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CaseMinister › Judgments › Supreme Court › 1976 › Ashfaq v. State (govt of NCT of Delhi)

Ashfaq v. State (govt of NCT of Delhi)

Supreme Court of India · 10 September 1976

Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
10 September 1976
Case no.
Crl.A. No. 1296 of 2002
Bench
Bhagwati, P.N.
Length
10 pages
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PETITIONER:
MOHD-ASHFAQ
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL U.P. AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/09/1976
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2161 1977 SCR (1) 563
1976 SCC (4) 330

ACT

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939---S. 58(2) proviso--Delay in apply-

ing for renewal of existing permit--If could be

condoned--Chapter IV A. -- If a delf contained code--Renew-

al application under S. 68F(1D)Whether s.57 applicable.

Limitation Act, 1963--Ss. 5 and 29(2)--If applicable.

HEADNOTE

Under the proviso to s. 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1939 an application for renewal of an existing permit shall

be made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry of

the permit. The procedure to be followed in this respect is

the same as provided in s. 57 for the grant of a fresh

permit. Under s. 58(3) a delay of not more than 15 days in

making the renewal application can be condoned by the Re-

gional Transport Authority.

The proviso to s. 68F(1D) provides for the renewal of an

existing permit for a limited period when a Scheme is pub-

lished under s. 68C. Since a Scheme was published under

this section the appellant made an application under s.

68F(1D) for renewal of his permit. R was rejected by the

RTA on the ground that there was delay of 18 days which was

not capable of being condoned. The Transport Appellate

Tribunal dismissed his appeal and the High Court summarily

rejected his writ petition.

In appeal to this Court it was contended that (i) Chapter

IVA of the Act, which s. 68 occurs, being a self-contained

code the proviso to s. 58(2) was not applicable in the case

of an application for renewal filed under the proviso to s.

68F(1D) or (ii) in the alternative the delay could be con-

doned by the RTA for sufficient cause under s. 5 read with

s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD: (1) (a) Section 68F(1D) imposes a prohibition on

grant or renewal of permit during the intervening period

between the publication of a scheme under s. 68C and the

publication of the approved scheme and if the proviso were

not enacted. renewal of an existing permit expiring after

the publication of the scheme under s. 68C would have been

barred. This, the legislature did not want and hence the

proviso was introduced permitting renewal of an existing

permit though for a limited period, despite the general

prohibition enacted in sub-s. (1D). This renewal was not

intended to be some special kind of renewal. There is no

reason why the provisions of s. 57 and the proviso to s.

58(2) should not apply in case of a renewal application

under the proviso to s. 68F(1D).[569 A-B]

(b) chapter IVA is not a self-contained code and the

other sections apply to an application under the proviso to

s. 68F(1D)of the Act. [569D]

(i) The procedure in s. 57 applies because. there is no

other procedure prescribed by the Act. [569C]

(ii) The time limit specified in the proviso to s. 58(2)

also applied as otherwise there would be no time limit for

making an application for renewal.[569D]

(iii) Section 68F(3) also proceeds on the assumption

that, but for its enactment, an order made by the RTA under

sub˜3 (1) or (2) of s. 68F would have been appealable under

s. 64 and it was to exclude the applicability of s. 64 that

68F(3) was enacted. [569 E-F]

564

(2) The word used in sub-s. 3 is ’may’ and not ’shall’

and the RTA is given a discretion to entertain an applica-

tion for renewal of a permit even where it is beyond time,

though not more than 15 days. It could never have been the

intention of the legislature that even where there is no

sufficient cause for delay in making an application for

renewal, the Regional Transport Authority should still be

bound to entertain the application for renewal merely on the

ground that the delay is of not more than 15 days. [570F.

571A-B]

3 (a) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes s.

5 applicable in the ease of an application for renewal

unless its applicability can be said to be expressly exclud-

ed by any provision of the Act. Sub-section (3) of s. 58 in

so many terms says that the RTA .may condone the delay in

making of an application for renewal and entertain it on

merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This

clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond

time by more than 15 days, the RTA shall not be entitled to

entetain it.

[571E-G]

(b) There is an express provision in sub-s. (3) that

delay in making an application for renewal shall be condona-

ble only if it is of not more than 15 days and that express-

ly excludes the applicability of s. 5 in cases where an

application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days.

[571G]

JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 871 of 1974.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 3-4-1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.

Writ Petition No. 2128/73).

Yogeshwar Prasad and Miss Rani Arora for M/S Bagga for

the Appellant.

