PETITIONER:
A.B.C. LAMINART PVT. LTD. & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
A.P. AGENCIES, SALEM
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/03/1989
BENCH:
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
OZA, G.L. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 1239 1989 SCR (2) 1
1989 SCC (2) 163 JT 1989 (2) 38
1989 SCALE (1)633
ACT
Sections 23 & 28---Indian Contract Act--Parties to
contract agree to submit dispute to the jurisdiction of a
particular court--Interpretation of clauses of such co n-
tract-Ouster clause II--Interpretation and constructi on
of--In particular:
Section 9--Civil Procedure Code-Civil court--Jurisdi c-
tion-Ouster of--Interpretation of clauses of contract.
Statutory Interpretation ’Ouster clause ’--Construction of .
Words and Phrases ’Ex dolo malo non orit ur
actio’--’expressio unus est exclusio alterius’--meaning of .
HEADNOTE
The first appellant is a manufacturer and supplier of
metallic yarn under the name and style "Raplon Mettal ic
Yarn" having its registered office at Udyognagar, Mohamad a-
bad, Gujarat within the jurisdiction of the civil court at
Kaira. The second appellant is the sister concern of t he
first appellant.
The Respondent is a registered partnership firm doi ng
business in metallic yarn and other allied products at
Salem. The first appellant entered into an agreement wi th
the Respondent on 2.10.74 whereunder the appellants were to
supply 5000 bobbins of Ruplon Metallic Yarn to the Respon d-
ent at the rate of Rs.35 per bobbin as stipulated in t he
terms of the agreement. Under clause (11) of the agreeme nt
it was provided that any dispute arising out of this sa le
shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction. Dispute havi ng
arisen out of this contract, the Respondent filed a su it
against the appellants in the court of Subordinate Judge at
Salem for the recovery of Rs.1,63,240 being the balance of
the advance in the hands of the appellants and also for a
sum of Rs.2,40,000 towards damages. The appellants int er
alia took preliminary objection that the Subordinate Jud ge
at Salem had no jurisdiction to entertain the Suit as t he
parties by express contract had agreed to confer exclusi ve
jurisdiction in regard to ali disputes arising out of t he
contract on the civil court at Kaira. The trial court uphe ld
the prelimi-
2
nary objection and found that it had, in view of clause (1 1)
of the contract, no jurisdiction to entertain the’ suit. It
accordingly returned the plaint for presentation before t he
proper court.
The Respondent appealed to the High Court against t he
order of the .Subordinate Judge. The High Court allowed t he
appeal, set aside the Judgment of the trial court, with a
direction to take the plaint on file and dispose of the su it
on merits and on other issues.
Hence this appeal by the appellants. Dismissing t he
appeal, this Court,
HELD: That an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdi c-
tion of the court will be unlawful and void being again st
the public policy, Ex-dolo malo non oritur actio. [6G]
The jurisdiction of the court in the matter of a co n-
tract will depend on the situs of the contract, and t he
cause of action arising through connecting factors. [7B-C]
So long as the parties to a contract do not oust t he
jurisdiction of all the courts which would otherwise ha ve
jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law, it
cannot be said that the parties have by their contra ct
ousted the jurisdiction ofthe court. [8G]
Where the parties to a contract agreed to submit t he
disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction whi ch
would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the la w,
their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to
other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as again st
public policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction th ey
agree to submit to would not otherwise be proper, jurisdi c-
tion to decide disputes arising out of the contract it mu st
be declared void being against public policy. [8H; 9A-B]
Where there may be two or more competent courts whi ch
can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of
action having arisen there-within if the parties to t he
contract agreed to vest jurisdiction on one such court to
try the dispute which might arise as between themselves t he
agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clea r,
unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by
sections 23 & 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be unde r-
stood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercanti le
Law and Practice permit such agreements. [11B-C]
3
Where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to
see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other court s.
