PETITIONER:
BANSIDHAR AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1989
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
KANIA, M.H.
CITATION:
1989 AIR 1614 1989 SCR (2) 152
1989 SCC (2) 557 JT 1989 (2) 518
1989 SCALE (1)1091
ACT
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955: Chapter III-B and ss. 5(6 A)
and 30E--Ceiling area--Determination of--Effect of repe al
of--Proceedings with reference to appointed date under t he
Act--Whether can be initiated and continued under the r e-
pealed provisions, even after coming into effect of Raja s-
than Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ac t,
1973--State’s right to excess land and land-owner’s liabil i-
ty to surrender surplus land, on the appointed day--Wheth er
a right accrued and liability incurred within the meaning of
clause (c) and (e) ors. 6 of Rajasthan General Claus es
Act--Whether affected by repeal--Sec. 6 of Rajasthan Gener al
Clauses Act--Whether attracted--Whether s. 3 of 1973 Act h as
overriding effect as to exclude operation of the 1955 Act.
Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdin gs
Act, 1973: Sections 3, 4(1), 15(2) and 40(1)--Ceili ng
area--Determination of--Repeal of Chapter III-B and s. 5(6 A)
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955--Effect of--Whether cas es
as on notified date should be decided under old law--Wheth er
rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old l aw
affected--Whether new law has overriding effect over the o ld
one.
General Clauses Act, 1897/Rajasthan General Claus es
Act, 1955: Section 6---Applicability of--In absence of
express reference to the section or of express provisions to
similar effect in the repealing Act-Repeal and re-enactme nt
on the same subject--Rights accrued and liabilities incurr ed
under repealed law--Whether effaced.
Statutory Construction: Repeal and Saving--Rights a nd
obligations saved in repealing statute--Whether exhaustive .
HEADNOTE
Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 pr e-
scribing a ceiling on holdings of agricultural lands, a nd
cl.(6A) of s. 5, defining ’ceiling area’ were introduc ed
into the Act by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 196 0.
The notified date under the 1955 Act was
153
1.4.1966. Subsequentiy, on 1.1.1973, by the Rajasthan Imp o-
sition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 197 3,
these provisions were repealed, except to the extent ind i-
cated in the second proviso to s. 4(1) and s. 15(2) of t he
Ordinance. Certain transfers made by the landholders, ev en
during the operation of the-old law, were recognised as
valid transfers for the purpose of computation of ceili ng
area under the new dispensation brought about by the Ord i-
nance. The Ordinance was replaced by the 1973 Act wi th
retrospective effect from 1.1.1973. Section 40 of the A ct
repealed both the old law in Chapter III-B of the 1955 A ct
and the earlier Ordinance.
After the 1973 Act came into force on 1.1.1973 cases f or
determination of ’ceiling-areas’ under Chapter III-B of t he
1955 Act came to be initiated and were sought to be conti n-
ued under the repealed Chapter III-B against the appellan ts
including the appellants in C.A. No. 1003(N) of 1977 w ho
claimed to have entered into possession and cultivation of
certain parcels of land, pursuant to agreements to se ll
dated 28.4.1957, said to have been executed, in their favo ur
by the then land holder. The sale deeds in this case we re
passed on 22.8.1966, after the notified date. Proceedin gs
for the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of the th en
land-holder were commenced under the repealed Chapter II IB
of the 1955 Act, and the purchases in question were held to
be hit by s. 3ODD of the repealed Chapter III-B, as appe l-
lants did not possess the residential qualifications, pr e-
scribed by the section for the eligibility for recogniti on
of such transfers.
The appellants approached the High Court, contendi ng
that after the coming into force of the 1973 Act which by s.
40, repealed Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act, recourse cou ld
not be had to the repealed law for purposes of commencemen t,
conduct and conclusion of any proceedings for fixation of
ceiling as prescribed under the old law.
Rejecting the contention of the appellants, the Hi gh
Court held that the new Act of 1973 did not have the swee p-
ing effect of destroying all the rights accrued and liabil i-
ties incurred under the old Act.
The correctness of the view of the High Court, w as
challenged in the appeals before this Court. Some other wr it
petitions were also filed directly in this Court.
On the questions whether (a) the scheme contemplated by
the 1973 Act and the different criteria and standards f or
the determination of ceiling area envisaged in it and, in
particular, having regard to the
154
limited scope of the saving-provision of s. 40 which, qui te
significantly, omitted to invoke and attract s. 6 of t he
Rajasthan General Clauses Act 1955 to .he repeal of s. 5(6 A)
and Chapter III-B of the ’1955 Act’, must be construed a nd
held to manifest an intention contrary’ to and inconsiste nt
with the keeping alive or saving of the repealed law so as
to be invoked in relation to and applied for the pendi ng
cases which had not been concluded under the old law befo re
the repeal; and (b) even if s. 6 of the Rajasthan Gener al
Clauses Act 1955 was attracted and the old law was saved f or
the purpose, provisions of the old law could not be invok ed
as no right had been "accrued" in favour of the State in
relation to the surplus area determinable under the old l aw
nor any liability incurred by the land-holders under the o ld
law so as to support the initiation of the proceedings f or
fixation of ceiling-area under the old law after its repea l.
