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Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. Police Commissioner & Anr.

Supreme Court of India · 16 March 1989 · [1989] 2 S.C.R. 43

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
16 March 1989
Reported as
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 43
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
Pandian, S.R. (J)
Length
12 pages
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PETITIONER:
DHARAMDAS SHAMLAL AGARWAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
POLICE COMMISSIONER & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT16/03/1989
BENCH:
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 1282 1989 SCR (2) 43
1989 SCC (2) 370 JT 1989 (1) 580
1989 SCALE (1)658

ACT

Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 198 5:

SS. 3(2) & 6---Detention Order--Validity of--Material a nd

vital fact having a bearing on the issue not placed befo re

detaining authority--Held, requisite subjective satisfacti on

vitiated by non_application of mind.

HEADNOTE

The petitioner was detained under an order dated 17 th

September, 1988 made by the detaining authority under sub s.

(2) of s. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activ i-

ties Act, 1985 with a view to prevent him from acting in a ny

manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. T he

grounds of detention mentioned five offences register ed

against him with police records, out of which the first o ne

under s. 324 IPC was stated to have been compromised, t he

second under s. 332 IPC and the third under ss. 148 and 3 07

IPC respectively were stated to be pending trial, the four th

under s. 302 IPC was stated not proved, while the fif th

under s. 302 IPC was stated to be in the court.

The Government approved the said order on 21st Septe m-

ber, 1988. The detenu submitted his representation dat ed

22nd September, 1988 to the first respondent who by h is

order dated 30th September, 1988 rejected the same. He

thereupon, filed this petition under Article 32 of t he

Constitution.

It was contended for the petitioner that he has be en

acquitted even on 26th August, 1988 in the case shown at

serial No. 2 in the Table appended to the grounds of dete n-

tion, and on 6th June, 1988 in the case shown at Serial N o.

3, that this material and vital fact of his acquittal in t he

said cases had not been placed before the detaining author i-

ty and this non-placing and the consequent non-considerati on

of the said material likely to influence the mind of t he

detaining authority vitiates the subjective satisfaction a nd

invalidates the detention order, that the names of his s o-

called associates were nowhere disclosed which fact wou ld

show either the authority did not know as to who the se

associates were or knowing their names has refrained fr om

furnishing it to the detenu thereby disabling him to ma ke

his effective representation, and

44

that the grounds of detention otherwise were vague or def i-

cient. For the respondent it was contended that each activ i-

ty of the petitioner was a separate ground of detention a nd

that the fact that the petitioner was acquitted in the sa id

cases was of no consequence.

Allowing the writ petition,

HELD: The requisite subjective satisfaction, the form a-

tion of which is a condition precedent to passing of a

detention order, will get vitiated if material or vit al

facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed t he

satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the oth er

and influenced his mind are either withheld or suppressed by

the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by

the detaining authority before issuing the detention orde r.

[51D-E]

In the instant case, at the time when the detaini ng

authority passed the detention order the vital fact of

acquittal of the detenu in cases mentioned at serial Nos. 2

and 3 had not been brought to his notice and on the oth er

hand it was withheld and the detaining authority was giv en

to understand that the trial of those cases was pendin g.

This non-placing of the material fact resulting in no n-

application of the mind of the detaining authority to t he

said fact has vitiated the requisite subjective satisfa c-

tion, rendering the impugned detention order invalid. T he

same is, therefore, set-aside. The detenu be set at liber ty

forthwith. [51E, F, G, H]

S.K. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC

2353; Suresh Mahato v. The District Magistrate, Burdwan

JUDGMENT

Ors., AIR 1975 SC 728; Asha Devi v. Additional Secretary to

the Government of Gujarat & Anr., [1979] 2 SCR 215 and Si ta

Ram Somani v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1986] 2 SCC 86

referred to.

Shiv Rattan Makim v. Union of India & Ors., [1985] Sup p.

(3) SCR 843 and Subharta v. State of West Bengal [1973] S CC

250, distinguished. &

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 5 37

of 1988.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, M.K. Pandit, P.H. Parekh, J.H. Pare kh

and M.N. Sompal for the Petitioner.

45

P.S. Poti, Mrs. H. Wahi and M.N. Shroff for the Respondent s.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. This is a petition under Artic le

32 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality a nd

validity of the order of detention dated 17.9.1988 passed by

the detaining authority (the Commissioner of Police, Ahmed a-

bad City) clamping upon the petitioner (the detenu herei n)

the impugned order of detention under Sub-section (2) of

Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activ i-

ties Act, 1985 on the ground that he on the materials plac ed

before him was satisfied that it was necessary to make th is

order of detention with a view to preventing the detenu fr om

acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of

public order in the area of Ahmedabad City and directed t he

detenu to be detained in Sabarmati Central Prison. In purs u-

ance of the said order, the detenu has been detained in t he

aforesaid prison.