When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accept ed
notions of contract would bind the parties and unless t he
absence of ad idem can be shown the other courts shou ld
avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of
the ouster clause, when words like ’alone’, ’only’ ’excl u-
sive’, and the like have been used, there may be no diff i-
culty. Even without such words in appropriate cases t he
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius’-expression of
one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an
appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In
such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of
another. Where certain jurisdiction is specified in t he
contract, an intention to exclude all others from its oper a-
tion may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be
properly construed. [12E-G]
" S. Manuel Raj & Co. v .J. Muni Lal & Co., AIR 19 63
Gujarat 148; Sri Rajendra Mills v. Hal Hassan, AIR 1970 Ca l.
342; Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3 S CR
314; Nanak Chand v. T.T. Elect. Supply Co., AIR 1975 M ad
103; Naziruddin v. V.A. Annamalai & Ors., [1978] 2, MLJ 25 4;
Snehal Kumar Sarabhai v. E.T. Orgn., AIR 1975 Gujarat 72 a nd
Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird & Co., AIR 1979 Mad. 1 6,
referred to.
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.: Civil Appeal No. 2682 of
1982
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.11.1980 of t he
Madras High Court in C.M.A. No. 218 of 1978
Pinaki Mishra, Shishir Sharma and P.H. Parekh for the Appe l-
lants.
S.S. Javeli, B.R. Agarwala and R.B. Hathikhanavala f or
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.N. SAIKIA, J. This is an appeal by special leave fr om
the judgment and order of the High Court at Madras dated 4 th
November, 1980 in C.M.A. No. 218 of 1978 allowing the appe al
and setting aside the judgment of the Subordinate Judge at
Salem in original suit No 302 of 1975 on the prelimina ry
question of jurisdiction.
4
The first appellant is a manufacturer and supplier of
metallic yarn under the name and style ’Rupalon Metall ic
Yarn’ having its registered office at Udyognagar, Mohamad a-
bad, Gujarat within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of
Kaira. The second appellant is a sister concern of the fir st
appellant doing business with it. The respondent is a regi s-
tered partnership firm doing business in metallic yarn a nd
other allied products at Salem.
The first petitioner entered into an agreement with t he
respondent on 2.10.1974 whereunder the appellants were to
supply 5000 bobbins of Rupalon Metallic Yarn to the respon d-
ent at the rate of Rs.35 per bobbin as stipulated in diffe r-
ent clauses of the agreement. Clause 11 of the agreeme nt
provided as follows:
"Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to
Kaira jurisdiction."
Disputes having arisen out of the contract the responde nt
filed a suit, being original suit No. 302 of 1975, again st
the appellants in the Court of Subordinate Judge at Sal em
for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,63,240 claiming to be t he
balance of the advance remaining in the hands of the appe l-
lants and also a sum of Rs.2.40,000 towards damages. T he
appellants took a number of defences and also took a preli m-
inary objection that the Subordinate Judge at Salem had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit as parties by expre ss
contract had agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction in
regard to all disputes arising out of the contract on t he
civil Court at Kaira.
The Trial Court, inter alia, framed issue No. 2 as follows :
"Issue No. 2. Has the court no jurisdiction to entertain or
try this suit?"
The learned Court treating it as a preliminary issue in i ts
judgment dated 18.4.1978 found that it had no jurisdicti on
to entertain the suit in view of Clause 11 and according ly
it returned the Plaint for presentation in the proper cour t.
The respondent appealed therefrom, in C.M.A. No. 218 of
1978, to the High Court of Madras which by the impugn ed
Judgment and Order dated 4.11.1980 allowed the appea l,
setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court with a dire c-
tion to take the plaint on file and dispose of the suit on
merits on other issues. Hence this appeal.
5
Mr. Pinaki Misra, the learned counsel for the appe l-
lants, submits that Clause 11 of the agreement having pr o-
vided that any dispute arising out of this sale shall be
subject to Kaira jurisdiction, the parties are bound by it
and the suit could therefore have been filed only with in
Kaira jurisdiction and not at Salem, and as such, the Hi gh
Court committed error of law in setting aside the Tri al
Court judgment and in directing the Court as Salem to ente r-
tain the suit. Mr. S.S. Javali, the learned counsel for t he
respondent, submits that what is being called Clause 11 of
the agreement was only one of the general terms and cond i-
tions of the sale and not a clause in the agreement, a nd
that even if it was construed as a clause in the agreeme nt
itself it was not exclusive so as to take away all jurisdi c-
tions except that of Kaira.