Dismissing the appeals, Special Leave Petitions and Wr it
Petitions, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 When there is a repeal of a statute accomp a-
nied by re-enactment of a law on the same subject, t he
provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked in to
not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequenc es
envisaged by s. 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or n ot
but only for the purpose of determining whether the prov i-
sions in the new statute indicate a different intentio n.
[164F-G]
State of Punjab v. Mohan Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 873 referr ed
to.
1.2 Mere absence of an express reference to s. 6 of t he
General Clauses Act is not conclusive, unless such omissi on
is attended with the circumstance that the provisions of t he
new-law evince and make manifest and intention contrary to
what would, otherwise, follow by the operation of the Se c-
tion, the incidents and consequences of s. 6 would follo w.
[163A-B]
B. Bansgopal v. Emperor, AIR 1933 All 669 referred to.
1.3 The scheme of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 does not manifest an inte n-
tion contrary to, and inconsistent with, the saving of t he
repealed provisions of s. 5(6A) and Chapter III-B of t he
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 so far as pending cases a re
concerned, and the rights accrued and liabilities incurr ed
under the old law are not effaced. The indicia that the o ld
law was not effaced are in s. 15(2) and s. 40(1) read wi th
second proviso to s. 4(1) of the new Act. [167G; 165E]
155
1.4 The High Court was right in holding that the openi ng
words of s. 15(2) "without prejudice to any other reme dy
that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,
1955" clearly showed that the pending cases had to be go v-
erned by the old law, and if transactions past and clos ed
had to be reopened and decided afresh under the provisio ns
of the repealed law, and the ceiling area under Chapter I II
of the 1955 Act had to be fixed under its repealed prov i-
sions, then it must follow, as a necessary corollary, th at
the pending cases must be decided under the old law, a nd
that the expression "law for the time being in force" d id
not take within its sweep a law "deemed to be in force" an d,
therefore, the opening words of s. 3 of 1973 Act would n ot
have an overriding effect so as to exclude the old la w.
[167A-D]
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. The State of Vindh ya
Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188 and Chief Inspector of Mines v.
K.C. Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 referred to.
2. A saving provision in a repealing statute is n ot
exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or t he
rights that survive the repeal. [167D-E]
1. T. Commissioner U.P. v. Shah Sadiq and Sons, AIR 19 87
SC 1217 @ 1221 referred to.
3.1 For purpose of clauses (c) and (e) of the Rajasth an
General Clauses Act, 1955, the "right" must be "accrued" a nd
not merely an inchoate one. the distinction between what is
and what is not a right preserved by s. 6 of the Gener al
’Clauses Act is often one of great fineness. What is una f-
fected by the repeal is a right ’acquired’ or ’accrue d’
under the repealed statute and not "a mere hope or expect a-
tion" of acquiring a right or liberty to apply for a righ t.
[168E]
3.2 The right of the State to the excess land was n ot
merely an inchoate right under the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,
1955, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of s. 6(c) of
the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. [172D]
The rights and obligations under s. 30E of the 1955 A ct
had had to be determined with reference to the notified da te
i.e. 1.4.1966. The right of the State, to take over exce ss
land, vested in It as on the appointed date, and only t he
quantification remained to be worked out. The liability of
the land-owner to surrender the excess land as on
156
1.4.1966 was a liability "incurred" also within the meani ng
of the said provision. [170E;171H; 172D]
Lalji Raja v. Firm Hansraj, [1971] 3 SCR 815; Raghuna th
v. Maharashtra, [1972] 1 SCR 48 at 57; Bhikoba Shank ar
Dhumal (dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed
JUDGMENT
Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 218 at 228; State of Maharashtra v.
Annapurnabai and Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 273 at 275; Direct or
of Public Works v. Ho Po Sany, [1961] 2 All E.R. 721 a nd
M.S. Shivananda v. K.S.R. Corpn., AIR 1980 SC 77 at 81 r e-
ferred to. &
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 203 7-
2042 of 1977 etc. etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.1976 of t he
Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Special appeal Nos. 8, 20, 2 2,
26, 27 and 28 of 1976.
A.K. Sen, V.M. Tarkunde, Shanti Bhushan, Sushil Kum ar
Jain, N.D.B. Raju, Ram Kalyan Sharma,Jagdish Nandware, K. B.
Rohtagi, S.K. Dhingra, R.S. Sodhi and Vineet Kumar for t he
Appellants.
C.M. Lodha, Badri Dass Sharma, S.D. Khanduja and Ind ra
Makwana for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. These appeals, by Special Leave a nd
Petitions for grant of Special Leave pertaining to agrari an
reform legislation in the State of Rajasthan, arise out of
and are directed against the judgment dated 21st Octobe r,
1976, of a full bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, di s-
missing a batch of special appeals and affirming the jud g-
ment dated 2.12.1975 of the learned Single Judge of the Hi gh
Court rejecting appellants contentions against the legali ty
of certain proceedings for the fixation of ceiling on agr i-
cultural holdings initiated and continued under the Prov i-
sions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 195 5.
