PETITIONER:
BRAHMANAND
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1977
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 1198 1977 SCR (3) 485
1977 SCC (3) 1
ACT
Eviction on the ground of arrears of rent--Tenant due to
strained relations deposits rent in the Court--Whether such
deposit shall be deemed that the rent has been duly
paid--United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act 1947. S. 3(1)(a) r/w. s. 7-C(v) and (6) inter-
pretation of.
HEADNOTE
Section 3(1)(a) of the United Provinces (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, permits ejectment on
the ground of arrears of-rent when the tenant is in arrears
of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the
same to the landlord within one month of the service upon
him of a notice of demand. Section 7-C(1) enables deposits
of rent to be made when a landlord refuses to accept any
rent lawfully paid to him by a tenant and s. 7-C(6) enjoins
that "in any case where a deposit has been made as afore-
said, it shall be deemed that the rent has been duly paid by
the tenant to the landlord."
The appellant-tenant had extremely strained relations
with his landlady leading to criminal cases. He deposited
the rent payable by him in the court regularly. The trial
court as well as the High Court, taking the view that such
prompt deposits of rent in the court did not satisfy the
provisions of s. 3(1)(a) of the United ’Provinces (Tempo-
rary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, since it is
not equivalent to payment of rent to the landlord, granted
the ejection application filed by the respondent-landlady.
Allowing the appeal by special leave and remanding the case,
the court,
HELD: (1 ) The construction pot by the courts below on
s. 7-C is too narrow and a liberal construction of the
expression "paid to him by a tenant" in s. 7-C (1) is neces-
sary. [487 B-D]
(2) A correct interpretation of s. 7 has to be condi-
tioned by the circumstances prevailing between the parties.
In a situation where not merely bitterness and friction but
potentially violent terms mar the life of the parties, s.
7-C of the Act has to be read realistically. It is not
necessary for the tenant to create a situation of tension
and violence by physically giving the rent into the hands of
the landlord. It is an idle ritual to insist or a physical
tender of payment of rent where the circumstances make it
impracticable. But harassing the landlord by straightaway
depositing the rent in court without fulfilment of the
conditions required by s. 7-C(1) is also unwarranted. [486
G-H, 487 A, D]
The expression "where the deposit has been made as
aforesaid" in s. 7-C (6) means that the deposit is permissi-
ble only when the condition in s. 7-C(1) is complied with.
If the landlord refuses to accept rent paid to him a deposit
is permissible but payment need not be by physical tender
person to person. It can be by money order or through
messenger or by sending a notice to the landlord asking
him to nominate a bank into which the rents may be regularly
paid to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord refuses
under these circumstances then a court deposit will be the
remedy. In the instant case the courts below have not
considered whether the circumstances which drove the appel-
lant into the depositing of rent in court were such as
eliminated the other possibilities of direct payment. [487
E-F, A]
Observation
It would be a far more satisfactory solution of the
situation between two neighbours who have fallen out, if the
parties would come to terms at the gentle suggestion of the
court below as to what it considers Just aided by the activ-
ist endeavours of counsel, than a mere adjudication of the
points of fact and law raised which will leave the parties
as bitter neighbours. [The court directed the appellate
court to take .the initiative in the matter with a caution
to-be totally non-aligned in the process. [488 A-B]
486
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDCTION: CIVIL Appeal No. 711 of 1976.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 28-4-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Second
Appeal No. 1719 of 1972)
Yogeshwar Prasad, Miss Rani Arora and Meera Bali, for
the appellant.
S.L. Bhatia and H.K. Puri, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the’ Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. The defendant-tenant is the appellant
and the appeal is by special leave. The landlord sued’ for
ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent as provided in s.
3 of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947. Section 3(1) (a) states, among one of
the grounds of eviction,
"that the tenant is in arrears of rent
for more than three months and has failed to
pay the same to the landlord within one month
of the service upon him of a notice of
demand." ’
In the present case, the complaint of the plaintiff was
that the rent was not paid but was deposited into court
regularly. The trial court as well as the High Court took
the view that such prompt deposits of rent into court did
not satisfy the provisions of s. 3(1)(a) since it is not
equivalent to payment of rent to the landlord. Counsel for
the appellant contends. that s. 7-C(6) of the Act
strikes a different note. It reads:
"In any case where a deposit has been
made, as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that
the rent has been duly paid by the tenant to
the landlord. (emphasis supplied)"
S. 7-C(1)enables deposits of rent to be made when a
landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by
a tenant. In the present case the facts are glaring. The
relations between the parties appears to be extremely
strained and they are living in adjacent premises. There
was a criminal case by the tenant against the landlord as
early as 1969 for offences under ss. 323, 504, 506, 352, 354
and 452 I.P.C. The case ended in an acquittal but the
relations did not improve. Even now there is a pending
prosecution by the tenant of the landlord for offences of a
serious nature. It is common ground that not merely bit-
terness and friction but potentially violent terms mar the
life of these parties. In such a situation s. 7-C of the
Act has to be .read realistically. It is not. necessary for
the tenant to create a situation, of tension and Violence by
physically offering the rent into the hands of the landlord.