The first question to be decided, therefore, is wheth er
Clause 11 as aforesaid formed part of.the agreement. M r.
Javali submits that Ext. B-1 is an order of confirmation N o.
68/59 dated 2.10.1974 from the Sales Executive for the fir st
appellant to the respondent acknowledging the receipt of
their order and registering the same subject to the ter ms
and conditions ’overleaf’. The general terms and conditio ns
printed overleaf included the aforesaid Clause 11. We a re
unable to agree. Admittedly the parties have transacted t he
business on inter alia basis of Clause 11. There is, ther e-
fore, no escape from the conclusion that Clause 11 form ed
part of the agreement and the parties would be bound by it
so long as they would be bound by the contract itself. It is
not open to the respondent to deny existence of Clause 1 1.
The submission of Mr. Javali has, therefore, to be rejecte d.
The next question is whether Clause 11 is valid, and if
so, What would be its effect? As Clause 11 formed part of
the agreement it would be valid only if the parties cou ld
have validly agreed to it. It is common knowledge that t he
law of contract only prescribes certain limiting principl es
within which parties are free to make their own contract s.
An agreement enforceable at law is a contract. An agreeme nt
which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the Court abs o-
lutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. Each of
the citizens has the right to have his legal position dete r-
mined by the ordinary Tribunal except, of course, in a
contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is
valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a
contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which disputes in
respect of the contract shah be subject. "It has long be en
established", say Cheshire and Fifoot, "that a contra ct
which purports to destroy the right of one or both of t he
parties to submit questions of law to the courts is contra ry
to public policy and is void pro tanto". However, arbitr a-
tion is a
6
statutory mode of settlement; and as a matter of commerci al
law and practice parties to a contract may agree as to t he
jurisdiction to which all or any disputes on or arising o ut
of the contract shall be subject.
Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provid es
that every agreement by which any party thereto is restric t-
ed absolutely from enforcing his fights under or in respe ct
of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in t he
ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he
may thus enforce his fights, is void to that extent. This is
subject to exceptions, namely, (1) contract to refer to
arbitration and to abide by its award, (2) as a matter of
commercial law and practice to submit disputes on or in
respect of the contract to agreed proper jurisdiction a nd
not other jurisdictions though proper. The . principle of
Private International Law that the parties should be bou nd
by the jurisdiction clause to which they have agreed unle ss
there is some reason to contrary is being applied to munic i-
pal contracts. In Lee v. Showmen’s Guild, [1952] 1 All E. R.
1175 at 1181 Lord Denning said:
"Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts fr om
their jurisdiction. They can, of course, agree to lea ve
questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to t he
decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, ma ke
the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, b ut
they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of la w.
They cannot prevent its decisions being examined by t he
courts. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take t he
law out of the hands of the courts and put it into the han ds
of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to t he
courts in cases of error of law, then the agreement is to
that extent contrary to public policy and void."
Under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act the consi d-
eration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is
opposed to public policy. Every agreement of which t he
object or consideration is unlawful is void. Hence there c an
be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the juri s-
diction of the Court will be unlawful and void being again st
the public policy. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. If ther e-
fore it is found in this case that Clause 11 has absolute ly
ousted the jurisdiction of the Court it would be again st
public policy. However, such will be the result only if it
can be shown that the jurisdiction to which the parties ha ve
agreed to submit had nothing to do with the contract. If on
the other hand it is found that the jurisdiction agre ed
would also be
7
a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract it cou ld
not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the Cour t.
This leads to the question in the facts of this case as to
whether Kaira would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of
this contract. It would also be relevant to examine if so me
other courts than that of Kaira would also have had juri s-
diction in the absence of Clause 11 and whether that wou ld
amount to ouster of jurisdiction of those courts and wou ld
thereby affect the validity of the clause.
The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contra ct
will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of
action arising through connecting factors.