In the Writ-petition filed directly in this Court relie fs
similar to those sought before the High Court are claimed.
The principal controversy before High Court in t he
proceedings, shorn of its niceties and embellishments, w as
whether the proceedings for fixation of ceiling area wi th
reference to the appointed dated i.e. 1.4.1966 under Chapt er
III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
157
(’1955 Act’ for short) could be initiated and continu ed
after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of
Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act (Act No. 11 of 197 3)
(’1973 Act’ for short) which w.e.f. 1.1.1973 repealed Se c-
tion 5(6A) and Chapter III-B of the old Act, i.e. ’ 19 55
Act’.
2. Chapter III-B, pertaining to imposition of ceiling on
agricultural holdings, in the State of Rajasthan, was intr o-
duced into the ’1955 Act’ by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amen d-
ment) Act, 1960. As a sequential necessity Section 5 w as
amended by the introduction in it of Clause (6A) whi ch
defined "ceiling-area". The notified-date, as original ly
fixed, was 1.4.1965; but owing to the uncertainties impart ed
to the implementation of the law by the challenge made to
the provisions of Chapter III-B before the High Court a nd
the interim-orders of the High Court staying the operati on
of the law, Government had had to re-notify 1.4.1966 as t he
fresh notified-date, after the challenge to the validity of
Chapter III-B had been repelled by the High Court.
By the time, the ’1973 Act’ was brought into for ce
disputes touching the determination of the ceiling areas in
33,471 cases had come to be decided in accordance with t he
provisions of Chapter III-B of the earlier ’1955 Act’. Aft er
the ’1973 Act’ came into force on 1.1. 1973, some 8,4 94
cases for the determination of ’ceiling-areas’ under III -B
of the ’1955 Act’ came to be initiated and were sought to be
continued under said Chapter III-B of the repealed ’19 55
Act’ on the view that the repeal of Chapter III-B of t he
1955 Act by the 1973 Act’ did not affect the rights accru ed
and liabilities incurred under the old law. Appellant s’
principal contention is that after the coming into force of
the 1973 Act which, by its 40th Section, repealed Chapt er
III-B of the ’ 1955 Act’, recourse could not be had to t he
repealed-law for purposes of commencement, conduct a nd
conclusion of any proceedings for fixation of ceiling as
prescribed under the old law. This contention has be en
repelled by the full bench of the High Court in the judgme nt
under appeal. The correctness of view of the full ben ch
arises for consideration in these appeals.
3. The factual antecedents in which the controver sy
arose before the High Court may be illustrated by the fac ts
of one of the appeals. In CA 1003(N) of 1977, the appe l-
lants’ claim to have entered into possession and cultivati on
of certain parcels of land pursuant to alleged agreements to
sell dated 28.4.1957 said to have been executed in the ir
favour by the then land-holder, a certain Sri Hari Sing h.
The sale deeds were passed only on 22.8.1966, after t he
notified-date. Proceed-
158
ings for the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of S ri
Hari Singh were commenced under the Repealed Chapter III -B
of the ’1955 Act’. Appellants’ pruchases were held to be h it
by Section 30 DD of the said Chapter III-B, which prescrib ed
certain residential qualifications, which appellants did n ot
possess, for the eligibility for recognition of such tran s-
fers. Appellants’ contention is that if the new law had be en
applied to the case of the vendor, the transfers in the ir
favour would have been held valid and that invoking of
Chapter III-B of the repealed law was impermissible. Apa rt
from the facts of individual cases and their particulariti es
the basic question is one of construction-whether the prov i-
sions of the old law are saved and survive to govern pendi ng
cases.
4. We have heard Sri A.K. Sen, Sri Tarkunde and S ri
Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocates for the appellan ts
and Sri Lodha, learned Senior Advocate for the State of
Rajasthan and its authorities. The appellant’s princip al
contention--which we perceive as one of construction of
statutes--is that the later law made manifest, expressly a nd
by necessary implication, an intention inconsistent with t he
continuance of the rights and obligations under the repeal ed
law and that, accordingly, after 1.1.1973, the date of
coming into force of the ’1973 Act’, no proceedings und er
the old law could be initiated or continued.
