified landlord at
the time of his death shall be entitled to
make an application under this section to the
Controller,
(a)in the case of death of such specified
landlord, before the commencement of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act,
1985 within one year of such commencement:
(b)In this case of death of such specified
landlord, after such commencement, but before
the date of his retirement, within one yew of
the date of his death;
164
(c)in the case of death of such specified
landlord, after such commencement and the date
of his retirement, within one year of the date
of such retirement;
and on the date of such application the right
to recover the possession of the residential
building or scheduled building, as the case
may be, which belonged to such specified
landlord at the time of his death shall accrue
to the applicant:
Provided further that nothing in this section
shall be so construed a.-, conferring a right
on any person to recover possession of more
than one residential or scheduled building
inclusive of any part or parts thereof if it
is let out in part or parts:
Provided further that the controller may give
the tenant a reasonable period for putting the
specified landlord or, as the case may be, the
widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed
daughter-in-law in possession of the
residential building or scheduled building, as
the case may be, and may extend such time so
as not to exceed three months in the
aggregate.
Explanation. For the purpose of this section
the expression "retirement" means termination
of service of a specified landlord otherwise
than by resignation." Further by this Amendment Act of 1985, special procedure for disposal of applications under section 13A was prescribed and some other ancillary amendments were also made. The definitions in clauses (a), (d), (g) and (h) of Section 2 and the material part of section 4 quoted above remain the same in the principal Act as originally enacted even after these amendments, section 13, in so far as it is material for the present case, as it stands amended in the above manner now reads as under:-
"13. Eviction of tenants (1) A tenant in
possession of a building or rented land shall
not be evicted therefrom in execution of a
decree passed before or after the commencement
of this Act or otherwise and whether before or
after the termination of the tenancy, except
in accordance with the
165
provisions of this section, or in pursuance of
an order made under section 13 of the Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as
subsequently amended.
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant
shall apply to the Controller for a direction
in that behalf. If the Controller, after
giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the applicant, is
satisfied
(i)...............
(ii) that the tenant has after the
commencement of this Act without the written
consent of the landlord
(a)................
(b) used the building or rented land for a
purpose other than that for which it was
leased, or
(iii) that the tenant has committed such acts
as are likely to
impair materially the value or utility of the
building or rented land, or
xxx XXK
xxx
(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the
controller for an order directing the tenant
to put the landlord in possession
(i) in the case of a residential building if
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
(b) he is not occupying an other residential
building, in the urban area concerned; and
xxx xxx
xxx
(i-a) in the case of a residential building,
if the landlord is a member of the armed
forces of the Union of India and requires it
for the occupation of his family and if he
produces a certificate of the prescribed
authority, referred to in section 7 of the
Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that
he is serving under
166
special conditions within the meaning of
section 3 of that Act.
XXK xxx xxx
(ii) in the case of rented land, if
(a) he requires it for his own use:
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area
concerned for the purpose of his business any
other such rented land; and
(c) he has not vacated such rented land
without sufficient cause after the
commencement of this Act, in the urban area
concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
(iv) in the case of any residential building,
if he requires it for use as an office, or
consulting room by his son who intends to
start practice as a lawyer or as a "registered
practitioner" within the meaning of that
expression as used in the Punjab Medical
Registration Act, 1916, or for the residence
of his son who is married, if
(a) his son as aforesaid is not occupying in
the urban area concerned any other building
for use as office, consulting room or
residence, as the case may be; and
(b) his son as aforesaid has not vacated
such a building without sufficient cause after
the commencement of this Act, in the urban
area concerned
xxx xxx xxx The main argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that omission of the words "or a scheduled’ after the word ’residential’ in section 13(3) (a) (i) by the 1956 Amendment while using those words in addition to the word ’residential in section 13A, subsequently inserted-in 1985, is a clear indication that the ground of eviction contained in section 13(3) (A) (i) (a) of _personal need of the landlord.is no longer available to landlords in general after the 1956 Amendment, awn though a more expeditious remedy on that ground has been provided by 13A from 167 1985 to the category of specified landlords alone. The retention of the separate definition of ’scheduled building’ in section 2(h) and use of that expression elsewhere in the Act, including section 4 and section 13, is referred in support of this submission. The question is whether this construction is proper. In section 2 which contains the definitions, clause (a) defines ’building’. Clause (d) then defines ’nonresidential building’ to mean a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade. Thus, to be a nonresidential building, it must be used solely for the purpose of business or trade. Clause (g) defines ’residential building’ to mean any building which is not a nonresidential building. These definitions make it clear that all buildings are divided into two categories : ’nonresidential’ and ’residential’. Buildings used solely for the purpose of business or trade are ’non-residential’ and the remaining buildings are all ’residential’. Accordingly, no building to which the Act applies is outside the classification of ’non-residential’ and ’residential’. Then comes clause (h) which defines ’scheduled building’ to mean a residential building which is being used partly for a scheduled purpose. The definition of ’scheduled building’ in clause (h) itself makes it clear that it is a residential building as defined in clause (g) with the