PETITIONER:
BEANT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT18/11/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1977 AIR 388 1977 SCR (2) 122
1977 SCC (1) 220
ACT
Constitution of India, Article 226--High Court’s rejec-
tion of findings of facts: by departmental authorities, when
justified---Article 136, interference by Supreme Court, rule
of practice.
HEADNOTE
The property under dispute was put up for sale at two
different auctions by the Managing Officer, Amritsar. The
Rehabilitation authorities cancelled the bid of the first
auction purchaser Smt. Rup Kaur, holding that she had failed
to deposit the sale price in spite of issuing her a regis-
tered notice, and at the. second auction the appellant’s bid
was accepted. In a petition filed under Art. 226, a Single
Judge of the High Court found the findings of facts to be
erroneous and the impugned order void, and granted a writ in
favour of Smt. Rup Kaur. On appeal, the decision was upheld
by a Division Bench of the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal the Court,
HELD: (1) The High Court does not sit as a court of
appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the au-
thorities which are empowered to give their decisions, but
apart from jurisdictional errors, the High Court may
correct errors apparent on the face of the record. An error
to be apparent must be one which does not take prolonged
arguments to bring it to the surface. The Single Judge’s
conclusion that provisions of Rule 90 of the Displaced
Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, had not
been complied with, was not erroneous. [123C-D. 126E-F]
S.L. Hegde & Ors. v.M.B. Tirumale [1960] (1) SCR 890, ap-
plied
Hiralal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner New
Delhi [1961] P.L.R. 560, referred to.
(2) It is a settled rule of practice of this Court not
to interfere with the’ exercise of discretionary powers of
High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution merely be-
cause two views are possible upon the facts of a case. For
interference by this Court, the question must involve at-
least a matter of public or general importance or the injus-
tice suffered by an individual due to an error of law should
be so gross as to touch the conscience of this Court in
which case it would be deemed to be one of more than private
importance. [123E-F]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 333 of 1969.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated the 22-8-
1968 the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 427 of
1968).
B. Sen and H.K. Puri, for the appellant
S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and K.R.Nagaraja. for respondent No.
5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by--
BEG, J.--This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgement of a Division Bench of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana. dismissing in litnine an appeal against
a judgment and order of a
123
learned single Judge of that Court by which a Writ Petition
made to the High Court had been granted.
We have been taken through the very detailed judgment of
the learned single Judge where all the relevant facts are
considered in detail. The questions which have been raised
before us are: firstly, whether the learned single judge was
justified in considering the facts of the case and recording
certain findings of fact without having even the advantage’
of the record of the proceedings of the Deputy Chief Settle-
ment Commissioner, and other officers who had given certain
other findings in favour of the appellant; secondly, whether
the learned single Judge’s findings of fact are correct;
and, thirdly, whether any such apparent error was disclosed
in the proceedings of the authorities acting under the
Refugees Rehabilitation and Settlement Act as to justify
interference by the High Court. It was urged that a mistake
apparent on the face of the record has to be one which does
not necessitate delving deep into facts on record to discov-
er it after a re-examination of questions of fact which
ought to be left to the authorities empowered to give these
findings. It is true that the High Court does not sit as a
Court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of
the authorities which are empowered to give their decisions
in such cases. Apart from jurisdictional errors, the High
Court may correct errors apparent on the face of the record.
An error to be apparent must, according to a rough test laid
down by this Court in S.L. Hedge & Ors. v. M.B. Tirumale(1),
be one which does not take prolonged arguments to bring it
to the surface. These propositions are quite well estab-
lished.
It is, however, also a settled rule of practice of this
Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary
powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
merely because two views are possible upon the facts of a
case. Furthermore, in order to induce this Court to inter-
fere under Article 136 of the Constitution the the question
must involve at least a matter of public or general
importance or the injustice suffered by an individual due to
an error of law should be so gross as to touch the con-
science of this Court in which case it would be deemed to be
one of more than private importance.
The case before us is one of a competition between two
auction purchasers of the same property put up for sale at
two different auctions by the Managing Officer, Amritsar.