5. The points that fall for consideration in the se
appeals are whether:
(a) the scheme contemplated by and the different criter ia
and standards for the determination of "ceiling-area" envi s-
aged in the ’1973 Act’ and, in particular, having regard to
the limited scope of the saving-provision of Section 40
thereof which, quite significantly, omits to invoke a nd
attract Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act 19 55
to the Repeal of Section 5(6A) and Chapter III-B of t he
’1955 Act’ must be construed and held to manifest an inte n-
tion contrary to and inconsistent with the keeping alive or
saving of the repealed law so as to be invoked in relati on
to and applied for the pending cases which had not be en
concluded under the old law before the repeal; and
(b) that, at all events, even if Section 6 of the Rajasth an
General Clauses Act 1955 was attracted and the old law w as
saved for the purpose, provisions of the old-law could n ot
be invoked as no right had been ,"accrued" in favour of
159
the State in relation to the surplus-area determinable und er
the old law nor any liability "incurred" by the land-holde rs
under the old law so as to support the initiation of t he
proceedings for fixation of ’Ceiling-area’ under the old-l aw
after its repeal.
6. Re: Contentions (a)
In order that this contention, which is presented wi th
some perspicuity, is apprehended in its proper prospective a
conspectus of the essential provisions of the earlier l aw
and later law pertaining to prescription of ceiling on
agricultural holdings is necessary.
In 1955, The Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 was enacted. By
the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, for the first tim e,
provisions in Chapter III-B prescribing a ceiling on hol d-
ings of agricultural lands got introduced into the ’19 55
Act’. This amending Act of 1960 received Presidential asse nt
on 12th March 1960. The Chapter III-B was, by an appropria te
notification, brought into force with effect from 15 th
December, 1963. The notified-date, under the ’1955 Act’, as
stated earlier, was 1.4.1965.
Section 5(6A) of the’ 1955 Act’ defined ’Ceiling-area’.
" "Ceiling area" in relation to land held anywhe re
throughout the State by a person in any capacity whatsoeve r,
shall mean the maximum area of land that may be fixed as
ceiling area under section 30C in relation to such person; "
Section 30B in Chapter III-B provided:
"30. B. Definitions--For the purposes of this Chapter--
(a) "family" shall mean a family consisting of a
husband and wife, their children and grand-children bei ng
dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so
dependent, and
(b) "person" in the case of an individual, sha ll
include the family of such individual."
Section 30C providing for the extent of ceiling area said:
160
"30C. Extent of ceiling area--
The ceiling area for a family consisting of five or le ss
than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land;
Provided that, where the members of a family exce ed
five, the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be i n-
creased for each additional member by five standard acre s,
so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of
land.
Explanation--A ’standard acre’ shall mean the ar ea
of land which, with reference to its productive capacit y,
situation, soil classification and other prescribed partic u-
lars, is found in the prescribed manner to be likely to
yield ten maunds of wheat yearly; and in case of land n ot
capable of producing wheat, the other likely produce there of
shall, for the purpose of calculating a standard acre, be
determined according to the prescribed scale so as to be
equivalent in terms of money value to ten maunds of wheat:
Provided that, in determining a ceiling area in
terms of standard acres. the money value of the produce of
wellirrigated (chahi) land shall be taken is being equiv a-
lent to the money value of the produce of an equal area of
un-irrigated (barani) land."
In exercise of the Rule making powers under the ’1955 Act ’,
the State Government framed and promulgated The Rajasth an
Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Government Rule s,
1963, which came into force on and with effect fr om
15.12.1963. Rule 9 required that in order to enable t he
Sub-Divisional Officer to determine the ceiling area a p-
plicable to every person under Section 30C of the Act and to
enforce the provisions of Section 30E, every land-holder a nd
tenant in possession of lands, in excess of the ceiling ar ea
applicable to him, shall file a declaration within si x-
months from the notified-date. The law fixed 30 standa rd
acres as the ceiling area. Thereafter, successive amendmen ts
were made to Chapter III-B of the ’1955 Act’ which, whi le
maintaining the ceiling at 30 standard acres, howeve r,
recognised certain transfers effected after 1958, which we re
not originally so recognised in fixing the ceiling. Aga in
(by an amendment) of the year 1970, Section 30 (1) w as
deleted. The 1955 Act itself came to be included in the IX
Schedule to the Constitution by a Parliamentary law. T he
challenge to
161
said inclusion was repelled by this Court.
7. On 1.1.1973, the Governor of the State of Rajasth an
promulgated The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agrilcu l-
tural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 under Article 213 of t he
Constitution of India. The Ordinance repealed the corr e-
sponding provisions relating to ceiling on agricultur al
holdings contained in Section 5(6A) and Chapter III-B of t he
’1955 Act’ except to the extent indicated in the Seco nd
proviso to Section 4(1) and Section 15(2) of the said Ord i-
nance. The Ordinance brought into existence a new concept of
and standards for the "ceilingarea". Certain transfers ma de
by the land-holders even during the operation of the old l aw
were recognised as valid transfers for purposes of comput a-
tion of ceiling area under the new dispensation broug ht
about by the Ordinance. This Ordinance was replaced by t he
1973 Act which was made operative retrospectively fr om
1.1.1973 being the date of promulgation of the Ordinanc e.
Section 40 of the ’1973 Act’ repealed, as did the predece s-
sor-Ordinance, both the old law in Chapter III-B of t he
’1955 Act’ and the earlier Ordinance for which it substitu t-
ed.