qualification that such a residential building is one which is used partly for a specified purpose. In other words, ’scheduled building’ as defined in clause (h) is merely a kind of ’residential building’ as defined in clause (g), its characteristic being its part user for a scheduled purpose. The reason to defined ’scheduled building’ separately in clause (h) is also evident from some provisions of the Act itself. The Act makes a distinction for the purpose of determination of fair rent between a residential building which is being used partly for a scheduled purpose and is, therefore, treated as a ’scheduled building’ and the remaining residential buildings which are not so used. This is clear from the scheme of section 4 itself providing for determination of fair rent. This is also clear from the fact that from the definition of ’building’ given in section 2(a), the only category excluded is a ’non-residential building’ as defined in section 2(d) for the purpose of section 2(g) and not also ’scheduled building’ defined in section 2(h) and in section 2(h), a ’scheduled building" is defined to mean a residential building used partly for a scheduled purpose. A separate definition of ’scheduled building’ in clause (h) while making it 168 clear therein that it means a residential building used partly for a specified purpose does not, therefore, indicate that a scheduled building ceases to be a residential building or is a category of building separate from a residential building for the purpose of eviction of tenants in the scheme of section 13 of the Act. This is the only manner in which a harmonious construction can be made of these provisions. The question now is of the effect of the 1956 Amendment which omitted the words ’or a scheduled’ in section 13(3) as indicated earlier. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act of 1956 clearly says that the provision allowing eviction on the ground of personal need has been misused by certain landlords and according to the Act applicable to Delhi the tenants of industrial and commercial premises cannot be ejected on the ground of personal need, while in the Punjab, such tenants can be evicted therefrom also on the ground of personal need. To avoid hardship to such tenants, it was considered necessary that the tenants of non-residential property in the Punjab should be placed at par with tenants of such property in Delhi. Thus, the object of this enactment was to equate the Punjab tenants with Delhi tenants and exclude the ground of landlord’s personal need for eviction of tenants of non-residential property. To achieve this object deletion was made of the words other than ’residential’ from section 13(3) providing for eviction of tenants from buildings on the ground of landlord’s personal need. Obviously, in view of the definition of ’scheduled building’ in section 2(h) being clear to indicate that ’scheduled building’ is a ’residential building, retention of the words ,or a scheduled’ after ’residential’ was considered superfluous while omitting the words ’non-residential building’ in other parts of section 13(3) relating to the ground of personal need for eviction of the tenants from buildings. Subsequently, in section 13A, when inserted by 1985 Amendment, the word ’scheduled’ was also used after ’residential’, may be, in view of the controversy like the present raised on the basis of the 1956 Amendment, to avoid any such controversy therein. That does not, however, mean that section 13 which must be construed in the manner indicated by us should be read differently for that reason. In fact, insertion of section 13A further reinforces the view we have taken. There would be no occasion to provide an expeditious remedy for eviction of tenants of a category of 169 landlords and to also provide for a special summary procedure for them unless the remedy of eviction on the ground of personal need was already available generally to the landlords in section 13. It is significant that section 13 was also amended by the 1985 Amendment by inserting subsection (4-A) therein as a result of insertion of the new section 13A in the principal Act. Thus, the 1985 Amendment itself shows that section 13A is not a separate and distinct provision but has to be read along with section 13 of the principal Act forming a part of the general scheme contained in section 13 for eviction of tenants on the ground of personal need from buildings which are not non-residential. The construction we have made of section 13(3)(a)(i), as it stood after the 1956 Amendment, is the only construction which can be made to harmonise with the definitions in section 2 which continue to remain as originally enacted and the other provisions of the Act which have been referred. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant on this point is, therefore, rejected. The result of the above discussion is that the respondent landlord’s personal need being found proved, the ground of eviction contained in section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) is available and the order of eviction passed against the appellant can be sustained on this ground alone. The construction made by the High Court of Section 13(3) (a) (i) that it does not apply to a scheduled building is, therefore, erroneous. The only surviving question is the availability of the ground of change of user contained in section 13(2) (ii) (b) on which the order of eviction has been passed by the High Court. In view of the above conclusion reached by us that the ground in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) is made out, the consideration of this question in the present-case appears unnecessary. We have considered and decided that question in a connected matter Bishamber Das Kohli (Dead) by Lrs. v. Smt..Satya Bhalla. However, a brief reference to the general principle may be apposite. If the express terms of lease restrict the user solely for purpose of residence, then use of any part thereof for even a scheduled purpose without the written consent of the landlord may amount to use of the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. That, however, is a question of fact in each case. In that case while the ground of eviction in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) would remain available to the landlord 170 for eviction of the tanant, in view of the express covenant against user of any part of the residential building even for a scheduled purpose. It may make available also the ground of change of user under section 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act. In the present case, it is unnecessary to go into this further question since the order of eviction can be sustained on the ground contained in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) alone as already indicated. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 3,000. U.R. Appeal dismissed. 171