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Girja Shankar Tiwari and Anr. v. Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty and Anr.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
5 October 1988
Case no.
0
Bench
Mukharji,Sabyasachi (J)

In short. The case involves a dispute over the deemed vacancy of a rented property in Rae Bareli, originally leased to an Aushadhalaya, which ceased operations. The core issue was whether the premises were deemed vacant under Section 12 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, due to the occupation of an employee of the Aushadhalaya without the landlord's consent. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Girja Shankar Tiwari, affirming the Rent Controller's decision that the premises were deemed vacant, thereby allowing the petitioner to seek allotment of the property.

Facts

The premises in question were rented to an Aushadhalaya in 1946 or 1947. After the Aushadhalaya ceased to exist in 1976, an employee (Respondent No. 1) continued to occupy the premises and paid rent in the name of the Aushadhalaya. The petitioner filed an application under Section 12 of the U.P. Act, claiming the premises had become vacant. The Rent Controller agreed, but the High Court dismissed the application, considering the employee as part of the Aushadhalaya and treating the rent payments as valid. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Arguments

Petitioner Arguments

The petitioner argued that the premises were not occupied by the tenant (the Aushadhalaya) or its family members, thus constituting a deemed vacancy under the Act. The petitioner contended that the employee's occupation did not equate to tenancy and that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the tenancy status. The Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing that the employee was not a tenant and that the rent was paid in the name of the Aushadhalaya, not the employee.

Respondent Arguments

The respondent argued that the employee was effectively a tenant as he continued to occupy the premises and pay rent, which the landlord accepted. The High Court supported this view, suggesting that the landlord's knowledge of the employee's occupation implied consent. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the landlord did not consent to a change in tenancy and that the employee's payments did not establish a new tenancy.

Precedents considered

The judgment did not cite specific precedents but relied on the interpretation of Section 12 of the U.P. Act. The court's reasoning was grounded in the legal principle that a deemed vacancy arises when a tenant ceases to occupy the premises and allows a non-family member to occupy without consent.

Legal principles

The court considered the principle of deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the U.P. Act, which stipulates that if a landlord does not occupy the building and allows a non-family member to occupy it, a vacancy is deemed to exist. The court also emphasized the importance of consent in tenancy arrangements, noting that the landlord did not consent to the employee's occupation.

Decision and reasoning

Rationale

The Supreme Court reasoned that the premises were not occupied by the tenant or their family, and thus, a deemed vacancy occurred. The court criticized the High Court's conclusion that the employee was a tenant, stating that the Aushadhalaya was the original tenant, and the employee's occupation did not change this status. The court highlighted the lack of evidence supporting the claim that the landlord recognized the employee as a tenant.

Outcome

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and affirmed the Rent Controller's ruling that the premises were deemed vacant. The court allowed the petitioner to proceed with the application for allotment of the premises. Specific instructions regarding the appeal process were not detailed in the judgment.

Conclusion

This judgment reinforces the legal principle that a deemed vacancy can occur even when a property is occupied, provided the original tenant has ceased to occupy it and has not consented to the new occupant. It clarifies the interpretation of tenancy under the U.P. Act, emphasizing the necessity of landlord consent for any change in tenancy status.

Read the full judgment on the Supreme Court website (PDF)

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