PETITIONER:
G. PONNIAH THEVAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NELLAYAM PERUMAL PILLAI AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 244 1977 SCR (2) 446
1977 SCC (1) 500
ACT
Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, s, 2(e)
"Landlord", whether relates only to creator of
lease---Section 3(1) whether protects tenancy rights creat-
ed by life-estate holder extending beyond his
life-time--Provisions of Act, whether prospective.
HEADNOTE
The plaintiffs-respondents who became owners of the land
in dispute, as remainder-men, sued to evict the appellant, a
cultivating tenant, on the ground that his tenancy rights
created by Annamalai Ammal, a life-estate holder had ceased
with her death. The appellant claimed protection under s.
3(1) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955.
The respondents contended that such protection was only
available against the creator of a lease, to persons who
were cultivating tenants in 1955 when the Act came into
force, and not to the appellant who became a cultivating
tenant in 1961.The eviction suit was decreed. by the Dis-
trict Court and the High Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: (1 ) The statutory definition of the term "land-
lord" relates not only to the person who created the lease
but contemplates and takes in every successive holder who
could be entitled to evict a tenant. That. person can only
one who has the right, at the time of filing the suit, to
realise rents or evict persons in wrongful occupation.
[449G-H]
(2) The terms of the statutory protection apply to all
tenancies governed by the Act irrespective of the nature of
rights of the person who leased the land so long as the
lessor was entitled to create a tenancy. [447E]
The Court observed--
The Madras High Court’s view that a life estate holder
cannot create a. tenancy which could last beyond his life-
time, applied to statutory tenancies runs counter not only
to the principles underlying creation of statutory tenancy
rights in agricultural land, through out the country, but is
in conflict with the particular statutory protection con-
ferred upon cultivating tenants in the State of Madras.
[447E-F]
(3) The provisions of the Act’ are prospective except
for section 4(1) and even s. 4(1) shows that the protection
was not meant merely for those who were cultivating tenants
in 1955. The provisions became enforceable as soon as the
Act became operative and there is nothing in the Act to show
that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in
its operation only as a protection given to persons who
were cultivating tenants in 1955. [450B-C]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICION: Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1976.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 29-1-1976 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal
No..468/75).
K.S. Ramarmurthi and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan, for the appel-
lant.
T.S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Miss
Veena Devi Khanna, for respondents Nos. 2---4.
447
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.--This appeal by special leave raises quite a simple
question interpretation of the provisions of the Madras
Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, (hereinafter
referred to as ’the act’) which we think, have been ignored
entirely by the Madras high court in the judgment under
appeal.
The undisputed facts are: one Annamalai Pillai died
leaving behind two widows, namely, Annamalai Ammal and
Veerayee. The last mentioned lady instituted a suit No. 482
of 1927 in the Court of the District Munsif, Periyakulam,
for partitioning the properties of the deceased, impleading
the other widow and a nephew of the deceased Annammalai
Pillai as defendants. That suit ended in a compromise dated
6th July, 1935. Under the terms of the compromise decree,
some land was given to Annamalai Ammal for enjoyment during
her life time, and, thereafter, absolutely to the sons of
the second defendant of suit No. 482 of 1927. Annamalai
Ammal died on 26th July, 1968. She had, however, during her
life time, inducted a tenant, G. Ponniah Thevar, the appel-
lant before us, by means of a lease dated 27th March, 1961.
After the death of Annamalai Ammal, the plaintiffs-respond-
ents, as remainder-men, sued to evict the appellant, the
cultivating tenant, on the ground that his tenancy rights
did not enure beyond the life time of Annamalai Ammal.