G.N. Dikshit and O.P. Ran, for Respondents No. 1 and 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed

against an order passed by the High Court of Allahabad

rejecting a writ petition filed by the appellant challenging

the validity of an order of the State Transport Appellate

Tribunal confirming an order of the Regional Transport

Authority rejecting the application of the appellant for

renewal of his stage carriage permit for the route Nagina-

Jaspur.

The route Nagina-Jaspur lies within the jurisdiction of

the Regional Transport Authority Bareilly. The appellant and

his brother Mohd. Ashfaq held a stage carriage permit for

this route for some years and it was due to expire on 1st

July, 1971. Before the expiration of the period of permit,

however, a scheme was prepared and published by the State

Transport Undertaking under Section 68C of the Motor

Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’)

and this scheme covered the route Nagina-Jaspur. The

publication of this scheme did not affect the validity of

the permit of the appellant and Mohd. Ashfaq and they

continued to ply their motor vehicles on the route Nagina-

Jaspur on the strength of the permit. During the currency

of the permit, several amendments of a far-reaching charac-

ter were made in the Act by Act 56 of 1969 and sub-sections

(1A) to (1D) were introduced in Section 68F after sub-sec-

tion (1). These sub-sections are material and they may be

reproduced as follows:

"68F(1A) Where any scheme has been published by a State

Transport Undertaking under section 68C, that Undertaking

may apply for a temporary permit. in respect of any

565

area or route or portion thereof specified in the said

scheme, for the period intervening between the date of

publication of the scheme and the date of publication of the

approved or modified scheme, and where such application is

made, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Trans-

port Authority, as the case may be, shall, if it is satis-

fied that it is necessary to increase, in the public inter-

est, the number of vehicles operating in such area or route

or portion thereof, issue the temporary permit prayed for by

the State Transport Undertaking.

(1B) A temporary permit issued in pursuance of the

provisions of sub-section (1A) shall be effective,--

(i) if the scheme is published under sub-section

(3) of section 68D, until the grant of the permit

to the State Transport Undertaking under sub-

section (1), or

(ii) if the scheme is not published under sub-

section (3) of section 68D, until the expiration of

the one week from the date on which the order under

sub-section (2) of section 68D is made.

(1C) If no application for a temporary

permit is made under sub-section (1A), the State

Transport Authority or the Regional Transport

Authority, as the case may be, may grant, subject

to such conditions as it may think fit, temporary

permit to any person in respect of the area or

route or portion thereof specified in the scheme

and the permit so granted shall cease to be effec-

tive on the issue of a permit to the State Trans-

port Undertaking in respect of that area or route

or portion thereof.

(1D) Save as otherwise provided in sub-

section (1A) of sub-section (1C), no permit shall

be granted or renewed during the period intervening

between the date of publication, under section 68C

of any scheme and the date of publication of the

approved or modified scheme, in favour of any

person for any class of road transport service in

relation to an area or route or portion thereof

covered by such scheme:

Provided that where the period of operation

of a permit in relation to any area, route or

portion thereof specified in a scheme published

under section 68C expires after such publication,

such permit may be renewed for a limited peri-

od, but the permit so renewed shall cease to be

effective on the publication of the scheme under

sub-section (3) of section 68D."

Since the permit of the appellant and Mohd. Ashfaq was going

to expire on 1st July, 1971, the appellant made an applica-

tion for renewal of the permit under the proviso to sub-

section (1D) of Section 68F and submitted the application to

the Regional Transport Authority on 22nd March, 1971. When

the application came up for hearing before the

566

Regional Transport Authority, there was admittedly no objec-

tor against it, but the Regional Transport Authority took

the view that under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Sec-

tion 58 an application for renewal of a permit is required

to be made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry

of the permit and even if there is delay in making the

application, it can be condoned under sub-section (3) of

Section 58 but only if it is a delay of not more than 15

days and since in the present case the application for

renewal of the permit was made by the appellant on 22nd

March, 1971, it was late by 18 days and hence the delay was

not capable of being condoned and in this view, the

Regional Transport Authority by an order dated 28th March,

1973 rejected the application for renewal of the permit as

time-barred.

The appellant preferred an appeal to the State Transport

Appellate Tribunal and in the appeal the appellant chal-

lenged the correctness of the order of the Regional Trans-

port Authority. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal,

however, agreed with the view taken by the Regional

Transport Authority and held that in view of the specific

prohibition contained in sub-section (3) read with the

proviso to subsection (2) of Section 58 it was not competent

to the Regional Transport Authority to condone the delay in

making of the application for renewal of the permit, since

the delay was of more than 15 days. The State Transport

Appellate Tribunal also observed that in any event the

material produced before the Regional Transport Authority

did not make out any sufficient cause for not making the

application for renewal of the permit within time and hence

even if there was no statutory bar against condonation of

delay of more than 15 days, this was not a fit case in which

the delay should be condoned. The State Transport Appellate

Tribunal accordingly confirmed the order of the Regional

Transport Authority.