Section 3, Section 4(1), Second Proviso and Section 40
of the 1973 Act require particular notice.
Section 3 provides:
"3. Act to override other laws, contracts, etc.--
The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstandi ng
anything inconsistent contained in any other law for t he
time being in force, on any custom, usage or contract or
decree or order of a court or other authority."
The Second Proviso to the Explanation appended to Se c-
tion 4(1) of the Act says:
"Provided further that if the ceiling area applicable to a ny
person or family in accordance with this section exceeds t he
ceiling area applicable to such person or family accordi ng
to the provisions of law repealed by section 40, in th at
case the ceiling area applicable to such person or fami ly
will be the same as was under the provisions of the sa id
repealed law."
162
Section 40 provides:
"40. Repeal and savings--(1) Except as provided in seco nd
proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and in subsecti on
(2) of Section 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause (6 A)
of section 5 and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,
2955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 2955) are hereby repealed except in
the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisio ns
shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act com es
into force in that area.
(2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricu l-
tural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance-I of
1973) is hereby repealed.
(3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ord i-
nance under sub-section (2), anything done or any acti on
taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be
deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act a nd
section 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 29 55
(Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal a nd
re-enactment. "
Section 41 contains a statutory declaration that t he
’Act’ is for giving effect to the directive principles of
State policy towards securing the principles specified in
Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India.
8. Appellants’ learned counsel contend that when the re
is a repeal of a statute followed by a re-enactment of a n ew
law on the same subject, with or without modification s,
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not attracted a nd
the question as to the extent to which the repealed law is
saved would be dependent upon the express provisions of t he
later statute or what must be held to be its necessary a nd
completing implications. It was urged that where the repe al
is accompanied by a afresh Legislation on the same subjec t,
the new law alone will determine if, and how far, the o ld
law is saved and that in the absence of an express appeal to
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or of express prov i-
sions to similar effect in the new law itself, the prov i-
sions of the old law must be held to have been effac ed
except whatever had been done, or having effect as if don e.
This argument has the familiar ring of what Sulaiman, C J.
had said on the matter in Rashid Ahmad v. Mt. Anis Fatima &
Ors., AIR 1933 All. 3. But it
163
must now be taken to be settled that the mere absence of an
express reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is
not conclusive, unless such omission to invoke Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act is attended with the circumstan ce
that the provisions of the new-law evince and make manife st
an intention contrary to what would, otherwise, follow by
the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, t he
incidents and consequences of Section 6 would follow.
9. Appellants’ learned counsel submitted that the legi s-
lation in question pertaining, as it did, to the topic of
agrarian reform was attendant with the difficulties natura l-
ly besetting a task so inextricably intermixed with compl ex
and diverse and, indeed, often conflicting socio-econom ic
interests had had to go through stages of empirical evol u-
tion and that having regard to the wide-diversity of
policy-options manifest between the earlier and the lat er
legislations, the conclusion becomes inescapable that t he
later legislation, made manifest an intention inconsiste nt
with and contrary to the continuance of the rights a nd
obligations under the repealed law. It was agreed that wi th
the experience gained in the implementation of the policy of
agrarian reforms embodied in the repealed law, the n ew
policy-considerations--reflected in the new and basical ly
different thinking on some of the vital components of t he
new-policy--were evolved and incorporated in the new law, so
much so that the repealed and repealing laws represented t wo
entirely different systems and approaches to the policy of
agrarian reforms and the two systems, with their mark ed
differences on basic and essential criteria underlying the ir
policies, could not co-exist. It was urged that the stat e-
ment of objects and reasons appended to the 1973 Bill reco g-
nised that the legislative policy and technique underlyi ng
the old law were ineffective in removing the great dispari ty
that persisted in the holdings of agricultural lands or in
diluting the concentration of agricultural wealth in t he
hands of a few and recognised the necessity "to reduce su ch
disparity and to re-fix the ceiling area on the agricultur al
holdings so that agricultural land may be available f or
distribution to land-less persons". It was pointed out th at
material criteria relevant to the effectuation of the ne w-
policy made manifest an intention contrary to the surviv al
of the policy under the old law. The wide changes in t he
policy of the later law which reflected a new and basical ly
different approach to the matter, included (i) a fundament al
rethinking on the concept of the "ceilling-area" by reduci ng
the 30 standard acres prescribed in the old law to 18 stan d-
ard acres; (ii) the re-definition of the very concept of
’family’ and ’separate unit’; (iii) the point of time wi th
reference to which the composition and strength of t he
family would require to be ascertained; (iv) a re-
164
thinking, and a fresh policy as to the recognition of tran s-
fers made by land-holders including even those transfe rs
made during the period of operation of the old law; (v) t he
point of time of the vesting of the surplus land in Gover n-
ment; (vi) the re-defining of the principles and prioriti es
guiding the distribution of the surplus land to landle ss
persons, and (vii) the amount to be paid to the land holde rs
for the excess land vesting in the State under the new law .