The Government approved the order of detention on

21.9.1988. The detenu submitted his representation dat ed

22.9.1988 to the Ist respondent who by his order dat ed

30.9.1988 rejected the same. Hence this Writ Petition.

Before adverting to the arguments advanced by Dr. Ch i-

tale, on behalf of the detenu; we would like to produce t he

relevant portion of the grounds of detention which rea ds

thus:

" ...... As such you are a dangerous person as defined in

section 2(c) of the said Act, and known as dangerous perso n.

As you with the aid of your Associates create dangero us

atmosphere in the said vicinity you disturb public peac e,

maintenance and as such following offences were register ed

against you with Police Records, and in which you we re

arrested.

Sr. Plice Offence Section Decision

No. Station Regd. No.

1. Sabarmati 140/81 324, 114 Compro-

IPC mised

16.2.82

2. Sherkotda 411/82 332,323, P.T.

114 IPC

46

3. Sherkotda 412/82 PIC 147, 148 P.T.

149,307 BP Act

135(1)

4. Sherkotda 452/85 IPC 302, Not

109,3 proved

5. Sabarmati 346/87 IPC 302, In the

109,34 Court

While considering complaints, in the above cases, Identif i-

cation (Chehra Nissan) Register, and charge-sheets co n-

tents carefully, it is found that you, with the aid of yo ur

associates, in the said area, give threats to innoce nt

people, and cause injuries to them by showing dangero us

weapons that like Acid, Knife, sharp weapons. As such y ou

commit offences punishable for causing injuries to hum an

body and which are punishable in Indian Pen al

Code .......... "

Dr. Chitale, the learned counsel for the petition er

took us through the grounds of detention and the oth er

relevant records, particularly the copies of the statemen ts

of witnesses on the basis of which the detaining authori ty

has claimed to have drawn his subjective satisfaction f or

passing this impugned order of detention and raised vario us

contentions inter-alia contending; (1) The material a nd

vital fact, namely, the acquittal of the detenu in the cas es

registered in Crime Nos. 411 and 412 of 1982 of Sherkot da

Police Station as shown at Serial Nos. 2 and 3 in the tab le

appended to grounds of detention which fact would ha ve

influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or

the other on the question whether or not to make the dete n-

tion order, has not been placed before the detaining autho r-

ity and this non-placing and the consequent non-consider a-

tion of the said material likely to influence the minds of

the detaining authority vitiates the subjective satisfacti on

and invalidates the detention order; (2) Leave apart, t he

non-disclosure of the names of the witnesses on whose stat e-

ments the detaining authority placed reliance to draw h is

subjective satisfaction, claiming privilege under Secti on

9(2) of the Act, the grounds of detention otherwise a re

vague or deficient and lacking details with regards to t he

names of the ’associates’, for the disclosure of which no

privilege could be claimed and hence it was not possible f or

the detenu in the absence of the names of the so call ed

’associates’ to make an effective representation against t he

order of detention, the deprivation of which amounts to an

infringement of the

47

constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(5) of t he

Constitution of India; (3) Though the authority has me n-

tioned in more than one place the words ’your associate s’

which fact evidently should have influenced the mind of t he

detaining authority in making this impugned order, the nam es

of the associates are nowhere disclosed which fact wou ld

show either the authority did not know as to who the assoc i-

ates were or knowing the names of the associates, he h as

refrained from furnishing it to the detenu thereby disabli ng

the detenu to make his effective representation; and (4) T he

materials placed before the detaining authority were hard ly

sufficient to draw any conclusion that the alleged activ i-

ties of the detenu were detrimental to the ’ ’ maintenan ce

of public order..’ ’

A plethora of decisions were cited by Dr. Chitale. T he

learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Poti vehement ly

urged that the contentions urged by Dr. Chitale do not mer it

consideration and the detaining authority in the prese nt

case is justified in passing this order of detention. M r.

Poti also cited number of decisions in support of his su b-

missions.

We shall now examine these contentions in seriatim.

