PETITIONER:
FIRM PANJUMAL DAULATRAM
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SAKHI GOPAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1977
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 2077 1977 SCR (3) 767
1977 SCC (3) 284
ACT
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 S.
12(1)(e) & (f)--Scope of---Bona fide requirement---Require-
ment of the land-lord of accommodation of both residential
and non-residential part of the building, if proved enti-
tled eviction of the tenant.
HEADNOTE
Under sub clauses (e) and (f) of S. 12(1) of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, a landlord can
evict a tenant, if the residential and the non-residential
accommodation respectively let out to the latter is required
bona fide by him for occupation as a residence and for the
purpose of continuing or starting his business. Accommoda-
tion under the Act means any building or part of a building,
whether residential or non-residential.
The appellant-tenant was inducted in by the respondent
in 1955 for the dual purposes of residential and non-resi-
dential purpose of running a cloth shop. The landlord, bona
fide required the building for his residence and also for
starting his business of running a Chemist shop. The Evic-
tion Suit filed by him was dismissed by the trial court,
but the appellant and the High Court ,,ranted him the
eviction decree.
Discussing the appeal by special leave, the Court.
HELD: The residential portion as well as a non-residen-
tial portion are parts of the building and each is an accom-
modation by definition. The landlord is entitled to evic-
tion of the "accommodation" if he makes out a bona fide
residential and non-residential requirement of the portions.
In the instant case the contract was integral but had dual
purpose. The landlord has put forward dual requirements
which neatly fit into S. 12(1)(e) and (f) of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The findings of
the appellate Court regarding the bona fide requirement of
the landlord, not having been challenged in the High Court
and in this Court in the memorandum of Appeal, the conse-
quence viz. eviction is inevitable. [769 E-G]
S. Sanyal v. Gianchand [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536, distinguished.
[The Court, however granted time to the appellants for
vacating the building till 1-1-1978, in terms of equity].
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 991/76.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 21.1.1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Second Appeal No. 415 of 1971)
S. Choudhury, D.N. Mishra, O.C. Mathur and Shri Narain
for the appellant.
G.L. Sanghi, V.K. Sanghi, R.K. Sanghi and S.N. Khanduja
for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. A suit for eviction of an accommodation
from the tenant to whom it had been let for residential and
non-residential
768
purposes resulted in dismissal by the trial Judge. But in
an appeal, the final court of fact took the view that the
landlord (respondent) was entitled to eviction. The tenant
challenged the appellate decree before the High Court in
Second Appeal without success and has therefore come up to
this Court with this appeal by special leave.
A short point has been raised which deserves only a
short answer. Since we agree with the High Court which in
turn has agreed with the first appellate court, our judgment
can afford to be brief.
A statement of necessary facts may now be given. The
landlord had let out the premises, which is a storeyed
building, to be tenant as per Ex. P-1 of 1955. The signif-
icant clause in the lease deed runs thus:
"1 XXX
2. I take your house for my own use i.e. for
opening a cloth shop and for residential
purposes and I will not sublet your house to
anybody.
XXX XXX XXX
XXX."
The tenant has thus put the building to busi-
ness and residential purposes. The landlord,
who is an M. Sc., claimed the building back on
the score that he wanted to run a medical
store on the ground floor a non-residential
purpose---and stay on the first floor with his
wife--a residential purpose. Thus the acommo-
dation was let out for dual purposes, was
being used presumably for these requirements
and was being claimed back by the landlord for
the twin purposes mentioned above. The final
court of fact has held that the landlord needs
the building for his chemist’s shop and for
his residential use.The High Court in Second
Appeal has upheld this finding and added that
"the finding as to his bonafide requirement
was rightly not challenged before me ......
The conclusion that the courts have reached is
the only conclusion possible on the evidence
on record in the light of the circumstances
appearing."
This statement by the High Court that the
bonafide requirement of the landlord was not
challenged before it has not been questioned
in the memorandum of appeal to this Court.
It must therefore be taken that the bonafide
need of the landlord is validly made out.
The short point that survives is as to
whether the composite purposes of the lease
would put it out of the ground set out for
eviction under s. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The said
Act defines ’accommodation’ thus:
" ’accommodation’ means any building or part
of a building, whether residential or non-
residential and includes,--
XX XXX
XXX."
769
It follows that an accommodation can be resi-
dential, non-residential or both. S. 12 bars
an action of eviction of a tenant from any
accommodation except on one or more of the
grounds set out therein. S. 12(1) (e) and
(f), bearing on the present case, may be
appropriately extracted here:
"12. Restriction on eviction of tenents (1)
(a) to (d) x x x x x
(e) that the accommodation let for residential
purposes is required bona fide by the landlord
for occupation as a residence for himself or
for any member of his family, if he is the
owner thereof, or for any person for whose
benefit the accommodation is held. and that
the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommoda-
tion of his own in the occupation in the city
or town concerned;
(f) that the accommodation let for non-
residential purposes is required bona fide by
the landlord for the purpose of continuing or
starting his business or that of any of his
major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the
owner thereof or for any person for whose
benefit the accommodation is held and that the
landlord or such person has no other reasona-
bly suitable non-residential accommodation of
his own in his occupation in the city or town
concerned;.
XXX XXX
XXX."
The residential portion is a part of the
building and is an accommodation by defini-
tion. The non-residential portion is also a
part of the building and is an accommoda-
tion by definition. The lease has been given
for residential as well as non-residential
purposes. The landlord is entitled to evic-
tion of the residential portion if he makes
out a bonafide residential requirement.
Likewise he is entitled to eviction of the
non-residential portion which is an accommoda-
tion if he makes out a non-residential
requirement. We have already found that the
final court of fact, affirmed by the High
Court, has found in favour of the landlord
regarding his residential as well as non-
residential requirements. Therefore, nothing
more can be done in defence of the tenant in
the light of the present law.
Counsel contended that in a decision of
this Court, viz, S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand,(1)
it has been held that it is not permissible
for the court to split up a contract in an
eviction proceeding. We agree. There is no
question of splitting up of the contract in
the present case, as is abundantly plain from
what we: have stated. The contract was
integral but had dual purposes. The landlord
has put forward dual requirements which neatly
fit into s. 12(1)(e) and (f). The conse-
quence is inevitable that the eviction order
has to be upheld.
(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536.
770
It is seep, that the tenant has been doing a thriving
cloth business, with goodwill attached to it, for well knigh
30 years. It is therefore but fair that the. tenant is
given sometime to rehabilitate himself by securing an alter-
native but suitable accommodation. In our towns where
scarcity of accommodation is the rule it is not that easy to
secure alternative premises. Taking due note of this reali-
ty, we direct that while dismissing the appeal the eviction
order shall not be put into execution before 1st January,
1978.
Parties will bear their respective costs.
S.R. Appeal
dismissed.
771