A cause of action means every fact, which, if traverse d,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
support his right to a judgment of the Court. In oth er
words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the l aw
applicable to them gives the plaintiff a fight to reli ef
against the defendant. It must include some act done by t he
defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of
action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actu al
infringement of the fight sued on but includes all t he
material facts on which it is founded. It does not compri se
evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fa ct
necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obta in
a decree. Everything which if not proved would give t he
defendant a fight to immediate judgment must be part of t he
cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to t he
defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it
depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by t he
plaintiff.
Under section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedu re
subject to the limitation stated therebefore, every su it
shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in pa rt
arises. It may be remembered that earlier section 7 of Act 7
of 1888 added Explanation III as under:
"Explanation III--In suits arising out of contract the cau se
of action arises within the meaning of this section at a ny
of the following places, namely:
(1) the place where the contract was made;
(2) the place where the contract was to be perform ed
or performance thereof completed;
8
(3) the place where in performance of the contract a ny
money to which the suit relates was expressly or implied ly
payable."
The above Explanation III has not been omitted b ut
nevertheless it may serve a guide. There must be a connec t-
ing factor.
In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of
action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of
contract the cause of action consists of the making of t he
contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be fil ed
either at the place where the contract was made or at t he
place where it should have been performed and the brea ch
occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of
action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at t he
place where it was made. The determination of the pla ce
where the contract was made is part of the Law of Contrac t.
But making of an offer on a particular place does not fo rm
cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of co n-
tract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimati on
result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a
court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was commun i-
cated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of
action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be
filed at the place where the contract should have perform ed
or its performance completed. If the contract is to be
performed at the place where it is made, the suit on t he
contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits f or
agency actions the cause of action arises at the place whe re
the contract of agency was made or the place where actio ns
are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agen t.
Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or
impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiati on
of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is
the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is plead ed
as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to t he
Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to
be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears T he
above are some of the connecting factors.
So long as the parties to a contract do not oust t he
jurisdiction of all the Courts which would otherwise ha ve
jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law it
cannot be said that the parties have by their contra ct
ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts. If under the l aw
several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties ha ve
agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to
other or others of them it cannot be said that there is
total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where t he
parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes
9
arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which wou ld
otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law the ir
agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to oth er
jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against publ ic
policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction they agreed to
submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to
decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be
declared void being against public policy. Would this be t he
position in the instant case?
In S. Manuel Raj & Co. v. J. Manilal & Co., AIR 19 63
Guj. 148 where one of the parties to the contract signed an
order form printed by the other party containing the wor ds
"subject to Madras jurisdiction" and sent the order form to
the other party it was held that the party must be assum ed
to have agreed that Madras was the place for settlement of
the dispute and it was not open to that person who sign ed
the order form of the opposite party containing the print ed
words to show that printed words were not part of the co n-
tract and that those words in the contract was to exclu de
the jurisdiction of other Courts and to keep sole jurisdi c-
tion to one Court. It was observed that the object of prin t-
ing such words as "subject to Madras jurisdiction" in t he
contract was to exclude the jurisdiction of other Courts a nd
to give sole jurisdiction to one Court and it was in cons o-
nance with the commercial practice in India. Similarly in
Sri Rajendra Mills v. Haji Hassan, A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 3 42
where there was a contract between the plaintiff and defen d-
ant No. 1 under which the parties agreed that all sui ts
arising on or out of the contract, would be instituted in
the Court at Salem, the Division Bench held that it was tr ue
that the suit could have been instituted either at Salem or
at Howrah under section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Proc e-
dure, as the cause of action, admittedly arose in part in
both the places and it was therefore a case where two Cour ts
had concurrent jurisdiction and, in such a case, it was op en
to the parties to make a choise restricting the Court in
which the suit under or upon the contract could be institu t-
ed. In other words, both the Courts having territori al
jurisdiction, the parties by their agreement waived the ir
right, to institute any action, as aforesaid except at
Salem. It was observed that under those circumstances it w as
not open to the plaintiff to object to the order for retu rn
of the plaint for presentation to the Court at Salem as t he
choice of forum in case of alternative forums lies with t he
plaintiff and the plaintiff having debarred or preclud ed
itself from going to any other Court except at Salem whi ch
would be a proper Court as against the defendants it wou ld
not be just to allow the plaintiff at the instance of a ny
other party or under cover of its objection to institute t he
suit except in-the Court at Salem.