The first was in favour of the respondent Smt. Rup Kaur,
held on 20th August, 1959, and the second in favour of.
Beant Singh, the appellant, held on 10th May, 1961, on the
assumption that the first auction could be cancelled. The
broad material facts, apparent from the original official
record, which is now before us, are stated below.
At the auction sale on 20th August, 1959, held by the
Managing Officer, Amritsar, Rup Kaur’s bid of Rs. 32,000/-,
being the highest, was accepted and this fact was communi-
cated to her by a letter dated
(1) [1960] (1) S.C.R. 890.
124
11th September, 1959, sent through her son and general
attorney M.S. Grewal. This letter was in the following
terms:
"Dear Sir/Madam,
I am to inform you that your bid for Rs.
32,000/(Rupees thirty two thousands only) in
respect of property No. B-XII-18-S-14 (Portion
I and III) Hide Market Amritsar has been
accepted as per terms and conditions of the
auction.
2. You have executed an indemnity bond
in lieu of the earnest money due from you for
adjustment against the compensation admissible
on your verified claim(s). For this purpose
please furnish if you have not already done at
the time of auction the registration number of
your compensation application, so as to reach
this office within seven days of the issue of
this letter. In case you intend to associate
any other claimants with you in the purchase
of the above mentioned property you should
also submit affidavits of association duly
completed by you and by each of your asso-
ciates, as per specimen attached to this
office within the period specified above.
3. The balance of the purchase money, if
any, found due from you, after scrutiny of
your compensation application and that of your
associates will be communicated to you in due
course.
Yours
faithfully,
Sd/-
District Rent &
Managing Officer,
Amri tsar".
The above mentioned letter showed that the contesting re-
spondent being a displaced person had executed an indemnity
bond and had to furnish some information so that adjustment
of the compensation due to her may be made against the
amount which she had to deposit. What was that information?
On the margin of the front page of this letter is a partial-
ly illegible writing running from top to bottom of the
printed full-scap sheet on the original record. With some
difficulty the following part only can be read: "You are
required to submit the following documents regarding provi-
sional possession within seven days from the receipt of this
letter failing which your case wilt be .... " After "will
be" nothing is found written. It is disputed between the
parties whether this writing in hand of the margin existed
on the letter received by Smt. Rup Kaur’s attorney. Howev-
er, even looking at the copy on the original record, the
meaning is not at all intelligible. If it existed, it could
only confuse and not enlighten the recipient as to what was
to be done.
An order was then passed, on 8th March, 1961, which runs
as follows:
125
"ORDER,
Smt. Roop Kaur through her attorney Shri
M.S. Grewal the auction purchaser of unit No.
B.XIII-18-S-14 (Portion I and III) Hide Market
Amritsar has failed to deposit the balance
sale price amounting to Rs. 28,000/- in spite
of issue of registered notice for 2-1-61. Her
bid is, therefore, cancelled and earnest money
forfeited. Settlement Officer Jullndur may be
requested to deduct Rs. 3200/- as earnest
money out of CA No. P/J/I0110. The applicant
may be informed accordingly and property
disposed of in the next sale programme.
Announced.
Dated 8-3-61. Sd/-
Distt. Rent &
Managing Officer,
Am ritsar".
This order does not state that parties were duly heard. It
is disputed whether the notice mentioned in it, alleged to
have been sent to Smt. Rup Kaur on 18-12-1960 asking her to.
appear on 2-1-1961, was received by the contesting respond-
ent.’ Even if the learned Single Judge’s finding that it was
not received at all by her were not correct, the time fixed
for her appearance was too short. Furthermore, the allega-
tion that she had been called upon, presumably by the letter
dated 11-9-1959 to deposit Rs. 28,000/- was, on the face of
it, untrue. Despite a report in her favour by the Regional
Settlement Commissioner, who investigated the facts and
reported to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, that she had
not been properly served, justice was denied to her by the
Chief Settlement Commissioner on 26-6-1963.