In the grounds of detention five cases register ed

against the detenu in respect of which he had been arrest ed

are taken into consideration by the detaining authority to

draw his subjective satisfaction that the detenu was di s-

turbing the maintenance of public order. Out of the fi ve

cases, two cases mentioned under Serial Nos. 2 and 3 a re

shown as ’P.T. ’, that is pending trial. In other words on

17.9.88 i.e. the date of passing the order of detention, t he

detaining authority was of the opinion that the trials of

both the cases were not over, though actually the detenu h ad

been acquitted even on 26.8.1988 in the case relating to

Crime No. 411 of 1982 and on 5.6.88 in the case relating to

Crime No. 412/82. Though the acquittal of both the cases a re

admitted, the date of acquittal of Crime No. 411/82 is giv en

as 6.7.88 in the counter. In the Writ Petition two grou nd

Nos. 10 and 11 are with reference to these cases. They re ad

as follows:

"10. The petitioner states that in the grounds of detenti on

the detaining authority has mentioned erroneously that Ca se

No. 411 of 1982 is pending. In fact, the said Case w as

decided by the Court on 26.8.1988 and the petitioner w as

acquitted by the judgment dated 26.9.1988 delivered by t he

Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 7, Ahmedabad. When

48

grounds of detention were passed and when the detenti on

order was passed in September, 1988, the detaining authori ty

has taken a non-existing fact into account that the sa id

case was pending trial. The detention is liable to be

quashed on this ground also.

11. Likewise, the grounds of detention mention ed

that Case No. 412 of 1982 is pending which is erroneous. T he

said case was decided on 5.6.1988 and the petitioner w as

acquitted. The detention is liable to be quashed for taki ng

this non-existing ground."

These two grounds are answered by the detaining author i-

ty in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his affidavit in reply swo rn

in December 1988 which read thus:

"12. With reference to the averments made in para 10 of t he

petition, I say that the same are not true’ and deni ed

hereby. I say that the petitioner was acquitted in Crime N o.

411 of 1982 by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court no. 7,

Ahmedabad by an order dated 6.7.1988. However, it is submi t-

ted that each activity of the petitioner is a separa te

ground of detention against the petitioner and, therefor e,

even if the petitioner is acquitted in the said Crimin al

Case, the detention order is not vitiated on that count.

13. With reference to the averments made in para 11 of t he

petitioner, I say that the same are not true and deni ed

hereby. I say that it is true that in the Criminal Case N o.

412/82 the petitioner was acquitted by the Sessions Cou rt

No. 20, Ahmedabad on 5.6.1984. However, as submitted here i-

nabove, each activity of the petitioner is a separate grou nd

for detention of the petitioner, and, therefore, the fa ct

that the petitioner was acquitted in Criminal Case no. 4 11

(Sec 412) of 1982 has no bearing on the detention order a nd

the detention order cannot be said to be vitiated on th at

count."

Though as per Section 6 of the Act the grounds of dete n-

tion are severable and the order of detention shall not be

deemed to be invalid or inoperative if one ground or some of

the grounds are invalid, the question that arises for co n-

sideration is whether the detaining authority was real ly

aware of the acquittal of the detenu in those two cases

49

mentioned under Serial Nos. 2 and 3 on the date of passi ng

the impugned order. It is surprising that the detaini ng

authority who has specifically mentioned in the grounds of

detention that the petitioner’s cases 2 and 3 were pendi ng

trial on the date of passing the order of detention has co me

forward with a sworn statement in reply, filed nearly thr ee

months after signing the grounds of detention, that he kn ew

that the accused had been acquitted in both the cases. T he

averments made in paragraphs 12 and 13 in the affidavit in

reply are not clear at what point of time the detaini ng

authority came to know of the acquittal of the detenu in

both the cases. At any rate, it is not his specific ca se

that the fact of acquittal was placed before him for consi d-

eration at the time of passing the impugned order. But wh at

the authority repeatedly states is that "each activity of

the petitioner is a separate ground of detention" and ad ds

further that "the fact that the petitioner was acquitted in

Criminal Case No. 411/82 and 412/82 is of no consequence ".

We are unable to comprehend the explanation given by t he

detaining authority. It has been admited by Mr. Poti th at

the sponsoring authority initiated the proceedings a nd

placed all the materials before the detaining authority on

14.9.1988 by which date the petitioner had already be en

acquitted in the above said two cases. Thus it is clear th at

either the sponsoring authority was not aware of the acqui t-

tals of those two cases or even having been aware of t he

acquittals had not placed that material before the detaini ng

authority. So at the time of signing the order of detentio n,

the authority should have been ignorant of the acquittal s.

Evidently to get over the plea of the detenu in the wr it

petition in this regard for the first time in the counte r,

the detaining authority is giving a varying statement as if

he knew about the acquittal of the detenu in both the case s.