10
In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3
S.C.R. 3 14 where the appellant agreed to do certain co n-
struction work for the respondent who had its princip al
place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a
written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arb i-
tration in case of dispute. Clause 13 provided that notwit h-
standing the place where the work under the contract was to
be executed the contract shall be deemed to have been e n-
tered into by the parties at Bombay, and the Court in Bomb ay
alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. On dispu te
arising between the parties the appellant submitted a pet i-
tion to the Court at Varanasi for an order under section 20
of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the agreement be filed a nd
an order of reference be made to an arbitrator or arbitr a-
tors appointed by the Court. The respondent contended th at
in view of the Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement on ly
the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction. The Trial Court al so
held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varana si
and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdicti on
on the Courts at Bombay which they did not otherwise po s-
sess. The High Court in re vision held that the Courts at
Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law and hen ce
could entertain the petition and that in view of Clause 13
of the arbitration agreement the petition could not be
entertained at Varanasi and directed the petition to be
returned for presentation to the proper Court. On appe al
therefrom one of the questions that fell for considerati on
of this Court was whether the Courts at Bombay alone h ad
jurisdiction over the dispute.It was held that the Code of
Civil Procedure in its entirety applied to proceedings und er
the Arbitration Act by virtue of section 41 of that Act. T he
jurisdiction of the Court under the Arbitration Act to
entertain a proceeding for filing an award was according ly
governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedur e.
By the terms of section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedu re
read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent compa ny
which had its principal place of business at Bombay w as
liable to be sued at Bombay. 1t was held that it was n ot
open to the parties to agreement to confer by their agre e-
ment jurisdiction on a Court which did not possess under t he
Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of
Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try the suit or proceedi ng
an agreement between the parties that the dispute betwe en
them shall be tried in one of such Courts was not contra ry
to public policy and such an agreement did not contrave ne
section 28 of the Contract Act. Though this case arose o ut
of an arbitration agreement there is no reason why the sa me
rule should not apply to other agreements in so far as
jurisdiction is concerned. Without referring to this dec i-
sion a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nan ak
Chand v. T.T. Elect Supply Co., A.I.R. 1975 Madras
11
103 observed that competency of a Court to try an acti on
goes to the root of the matter and when such competency is
not found, it has no jurisdiction at all to try the cas e.
But objection based on jurisdiction is a matter which pa r-
ties could waive and it is in this sense if such jurisdi c-
tion is exercised by Courts it does not go to the core of it
so as to make the resultant judgment a nullity. Thus it is
now a settled principle that where there may be two or mo re
competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent up on
a part of the cause of action having arisen therewithin, if
the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in
one such court to try the dispute which might arise as
between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such a
contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it
is not hit by sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. Th is
can not be understood as parties contracting against t he
Statute. Mercantile Law and Practice permit such agreement s.
In Nazirrudin v. V.A. Annamalai & Ors., [1978] 2 M.L. J.
254 where the question was whether Rule 35 of U.P. Sta te
Lottery Rules, 1969 confined the jurisdiction only to Lu c-
know. The Rule said: "35. Legal jurisdiction in all matte rs
concerning the State lottery shall be Lucknow." The so le
question for consideration therefore was whether the abo ve
Rule had the effect of vesting exclusive jurisdiction on ly
in the Courts in Lucknow and thereby taking away the juri s-
diction which the subordinate judge court at Veilore cou ld
have if it was established that the lottery ticket w as
stolen within the jurisdiction of that Court from the fir st
respondent. Held, it was well established that the jurisdi c-
tion of a Civil Court can be taken away only by an expre ss
provision or by necessary implication and ousting of a
jurisdiction of Civil Court should not and ought not be
inferred from an ambiguous provision. In that particul ar
case it was common case of the parties that Rule 35 did n ot
expressly take away the jurisdiction of any other Court, a nd
vest the exclusive jurisdiction only in the Courts at Lu c-
know. A note of caution was sounded by M.P. Thakkar, J. as
he then was, in Snehal Kumar Sarabhai v. E.T. Orgn., A.I. R.