It was submitted that the two laws--the old and t he
new-envisaged two totally different sets of values a nd
policies and were so disparate in their context and effe ct
as to yield the inevitable inference that the policy a nd
scheme of the later law, by reason alone of the peculiar i-
ties and distinction of its prescriptions, should be held to
manifest an intention contrary to the saving of the old l aw
even respective pending cases. The ceiling laws, it w as
submitted, envisage and provide an integrated and inte r-
connected set of provisions and the marked distinctions in
the vital provisions in the two sets of laws rendered t he
continued applicability of the old law to any case, n ot
already finally concluded thereunder, as impermissible in
law as unreasonable in its consequences if permitted. It w as
urged that Section 3 of the 1973 Act was a clinching indic a-
tor in this behalf when it provided that the provisions of
the later law "shall have effect notwithstanding anythi ng
inconsistent contained in any other law for the time bei ng
in force, or any custom, usage, or contract or decree or
order of a Court or other authority" (underlining supplie d)
and that the old Act, even if it was, otherwise, held to be
in force in relation to pending cases, was clearly ove r-
borne by Section 3 of the new law.
When there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by r e-
enactment of a law on the same subject, the provisions of
the new enactment would have to be looked into not for t he
purpose of ascertaining whether the consequences envisag ed
by Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not--Sec. 6
would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation man i-
fests a contrary intention--but only for the purpose of
determining whether the provisions in the new statute ind i-
cate a different intention. Referring to the way in whi ch
such incompatibility with the preservation of old rights a nd
liabilities is to be ascertained this Court in State of
Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 893 said:
" ....... Such incompatibility would have to be
ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant prov i-
sions of the new Law and the mere absence of a saving
clause is by itself not material. The provision of Sec. 6 of
165
the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal ev en
if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary inte n-
tion can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, t he
consequences laid down in Section 6 of the Act will app ly
only when a statute or regulation having the force of a
statute is actually repealed" ....
Addressing itself to the question whether, having rega rd
to the particular provisions of the 1973 Act, the inferen ce
that the new law manifests such contrary intention cou ld
justifiably be drawn, the High Court observed:
"We have, therefore, to examine whether the n ew
law expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wi pe
out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which h ad
accrued and incurred under the old law ...... "
"Having carefully gone through all the authoriti es
cited by the parties as referred to above, we are of opini on
that the new Act of 1973 does not have the sweeping effe ct
of destroying all the rights accrued and liabilities i n-
curred under the old law ....... "
10. One of the indicia that the old law was not effac ed
is in sec. 15(2) of the new Act. It provides that if t he
State Government was satisfied that the ’ceiling-area’ in
relation to a person as fixed under the old-law had be en
determined in contravention of that law, a decided ca se
could be re-opened and inquired into it and the ’ceilin g-
area’ and the ’surplus area’ determined afresh in accordan ce
with the provisions of the old law. Another indicium is in
Sec. 40(1) read with the Second Proviso to Sec. 4(1) o f’
1973 Act’ which provides that if the ceiling area applicab le
to a person or a family in accordance with the said Se c.
4(1) exceeds the ’ceiling-area’ applicable to such perso ns
or family, under the old law, then, the ’ceiling-are a’
applicable to such person or family would be the same as w as
provided under the provisions of the old law.
The High Court relied upon and drew sustenance for i ts
conclusion from, what it called, the internal evidence in
the Act which, according to the High Court, indicated th at
pending-cases were governed only by the old law. The Hi gh
Court referred to sec. 15(2) inserted by Act No. 8 of 19 76
and what, according to it, necessarily flowed from it in
support of its conclusion. Sec. 15(2) inserted by Act No. 8
of 1976
166
"(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that m ay
be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 19 55
(Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955), if the State Government, aft er
calling for the record or otherwise, is satisfied that a ny
final order passed in any matter arising under the prov i-
sions repealed by Section 40, is in contravention of su ch
repealed provisions and that such order is prejudicial to
the State Government or that on account of the discovery of
new and important matter or evidence which has since come to
its notice, such order is required to be re-opened, it ma y,
at any time within five years of the commencement of th is
Act, direct any officer subordinate to it to re-open su ch
decided matter and to decide it afresh in accordance wi th
such repealed provisions."
(Emphasis Supplied)
The High Court referring to the opening words of t he
above provisions observed:
"The opening words of the section ’without prejudice to a ny
other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasth an
Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955)’, clearly show th at
the pending cases have to be governed by the old law. If
transactions past and closed have to be reopened and decid ed
afresh under the provisions of the repealed law, and t he
ceiling area under Chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,
1955, has to be fixed under its repealed provisions, then it
must follow as a necessary corollary, that the pending cas es
must be decided under the old law."