The learned single Judge had examined the facts and
pointed out other obvious illegalities at earlier stages
showing that provisions of Rules 90 and 92 and 105 of the
Displaced Persons Compensation & Rehabilitation Rules 1955
were not complied with in cancelling the sale. According to
Rup Kaur, who filed some application on 9th May, 1961, when
she learnt what had happened, she had also filed an appeal
against the order of 8th March, 1961, and made a request for
extension of time for payment of the balance of the purchase
money, but, on 14th June, 1961, the following order was
passed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner on her
appeal:
"This is an appeal against the order of
Distt. Rent & Managing Officer Amritsar dated
8-3-61 whereby he cancelled the appellants bid
and forfeited the earnest money on account of
his failure to deposit the balance price of
property No. B. XIII-18-S-14 (Portion I & III)
Hide Market Amritsar purchased by him at the
open auction within the specified time. For
all intents and purposes this appeal is for
extension of time to deposit the balance
purchase price.
126
Extension of time is an administrative
matter for which no judicial action is called
for. Dismissed. Inform the appellant
accordingly".
The learned Single Judge pointed out that the above
mentioned order of the Appellate authority was also void for
contravening the provisions of Rule 105 as interpreted by a
Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab in Hira Lal Kher v.
The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi(1), so that it
was the duty of the Settlement Commissioner, to fix a date
for hearing and to inform the ’appellant it was not
discharged. Apparently, the appeal was decided without
informing the contesting respondent Smt. Rup Kaur when her
appeal would be heard. Rule 105, which was thus contra-
vened, provides:
"105. Provisions of Order XLI of the
Code of Civil procedure apply to appeals and
revisions.Except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Act or in these rules, the
procedure laid down in order XLI of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908)
shall,. so far as may be applicable, apply to
the hearing and disposal of ap.peals and
revisions and the Act".
Furthermore, extension of time was not just an "adminis-
trative matter". The question whether Rup Kaur had made out
a case for it or not should have been quasi-judicially
considered and decided. Indeed, if provisions of the Civil
Procedure Code were applied to these appeals and extension
of time was only a relief sought, the discretion to grant it
or refuse it had to be judicially and judiciously exercised.
The order was made on an apparently wrong assumption.
The learned single Judge had restored the position to
what it was when the letter dated 11th September, 1959, was
received by M.S. Grewal, the son and general attorney of Rup
Kaur, and had directed the Managing Officer to proceed in
accordance with Law. After having heard Learned Counsel for
both sides at some length, we are not satisfied that any
injustice has been done to the appellant who will, no doubt,
get back whatever money he may have deposited. We think,
that, in the circumstances of the case, it could not be said
that the learned single Judge’s conclusion, that provisions
of Rule 90 had not been complied with in dealing with the
case of Rup Kaur, who had suffered injustice, was erroneous.
The learned Judge had stated his conclusion as follows:
"A mere reading of the above-quoted
provision shows that one of the conditions
precedent entitling the Rehabilitation
Authorities to cancel the sale and to forfeit
the initial deposit is the service on the
auction purchaser of a notice specified in
sub-rule (11), sub-rule (12) or sub-rule (13)
of rule. 90. The petitioner admittedly
complied with the requirement of the notice
under sub-rule (12) of rule 90 (Annexure "F")
and no notice in terms of the requirements of
subrule (13) of rule 90 was ever admittedly
issued to or
(1) (1961) P.L.R. 560.
127
served on the petitioner. In these
circumstances, the Rehabilitation Authorities
has no jurisdiction whatsoever for
cancelling the sale in favour of the
petitioner on account of alleged non-payment
of the balance of the purchase price and for
forfeiting the initial deposit made by her.
In this view of the matter, the impugned
orders cancelling the sale in favour of the
petitioner and forfeiting her initial deposit
are wholly without jurisdiction and cannot
possibly be sustained. Errors of law in the
orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner
and the order Rehabilitation Authorities are
apparent on their face inasmuch as the said
orders have been passed in absolute ignorance
of the statutory provisions referred to
above".
We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the view
taken by the High Court. Consequently, we dismiss this
appeal. But, in the circumstances of the case, the parties
will bear their own costs.
M.R. Appeal dis-
missed.
128