We are satisfied that a correct interpretation of s. 7 has
to be conditioned by the circumstances prevailing between
the. parties: In the case we are concerned with, the rela-
tions between the parties being Very estranged it is an idle
487
ritual to insist on a physical tender of payment of the
rent where the circumstances make it impractical and,
therefore, subject to what we have said later, prima facie,
s. 7-C(1) is attracted and in such cases s. 7-C(6) makes
court deposit equivalent to payment by the tenant to the
landlord. Of course, in the absence of special and adequate
grounds the tenant cannot drive the landlord to collect his
rent every time through the court with all the attendant
inconvenience and expense.
We consider the construction put by the courts below on
s. 7-C too narrow. The High Court has proceeded on the
footing that a deposit under s. 7-C can be made only if the
landlord refuses to accept the rent tendered to him or, if
there is any dispute as to the person who is actually enti-
tled to receive the rent. "None of the conditions existed in
the instant case... and the plaintiff had asked the defend-
ant not to deposit the rent in court but to pay her the
same. The defendant was accordingly required to pay the
rent to her, not to deposit the same in court. The deposit,
accordingly, could not constitute payment of rent to the
plaintiff and the defendant, consequently, was in arrears of
rent... ".
As we have earlier pointed out, a liberal construction
of the expression paid to him by a tenant in s. 7-C(1) is
necessary. Physically offering payment when the relations
between the parties are strained is to ask for trouble and
be impractical. But harassing the landlord by straightway
depositing the rent in court without fulfilment of the
conditions required by s. 7-C(1) is also unwarranted. Sec-
tion 7-C(6) by using the expression ’where the deposit has
been made as aforesaid’ takes us back to s. 7-C(1). That is
to say, the deposit is permissible only when the condition
in s. 7-C(1) is complied with. If the landlord refuses to
accept rent paid to him a deposit is permissible. But pay-
ment need not be by physical tender, person to person. It
can be by money order, or through messenger or by sending a
notice to the landlord asking him to nominate a bank into
which the rents may be regularly paid to the credit of the
landlord. If the landlord refuses under these circum-
stances, then a court deposit will be the remedy.
In the present case, on account of the bad blood be-
tween the parties a physical tender of the rent is ruled
out. At the same time the courts below have not considered
whether the circumstances which drove the appellant into
depositing the rent in court were such as eliminated the
other possibilities of direct payment we have indicated. It
is therefore fair to set aside the finding of the courts
below and remand the case to the lower appellate court
(which. is the final court of fact under ordinary circum-
stances) to ascertain whether any of the alternatives we
have indicated, or may otherwise be made out by the tenant
as equivalent to payment of rent, is present in the case.
If no such circumstance is made out by the tenant justifying
deposit of rent in court, the decree for eviction will
stand. Otherwise, the petition for eviction will be dis-
missed.
488
It may well be that having regard to the fact that the
respondent,the landlady belonging to the weaker sex, has
necessarily to live as adjacent occupant of the appellant,
a fairly affluent doctor, and taking note of the fact that
the relations between the parties are so embittered as to
lead to criminal cases, it may be furtherance of justice
if the appellate court tries to settle the dispute without
taking sides. If the parties are able to come to terms at
the gentle suggestion of the court as to what it considers
just, aided by the activist endeavours of counsel, it
would be a far more satisfactory solution of the situation
between two neighbors who have fallen out than a bare adju-
dication of the points of fact and law raised which will
leave the parties as bitter neighbors. We therefore think
it proper to direct the appellate court to take the initia-
tive in the matter but caution it to be totally non-aligned
in the process.
With these observations we allow the appeal’ and remand
the case to the lower appellate court. Parties will bear
their own costs upto now incurred.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
489