11. Sri Lodha, learned counsel for the State of Raja s-
than submitted that the ’ceiling-area’ had to be fixed wi th
reference to the notified date i.e. 1.4.1966 by the statut o-
ry standards prescribed under the Chapter III-B of the ’19 55
Act’. The two legislations are complementary to each oth er
and constitute two tier provisions. So far as the cases th at
attracted and fell within Chapter III-B of 1955 Act, as on
1.4.1966, would continue to be governed by that law as t he
fights and obligations created by the said Chapter III -B
amounted to create rights and incur liabilities. Shir Lod ha
submitted that the view taken by the High Court was unexce p-
tionable.
12.. On a careful consideration of the matter, we are i n-
clined to
167
agree with the view taken by the High Court on the poin t.
The reliance placed by appellants’ learned counsel on t he
provisions of Sec. 3 of 1973 Act as detracting from t he
tenability of the conclusion reached by the High Court on
the point is, in our opinion, somewhat tenuous. The conte n-
tion of the learned counsel is that the expression "notwit h-
standing anything inconsistent contained in any other l aw
for the time being in force" in Section 3 of the 1973 A ct
would exclude the operation of Chapter III-B of the ’19 55
Act’ which, according to the contention, even if kept ali ve
would yet be a ’law for the time being in force’ and, ther e-
fore, be excluded by virtue of Section 3. This contenti on
has been negatived by the High Court--and in our opini on
rightly--by placing reliance on the pronouncements of th is
Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. The State of
Vindhya Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188 and’ Chief Inspector of
Mines v. K.C. Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838. The High Court he ld
that the expression "law for the time being in force" do es
not take within its sweep a law ’deemed to be in force’ a nd
that, accordingly, the opening words of Sec. 3 relied up on
by the Appellants’ learned counsel will not have an overri d-
ing effect so as to exclude the old law.
13. A saving provision in a repealing statute is n ot
exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or t he
rights that survive the repeal. It is observed by this Cou rt
in 1.T. Commissioner, U.P. v. Shah Sadiq & Sons, AIR 1987 SC
1217 at 1221:
" ....... In other words whatever rights a re
expressly saved by the ’savings’ provision stand saved. Bu t,
that does not mean that rights which are not saved by t he
’savings’ provision are extinguished or stand ipso fac to
terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing t he
old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are sav ed
unless they are taken away expressly. This is the princip le
behind Sec. 6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897 ...... "
We agree with the High Court that the scheme of the 1973 A ct
does not manifest an intention contrary to, and inconsiste nt
with, the saving of the repealed provisions of sec. 5(6 A)
and Chapter III-B of ’1955 Act’ so far as pending cases a re
concerned and that the rights accrued and liabilities i n-
curred under the old law are not effaced. Appellant’s co n-
tention (a) is, in our opinion, insubstantial.
14. Re: Contention(b):
This takes us to the next question whether in the prese nt
cases
168
even if the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Gener al
Clauses Act, 1955, are, attracted, the present cases did n ot
involve any rights "accrued" or obligations "incurred" so as
to attract the old law to them to support initiation or
continuation of the proceedings against the land-holde rs
after the repeal. It was contended that even if the prov i-
sions of the old Act were held to have been saved it cou ld
not be said that there was any right accrued in favour of
the State or any liability incurred by the land holders in
the matter of determination of the ’ceiling-area’ so as to
attract to their cases the provisions of the old law. T he
point’ emphasised by the learned counsel is that the exces s-
land would vest in the State only after the completion of
the proceedings and upon the land-holder signifying h is
choice as to the identify of the land to be surrendere d.
Clauses (c) and (e) of Sec. 6 of the Rajashtan Gener al
Clauses Act, 1955, provide, respectively, that the repeal of
an enactment shall not, unless a different intention a p-
pears, "affect any right privilege, obligation, or liabil i-
ty, acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so
repealed" or "affect any investigation. legal proceeding or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligatio n,
liability, fine, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as
aforesaid."
For purposes of these clauses the "right" must be
"accrued" and not merely an inchoate one. The distincti on
between what is and what is not a right preserved by Secti on
6 of the General Clauses Act, it is said, is often one of
great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal is a rig ht
’acquired’ or ’accrued’ under the repealed statute and n ot
"a mere hope or expectation" of acquiring a right or liber ty
to apply for a right.
In Lalji Raja v. Firm Hansraj, [1971] 3 SCR 815 th is
Court dealing with the distinction between the "abstra ct
rights" and "specific rights" for the purpose of the oper a-
tion of Sec. 6 of General Clauses Act said:
"That a provision to preserve the right accru ed
under a repealed Act ’was not intended to preserve t he
abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act ...... It
only applied to specific rights given to an individual up on
happening of one or the other of the events specified in
statute’--See Lord Atkin’s observations in Hamilton Gell v.
White, [1922] 2 K.B. 422. The mere right, existed at t he
date of repealing statute, to take advantage of provisio ns
of the statute repealed is not a ’right accrued’ within t he
meaning
169
of the usual saving clause--see Abbot v. Minister for Land s,
[1895] A.C. 425 and G. Ogden Industries pry. Ltd. v. Luca s,
[1969] 1 All E.R. 121"
15. To ascertain whether these were ’accrued’ rights a nd
’incurred’ liabilities a reference Section 30E of the r e-
pealed law is necessary.