This led to the filing of a writ petition by the appel-

lant in the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court sum-

marily rejected the writ petition stating that no ground

had been made out for exercise of the extraordinary juris-

diction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu-

tion. Hence the appellant brought the present appeal with

special leave obtained from this Court.

Two contentions were urged on behalf of the appellant in

support of the appeal. The first contention was that the

time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) of

section 58 was not applicable in case of an application for

renewal of a permit under the proviso to subsection (10) of

section 68F and the Regional Transport Authority was not

entitled to reject the application of the appellant for

renewal of his permit as time-barred. It has also been

contended in the alternative that even if the time limit set

out in to proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 was

applicable, sub-section (3) extended such time limit by

fifteen days and even if thereafter there was any delay

beyond the extended time limit, it could be condoned by the

Regional Transport Authority for sufficient cause by reason

of section 5 read with section 29, subsection (2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963. The second contention Which followed

on the acceptance of the last contention was that the

appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appli-

cation for renewal

567

of his permit within the extended time limit and hence the

Regional Transport Authority should have condoned the delay

and entertained the application on merits. The validity of

both these contentions was disputed on behalf of respondents

1 and 2 and it was urged that the time limit specified in

the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 was applicable

in the present case and the only delay which could be con-

doned was a delay of 15 days and not more and in any event,

there was no sufficient cause made out by the appellant for

not making the application for renewal within time and hence

the application for renewal was rightly rejected as time-

barred. We shall proceed to consider the merits of these

rival contentions.

The first question which arises for consideration on

these contentions is as to whether the time limit pre-

scribed by the proviso to subsection (2) of section 58

applies in case of an application for renewal of a permit

under the proviso to sub-section (10) of section 68F. The

argument of the appellant was that Chapter IVA which

contains, inter alia, section 68F, is a self-contained

Chapter and nothing in the other provisions of the Act

applies to proceedings under that Chapter and hence neither

the procedure under section 57 nor the time limit specified

in the proviso 10 sub-section (2) of section 58 has any

application to an application for renewal of a permit under

the proviso to sub-section (10) of section 68-F. This

argument is, in our opinion, manifestly wrong. The scheme

of Chapter IVA is clear and it does not exclude the applica-

bility of the provisions contained in section 57 and the

proviso to sub-section (2) of section 68. Chapter IVA

contains a fasciculus of sections commencing from section

68A and ending with section 68-B. Section 68-A defines

certain expressions used in Chapter IVA. Section 68-B gives

overriding effect to the provisions contained in Chapter IVA

by saying that these provisions shall have effect, notwith-

standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in

Chapter IV or in any other law for the time being in force.

Section 68-C provides that where any State Transport

Undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of provid-

ing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-

ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the

public interest that road transport service in relation to

any route should be run and operated by the State Transport

Undertaking, a scheme may be prepared by the S1ate Transport

Undertaking giving particulars of the nature of the services

proposed to be rendered, the route proposed to be covered

and other prescribed particulars and such scheme shall be

duly published. Certain categories of persons are empow-

ered by section 68-D sub-section (1) to file objections

against the scheme published under sect-ion 68-C and the

State Government may then, after considering such objections

and hearing the parties, approve or modify the scheme under

sub-section (2) of section 68-D. Section 68-D sub-section

(3) provides that the scheme as approved or modified under

sub-section (2) shall be Published in the Official

Gazette and it shall thereupon become final and shall be

called the approved scheme and the routes to which it

relates shall be called the notified routes. Section 68-E

provides for concellation or modification of the scheme.

Then follows section 68-F which is material for our purpose.

Sub-section (1) of that section provides for issue of a

permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of a

notified route

568

after publication of an approved scheme. But what is to

happen during the period between the publication of a

scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the ap-

proved scheme under sub-section (3) of section 68-D ? That

is taken care of by sub-sections (1A) to (1-D) of section

68F. Sub-section (1-A) provides that for this intervening

period, the State Transport Undertaking may apply for a

temporary permit in respect of a route specified in the

scheme and where such application is made, the Regional

Transport Authority shall, if it is satisfied that it is

necessary to increase, in the public interest, the number of

vehicles operating on such route, issue the temporary

permit prayed for by the State Transport Undertaking. What

shall be the duration of such temporary permit is laid down

in sub-section (1-B). Sub-section (1-C) deals with the

situation where no application for a temporary permit is

made by the State Transport Undertaking and it says that in

such a case, the Regional Transport Authority may grant

temporary permit to any person in respect of a route speci-

fied in the scheme. Sub-section (1-D) imposes a prohibi-

tion that "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1-A)