As ruled by this Court in Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of Ind ia

& Ors., [1985] Supp. (3) SCR 843 at page 848 "even if a

criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is th en

made, it would not invalidate the order of detention" b e-

cause as pointed out by this Court in Subharta v. State of

West Bengal, [1973] 3 SCC 250 "the purpose of preventi ve

detention being different from conviction and punishment a nd

subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former whi le

proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in t he

latter", the order of detention would not be bad mere ly

because the criminal prosecution has failed. In the prese nt

case, we would make stress, not on the question of acquitt al

but on the question of non-placing of the material and vit al

fact of acquittal which if had been placed, would ha ve

influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or

the other. Similar questions arose in Sk. Nizamuddin v.

State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2353 in which the dete n-

tion order was passed under the provisions of Maintenance of

50

Internal Security Act. In that case the ground of detenti on

was rounded on a solitary incident of theft of alumini um

wire alleged to have been committed by the detenu therei n.

In respect of that incident a criminal case was filed whi ch

was ultimately dropped. It appeared on ’record that t he

history sheet of the detenu which was before the detainin g.

authority did not make any reference to the criminal ca se

launched against the petitioner, much less to the fact th at

the prosecution had been dropped or the date when the pet i-

tioner was discharged from the case. In connection with th is

aspect this Court observed as follows:

"We should have thought that the fact that a criminal ca se

is pending against the person who is sought to be proceed ed

against by way of preventive detention is a very materi al

circumstance which ought to be placed before the Distri ct

Magistrate. That circumstance might quite possible have an

impact on his decision whether or not to make an order of

detention. It is not altogether unlikely that the Distri ct

Magistrate may in a given case take the view that since a

criminal case is pending against the person sought to be

detained, no order of detention should be made for t he

present, but the criminal case should be allowed to run i ts

full course and only if it fails to result in convictio n,

then preventive detention should be resorted to. It would be

most unfair to the person sought to be detained not to

disclose the pendency of a criminal case against him to t he

District Magistrate."

It is true that the detention order in that case was s et

aside on other grounds but the observation extracted abo ve

is quite significant. The above observation was subsequent ly

approved by this Court in Suresh Mahato v. The Distri ct

Magistrate, Burdwan and Others, AIR 1975 SC 720 and in As ha

Devi v. Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of

Gujarat & Ant., [1979] 2 SCR 215. In the latter case (i. e.

Asha Devi), it has been pointed out:

" ........ if material or vital facts which would infl u-

ence the minds of the detaining authority one way of t he

other on the question whether or not to make the detenti on

order, are not placed before or are not considered by t he

detaining authority it would vitiate its subjective sati s-

faction rendering the detention order illegal."

51

In Sita Ram Somani v. State of Rajasthan and Other s,

[1986] 2 SCC 86 certain documents which were claimed to ha ve

been placed before the Screening Committee in the fir st

instance were not placed before the detaining authority a nd

consequently there was no occasion for the detaining autho r-

ity to apply its mind to the relevant material. In t he

circumstances of that case, a principal point was rais ed

before this Court that there was no application of mind by

the detaining authority to those vital materials which we re

with-held. This Court, while answering that contenti on

observed thus:

"No one can dispute the right of the detaining authority to

make an order of detention if on a consideration of t he

relevant material, the detaining authority came to t he

conclusion that it was necessary to detain t he

appellant.’But the question was whether the detaining a u-

thority applied its mind to relevant considerations. If it

did not, the appellant would be entitled to be released."

From the above decisions it emerges that the requisi te

subjective satisfaction. the formation of which is a cond i-

tion precedent to passing of a detention order will g et

vitiated if material or vital facts which would have beari ng

on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaini ng

authority one way or the other and influenced his mind a re

either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or

ignored and not considered by the detaining authority befo re

issuing the detention order. It is clear to our mind that in

the case on hand, at the time when the detaining authori ty

passed the detention order this vital fact, namely, t he

acquittals of the detenu in case Nos. mentioned at seri al

Nos. 2 and 3 have not been brought to his notice and on t he

other hand they were withheld and the detaining authori ty

was given to understand that the trial of those cases we re

pending. The explanation given by the learned counsel f or

the respondents, as we have already pointed out, cannot be

accepted for a moment. The result is that the nonplacing of

the material fact--namely the acquittal of detenu in t he

above-said two cases resulting in non-application of min ds

of the detaining authority to the said fact has vitiated t he

requisite subjective satisfaction, rendering the impugn ed

detention order invalid.

Since we have now come to the conclusion that the ord er

of detention is to be set aside on the first ground itsel f,

we are not inclined to traverse on other grounds. In t he

premises, the impugned order is set aside and the Wr it

Petition is allowed. We direct that the detenu be set at

liberty forthwith.

P.S.S. Petition allowed.

52

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