Sec. 30-E of 1955 Act provides:
"30-E. Maximum land that can be held and restri c-
tion on future acquisitions:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this A ct
or in any other law for the time being in force, no pers on
shaH, as from a date notified by the State Government in
this behalf:--
(a) Continue to hold or retain in his possessi on
in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in
excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or
(b) acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage, assig n-
ment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or
bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the exte nt
of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him;
Provided that different dated may be so notifi ed
for different areas of the State.
(2) Every person, who, on such date, is in posse s-
sion of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to h im
or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by
acquisition under clause (b) of sub-section (1), shal l,
within six months of such date or within three months of
acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of su ch
possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender su ch
excess land to the State Government and place it at t he
disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of who se
jurisdiction such land is situate.
........... (Omitted as unnecessary)
170
(3) Any person failing intentionally to make a
report or to surrender land as required by sub-section ( 2)
shall, on conviction, be punishable with a fine which m ay
extend to one thousand rupees.
(4) Without prejudice and in addition to su ch
conviction and fine the person retaining possession of a ny
land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him sha ll
be deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from su ch
excess land and to pay penalty in accordance with clause ( a)
of sub-section (i) of section 183;
Provided that the lands, from which a person sha ll
be so ejected shaH, as for as may be, un-encumbered lands.
(5) All lands coming to the State Government by
surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under su b-
section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumberances.
......... (Omitted as unnecessary)"
The rights. and obligations under this provision had h ad
to be determined with reference to the notified date i. e.
1.4.1966. Referring to analogous provision of the Maharas h-
tra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, th is
Court in Raghunath v. Maharashtra, [1972] 1 SCR 48 at 57
observed:
"The scheme of the Act seems to be to determine t he
ceiling area of each person (including a family) with refe r-
ence to the appointed day. The policy of the Act appears to
be that on and after the appointed day no person in t he
State should be permitted to hold any land in excess of t he
ceiling area as determined under the Act and that ceili ng
area would be that which is determined as on the appoint ed
day..."
16. Again in Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by LRs. &
Ors. v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed & Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 2 18
at 228, it was observed:
"A close reading of the aforesaid provisions of
the Act shows that the determination of the extent of su r-
plus land of a holder has to be made as on the appoint ed
day. If
171
any person has at any time after the fourth day of Augus t,
1959, but before the appointed day held any land (includi ng
any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area, su ch
person should file a return within the prescribed peri od
from the appointed day furnishing to each of the Collecto rs
within whose jurisdiction any land in his holding is situa t-
ed, in the form prescribed containing the particulars of a ll
land held by him. If any person acquires, holds or com es
into possession of any land including any exempted land in
excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed da y,
such person has to furnish a return as stated above with in
the prescribed period from the date of taking possession of
any land in excess of the ceiling area ............ "
A contention similar to the one urged for the appellan ts
here that the title respecting the surplus land would ve st
in the Government upon such land being taken possession of
by Government after the declaration regarding the surpl us
was noticed in that case. But, it was held that the liabil i-
ty to surrender the surplus land would date back to t he
appointed day. This Court said:
" ...... Any other construction would make t he
Act unworkable and the determination of the extent of su r-
plus land of a holder ambulatory and indefinite ...... "
This was again reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. Ann a-
purnabai and Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 273 at 275. This Cou rt
said:
" .... Section 21 of the Act no doubt states that t he
title of the holder of the surplus land would become vest ed
in the State Government only on such land being taken po s-
session of after a declaration regarding the surplus land is
published in Official Gazette. But the liability to surre n-
der the surplus land relates back to the appointed day in
case of those who held land in excess of the ceiling on t he
appointed day. Therefore, even if the holder dies befo re
declaration of any part of his land as surplus land, t he
surplus land is liable to be determined with reference to
his holding on the appointed day .... "
17. It is, therefore, seen that the right of the Sta te
to take over excess land vested in it as on the appoint ed
day and only the quantification remained to be worked ou t.
As observed by Lord Morris, in
172
Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, [1961] 2 All. E. R.
721.
"It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment, a
right has been given, but that, in respect of it, so me
investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is
then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if
a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a
manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of
a right and an investigation which is to decide whether so me
right should be or should not be given. On a repeal t he
former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is
not."
The above passage was referred to with approval in M. S.
Shivananda v. K.S.R.T. Corpn., AIR 1980 SC 77 at 81.
18. We agree with the High Court that the right of t he
State to the excess land was not merely an inchoate rig ht
under the Act, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of
sec. 6 (c) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, a nd
the liability of the land-owner to surrender the excess la nd
as on 1.4.1986 was a liability "incurred" also within t he
meaning of the said provision. There is no substance in
contention (b) either.
19. These Appeals, Special Leave Petitions and t he
WritPetition, accordingly, fail and are dismissed. In t he
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to
costs.
N.P.V. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.
1 ?173