1975 Guj. 72 observing that the ouster clause could opera te
as estoppel against the parties to the contract, but it
could not tie the hands of the Court and denude it of t he
powers to do justice. Ordinarily, it was observed: t he
Courts would respect the agreement between the parties whi ch
was borne out of the meeting of their minds out of conside r-
ation of convenience, but the Courts were not obliged to do
so in every case; and that a new approach to the questi on
deserved to be made where the ouster clause was "calculat ed
to operate as an engine of oppression and as a means to
defeat the ends of justice." In such a case the free conse nt
may be
12
wanting and injustice may be avoided.
When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdi c-
tion pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to co n-
strue the ousting expression or clause properly. Often t he
stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to ha ve
been made at a particular place. This would provide t he
connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of th at
place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of th at
contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away juri s-
diction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industri es
v. Bird & Co., A.I.R. 1979 Madras 16 where the terms a nd
conditions attached to the quotation contained an arbitr a-
tion clause provided that: "any order placed against this
quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcut ta
and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an
Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us", it was held th at
it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it
did not mean to confer an exclusive jurisdiction on t he
Court at Calcutta, and when a part of the cause of acti on
had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdicti on
to entertain the suit under section 20(c) of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably d e-
duced that where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pert i-
nent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of oth er
Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specif ic
accepted notions of contract would bind the parties a nd
unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Cour ts
should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards constru c-
tion of the ouster clause when words like ’alone’, ’only ’,
’exclusive’ and the like have been used there may be no
difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cass es
the maxim ’expressio unius est exclusio alterius’--expre s-
sion of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. Wh at
is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of t he
case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply excl u-
sion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a
contract an intention to exclude all others from its oper a-
tion may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be
properly construed.
Coming to clause 11 we already found that this clau se
was included in the general terms and conditions of sale a nd
the order or confirmation No. 68/59 dated 2.10.1974 with t he
general terms and conditions was sent from Udyognaga r,
Mohmadabad, Gujarat to the respondent’s address at 12 Sur a-
mangalam Road Salem, Tamilnadu. The statement made in t he
Special Leave Petition that Udyognagar, Mohamadabad, Gujar at
is within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of
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Kaira has not been controverted. We have already seen th at
making of the contract was a part of the cause of action a nd
a suit on a contract therefore could be filed at the pla ce
where it was made. Thus Kaira court would even otherwi se
have had jurisdiction. The bobbins of metallic yarn we re
delivered at the address of the respondent at Salem whic h,
therefore, would provide the connecting factor for Court at
Salem to have jurisdiction. If out of the two jurisdictio ns
one was excluded by Clause 11 it would not absolutely ou st
the jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, would not be
void against public policy and would not violate sections 23
and 28 of the Contract Act. The question then is whether it
can be construed to have excluded the jurisdiction of t he
Court at Salem. In the clause ’any dispute arising out of
this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction’ ex fac ie
we do not find exclusive words like ’exclusive’, ’alone ’,
’only’ and the like. Can the maxim ’expressio unius e st
exclusio alterius’ be applied under the facts and circu m-
stances of the case? The order of confirmation is of no
assistance. The other general terms and conditions are al so
not indicative of exclusion of other jurisdictions. Und er
the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that whi le
connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction was ensured by
fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other juri s-
dictions having connecting factors were not clearly, una m-
biguously and explicitly excluded. That being the positi on
it could not be said that the jurisdiction of the Court at
Salem which Court otherwise had jurisdiction under l aw
through connecting factor of delivery of goods there at w as
expressly excluded. We accordingly find no error or infirm i-
ty in the impugned judgment of the High Court.
In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. W e,
however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Y.L. Appeal dismissed.
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