The suit for eviction, decreed by the District Court and
the High Court, is now before us. It is not disputed that
the provisions of the Act conferring protection upon culti-
vating tenants govern the rights of the appellant. We are,
therefore, not concerned with any rights under any general
or personal law which may enable the remainder--men to evict
a tenant of a life estate holder. The terms of the statu-
tory protection apply clearly to all tenancies governed by
the Act irrespective of the nature of rights of the person
who leased the land so long as the lessor was entitled to
create a tenancy. It is not disputed before us that Annama-
lai Ammal was entitled to create a tenancy. The only
question, on which there is a dispute, is whether a tenancy
created by her could legally extend beyond her life. The
Madras High Court had, apparently, followed certain deci-
sions of that Court which had applied the principle that a
life estate holder cannot create a tenancy which could
last beyond the life of a life-estate holder. The view taken
by the Madras High Court and applied to statutory tenancies
runs counter not only to the principles underlying creation
of statutory tenancy rights in agricultural land, throughout
the length and breadth of the country, but, it seems to us
to be obviously in conflict with the particular statutory
protection conferred upon cultivating tenants in the State
of Madras. These enactments are really meant for the pur-
poses proclaimed by them. The obvious effect of such statu-
tory provisions cannot be taken away or whittled down by
forensic sophistry. Courts should not allow themselves to
become tools for defeating clearly expressed statutory
intentions.
Section 2(aa) of the Act lays down:
"2(aa) ’cultivating tenant’ in relation
to any land-
(1) means a person who carried on personal
cultivation on such land, under a tenancy
agreement, express or implied, and
448
(2) includes--
(i) any such person as is referred to in
sub-clause (1) who continues in possession of
the land after the determination of the tenan-
cy agreement,
(ii) in the district of Tiruchirappalli, a
Kaiaeruvaramdar or a muttuvaramdar who works
on the land under an engagement with the
landlord for remuneration by a share in the
crop in respect of which the work is done, and
(iii) the heirs of any such person as is
referred to in subclause (1) or sub-clause
(2) (i) and (ii): but does not include a mere
intermediary or his heirs.
Explanation.---A sub-tenant shall be
deemed to be a cultivating tenant of the
holding under the landlord if the lessor of
such sub-tenant has ceased to be the tenant of
such landlord;’
Section 3 (1 ) of the Act lays down:
"3 ( 1 ) Subject to the next succeeding
sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be
evicted from his holding or any part thereof,
by or at the instance of his landlord, whether
in execution of a decree or order of a Court
or otherwise".
Section 3(2) deals with the exceptional circumstances, such
as default in payment of rent, in which the statutory pro-
tection is lifted. Section 3(3) relates to other matters
with which also we are not concerned here. Section 3 (4)
lays down the procedure for the eviction of tenants in those
cases in which the statutory protection is removed. It runs
as follows:
"4(a) Every .landlord seeking to evict a
cultivating tenant falling under sub-section
(2) shall, whether or not there. is an order
or decree of a Court for the eviction of such
cultivating tenant, make an application to the
Revenue Divisional Officer and such applica-
tion shall bear a Court-fee stamp of one
rupee.
(b) On receipt of such application, the
Revenue Divisional Officer shall, after giving
a reasonable.opportunity to the landlord and
the cultivating tenant to make their represen-
tations, hold a summary enquiry into the
matter and-pass an order either allowing the
application or dismissing it and in a case
falling under clause (a) or clause (aa) of
sub-section (2) in which the tenant had not
availed of the provisions contained in sub-
section (3), the Revenue Divisional Officer
may allow the cultivating tenant such time as
he considers just and reasonable having regard
to the relative circumstances of the landlord
and the cultivating tenant for depositing the
arrears of rent payable under this Act inclu-
sive of such costs as he may direct. If the
cultivating tenant deposits the sum as
directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the
rent under subsection (3) (b). If the culti-
vating tenant fails to deposit the
449
sum as directed the Revenue Divisional Officer
shall pass an
order for eviction".
Thus, we see that the statutory protection from evic-
tion, in this exhaustively comprehensive self contained
procedure may last even after the landlord has filed the
prescribed application for eviction an accrual of his cause
of action.