and sub-section (1-C), no permit shall be granted or renewed

during the period intervening between the date of publica-

tion under section 68-C of any scheme and the date of publi-

cation of the approved or modified scheme, in favour of

any person" in relation to a route covered by such scheme,

but this is subject to a proviso that where the period of

operation of a permit in relation to any route "specified in

a scheme published under section 68-C expires after such

publication, such permit may be renewed for a limited

period". It will, therefore, be seen that where a scheme

is published under section 68-C, no permit in respect of a

route specified in the scheme can be granted or renewed

during the intervening period between the publication of the

scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the

approved scheme, except a temporary permit to the State

Transport Undertaking under sub-section (1-A) or failing

that, a temporary permit to any other person under sub-

section (1-C), with this qualification that an existing

permit can be renewed for a limited period. The holder of

an existing permit would obviously exnecessitas have to

make an application, if he wants renewal of his permit

and the application for renewal would be considered by the

Regional Transport Authority. The question is: can this

application for renewal be made at any time and when it is

made, what procedure would govern it. Section 57 lays down

the procedure to be followed in dealing with an application

got grant of a permit and by reason of section 58 sub-sec-

tion (2), that procedure is applicable also in relation to

an application for renewal of a permit. There is also a time

limit laid down in the proviso to sub_section (2) of section

58 which says, in so far as relevant, that an application

for renewal of a .permit shall be made not less than 120

days before the date of expiry of the permit. These provi-

sions in section 57 and the proviso to sub-section (2) of

section 58 on their plain language apply to every applica-

tion for renewal of a permit and it is indeed difficult to

see what difference there is between an application for

renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (1-D)

of section 68-F and any other application for renewal of a

permit. An application for renewal of a permit under. the

proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F is as much an

application for renewal as any other. It had to be special-

ly provided for in the

569

proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F, because

sub-section (1-D) imposes a prohibition on grant or renewal

of permit during the intervening period between the publica-

tion of a scheme under section 68-C and the publication of

the approved scheme and, ii the proviso were not enacted,

renewal of an existing permit expiring after the publication

of the scheme under section 68-C would have been barred.

This, the Legislature did not want and hence the proviso was

introduced permitting renewal of an existing permit though

for a limited period, despite the general prohibition enact-

ed in sub-section (1-D). This renewal was not intended to be

sore6 special kind of renewal different from any other

ordinary renewal of a permit. There is, therefore, no

reason in principle why the provisions enacted in section 57

and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 should not

apply in case of an application for renewal of a permit

under the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F. If

the procedure set out in section 57 does not apply in such a

case, there is no other procedure prescribed by the Act

which can possibly be invoked and the result would be that

them would be no procedure for dealing with such an applica-

tion. for renewal and in that event, how would the objec-

tions be invited against the application for renewal and

within what time and who would be entitled to be heard and

when ? And equally if the time Limit specified in the

proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 does not apply,

there would be no time limit for making such an application

for renewal and it would be possible to make it any time,

even after the expiry of the period of the permit and the

Regional Transport Authority would be bound to consider it.

That surely could never have been the intention of the

Legislature. Moreover, it is implicit in the enactment of

section 68-B that Chapter IV-A is not a self-contained

Chapter to which the other provisions of the Act are inap-

plicable. If Chapter IVA were a self-contained Code by

itself, there would have been no need to give overriding

effect to the provisions in that Chapter as against the

other provisions of the Act. Section 68-F, sub-section (3)

also proceeds on the assumption that, but for its enactment,

an order made by the Regional Transport Authority under

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 68-F would

have been appealable under section 64 and it was to ex-

clude the applicability of section 64 that sub-section (3 )

of section 68-F was enacted. These two circumstances dearly

point to the conclusion that the other provisions of the

Act, to the extent to which their language warrants, apply

in relation to proceedings under Chapter IVA, save in so far

as they may be, expressly or by reason of repugnance or

inconsistency, overridden. We must, therefore, reject the

first contention of the appellant which seeks to exclude the

applicability of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section

58 to an application for renewal of a permit under the

proviso to subsection (1-D) of section 68-F.