Section 2(e) defines the landlord as follows:
"2(e) ’landlord’ in relation to a hold-
ing or part thereof means the person
entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from
such holding or part;"
The plaintiffs respondents, on their own showing, are
landlords as defined by the Act because they claimed, as the
learned Counsel for the contesting respondents admitted, to
be able to evict the appellant.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the appellant was the
lessee whose right to cultivate as a tenant had not been
determined by anything in the lease or under any statutory
provision. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out
that, even if there had been a determination of the tenancy
under a lease, the appellant would still be a cultivating
tenant as defined in the Act because of the provisions of
Section 2(aa) (2) (i) of the Act. Apparently, such a statu-
tory definition of a cultivating tenant and an exhaustive
procedure for his eviction in certain cases only and in no
other case, are there so as to carry out the purpose .stated
in the preamble as follows:
"Whereas it is necessary to protect
cultivating tenants in certain areas in the
State of Madras from unjust eviction".
The plaintiffs landlords could be entitled to resume
land only under section 4(A) of the Act added by the Madras
Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act of, 1956, for
purposes of personal cultivation in the manner laid down in
the Act itself. The tenant could also be evicted for arrears
of rent as provided in Section 3 (2) of the Act, be.cause,
in that case, the protection given by Section 3 (1) would
not apply. But, none of the conditions for eviction is
fulfilled in the case before us. Moreover, the procedure
for eviction is a special procedure provided by Section 3
(4) of the Act by proceedings in the Court of the Revenue
Divisional Officer.
Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent had tried to
advance two contentions in support of the view taken by the
High Court. Firstly, he submits that the protection given
under Section 3(1) was for the landlord of the cultivating
tenant. In view of the statutory definition of the term
"landlord", we think that the suit itself would fail if the
plaintiffs were not landlords. The statutory definition of
the term landlord relates not only to the person who created
the lease but contemplates and takes in every successive
holder who could be entitled to evict a tenant. That person
can only be one who has the right, at the time of filing the
suit, to realise rents or evict persons in wrongful occupa-
tion. ’There is nothing in the Act itself to show that the
protection given to
450
the cultivating tenant, as defined in the Act, was given
only against his original lessor and did not extend to
subsequent holders of land occupying the capacity of the
landlord. Secondly, it was urged that the protection was
given only to those persons who were cultivating tenants in
1955 when the Act came into force. The argument has only
to be stated to be rejected. There is not a scintilla of
indication in the provisions of the Act to support such an
impossible interpretation. The provisions of the Act are
clearly prospective except for the provisions of Section 4(
1 ) of the Act, showing that even a person who was a culti-
vating tenant of any land on 1st December, 1953. but is "not
in possession thereof at the commencement of the Act" could
be treated if he was in possession of the land on 1st
December, 1953. Even Section 4(1) of the Act shows that
the protection was not meant merely for those who were
cultivating tenants in 1955. Provisions of the Act show
that they became enforceable as soon as the Act became
operative. There is nothing whatsoever in the. Act to show
that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in
its operation only as a protection given to persons who were
cultivating tenants in 1955. Hence, we are unable to see
any reason whatsoever for denying the appellant the clearly
intended protection conferred upon cultivating tenants, as
defined in the Act, by the provisions of the Act set out
above.
Our attention has been invited to some cases which
relate to the. applicability of Section 76(a) of the Trans-
fer of Property Act. It is. true that this provision has
been applied to tenancies created under various statutory
provisions regulating the rights of tenants to agricultural
lands in States all over India. But, we are not concerned
here, with a case in which the position of the alleged
lessee is struck by Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Proper-
ty Act. Such alleged lessees are not tenants at all at the
time when they are inducted on the land as tenants whatever
else they may be. We, therefore, need not even refer to the
cases cited before us which relate either to this provision
of law or to enactments of other States.
Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the
judgment and decree of the High Court. But, in the circum-
stances of the case the. parties will bear their own costs.
M.R. Appeal allowed.
451