That takes us to the next question as to the applicabil-

ity of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to an applica-

tion for renewal of a permit. It would be convenient at this

state to refer to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3)

of section 58, which, so far as material, read as follows:

"(2) A permit may be renewed on an application made

570

and disposed of as if it were an application for a

permit:

Provided that the application for the renew,d

of a permit shall be made--

(a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or a

public

carrier’s permit, not less than one hundred

and twenty

days before the date of its expiry; and

(b) in any other case, not less than sixty days

before the date of its expiry:

Provided further that, other conditions being

equal, an application for renewal shall be given

preference over new applications for permits.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the

first proviso to sub-section (2), the Regional

Transport Authority may entertain an application

for the renewal of a permit after the last date

specified in the said proviso for the making of

such an application, if the application is made not

more than fifteen days after the said last date and

is accompanied by the prescribed fee."

The proviso to sub-section (2) requires that an application

for renewal of a permit should be made not less than 120

days before the date of expiry of the permit. But, notwith-

standing this provision, the Regional Transport Authority

may, under sub-section (3), entertain an application for

renewal of a permit after the last date specified in subsec-

tion (2), "if the application is made not more than 15 days

after the said last date and is accompanied by the pre-

scribed fee." Sub-section (3) thus vests a discretion in the

Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for

renewal of a permit even if it is beyond time, but in that

case the delay should not be of more than fifteen days. The

word used in sub-section (3) is "may" and not "shall" and

the Regional Transport Authority is given a discretion to

entertain ,m application for renewal of a permit even where

it is beyond time, though not more than 15 days. It may

condone the delay or it may not, depending on the circum-

stances of each case. The discretion is be exercised not on

any arbitrary of fanciful grounds or whim or caprice of the

Regional Transport Authority, but it is to be a judicial

discretion. It is true that the criterion which is to

guide the Regional Transport Authority in the exercise of

its discretion is not articulated in sub-section (3), but it

is implicit in every conferment of discretion on a judicial

or quasi-judicial authority that the discretion is to be

exercised in a judicial manner on well settled legal prin-

ciples. would not be right to attribute to the Legislature

an intention to confer unguided and unfettered discretion on

the Regional Transport Authority which is quasi-judicial

authority. The discretion is obviously to be exercised

where sufficient cause for not making the application for

renewal within time is made out by the applicant. This

571

criterion can legitimately be imported from section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 which contains an allied provision for

condonation of delay where an application is made beyond

time. It could never have been the intention of the Legis-

lature that even where there is no sufficient cause for

delay in making an application for renewal, the Regional

Transport Authority should still be bound to entertain the

application for renewal merely, on the ground that the delay

is of not more than 15 days. Sub-section (3) enacts a

provision for condonation of delay in making an application

for renewal and not provision extending the time limit

specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) in all cases as

a matter of course. If the intention of the Legislature

were that in every case delay of not more than 15 days in

making an application for renewal should be condoned as of

course, there was no need for a separate provision in sub-

section (3), but the Legislature could have very specified

"one hundred and five days" instead of "one hundred and

twenty days" in the proviso to sub-section (2).

It is, therefore, dear that sub-section (3) of section

58 confers a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority

to entertain an application for renewal when it is made

beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-sec-

tion (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion

is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application

for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause

for not making it in time. Now the question which arises

is: does section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as

to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient

cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it

is delayed by more than 15 days? Section 29, sub-section (2)

of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes section 5 applicable in

the case of an application for renewal unless its applica-

bility can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision

of the Act. The only provision of the Act sought to be

pressed into service for this purpose was sub-section (3).

Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude further extension of

time under section 5 ? If it does, then section 5 cannot be

availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay.

Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that the Regional

Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an

application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided

the delay is of not more than 15 days. This clearly means

that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more

than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be

entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no

power to condone the delay. There is thus an express

provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an appli-

cation for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not

more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applica-

bility of section 5 in cases where an application for renew-

al is delayed by more than 15 days. This provision may seem

harsh, but it has been deliberately and advisedly made

because the question of renewal of a permit must obviously

be decided before the expiration of the period of the permit

and in view of the elaborate procedure set out in section 57

for dealing with an application for renewal, a certain

minimum period before the expira-

5--1234SCI/76

572

tion of the period of the permit must be provided within

which this procedure can be completed so that the, renewal

can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit

expires. If an application for renewal could be entertained

even if made at any stage, it would dislocate the procedural

machinery set out in section 57 and that is why the Legisla-

ture prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the

delay in making an application for renewal may be condoned

by the Regional Transport Authority only if it is of not

more than 15 days. Here, the application made by the appel-

lant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more

than 15 days and hence the delay was not condonable and the

Regional Transport Authority was right in rejecting the

application for renewal as time barred.

We must, in the circumstances, dismiss the appeal, but

in view of the peculiar facts of the case we make no order

as to costs.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

573

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